Linux kernel mirror (for testing)
git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel
os
linux
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2/* Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method [RFC2631]
3 *
4 * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
5 * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>
6 */
7
8#include <linux/fips.h>
9#include <linux/module.h>
10#include <crypto/internal/kpp.h>
11#include <crypto/kpp.h>
12#include <crypto/dh.h>
13#include <crypto/rng.h>
14#include <linux/mpi.h>
15
16struct dh_ctx {
17 MPI p; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
18 MPI g; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
19 MPI xa; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
20};
21
22static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
23{
24 mpi_free(ctx->p);
25 mpi_free(ctx->g);
26 mpi_free(ctx->xa);
27 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
28}
29
30/*
31 * If base is g we compute the public key
32 * ya = g^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
33 * else if base if the counterpart public key we compute the shared secret
34 * ZZ = yb^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
35 */
36static int _compute_val(const struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI base, MPI val)
37{
38 /* val = base^xa mod p */
39 return mpi_powm(val, base, ctx->xa, ctx->p);
40}
41
42static inline struct dh_ctx *dh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
43{
44 return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
45}
46
47static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len)
48{
49 if (fips_enabled)
50 return (p_len < 2048) ? -EINVAL : 0;
51
52 return (p_len < 1536) ? -EINVAL : 0;
53}
54
55static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params)
56{
57 if (dh_check_params_length(params->p_size << 3))
58 return -EINVAL;
59
60 ctx->p = mpi_read_raw_data(params->p, params->p_size);
61 if (!ctx->p)
62 return -EINVAL;
63
64 ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size);
65 if (!ctx->g)
66 return -EINVAL;
67
68 return 0;
69}
70
71static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
72 unsigned int len)
73{
74 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
75 struct dh params;
76
77 /* Free the old MPI key if any */
78 dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
79
80 if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0)
81 goto err_clear_ctx;
82
83 if (dh_set_params(ctx, ¶ms) < 0)
84 goto err_clear_ctx;
85
86 ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size);
87 if (!ctx->xa)
88 goto err_clear_ctx;
89
90 return 0;
91
92err_clear_ctx:
93 dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
94 return -EINVAL;
95}
96
97/*
98 * SP800-56A public key verification:
99 *
100 * * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed
101 * trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A
102 * section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed.
103 *
104 * * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation
105 * according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed.
106 */
107static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y)
108{
109 MPI val, q;
110 int ret;
111
112 if (!fips_enabled)
113 return 0;
114
115 if (unlikely(!ctx->p))
116 return -EINVAL;
117
118 /*
119 * Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2.
120 *
121 * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1
122 * in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that
123 * p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and
124 * thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1.
125 */
126 if (mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(y, ctx->p) >= 0)
127 return -EINVAL;
128
129 /*
130 * Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p
131 *
132 * For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2.
133 */
134 val = mpi_alloc(0);
135 if (!val)
136 return -ENOMEM;
137
138 q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p));
139 if (!q) {
140 mpi_free(val);
141 return -ENOMEM;
142 }
143
144 /*
145 * ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one
146 * from it before shifting to the right.
147 */
148 ret = mpi_rshift(q, ctx->p, 1) ?:
149 mpi_powm(val, y, q, ctx->p);
150
151 mpi_free(q);
152 if (ret) {
153 mpi_free(val);
154 return ret;
155 }
156
157 ret = mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1);
158
159 mpi_free(val);
160
161 if (ret != 0)
162 return -EINVAL;
163
164 return 0;
165}
166
167static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
168{
169 struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req);
170 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
171 MPI base, val = mpi_alloc(0);
172 int ret = 0;
173 int sign;
174
175 if (!val)
176 return -ENOMEM;
177
178 if (unlikely(!ctx->xa)) {
179 ret = -EINVAL;
180 goto err_free_val;
181 }
182
183 if (req->src) {
184 base = mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(req->src, req->src_len);
185 if (!base) {
186 ret = -EINVAL;
187 goto err_free_val;
188 }
189 ret = dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, base);
190 if (ret)
191 goto err_free_base;
192 } else {
193 base = ctx->g;
194 }
195
196 ret = _compute_val(ctx, base, val);
197 if (ret)
198 goto err_free_base;
199
200 if (fips_enabled) {
201 /* SP800-56A rev3 5.7.1.1 check: Validation of shared secret */
202 if (req->src) {
203 MPI pone;
204
205 /* z <= 1 */
206 if (mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1) < 1) {
207 ret = -EBADMSG;
208 goto err_free_base;
209 }
210
211 /* z == p - 1 */
212 pone = mpi_alloc(0);
213
214 if (!pone) {
215 ret = -ENOMEM;
216 goto err_free_base;
217 }
218
219 ret = mpi_sub_ui(pone, ctx->p, 1);
220 if (!ret && !mpi_cmp(pone, val))
221 ret = -EBADMSG;
222
223 mpi_free(pone);
224
225 if (ret)
226 goto err_free_base;
227
228 /* SP800-56A rev 3 5.6.2.1.3 key check */
229 } else {
230 if (dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, val)) {
231 ret = -EAGAIN;
232 goto err_free_val;
233 }
234 }
235 }
236
237 ret = mpi_write_to_sgl(val, req->dst, req->dst_len, &sign);
238 if (ret)
239 goto err_free_base;
240
241 if (sign < 0)
242 ret = -EBADMSG;
243err_free_base:
244 if (req->src)
245 mpi_free(base);
246err_free_val:
247 mpi_free(val);
248 return ret;
249}
250
251static unsigned int dh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
252{
253 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
254
255 return mpi_get_size(ctx->p);
256}
257
258static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
259{
260 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
261
262 dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
263}
264
265static struct kpp_alg dh = {
266 .set_secret = dh_set_secret,
267 .generate_public_key = dh_compute_value,
268 .compute_shared_secret = dh_compute_value,
269 .max_size = dh_max_size,
270 .exit = dh_exit_tfm,
271 .base = {
272 .cra_name = "dh",
273 .cra_driver_name = "dh-generic",
274 .cra_priority = 100,
275 .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
276 .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_ctx),
277 },
278};
279
280
281struct dh_safe_prime {
282 unsigned int max_strength;
283 unsigned int p_size;
284 const char *p;
285};
286
287static const char safe_prime_g[] = { 2 };
288
289struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx {
290 struct crypto_kpp_spawn dh_spawn;
291 const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime;
292};
293
294struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx {
295 struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm;
296};
297
298static void dh_safe_prime_free_instance(struct kpp_instance *inst)
299{
300 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
301
302 crypto_drop_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn);
303 kfree(inst);
304}
305
306static inline struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(
307 struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
308{
309 return kpp_instance_ctx(kpp_alg_instance(tfm));
310}
311
312static int dh_safe_prime_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
313{
314 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
315 dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
316 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
317
318 tfm_ctx->dh_tfm = crypto_spawn_kpp(&inst_ctx->dh_spawn);
319 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm))
320 return PTR_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
321
322 kpp_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct kpp_request) +
323 crypto_kpp_reqsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm));
324
325 return 0;
326}
327
328static void dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
329{
330 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
331
332 crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
333}
334
335static u64 __add_u64_to_be(__be64 *dst, unsigned int n, u64 val)
336{
337 unsigned int i;
338
339 for (i = n; val && i > 0; --i) {
340 u64 tmp = be64_to_cpu(dst[i - 1]);
341
342 tmp += val;
343 val = tmp >= val ? 0 : 1;
344 dst[i - 1] = cpu_to_be64(tmp);
345 }
346
347 return val;
348}
349
350static void *dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime,
351 unsigned int *key_size)
352{
353 unsigned int n, oversampling_size;
354 __be64 *key;
355 int err;
356 u64 h, o;
357
358 /*
359 * Generate a private key following NIST SP800-56Ar3,
360 * sec. 5.6.1.1.1 and 5.6.1.1.3 resp..
361 *
362 * 5.6.1.1.1: choose key length N such that
363 * 2 * ->max_strength <= N <= log2(q) + 1 = ->p_size * 8 - 1
364 * with q = (p - 1) / 2 for the safe-prime groups.
365 * Choose the lower bound's next power of two for N in order to
366 * avoid excessively large private keys while still
367 * maintaining some extra reserve beyond the bare minimum in
368 * most cases. Note that for each entry in safe_prime_groups[],
369 * the following holds for such N:
370 * - N >= 256, in particular it is a multiple of 2^6 = 64
371 * bits and
372 * - N < log2(q) + 1, i.e. N respects the upper bound.
373 */
374 n = roundup_pow_of_two(2 * safe_prime->max_strength);
375 WARN_ON_ONCE(n & ((1u << 6) - 1));
376 n >>= 6; /* Convert N into units of u64. */
377
378 /*
379 * Reserve one extra u64 to hold the extra random bits
380 * required as per 5.6.1.1.3.
381 */
382 oversampling_size = (n + 1) * sizeof(__be64);
383 key = kmalloc(oversampling_size, GFP_KERNEL);
384 if (!key)
385 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
386
387 /*
388 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 3 (and implicitly step 4): obtain N + 64
389 * random bits and interpret them as a big endian integer.
390 */
391 err = crypto_stdrng_get_bytes(key, oversampling_size);
392 if (err)
393 goto out_err;
394
395 /*
396 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 5 is implicit: 2^N < q and thus,
397 * M = min(2^N, q) = 2^N.
398 *
399 * For step 6, calculate
400 * key = (key[] mod (M - 1)) + 1 = (key[] mod (2^N - 1)) + 1.
401 *
402 * In order to avoid expensive divisions, note that
403 * 2^N mod (2^N - 1) = 1 and thus, for any integer h,
404 * 2^N * h mod (2^N - 1) = h mod (2^N - 1) always holds.
405 * The big endian integer key[] composed of n + 1 64bit words
406 * may be written as key[] = h * 2^N + l, with h = key[0]
407 * representing the 64 most significant bits and l
408 * corresponding to the remaining 2^N bits. With the remark
409 * from above,
410 * h * 2^N + l mod (2^N - 1) = l + h mod (2^N - 1).
411 * As both, l and h are less than 2^N, their sum after
412 * this first reduction is guaranteed to be <= 2^(N + 1) - 2.
413 * Or equivalently, that their sum can again be written as
414 * h' * 2^N + l' with h' now either zero or one and if one,
415 * then l' <= 2^N - 2. Thus, all bits at positions >= N will
416 * be zero after a second reduction:
417 * h' * 2^N + l' mod (2^N - 1) = l' + h' mod (2^N - 1).
418 * At this point, it is still possible that
419 * l' + h' = 2^N - 1, i.e. that l' + h' mod (2^N - 1)
420 * is zero. This condition will be detected below by means of
421 * the final increment overflowing in this case.
422 */
423 h = be64_to_cpu(key[0]);
424 h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
425 h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
426 WARN_ON_ONCE(h);
427
428 /* Increment to obtain the final result. */
429 o = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, 1);
430 /*
431 * The overflow bit o from the increment is either zero or
432 * one. If zero, key[1:n] holds the final result in big-endian
433 * order. If one, key[1:n] is zero now, but needs to be set to
434 * one, c.f. above.
435 */
436 if (o)
437 key[n] = cpu_to_be64(1);
438
439 /* n is in units of u64, convert to bytes. */
440 *key_size = n << 3;
441 /* Strip the leading extra __be64, which is (virtually) zero by now. */
442 memmove(key, &key[1], *key_size);
443
444 return key;
445
446out_err:
447 kfree_sensitive(key);
448 return ERR_PTR(err);
449}
450
451static int dh_safe_prime_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buffer,
452 unsigned int len)
453{
454 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
455 dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
456 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
457 struct dh params = {};
458 void *buf = NULL, *key = NULL;
459 unsigned int buf_size;
460 int err;
461
462 if (buffer) {
463 err = __crypto_dh_decode_key(buffer, len, ¶ms);
464 if (err)
465 return err;
466 if (params.p_size || params.g_size)
467 return -EINVAL;
468 }
469
470 params.p = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p;
471 params.p_size = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p_size;
472 params.g = safe_prime_g;
473 params.g_size = sizeof(safe_prime_g);
474
475 if (!params.key_size) {
476 key = dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(inst_ctx->safe_prime,
477 ¶ms.key_size);
478 if (IS_ERR(key))
479 return PTR_ERR(key);
480 params.key = key;
481 }
482
483 buf_size = crypto_dh_key_len(¶ms);
484 buf = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
485 if (!buf) {
486 err = -ENOMEM;
487 goto out;
488 }
489
490 err = crypto_dh_encode_key(buf, buf_size, ¶ms);
491 if (err)
492 goto out;
493
494 err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm, buf, buf_size);
495out:
496 kfree_sensitive(buf);
497 kfree_sensitive(key);
498 return err;
499}
500
501static void dh_safe_prime_complete_req(void *data, int err)
502{
503 struct kpp_request *req = data;
504
505 kpp_request_complete(req, err);
506}
507
508static struct kpp_request *dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(struct kpp_request *req)
509{
510 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx =
511 kpp_tfm_ctx(crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req));
512 struct kpp_request *dh_req = kpp_request_ctx(req);
513
514 kpp_request_set_tfm(dh_req, tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
515 kpp_request_set_callback(dh_req, req->base.flags,
516 dh_safe_prime_complete_req, req);
517
518 kpp_request_set_input(dh_req, req->src, req->src_len);
519 kpp_request_set_output(dh_req, req->dst, req->dst_len);
520
521 return dh_req;
522}
523
524static int dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req)
525{
526 struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
527
528 return crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(dh_req);
529}
530
531static int dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req)
532{
533 struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
534
535 return crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(dh_req);
536}
537
538static unsigned int dh_safe_prime_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
539{
540 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
541
542 return crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
543}
544
545static int __maybe_unused __dh_safe_prime_create(
546 struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb,
547 const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime)
548{
549 struct kpp_instance *inst;
550 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx;
551 const char *dh_name;
552 struct kpp_alg *dh_alg;
553 u32 mask;
554 int err;
555
556 err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, &mask);
557 if (err)
558 return err;
559
560 dh_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
561 if (IS_ERR(dh_name))
562 return PTR_ERR(dh_name);
563
564 inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
565 if (!inst)
566 return -ENOMEM;
567
568 ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
569
570 err = crypto_grab_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn, kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
571 dh_name, 0, mask);
572 if (err)
573 goto err_free_inst;
574
575 err = -EINVAL;
576 dh_alg = crypto_spawn_kpp_alg(&ctx->dh_spawn);
577 if (strcmp(dh_alg->base.cra_name, "dh"))
578 goto err_free_inst;
579
580 ctx->safe_prime = safe_prime;
581
582 err = crypto_inst_setname(kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
583 tmpl->name, &dh_alg->base);
584 if (err)
585 goto err_free_inst;
586
587 inst->alg.set_secret = dh_safe_prime_set_secret;
588 inst->alg.generate_public_key = dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key;
589 inst->alg.compute_shared_secret = dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret;
590 inst->alg.max_size = dh_safe_prime_max_size;
591 inst->alg.init = dh_safe_prime_init_tfm;
592 inst->alg.exit = dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm;
593 inst->alg.base.cra_priority = dh_alg->base.cra_priority;
594 inst->alg.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
595 inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx);
596
597 inst->free = dh_safe_prime_free_instance;
598
599 err = kpp_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
600 if (err)
601 goto err_free_inst;
602
603 return 0;
604
605err_free_inst:
606 dh_safe_prime_free_instance(inst);
607
608 return err;
609}
610
611#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS
612
613static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe2048_prime = {
614 .max_strength = 112,
615 .p_size = 256,
616 .p =
617 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
618 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
619 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
620 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
621 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
622 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
623 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
624 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
625 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
626 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
627 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
628 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
629 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
630 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
631 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
632 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x28\x5c\x97\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
633};
634
635static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe3072_prime = {
636 .max_strength = 128,
637 .p_size = 384,
638 .p =
639 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
640 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
641 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
642 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
643 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
644 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
645 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
646 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
647 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
648 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
649 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
650 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
651 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
652 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
653 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
654 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
655 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
656 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
657 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
658 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
659 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
660 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
661 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
662 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\xc6\x2e\x37\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
663};
664
665static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe4096_prime = {
666 .max_strength = 152,
667 .p_size = 512,
668 .p =
669 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
670 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
671 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
672 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
673 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
674 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
675 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
676 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
677 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
678 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
679 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
680 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
681 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
682 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
683 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
684 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
685 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
686 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
687 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
688 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
689 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
690 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
691 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
692 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
693 "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
694 "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
695 "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
696 "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
697 "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
698 "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
699 "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
700 "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x65\x5f\x6a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
701};
702
703static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe6144_prime = {
704 .max_strength = 176,
705 .p_size = 768,
706 .p =
707 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
708 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
709 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
710 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
711 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
712 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
713 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
714 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
715 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
716 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
717 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
718 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
719 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
720 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
721 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
722 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
723 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
724 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
725 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
726 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
727 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
728 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
729 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
730 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
731 "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
732 "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
733 "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
734 "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
735 "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
736 "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
737 "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
738 "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
739 "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
740 "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
741 "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
742 "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
743 "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
744 "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
745 "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
746 "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
747 "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
748 "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
749 "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
750 "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
751 "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
752 "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
753 "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
754 "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xd0\xe4\x0e\x65\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
755};
756
757static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe8192_prime = {
758 .max_strength = 200,
759 .p_size = 1024,
760 .p =
761 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
762 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
763 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
764 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
765 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
766 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
767 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
768 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
769 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
770 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
771 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
772 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
773 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
774 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
775 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
776 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
777 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
778 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
779 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
780 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
781 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
782 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
783 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
784 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
785 "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
786 "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
787 "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
788 "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
789 "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
790 "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
791 "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
792 "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
793 "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
794 "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
795 "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
796 "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
797 "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
798 "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
799 "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
800 "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
801 "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
802 "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
803 "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
804 "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
805 "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
806 "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
807 "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
808 "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xcf\xf4\x6a\xaa\x36\xad\x00\x4c\xf6\x00\xc8\x38"
809 "\x1e\x42\x5a\x31\xd9\x51\xae\x64\xfd\xb2\x3f\xce\xc9\x50\x9d\x43"
810 "\x68\x7f\xeb\x69\xed\xd1\xcc\x5e\x0b\x8c\xc3\xbd\xf6\x4b\x10\xef"
811 "\x86\xb6\x31\x42\xa3\xab\x88\x29\x55\x5b\x2f\x74\x7c\x93\x26\x65"
812 "\xcb\x2c\x0f\x1c\xc0\x1b\xd7\x02\x29\x38\x88\x39\xd2\xaf\x05\xe4"
813 "\x54\x50\x4a\xc7\x8b\x75\x82\x82\x28\x46\xc0\xba\x35\xc3\x5f\x5c"
814 "\x59\x16\x0c\xc0\x46\xfd\x82\x51\x54\x1f\xc6\x8c\x9c\x86\xb0\x22"
815 "\xbb\x70\x99\x87\x6a\x46\x0e\x74\x51\xa8\xa9\x31\x09\x70\x3f\xee"
816 "\x1c\x21\x7e\x6c\x38\x26\xe5\x2c\x51\xaa\x69\x1e\x0e\x42\x3c\xfc"
817 "\x99\xe9\xe3\x16\x50\xc1\x21\x7b\x62\x48\x16\xcd\xad\x9a\x95\xf9"
818 "\xd5\xb8\x01\x94\x88\xd9\xc0\xa0\xa1\xfe\x30\x75\xa5\x77\xe2\x31"
819 "\x83\xf8\x1d\x4a\x3f\x2f\xa4\x57\x1e\xfc\x8c\xe0\xba\x8a\x4f\xe8"
820 "\xb6\x85\x5d\xfe\x72\xb0\xa6\x6e\xde\xd2\xfb\xab\xfb\xe5\x8a\x30"
821 "\xfa\xfa\xbe\x1c\x5d\x71\xa8\x7e\x2f\x74\x1e\xf8\xc1\xfe\x86\xfe"
822 "\xa6\xbb\xfd\xe5\x30\x67\x7f\x0d\x97\xd1\x1d\x49\xf7\xa8\x44\x3d"
823 "\x08\x22\xe5\x06\xa9\xf4\x61\x4e\x01\x1e\x2a\x94\x83\x8f\xf8\x8c"
824 "\xd6\x8c\x8b\xb7\xc5\xc6\x42\x4c\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
825};
826
827static int dh_ffdhe2048_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
828 struct rtattr **tb)
829{
830 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe2048_prime);
831}
832
833static int dh_ffdhe3072_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
834 struct rtattr **tb)
835{
836 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe3072_prime);
837}
838
839static int dh_ffdhe4096_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
840 struct rtattr **tb)
841{
842 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe4096_prime);
843}
844
845static int dh_ffdhe6144_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
846 struct rtattr **tb)
847{
848 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe6144_prime);
849}
850
851static int dh_ffdhe8192_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
852 struct rtattr **tb)
853{
854 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe8192_prime);
855}
856
857static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {
858 {
859 .name = "ffdhe2048",
860 .create = dh_ffdhe2048_create,
861 .module = THIS_MODULE,
862 },
863 {
864 .name = "ffdhe3072",
865 .create = dh_ffdhe3072_create,
866 .module = THIS_MODULE,
867 },
868 {
869 .name = "ffdhe4096",
870 .create = dh_ffdhe4096_create,
871 .module = THIS_MODULE,
872 },
873 {
874 .name = "ffdhe6144",
875 .create = dh_ffdhe6144_create,
876 .module = THIS_MODULE,
877 },
878 {
879 .name = "ffdhe8192",
880 .create = dh_ffdhe8192_create,
881 .module = THIS_MODULE,
882 },
883};
884
885#else /* ! CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
886
887static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {};
888
889#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
890
891
892static int __init dh_init(void)
893{
894 int err;
895
896 err = crypto_register_kpp(&dh);
897 if (err)
898 return err;
899
900 err = crypto_register_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
901 ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
902 if (err) {
903 crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
904 return err;
905 }
906
907 return 0;
908}
909
910static void __exit dh_exit(void)
911{
912 crypto_unregister_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
913 ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
914 crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
915}
916
917module_init(dh_init);
918module_exit(dh_exit);
919MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("dh");
920MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
921MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DH generic algorithm");