A container registry that uses the AT Protocol for manifest storage and S3 for blob storage.
atcr.io
docker
container
atproto
go
use confidential oauth in production
+857
-622
+10
.env.appview.example
+10
.env.appview.example
···
49
49
# JWT token expiration in seconds (default: 300 = 5 minutes)
50
50
# ATCR_TOKEN_EXPIRATION=300
51
51
52
+
# Path to OAuth client P-256 signing key (auto-generated on first run)
53
+
# Used for confidential OAuth client authentication (production only)
54
+
# Localhost deployments always use public OAuth clients (no key needed)
55
+
# Default: /var/lib/atcr/oauth/client.key
56
+
# ATCR_OAUTH_KEY_PATH=/var/lib/atcr/oauth/client.key
57
+
58
+
# OAuth client display name (shown in authorization screens)
59
+
# Default: AT Container Registry
60
+
# ATCR_CLIENT_NAME=AT Container Registry
61
+
52
62
# ==============================================================================
53
63
# UI Configuration
54
64
# ==============================================================================
+30
-8
CLAUDE.md
+30
-8
CLAUDE.md
···
221
221
**Key Components** (`pkg/auth/oauth/`):
222
222
223
223
1. **Client** (`client.go`) - Core OAuth client with encapsulated configuration
224
-
- Constructor: `NewClient(baseURL)` - accepts base URL, derives client ID/redirect URI
225
-
- `NewClientWithKey(baseURL, dpopKey)` - for token refresh with stored DPoP key
226
-
- `ClientID()` - computes localhost vs production client ID dynamically
224
+
- Uses indigo's `NewLocalhostConfig()` for localhost (public client)
225
+
- Uses `NewPublicConfig()` for production base (upgraded to confidential if key provided)
227
226
- `RedirectURI()` - returns `baseURL + "/auth/oauth/callback"`
228
227
- `GetDefaultScopes()` - returns ATCR registry scopes
228
+
- `GetConfigRef()` - returns mutable config for `SetClientSecret()` calls
229
229
- All OAuth flows (authorization, token exchange, refresh) in one place
230
230
231
-
2. **Token Storage** (`store.go`) - Persists OAuth sessions for AppView
232
-
- File-based storage in `/var/lib/atcr/refresh-tokens.json` (AppView)
231
+
2. **Keys** (`keys.go`) - P-256 key management for confidential clients
232
+
- `GenerateOrLoadClientKey()` - generates or loads P-256 key from disk
233
+
- Follows hold service pattern: auto-generation, 0600 permissions, /var/lib/atcr/oauth/
234
+
- `GenerateKeyID()` - derives key ID from public key hash
235
+
- `PrivateKeyToMultibase()` - converts key for `SetClientSecret()` API
236
+
- **Key type:** P-256 (ES256) for OAuth standard compatibility (not K-256 like PDS keys)
237
+
238
+
3. **Token Storage** (`store.go`) - Persists OAuth sessions for AppView
239
+
- SQLite-backed storage in UI database (not file-based)
233
240
- Client uses `~/.atcr/oauth-token.json` (credential helper)
234
241
235
-
3. **Refresher** (`refresher.go`) - Token refresh manager for AppView
242
+
4. **Refresher** (`refresher.go`) - Token refresh manager for AppView
236
243
- Caches OAuth sessions with automatic token refresh (handled by indigo library)
237
244
- Per-DID locking prevents concurrent refresh races
238
245
- Uses Client methods for consistency
239
246
240
-
4. **Server** (`server.go`) - OAuth authorization endpoints for AppView
247
+
5. **Server** (`server.go`) - OAuth authorization endpoints for AppView
241
248
- `GET /auth/oauth/authorize` - starts OAuth flow
242
249
- `GET /auth/oauth/callback` - handles OAuth callback
243
250
- Uses Client methods for authorization and token exchange
244
251
245
-
5. **Interactive Flow** (`interactive.go`) - Reusable OAuth flow for CLI tools
252
+
6. **Interactive Flow** (`interactive.go`) - Reusable OAuth flow for CLI tools
246
253
- Used by credential helper and hold service registration
247
254
- Two-phase callback setup ensures PAR metadata availability
255
+
256
+
**Client Configuration:**
257
+
- **Localhost:** Always public client (no client authentication)
258
+
- Client ID: `http://localhost?redirect_uri=...&scope=...` (query-based)
259
+
- No P-256 key generation
260
+
- **Production:** Confidential client with P-256 private key (if key exists)
261
+
- Client ID: `{baseURL}/client-metadata.json` (metadata endpoint)
262
+
- Key path: `/var/lib/atcr/oauth/client.key` (auto-generated on first run)
263
+
- Key algorithm: ES256 (P-256, not K-256)
264
+
- Upgraded via `config.SetClientSecret(key, keyID)`
248
265
249
266
**Authentication Flow:**
250
267
```
···
280
297
- No trust in client-provided identity information
281
298
- DPoP binds tokens to specific client key
282
299
- 15-minute token expiry for registry JWTs
300
+
- **Confidential clients** (production): Client authentication via P-256 private key JWT assertion
301
+
- Prevents client impersonation attacks
302
+
- Key stored in `/var/lib/atcr/oauth/client.key` with 0600 permissions
303
+
- Automatically generated on first run
304
+
- **Public clients** (localhost): No client authentication (development only)
283
305
284
306
### Key Components
285
307
+22
-4
cmd/appview/serve.go
+22
-4
cmd/appview/serve.go
···
119
119
slog.Info("TEST_MODE enabled - will use HTTP for local DID resolution and transition:generic scope")
120
120
}
121
121
122
-
// Create OAuth app (indigo client)
123
-
oauthApp, err := oauth.NewApp(baseURL, oauthStore, defaultHoldDID, testMode)
122
+
// Create OAuth app (automatically configures confidential client for production)
123
+
oauthApp, err := oauth.NewApp(baseURL, oauthStore, defaultHoldDID, cfg.Server.OAuthKeyPath, cfg.Server.ClientName)
124
124
if err != nil {
125
125
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create OAuth app: %w", err)
126
126
}
···
132
132
133
133
// Invalidate sessions with mismatched scopes on startup
134
134
// This ensures all users have the latest required scopes after deployment
135
-
desiredScopes := oauth.GetDefaultScopes(defaultHoldDID, testMode)
135
+
desiredScopes := oauth.GetDefaultScopes(defaultHoldDID)
136
136
invalidatedCount, err := oauthStore.InvalidateSessionsWithMismatchedScopes(context.Background(), desiredScopes)
137
137
if err != nil {
138
138
slog.Warn("Failed to invalidate sessions with mismatched scopes", "error", err)
···
385
385
config := oauthApp.GetConfig()
386
386
metadata := config.ClientMetadata()
387
387
388
+
// Convert indigo's metadata to map so we can add custom fields
389
+
metadataBytes, err := json.Marshal(metadata)
390
+
if err != nil {
391
+
http.Error(w, "Failed to marshal metadata", http.StatusInternalServerError)
392
+
return
393
+
}
394
+
395
+
var metadataMap map[string]interface{}
396
+
if err := json.Unmarshal(metadataBytes, &metadataMap); err != nil {
397
+
http.Error(w, "Failed to unmarshal metadata", http.StatusInternalServerError)
398
+
return
399
+
}
400
+
401
+
// Add custom fields
402
+
metadataMap["client_name"] = cfg.Server.ClientName
403
+
metadataMap["client_uri"] = cfg.Server.BaseURL
404
+
metadataMap["logo_uri"] = cfg.Server.BaseURL + "/web-app-manifest-192x192.png"
405
+
388
406
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
389
407
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
390
-
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(metadata); err != nil {
408
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(metadataMap); err != nil {
391
409
http.Error(w, "Failed to encode metadata", http.StatusInternalServerError)
392
410
}
393
411
})
+4
deploy/.env.prod.template
+4
deploy/.env.prod.template
···
151
151
# Default: 300 (5 minutes)
152
152
ATCR_TOKEN_EXPIRATION=300
153
153
154
+
# OAuth client display name (shown in authorization screens)
155
+
# Default: AT Container Registry
156
+
# ATCR_CLIENT_NAME=AT Container Registry
157
+
154
158
# Enable web UI
155
159
# Default: true
156
160
ATCR_UI_ENABLED=true
+99
-35
deploy/init-upcloud.sh
+99
-35
deploy/init-upcloud.sh
···
130
130
log_warn "IMPORTANT: Edit $ATCR_DIR/.env with your configuration!"
131
131
fi
132
132
133
-
# Create systemd service
134
-
log_info "Creating systemd service..."
135
-
cat > /etc/systemd/system/atcr.service <<'EOF'
133
+
# Create systemd services (caddy, appview, hold)
134
+
log_info "Creating systemd services..."
135
+
136
+
# Caddy service (reverse proxy for both appview and hold)
137
+
cat > /etc/systemd/system/atcr-caddy.service <<'EOF'
136
138
[Unit]
137
-
Description=ATCR Container Registry
139
+
Description=ATCR Caddy Reverse Proxy
138
140
Requires=docker.service
139
141
After=docker.service network-online.target
140
142
Wants=network-online.target
···
145
147
WorkingDirectory=/opt/atcr
146
148
EnvironmentFile=/opt/atcr/.env
147
149
148
-
# Start containers
149
-
ExecStart=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
150
+
# Start caddy container
151
+
ExecStart=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml up -d caddy
152
+
153
+
# Stop caddy container
154
+
ExecStop=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml stop caddy
155
+
156
+
# Restart caddy container
157
+
ExecReload=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml restart caddy
158
+
159
+
# Always restart on failure
160
+
Restart=on-failure
161
+
RestartSec=10
162
+
163
+
[Install]
164
+
WantedBy=multi-user.target
165
+
EOF
166
+
167
+
# AppView service (registry + web UI)
168
+
cat > /etc/systemd/system/atcr-appview.service <<'EOF'
169
+
[Unit]
170
+
Description=ATCR AppView (Registry + Web UI)
171
+
Requires=docker.service atcr-caddy.service
172
+
After=docker.service network-online.target atcr-caddy.service
173
+
Wants=network-online.target
174
+
175
+
[Service]
176
+
Type=oneshot
177
+
RemainAfterExit=yes
178
+
WorkingDirectory=/opt/atcr
179
+
EnvironmentFile=/opt/atcr/.env
180
+
181
+
# Start appview container
182
+
ExecStart=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml up -d atcr-appview
150
183
151
-
# Stop containers
152
-
ExecStop=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml down
184
+
# Stop appview container
185
+
ExecStop=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml stop atcr-appview
153
186
154
-
# Restart containers
155
-
ExecReload=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml restart
187
+
# Restart appview container
188
+
ExecReload=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml restart atcr-appview
189
+
190
+
# Always restart on failure
191
+
Restart=on-failure
192
+
RestartSec=10
193
+
194
+
[Install]
195
+
WantedBy=multi-user.target
196
+
EOF
197
+
198
+
# Hold service (storage backend)
199
+
cat > /etc/systemd/system/atcr-hold.service <<'EOF'
200
+
[Unit]
201
+
Description=ATCR Hold (Storage Service)
202
+
Requires=docker.service atcr-caddy.service
203
+
After=docker.service network-online.target atcr-caddy.service
204
+
Wants=network-online.target
205
+
206
+
[Service]
207
+
Type=oneshot
208
+
RemainAfterExit=yes
209
+
WorkingDirectory=/opt/atcr
210
+
EnvironmentFile=/opt/atcr/.env
211
+
212
+
# Start hold container
213
+
ExecStart=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml up -d atcr-hold
214
+
215
+
# Stop hold container
216
+
ExecStop=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml stop atcr-hold
217
+
218
+
# Restart hold container
219
+
ExecReload=/usr/bin/docker compose -f /opt/atcr/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml restart atcr-hold
156
220
157
221
# Always restart on failure
158
222
Restart=on-failure
···
166
230
log_info "Reloading systemd daemon..."
167
231
systemctl daemon-reload
168
232
169
-
# Enable service (but don't start yet - user needs to configure .env)
170
-
systemctl enable atcr.service
233
+
# Enable all services (but don't start yet - user needs to configure .env)
234
+
systemctl enable atcr-caddy.service
235
+
systemctl enable atcr-appview.service
236
+
systemctl enable atcr-hold.service
171
237
172
-
log_info "Systemd service created and enabled"
238
+
log_info "Systemd services created and enabled"
173
239
174
240
# Create helper scripts
175
241
log_info "Creating helper scripts..."
···
192
258
docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml logs -f "$@"
193
259
EOF
194
260
chmod +x "$ATCR_DIR/logs.sh"
195
-
196
-
# Script to get hold OAuth URL
197
-
cat > "$ATCR_DIR/get-hold-oauth.sh" <<'EOF'
198
-
#!/bin/bash
199
-
echo "Checking atcr-hold logs for OAuth registration URL..."
200
-
docker logs atcr-hold 2>&1 | grep -i "oauth\|authorization\|visit\|http" | tail -20
201
-
EOF
202
-
chmod +x "$ATCR_DIR/get-hold-oauth.sh"
203
261
204
262
log_info "Helper scripts created in $ATCR_DIR"
205
263
···
241
299
242
300
cat <<'EOF'
243
301
244
-
4. Start ATCR:
245
-
systemctl start atcr
302
+
4. Start ATCR services:
303
+
systemctl start atcr-caddy atcr-appview atcr-hold
246
304
247
-
5. Complete Hold OAuth registration:
248
-
/opt/atcr/get-hold-oauth.sh
249
-
250
-
Visit the OAuth URL in your browser to authorize the hold service.
251
-
252
-
6. Check status:
253
-
systemctl status atcr
305
+
5. Check status:
306
+
systemctl status atcr-caddy
307
+
systemctl status atcr-appview
308
+
systemctl status atcr-hold
254
309
docker ps
255
310
/opt/atcr/logs.sh
256
311
257
312
Helper Scripts:
258
313
/opt/atcr/rebuild.sh - Rebuild and restart containers
259
314
/opt/atcr/logs.sh [service] - View logs (e.g., logs.sh atcr-hold)
260
-
/opt/atcr/get-hold-oauth.sh - Get hold OAuth URL
261
315
262
316
Service Management:
263
-
systemctl start atcr - Start ATCR
264
-
systemctl stop atcr - Stop ATCR
265
-
systemctl restart atcr - Restart ATCR
266
-
systemctl status atcr - Check status
317
+
systemctl start atcr-caddy - Start Caddy reverse proxy
318
+
systemctl start atcr-appview - Start AppView (registry + UI)
319
+
systemctl start atcr-hold - Start Hold (storage service)
320
+
321
+
systemctl stop atcr-appview - Stop AppView only
322
+
systemctl stop atcr-hold - Stop Hold only
323
+
systemctl stop atcr-caddy - Stop all (stops reverse proxy)
324
+
325
+
systemctl restart atcr-appview - Restart AppView
326
+
systemctl restart atcr-hold - Restart Hold
327
+
328
+
systemctl status atcr-caddy - Check Caddy status
329
+
systemctl status atcr-appview - Check AppView status
330
+
systemctl status atcr-hold - Check Hold status
267
331
268
332
Documentation:
269
333
https://tangled.org/@evan.jarrett.net/at-container-registry
+399
docs/OAUTH.md
+399
docs/OAUTH.md
···
1
+
# OAuth Implementation in ATCR
2
+
3
+
This document describes ATCR's OAuth implementation, which uses the ATProto OAuth specification with DPoP (Demonstrating Proof of Possession) for secure authentication.
4
+
5
+
## Overview
6
+
7
+
ATCR implements a full OAuth 2.0 + DPoP flow following the ATProto specification. The implementation uses the [indigo OAuth library](https://github.com/bluesky-social/indigo) and extends it with ATCR-specific configuration for registry operations.
8
+
9
+
### Key Features
10
+
11
+
- **DPoP (RFC 9449)**: Cryptographic proof-of-possession binds tokens to specific client keys
12
+
- **PAR (RFC 9126)**: Pushed Authorization Requests for secure server-to-server parameter exchange
13
+
- **PKCE (RFC 7636)**: Proof Key for Code Exchange prevents authorization code interception
14
+
- **Confidential Clients**: Production deployments use P-256 private keys for client authentication
15
+
- **Public Clients**: Development (localhost) uses simpler public client configuration
16
+
17
+
## Client Types
18
+
19
+
ATCR supports two OAuth client types depending on the deployment environment:
20
+
21
+
### Public Clients (Development)
22
+
23
+
**When:** `baseURL` contains `localhost` or `127.0.0.1`
24
+
25
+
**Configuration:**
26
+
- Client ID: `http://localhost?redirect_uri=...&scope=...` (query-based)
27
+
- No client authentication
28
+
- Uses indigo's `NewLocalhostConfig()` helper
29
+
- DPoP still required for token requests
30
+
31
+
**Example:**
32
+
```go
33
+
// Automatically uses public client for localhost
34
+
config := oauth.NewClientConfigWithScopes("http://127.0.0.1:5000", scopes)
35
+
```
36
+
37
+
### Confidential Clients (Production)
38
+
39
+
**When:** `baseURL` is a public domain (not localhost)
40
+
41
+
**Configuration:**
42
+
- Client ID: `{baseURL}/client-metadata.json` (metadata endpoint)
43
+
- Client authentication: P-256 (ES256) private key JWT assertion
44
+
- Private key stored at `/var/lib/atcr/oauth/client.key`
45
+
- Auto-generated on first run with 0600 permissions
46
+
- Upgraded via `config.SetClientSecret(privateKey, keyID)`
47
+
48
+
**Example:**
49
+
```go
50
+
// 1. Create base config (public)
51
+
config := oauth.NewClientConfigWithScopes("https://atcr.io", scopes)
52
+
53
+
// 2. Load or generate P-256 key
54
+
privateKey, err := oauth.GenerateOrLoadClientKey("/var/lib/atcr/oauth/client.key")
55
+
56
+
// 3. Generate key ID
57
+
keyID, err := oauth.GenerateKeyID(privateKey)
58
+
59
+
// 4. Upgrade to confidential
60
+
err = config.SetClientSecret(privateKey, keyID)
61
+
```
62
+
63
+
## Key Management
64
+
65
+
### P-256 Key Generation
66
+
67
+
ATCR uses **P-256 (NIST P-256, ES256)** keys for OAuth client authentication. This differs from the K-256 keys used for ATProto PDS signing.
68
+
69
+
**Why P-256?**
70
+
- Standard OAuth/OIDC key algorithm
71
+
- Widely supported by authorization servers
72
+
- Compatible with indigo's `SetClientSecret()` API
73
+
74
+
**Key Storage:**
75
+
- Default path: `/var/lib/atcr/oauth/client.key`
76
+
- Configurable via: `ATCR_OAUTH_KEY_PATH` environment variable
77
+
- File permissions: `0600` (owner read/write only)
78
+
- Directory permissions: `0700` (owner access only)
79
+
- Format: Raw binary bytes (not PEM)
80
+
81
+
**Key Lifecycle:**
82
+
1. On first production startup, AppView checks for key at configured path
83
+
2. If missing, generates new P-256 key using `atcrypto.GeneratePrivateKeyP256()`
84
+
3. Saves raw key bytes to disk with restrictive permissions
85
+
4. Logs generation event: `"Generated new P-256 OAuth client key"`
86
+
5. On subsequent startups, loads existing key
87
+
6. Logs load event: `"Loaded existing P-256 OAuth client key"`
88
+
89
+
**Key Rotation:**
90
+
To rotate the OAuth client key:
91
+
1. Stop the AppView service
92
+
2. Delete or rename the existing key file
93
+
3. Restart AppView (new key will be generated automatically)
94
+
4. Note: Active OAuth sessions may need re-authentication
95
+
96
+
### Key ID Generation
97
+
98
+
The key ID is derived from the public key for stable identification:
99
+
100
+
```go
101
+
func GenerateKeyID(privateKey *atcrypto.PrivateKeyP256) (string, error) {
102
+
pubKey, _ := privateKey.PublicKey()
103
+
pubKeyBytes := pubKey.Bytes()
104
+
hash := sha256.Sum256(pubKeyBytes)
105
+
return hex.EncodeToString(hash[:])[:8], nil
106
+
}
107
+
```
108
+
109
+
This generates an 8-character hex ID from the SHA-256 hash of the public key.
110
+
111
+
## Authentication Flow
112
+
113
+
### AppView OAuth Flow
114
+
115
+
```mermaid
116
+
sequenceDiagram
117
+
participant User
118
+
participant Browser
119
+
participant AppView
120
+
participant PDS
121
+
122
+
User->>Browser: docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp
123
+
Browser->>AppView: Credential helper redirects
124
+
AppView->>PDS: Resolve handle → DID
125
+
AppView->>PDS: Discover OAuth metadata
126
+
AppView->>PDS: PAR request (with DPoP)
127
+
PDS-->>AppView: request_uri
128
+
AppView->>Browser: Redirect to authorization page
129
+
Browser->>PDS: User authorizes
130
+
PDS->>AppView: Authorization code
131
+
AppView->>PDS: Token exchange (with DPoP)
132
+
PDS-->>AppView: OAuth tokens + DPoP binding
133
+
AppView->>User: Issue registry JWT
134
+
```
135
+
136
+
### Key Steps
137
+
138
+
1. **Identity Resolution**
139
+
- AppView resolves handle to DID via `.well-known/atproto-did`
140
+
- Resolves DID to PDS endpoint via DID document
141
+
142
+
2. **OAuth Discovery**
143
+
- Fetches `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` from PDS
144
+
- Extracts `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, etc.
145
+
146
+
3. **Pushed Authorization Request (PAR)**
147
+
- AppView sends authorization parameters to PDS token endpoint
148
+
- Includes DPoP header with proof JWT
149
+
- Receives `request_uri` for authorization
150
+
151
+
4. **User Authorization**
152
+
- User is redirected to PDS authorization page
153
+
- User approves application access
154
+
- PDS redirects back with authorization code
155
+
156
+
5. **Token Exchange**
157
+
- AppView exchanges code for tokens at PDS token endpoint
158
+
- Includes DPoP header with proof JWT
159
+
- Receives access token, refresh token (both DPoP-bound)
160
+
161
+
6. **Token Storage**
162
+
- AppView stores OAuth session in SQLite database
163
+
- Indigo library manages token refresh automatically
164
+
- DPoP key stored with session for future requests
165
+
166
+
7. **Registry JWT Issuance**
167
+
- AppView validates OAuth session
168
+
- Issues short-lived registry JWT (15 minutes)
169
+
- JWT contains validated DID from PDS session
170
+
171
+
## DPoP Implementation
172
+
173
+
### What is DPoP?
174
+
175
+
DPoP (Demonstrating Proof of Possession) binds OAuth tokens to a specific client key, preventing token theft and replay attacks.
176
+
177
+
**How it works:**
178
+
1. Client generates ephemeral key pair (or uses persistent key)
179
+
2. Client includes DPoP proof JWT in Authorization header
180
+
3. Proof JWT contains hash of HTTP request details
181
+
4. Authorization server validates proof and issues DPoP-bound token
182
+
5. Token can only be used with the same client key
183
+
184
+
### DPoP Headers
185
+
186
+
Every request to the PDS token endpoint includes a DPoP header:
187
+
188
+
```http
189
+
POST /oauth/token HTTP/1.1
190
+
Host: pds.example.com
191
+
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
192
+
DPoP: eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6ImRwb3Arand0IiwiandrIjp7Imt0eSI6Ik...
193
+
194
+
grant_type=authorization_code&code=...&redirect_uri=...
195
+
```
196
+
197
+
The DPoP header is a signed JWT containing:
198
+
- `htm`: HTTP method (e.g., "POST")
199
+
- `htu`: HTTP URI (e.g., "https://pds.example.com/oauth/token")
200
+
- `jti`: Unique request identifier
201
+
- `iat`: Timestamp
202
+
- `jwk`: Public key (JWK format)
203
+
204
+
### Indigo DPoP Management
205
+
206
+
ATCR uses indigo's built-in DPoP management:
207
+
208
+
```go
209
+
// Indigo automatically handles DPoP
210
+
clientApp := oauth.NewClientApp(&config, store)
211
+
212
+
// All token requests include DPoP automatically
213
+
tokens, err := clientApp.ProcessCallback(ctx, params)
214
+
215
+
// Refresh automatically includes DPoP
216
+
session, err := clientApp.ResumeSession(ctx, did, sessionID)
217
+
```
218
+
219
+
Indigo manages:
220
+
- DPoP key generation and storage
221
+
- DPoP proof JWT creation
222
+
- DPoP header inclusion in token requests
223
+
- Token binding to DPoP keys
224
+
225
+
## Client Configuration
226
+
227
+
### Environment Variables
228
+
229
+
**ATCR_OAUTH_KEY_PATH**
230
+
- Path to OAuth client P-256 signing key
231
+
- Default: `/var/lib/atcr/oauth/client.key`
232
+
- Auto-generated on first run (production only)
233
+
- Format: Raw binary P-256 private key
234
+
235
+
**ATCR_BASE_URL**
236
+
- Public URL of AppView service
237
+
- Required for OAuth redirect URIs
238
+
- Example: `https://atcr.io`
239
+
- Determines client type (public vs confidential)
240
+
241
+
**ATCR_UI_DATABASE_PATH**
242
+
- Path to SQLite database (includes OAuth session storage)
243
+
- Default: `/var/lib/atcr/ui.db`
244
+
245
+
### Client Metadata Endpoint
246
+
247
+
Production deployments serve OAuth client metadata at `{baseURL}/client-metadata.json`:
248
+
249
+
```json
250
+
{
251
+
"client_id": "https://atcr.io/client-metadata.json",
252
+
"client_name": "ATCR Registry",
253
+
"client_uri": "https://atcr.io",
254
+
"redirect_uris": ["https://atcr.io/auth/oauth/callback"],
255
+
"scope": "atproto blob:... repo:...",
256
+
"grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
257
+
"response_types": ["code"],
258
+
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "private_key_jwt",
259
+
"token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg": "ES256",
260
+
"jwks": {
261
+
"keys": [
262
+
{
263
+
"kty": "EC",
264
+
"crv": "P-256",
265
+
"x": "...",
266
+
"y": "...",
267
+
"kid": "abc12345"
268
+
}
269
+
]
270
+
}
271
+
}
272
+
```
273
+
274
+
For localhost, the client ID is query-based and no metadata endpoint is used.
275
+
276
+
## Scope Management
277
+
278
+
ATCR requests the following OAuth scopes:
279
+
280
+
**Base scopes:**
281
+
- `atproto`: Basic ATProto access
282
+
283
+
**Blob scopes (for layer/manifest media types):**
284
+
- `blob:application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json`
285
+
- `blob:application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.v2+json`
286
+
- `blob:application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json`
287
+
- `blob:application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.list.v2+json`
288
+
- `blob:application/vnd.cncf.oras.artifact.manifest.v1+json`
289
+
290
+
**Repo scopes (for ATProto collections):**
291
+
- `repo:io.atcr.manifest`: Manifest records
292
+
- `repo:io.atcr.tag`: Tag records
293
+
- `repo:io.atcr.star`: Star records
294
+
- `repo:io.atcr.sailor.profile`: User profile records
295
+
296
+
**RPC scope:**
297
+
- `rpc:com.atproto.repo.getRecord?aud=*`: Read access to any user's records
298
+
299
+
Scopes are automatically invalidated on startup if they change, forcing users to re-authenticate.
300
+
301
+
## Security Considerations
302
+
303
+
### Token Security
304
+
305
+
**OAuth Tokens (managed by AppView):**
306
+
- Stored in SQLite database
307
+
- DPoP-bound (cannot be used without client key)
308
+
- Automatically refreshed by indigo library
309
+
- Used for PDS API requests (manifests, service tokens)
310
+
311
+
**Registry JWTs (issued to Docker clients):**
312
+
- Short-lived (15 minutes)
313
+
- Signed by AppView's JWT signing key
314
+
- Contain validated DID from OAuth session
315
+
- Used for OCI Distribution API requests
316
+
317
+
### Attack Prevention
318
+
319
+
**Token Theft:**
320
+
- DPoP prevents stolen tokens from being used
321
+
- Tokens are bound to specific client key
322
+
- Attacker would need both token AND private key
323
+
324
+
**Client Impersonation:**
325
+
- Confidential clients use private key JWT assertion
326
+
- Prevents attackers from impersonating AppView
327
+
- Public keys published in client metadata JWKS
328
+
329
+
**Man-in-the-Middle:**
330
+
- All OAuth flows use HTTPS in production
331
+
- DPoP includes HTTP method and URI in proof
332
+
- Prevents replay attacks on different endpoints
333
+
334
+
**Authorization Code Interception:**
335
+
- PKCE prevents code interception attacks
336
+
- Code verifier required to exchange code for token
337
+
- Protects against malicious redirect URI attacks
338
+
339
+
## Troubleshooting
340
+
341
+
### Common Issues
342
+
343
+
**"Failed to initialize OAuth client key"**
344
+
- Check that `/var/lib/atcr/oauth/` directory exists and is writable
345
+
- Verify directory permissions are 0700
346
+
- Check disk space
347
+
348
+
**"OAuth session not found"**
349
+
- User needs to re-authenticate (session expired or invalidated)
350
+
- Check that UI database is accessible
351
+
- Verify OAuth session storage is working
352
+
353
+
**"Invalid DPoP proof"**
354
+
- Clock skew between AppView and PDS
355
+
- DPoP key mismatch (token was issued with different key)
356
+
- Check that indigo library is managing DPoP correctly
357
+
358
+
**"Client authentication failed"**
359
+
- Confidential client key may be corrupted
360
+
- Key ID may not match public key
361
+
- Try rotating the client key (delete and regenerate)
362
+
363
+
### Debugging
364
+
365
+
Enable debug logging to see OAuth flow details:
366
+
367
+
```bash
368
+
export ATCR_LOG_LEVEL=debug
369
+
./bin/atcr-appview serve
370
+
```
371
+
372
+
Look for log messages:
373
+
- `"Generated new P-256 OAuth client key"` - Key was auto-generated
374
+
- `"Loaded existing P-256 OAuth client key"` - Key was loaded from disk
375
+
- `"Configured confidential OAuth client"` - Production confidential client active
376
+
- `"Localhost detected - using public OAuth client"` - Development public client active
377
+
378
+
### Testing OAuth Flow
379
+
380
+
Test OAuth flow manually:
381
+
382
+
```bash
383
+
# 1. Start AppView in debug mode
384
+
ATCR_LOG_LEVEL=debug ./bin/atcr-appview serve
385
+
386
+
# 2. Try docker login
387
+
docker login atcr.io
388
+
389
+
# 3. Check logs for OAuth flow details
390
+
# Look for: PAR request, token exchange, DPoP headers, etc.
391
+
```
392
+
393
+
## References
394
+
395
+
- [ATProto OAuth Specification](https://atproto.com/specs/oauth)
396
+
- [RFC 9449: OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9449)
397
+
- [RFC 9126: OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9126)
398
+
- [RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636)
399
+
- [Indigo OAuth Library](https://github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/tree/main/atproto/auth/oauth)
+10
pkg/appview/config.go
+10
pkg/appview/config.go
···
48
48
49
49
// DebugAddr is the debug/pprof HTTP listen address (from env: ATCR_DEBUG_ADDR, default: ":5001")
50
50
DebugAddr string `yaml:"debug_addr"`
51
+
52
+
// OAuthKeyPath is the path to the OAuth client P-256 signing key (from env: ATCR_OAUTH_KEY_PATH, default: "/var/lib/atcr/oauth/client.key")
53
+
// Auto-generated on first run for production (non-localhost) deployments
54
+
OAuthKeyPath string `yaml:"oauth_key_path"`
55
+
56
+
// ClientName is the OAuth client display name (from env: ATCR_CLIENT_NAME, default: "AT Container Registry")
57
+
// Shown in OAuth authorization screens
58
+
ClientName string `yaml:"client_name"`
51
59
}
52
60
53
61
// UIConfig defines web UI settings
···
123
131
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ATCR_DEFAULT_HOLD_DID is required")
124
132
}
125
133
cfg.Server.TestMode = os.Getenv("TEST_MODE") == "true"
134
+
cfg.Server.OAuthKeyPath = getEnvOrDefault("ATCR_OAUTH_KEY_PATH", "/var/lib/atcr/oauth/client.key")
135
+
cfg.Server.ClientName = getEnvOrDefault("ATCR_CLIENT_NAME", "AT Container Registry")
126
136
127
137
// Auto-detect base URL if not explicitly set
128
138
cfg.Server.BaseURL = os.Getenv("ATCR_BASE_URL")
+2
-2
pkg/appview/static/site.webmanifest
+2
-2
pkg/appview/static/site.webmanifest
+60
-37
pkg/auth/oauth/client.go
+60
-37
pkg/auth/oauth/client.go
···
7
7
import (
8
8
"context"
9
9
"fmt"
10
+
"log/slog"
10
11
"net/url"
11
12
"strings"
12
13
···
23
24
}
24
25
25
26
// NewApp creates a new OAuth app for ATCR with default scopes
26
-
func NewApp(baseURL string, store oauth.ClientAuthStore, holdDid string, testMode bool) (*App, error) {
27
-
return NewAppWithScopes(baseURL, store, GetDefaultScopes(holdDid, testMode))
27
+
func NewApp(baseURL string, store oauth.ClientAuthStore, holdDid string, keyPath string, clientName string) (*App, error) {
28
+
return NewAppWithScopes(baseURL, store, GetDefaultScopes(holdDid), keyPath, clientName)
28
29
}
29
30
30
31
// NewAppWithScopes creates a new OAuth app for ATCR with custom scopes
31
-
func NewAppWithScopes(baseURL string, store oauth.ClientAuthStore, scopes []string) (*App, error) {
32
-
config := NewClientConfigWithScopes(baseURL, scopes)
32
+
// Automatically configures confidential client for production deployments
33
+
// keyPath specifies where to store/load the OAuth client P-256 key (ignored for localhost)
34
+
// clientName is added to OAuth client metadata
35
+
func NewAppWithScopes(baseURL string, store oauth.ClientAuthStore, scopes []string, keyPath string, clientName string) (*App, error) {
36
+
var config oauth.ClientConfig
37
+
redirectURI := RedirectURI(baseURL)
38
+
39
+
// If production (not localhost), automatically set up confidential client
40
+
if !isLocalhost(baseURL) {
41
+
clientID := baseURL + "/client-metadata.json"
42
+
config = oauth.NewPublicConfig(clientID, redirectURI, scopes)
43
+
44
+
// Generate or load P-256 key
45
+
privateKey, err := GenerateOrLoadClientKey(keyPath)
46
+
if err != nil {
47
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to load OAuth client key: %w", err)
48
+
}
49
+
50
+
// Generate key ID from public key
51
+
keyID, err := GenerateKeyID(privateKey)
52
+
if err != nil {
53
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate key ID: %w", err)
54
+
}
55
+
56
+
// Upgrade to confidential client
57
+
if err := config.SetClientSecret(privateKey, keyID); err != nil {
58
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to configure confidential client: %w", err)
59
+
}
60
+
61
+
slog.Info("Configured confidential OAuth client", "key_id", keyID, "key_path", keyPath)
62
+
} else {
63
+
config = oauth.NewLocalhostConfig(redirectURI, scopes)
64
+
65
+
// Append client_name to localhost client ID query string
66
+
if clientName != "" {
67
+
u, err := url.Parse(config.ClientID)
68
+
if err == nil {
69
+
q := u.Query()
70
+
q.Set("client_name", clientName)
71
+
u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
72
+
config.ClientID = u.String()
73
+
}
74
+
}
75
+
76
+
slog.Info("Using public OAuth client (localhost development)")
77
+
}
78
+
33
79
clientApp := oauth.NewClientApp(&config, store)
34
80
clientApp.Dir = atproto.GetDirectory()
35
81
···
39
85
}, nil
40
86
}
41
87
42
-
// NewClientConfigWithScopes creates an OAuth client configuration with custom scopes
43
-
func NewClientConfigWithScopes(baseURL string, scopes []string) oauth.ClientConfig {
44
-
clientID := ClientIDWithScopes(baseURL, scopes)
45
-
redirectURI := RedirectURI(baseURL)
46
-
47
-
// Check if this is localhost (public client) or production (confidential client)
48
-
if strings.Contains(baseURL, "127.0.0.1") || strings.Contains(baseURL, "localhost") {
49
-
return oauth.NewPublicConfig(clientID, redirectURI, scopes)
50
-
}
51
-
52
-
// Production: confidential client
53
-
// Note: Client secrets would be configured separately if needed
54
-
return oauth.NewPublicConfig(clientID, redirectURI, scopes)
55
-
}
56
-
57
-
func (a *App) GetConfig() oauth.ClientConfig {
58
-
return *a.clientApp.Config
88
+
func (a *App) GetConfig() *oauth.ClientConfig {
89
+
return a.clientApp.Config
59
90
}
60
91
61
92
// StartAuthFlow initiates an OAuth authorization flow for a given handle
···
104
135
return a.clientApp.Dir
105
136
}
106
137
107
-
// ClientIDWithScopes generates a client ID with custom scopes
108
-
func ClientIDWithScopes(baseURL string, scopes []string) string {
109
-
scopeStr := strings.Join(scopes, " ")
110
-
if strings.Contains(baseURL, "127.0.0.1") || strings.Contains(baseURL, "localhost") {
111
-
// Localhost: use query-based client ID
112
-
return fmt.Sprintf("http://localhost?redirect_uri=%s&scope=%s",
113
-
url.QueryEscape(RedirectURI(baseURL)),
114
-
url.QueryEscape(scopeStr))
115
-
}
116
-
// Production: use metadata URL
117
-
return baseURL + "/client-metadata.json"
118
-
}
119
-
120
138
// RedirectURI returns the OAuth redirect URI for ATCR
121
139
func RedirectURI(baseURL string) string {
122
140
return baseURL + "/auth/oauth/callback"
···
124
142
125
143
// GetDefaultScopes returns the default OAuth scopes for ATCR registry operations
126
144
// testMode determines whether to use transition:generic (test) or rpc scopes (production)
127
-
func GetDefaultScopes(did string, testMode bool) []string {
145
+
func GetDefaultScopes(did string) []string {
128
146
scopes := []string{
129
147
"atproto",
130
148
// Image manifest types (single-arch)
···
135
153
"blob:application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.list.v2+json",
136
154
// OCI artifact manifests (for cosign signatures, SBOMs, attestations)
137
155
"blob:application/vnd.cncf.oras.artifact.manifest.v1+json",
156
+
// Used for service token validation on holds
157
+
"rpc:com.atproto.repo.getRecord?aud=*",
138
158
}
139
-
140
-
scopes = append(scopes, fmt.Sprintf("rpc:com.atproto.repo.getRecord?aud=%s", "*"))
141
159
142
160
// Add repo scopes
143
161
scopes = append(scopes,
···
176
194
177
195
return true
178
196
}
197
+
198
+
// isLocalhost checks if a base URL is a localhost address
199
+
func isLocalhost(baseURL string) bool {
200
+
return strings.Contains(baseURL, "127.0.0.1") || strings.Contains(baseURL, "localhost")
201
+
}
+4
-2
pkg/auth/oauth/client_test.go
+4
-2
pkg/auth/oauth/client_test.go
···
7
7
func TestNewApp(t *testing.T) {
8
8
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
9
9
storePath := tmpDir + "/oauth-test.json"
10
+
keyPath := tmpDir + "/oauth-key.bin"
10
11
11
12
store, err := NewFileStore(storePath)
12
13
if err != nil {
···
16
17
baseURL := "http://localhost:5000"
17
18
holdDID := "did:web:hold.example.com"
18
19
19
-
app, err := NewApp(baseURL, store, holdDID, false)
20
+
app, err := NewApp(baseURL, store, holdDID, keyPath, "AT Container Registry")
20
21
if err != nil {
21
22
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
22
23
}
···
33
34
func TestNewAppWithScopes(t *testing.T) {
34
35
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
35
36
storePath := tmpDir + "/oauth-test.json"
37
+
keyPath := tmpDir + "/oauth-key.bin"
36
38
37
39
store, err := NewFileStore(storePath)
38
40
if err != nil {
···
42
44
baseURL := "http://localhost:5000"
43
45
scopes := []string{"atproto", "custom:scope"}
44
46
45
-
app, err := NewAppWithScopes(baseURL, store, scopes)
47
+
app, err := NewAppWithScopes(baseURL, store, scopes, keyPath, "AT Container Registry")
46
48
if err != nil {
47
49
t.Fatalf("NewAppWithScopes() error = %v", err)
48
50
}
+4
-2
pkg/auth/oauth/interactive.go
+4
-2
pkg/auth/oauth/interactive.go
···
35
35
// Create OAuth app with custom scopes (or defaults if nil)
36
36
// Interactive flows are typically for production use (credential helper, etc.)
37
37
// so we default to testMode=false
38
+
// For CLI tools, we use an empty keyPath since they're typically localhost (public client)
39
+
// or ephemeral sessions
38
40
var app *App
39
41
if scopes != nil {
40
-
app, err = NewAppWithScopes(baseURL, store, scopes)
42
+
app, err = NewAppWithScopes(baseURL, store, scopes, "", "AT Container Registry")
41
43
} else {
42
-
app, err = NewApp(baseURL, store, "*", false)
44
+
app, err = NewApp(baseURL, store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
43
45
}
44
46
if err != nil {
45
47
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create OAuth app: %w", err)
+193
pkg/auth/oauth/keys.go
+193
pkg/auth/oauth/keys.go
···
1
+
package oauth
2
+
3
+
import (
4
+
"crypto/sha256"
5
+
"encoding/hex"
6
+
"fmt"
7
+
"log/slog"
8
+
"os"
9
+
"path/filepath"
10
+
11
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/atcrypto"
12
+
)
13
+
14
+
// KeyType represents the elliptic curve algorithm for key generation
15
+
type KeyType int
16
+
17
+
const (
18
+
// KeyTypeP256 uses NIST P-256 (ES256) - standard for OAuth/OIDC
19
+
KeyTypeP256 KeyType = iota
20
+
// KeyTypeK256 uses secp256k1 (ES256K) - used for ATProto PDS signing
21
+
KeyTypeK256
22
+
)
23
+
24
+
// GenerateOrLoadKey generates a new key pair or loads an existing one
25
+
// Supports both P-256 (OAuth) and K-256 (ATProto PDS) key types
26
+
func GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath string, keyType KeyType) (atcrypto.PrivateKey, error) {
27
+
// Ensure directory exists
28
+
dir := filepath.Dir(keyPath)
29
+
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
30
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create key directory: %w", err)
31
+
}
32
+
33
+
// Check if key already exists
34
+
if _, err := os.Stat(keyPath); err == nil {
35
+
// Key exists, load it
36
+
return loadKey(keyPath, keyType)
37
+
}
38
+
39
+
// Key doesn't exist, generate new one
40
+
return generateKey(keyPath, keyType)
41
+
}
42
+
43
+
// generateKey creates a new key pair of the specified type
44
+
func generateKey(keyPath string, keyType KeyType) (atcrypto.PrivateKey, error) {
45
+
var privateKey atcrypto.PrivateKey
46
+
var keyName string
47
+
var err error
48
+
49
+
switch keyType {
50
+
case KeyTypeP256:
51
+
privateKey, err = atcrypto.GeneratePrivateKeyP256()
52
+
keyName = "P-256"
53
+
case KeyTypeK256:
54
+
privateKey, err = atcrypto.GeneratePrivateKeyK256()
55
+
keyName = "K-256"
56
+
default:
57
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported key type: %d", keyType)
58
+
}
59
+
60
+
if err != nil {
61
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate %s key: %w", keyName, err)
62
+
}
63
+
64
+
// Serialize key to bytes
65
+
exportableKey, ok := privateKey.(atcrypto.PrivateKeyExportable)
66
+
if !ok {
67
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("key does not support export")
68
+
}
69
+
keyBytes := exportableKey.Bytes()
70
+
71
+
// Write to file with restrictive permissions
72
+
if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyBytes, 0600); err != nil {
73
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write key file: %w", err)
74
+
}
75
+
76
+
slog.Info("Generated new signing key", "type", keyName, "path", keyPath)
77
+
return privateKey, nil
78
+
}
79
+
80
+
// loadKey loads an existing private key from disk
81
+
func loadKey(keyPath string, keyType KeyType) (atcrypto.PrivateKey, error) {
82
+
// Read key bytes
83
+
keyBytes, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
84
+
if err != nil {
85
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read key file: %w", err)
86
+
}
87
+
88
+
var privateKey atcrypto.PrivateKey
89
+
var keyName string
90
+
91
+
switch keyType {
92
+
case KeyTypeP256:
93
+
privateKey, err = atcrypto.ParsePrivateBytesP256(keyBytes)
94
+
keyName = "P-256"
95
+
case KeyTypeK256:
96
+
// Check for old PEM format (migration path)
97
+
if IsPEMFormat(keyBytes) {
98
+
slog.Warn("Detected old P-256 PEM key, replacing with K-256")
99
+
return generateKey(keyPath, keyType)
100
+
}
101
+
privateKey, err = atcrypto.ParsePrivateBytesK256(keyBytes)
102
+
keyName = "K-256"
103
+
default:
104
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported key type: %d", keyType)
105
+
}
106
+
107
+
if err != nil {
108
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse %s private key: %w", keyName, err)
109
+
}
110
+
111
+
slog.Info("Loaded existing signing key", "type", keyName, "path", keyPath)
112
+
return privateKey, nil
113
+
}
114
+
115
+
// IsPEMFormat checks if bytes are in PEM format (for migration detection)
116
+
// Exported for testing and migration utilities
117
+
func IsPEMFormat(data []byte) bool {
118
+
return len(data) > 10 && string(data[:5]) == "-----"
119
+
}
120
+
121
+
// GenerateOrLoadClientKey generates a new P256 key pair or loads an existing one
122
+
// This is a convenience wrapper for OAuth client keys
123
+
func GenerateOrLoadClientKey(keyPath string) (*atcrypto.PrivateKeyP256, error) {
124
+
key, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath, KeyTypeP256)
125
+
if err != nil {
126
+
return nil, err
127
+
}
128
+
129
+
p256Key, ok := key.(*atcrypto.PrivateKeyP256)
130
+
if !ok {
131
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected P-256 key, got different type")
132
+
}
133
+
134
+
return p256Key, nil
135
+
}
136
+
137
+
// GenerateOrLoadPDSKey generates a new K256 key pair or loads an existing one
138
+
// This is a convenience wrapper for ATProto PDS signing keys
139
+
func GenerateOrLoadPDSKey(keyPath string) (*atcrypto.PrivateKeyK256, error) {
140
+
key, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath, KeyTypeK256)
141
+
if err != nil {
142
+
return nil, err
143
+
}
144
+
145
+
k256Key, ok := key.(*atcrypto.PrivateKeyK256)
146
+
if !ok {
147
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected K-256 key, got different type")
148
+
}
149
+
150
+
return k256Key, nil
151
+
}
152
+
153
+
// GenerateKeyID generates a stable key ID from a P256 public key
154
+
// Uses the first 8 characters of the hex-encoded SHA256 hash of the public key bytes
155
+
func GenerateKeyID(privateKey *atcrypto.PrivateKeyP256) (string, error) {
156
+
// Get public key
157
+
pubKey, err := privateKey.PublicKey()
158
+
if err != nil {
159
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get public key: %w", err)
160
+
}
161
+
162
+
// Get public key bytes
163
+
pubKeyBytes := pubKey.Bytes()
164
+
165
+
// Hash public key bytes
166
+
hash := sha256.Sum256(pubKeyBytes)
167
+
168
+
// Return first 8 characters of hex-encoded hash
169
+
return hex.EncodeToString(hash[:])[:8], nil
170
+
}
171
+
172
+
// PrivateKeyToMultibase converts a P256 private key to multibase format
173
+
// Required by indigo's SetClientSecret() API
174
+
func PrivateKeyToMultibase(key *atcrypto.PrivateKeyP256) string {
175
+
return key.Multibase()
176
+
}
177
+
178
+
// MultibaseToPrivateKey parses a multibase-encoded P256 private key
179
+
func MultibaseToPrivateKey(encoded string) (*atcrypto.PrivateKeyP256, error) {
180
+
// ParsePrivateMultibase returns PrivateKeyExportable interface
181
+
key, err := atcrypto.ParsePrivateMultibase(encoded)
182
+
if err != nil {
183
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse multibase key: %w", err)
184
+
}
185
+
186
+
// Type assert to P256 key
187
+
p256Key, ok := key.(*atcrypto.PrivateKeyP256)
188
+
if !ok {
189
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected P-256 key, got different key type")
190
+
}
191
+
192
+
return p256Key, nil
193
+
}
+2
-2
pkg/auth/oauth/refresher_test.go
+2
-2
pkg/auth/oauth/refresher_test.go
···
13
13
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
14
14
}
15
15
16
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
16
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
17
17
if err != nil {
18
18
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
19
19
}
···
45
45
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
46
46
}
47
47
48
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
48
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
49
49
if err != nil {
50
50
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
51
51
}
+12
-12
pkg/auth/oauth/server_test.go
+12
-12
pkg/auth/oauth/server_test.go
···
19
19
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
20
20
}
21
21
22
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
22
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
23
23
if err != nil {
24
24
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
25
25
}
···
43
43
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
44
44
}
45
45
46
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
46
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
47
47
if err != nil {
48
48
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
49
49
}
···
66
66
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
67
67
}
68
68
69
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
69
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
70
70
if err != nil {
71
71
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
72
72
}
···
92
92
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
93
93
}
94
94
95
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
95
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
96
96
if err != nil {
97
97
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
98
98
}
···
155
155
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
156
156
}
157
157
158
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
158
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
159
159
if err != nil {
160
160
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
161
161
}
···
182
182
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
183
183
}
184
184
185
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
185
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
186
186
if err != nil {
187
187
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
188
188
}
···
211
211
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
212
212
}
213
213
214
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
214
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
215
215
if err != nil {
216
216
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
217
217
}
···
238
238
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
239
239
}
240
240
241
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
241
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
242
242
if err != nil {
243
243
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
244
244
}
···
270
270
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
271
271
}
272
272
273
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
273
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
274
274
if err != nil {
275
275
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
276
276
}
···
314
314
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
315
315
}
316
316
317
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
317
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
318
318
if err != nil {
319
319
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
320
320
}
···
343
343
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
344
344
}
345
345
346
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
346
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
347
347
if err != nil {
348
348
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
349
349
}
···
377
377
t.Fatalf("NewFileStore() error = %v", err)
378
378
}
379
379
380
-
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", false)
380
+
app, err := NewApp("http://localhost:5000", store, "*", "", "AT Container Registry")
381
381
if err != nil {
382
382
t.Fatalf("NewApp() error = %v", err)
383
383
}
+2
-1
pkg/hold/oci/xrpc_test.go
+2
-1
pkg/hold/oci/xrpc_test.go
···
14
14
"testing"
15
15
16
16
"atcr.io/pkg/atproto"
17
+
"atcr.io/pkg/auth/oauth"
17
18
"atcr.io/pkg/hold/pds"
18
19
"atcr.io/pkg/s3"
19
20
"github.com/distribution/distribution/v3/registry/storage/driver/factory"
···
37
38
38
39
// Generate one signing key to be reused across all tests
39
40
sharedTestKeyPath = filepath.Join(tmpDir, "shared-signing-key")
40
-
privateKey, err := pds.GenerateOrLoadKey(sharedTestKeyPath)
41
+
privateKey, err := oauth.GenerateOrLoadPDSKey(sharedTestKeyPath)
41
42
if err != nil {
42
43
panic(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to generate shared signing key: %v", err))
43
44
}
-78
pkg/hold/pds/keys.go
-78
pkg/hold/pds/keys.go
···
1
-
package pds
2
-
3
-
import (
4
-
"fmt"
5
-
"log/slog"
6
-
"os"
7
-
"path/filepath"
8
-
9
-
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/atcrypto"
10
-
)
11
-
12
-
// GenerateOrLoadKey generates a new K256 key pair or loads an existing one
13
-
func GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath string) (*atcrypto.PrivateKeyK256, error) {
14
-
// Ensure directory exists
15
-
dir := filepath.Dir(keyPath)
16
-
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
17
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create key directory: %w", err)
18
-
}
19
-
20
-
// Check if key already exists
21
-
if _, err := os.Stat(keyPath); err == nil {
22
-
// Key exists, load it
23
-
return loadKey(keyPath)
24
-
}
25
-
26
-
// Key doesn't exist, generate new one
27
-
return generateKey(keyPath)
28
-
}
29
-
30
-
// generateKey creates a new K256 (secp256k1) key pair using indigo's atcrypto
31
-
func generateKey(keyPath string) (*atcrypto.PrivateKeyK256, error) {
32
-
// Generate K256 key (secp256k1) using indigo
33
-
privateKey, err := atcrypto.GeneratePrivateKeyK256()
34
-
if err != nil {
35
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate key: %w", err)
36
-
}
37
-
38
-
// Serialize key to bytes
39
-
keyBytes := privateKey.Bytes()
40
-
41
-
// Write to file with restrictive permissions
42
-
if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyBytes, 0600); err != nil {
43
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write key file: %w", err)
44
-
}
45
-
46
-
slog.Info("Generated new K-256 signing key", "path", keyPath)
47
-
return privateKey, nil
48
-
}
49
-
50
-
// loadKey loads an existing private key from disk
51
-
func loadKey(keyPath string) (*atcrypto.PrivateKeyK256, error) {
52
-
// Read key bytes
53
-
keyBytes, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
54
-
if err != nil {
55
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read key file: %w", err)
56
-
}
57
-
58
-
// Try to parse as K256 private key
59
-
privateKey, err := atcrypto.ParsePrivateBytesK256(keyBytes)
60
-
if err != nil {
61
-
// Check if this is an old P-256 PEM key (migration)
62
-
if isPEMFormat(keyBytes) {
63
-
slog.Warn("Detected old P-256 key, replacing with K-256")
64
-
// Generate new K-256 key (overwrites old P-256)
65
-
return generateKey(keyPath)
66
-
}
67
-
68
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse private key: %w", err)
69
-
}
70
-
71
-
slog.Info("Loaded existing K-256 signing key", "path", keyPath)
72
-
return privateKey, nil
73
-
}
74
-
75
-
// isPEMFormat checks if bytes are in PEM format (old P-256 keys)
76
-
func isPEMFormat(data []byte) bool {
77
-
return len(data) > 10 && string(data[:5]) == "-----"
78
-
}
-437
pkg/hold/pds/keys_test.go
-437
pkg/hold/pds/keys_test.go
···
1
-
package pds
2
-
3
-
import (
4
-
"bytes"
5
-
"os"
6
-
"path/filepath"
7
-
"testing"
8
-
9
-
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/atcrypto"
10
-
)
11
-
12
-
// TestGenerateOrLoadKey_Generate tests generating a new key
13
-
func TestGenerateOrLoadKey_Generate(t *testing.T) {
14
-
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
15
-
keyPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test-key")
16
-
17
-
// Verify key doesn't exist yet
18
-
if _, err := os.Stat(keyPath); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
19
-
t.Fatal("Expected key file to not exist")
20
-
}
21
-
22
-
// Generate key
23
-
key, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath)
24
-
if err != nil {
25
-
t.Fatalf("GenerateOrLoadKey failed: %v", err)
26
-
}
27
-
28
-
if key == nil {
29
-
t.Fatal("Expected non-nil key")
30
-
}
31
-
32
-
// Verify key file was created
33
-
if _, err := os.Stat(keyPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
34
-
t.Error("Expected key file to be created")
35
-
}
36
-
37
-
// Verify key file has restrictive permissions (0600)
38
-
fileInfo, err := os.Stat(keyPath)
39
-
if err != nil {
40
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to stat key file: %v", err)
41
-
}
42
-
43
-
perm := fileInfo.Mode().Perm()
44
-
expectedPerm := os.FileMode(0600)
45
-
if perm != expectedPerm {
46
-
t.Errorf("Expected key file permissions %o, got %o", expectedPerm, perm)
47
-
}
48
-
49
-
// Verify key can sign data
50
-
testData := []byte("test data")
51
-
signature, err := key.HashAndSign(testData)
52
-
if err != nil {
53
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to sign with generated key: %v", err)
54
-
}
55
-
56
-
if len(signature) == 0 {
57
-
t.Error("Expected non-empty signature")
58
-
}
59
-
60
-
// Verify signature
61
-
pubKey, err := key.PublicKey()
62
-
if err != nil {
63
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to get public key: %v", err)
64
-
}
65
-
66
-
err = pubKey.HashAndVerify(testData, signature)
67
-
if err != nil {
68
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to verify signature: %v", err)
69
-
}
70
-
}
71
-
72
-
// TestGenerateOrLoadKey_Load tests loading an existing key
73
-
func TestGenerateOrLoadKey_Load(t *testing.T) {
74
-
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
75
-
keyPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test-key")
76
-
77
-
// Generate initial key
78
-
key1, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath)
79
-
if err != nil {
80
-
t.Fatalf("GenerateOrLoadKey failed on first call: %v", err)
81
-
}
82
-
83
-
// Get key bytes for comparison
84
-
key1Bytes := key1.Bytes()
85
-
86
-
// Load the same key again
87
-
key2, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath)
88
-
if err != nil {
89
-
t.Fatalf("GenerateOrLoadKey failed on second call: %v", err)
90
-
}
91
-
92
-
// Get key2 bytes
93
-
key2Bytes := key2.Bytes()
94
-
95
-
// Verify keys are identical
96
-
if len(key1Bytes) != len(key2Bytes) {
97
-
t.Fatalf("Key byte length mismatch: %d vs %d", len(key1Bytes), len(key2Bytes))
98
-
}
99
-
100
-
for i := range key1Bytes {
101
-
if key1Bytes[i] != key2Bytes[i] {
102
-
t.Errorf("Key byte mismatch at position %d: %x vs %x", i, key1Bytes[i], key2Bytes[i])
103
-
}
104
-
}
105
-
106
-
// Verify both keys produce same signature for same data
107
-
testData := []byte("consistent test data")
108
-
109
-
sig1, err := key1.HashAndSign(testData)
110
-
if err != nil {
111
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to sign with key1: %v", err)
112
-
}
113
-
114
-
// Verify sig1 with key2's public key
115
-
pubKey2, err := key2.PublicKey()
116
-
if err != nil {
117
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to get public key from key2: %v", err)
118
-
}
119
-
120
-
err = pubKey2.HashAndVerify(testData, sig1)
121
-
if err != nil {
122
-
t.Error("Signature from key1 should verify with key2 (they're the same key)")
123
-
}
124
-
}
125
-
126
-
// TestGenerateOrLoadKey_P256Migration tests migrating from old P-256 keys
127
-
func TestGenerateOrLoadKey_P256Migration(t *testing.T) {
128
-
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
129
-
keyPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "old-pem-key")
130
-
131
-
// Create a fake PEM file (old P-256 format)
132
-
pemContent := []byte(`-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
133
-
MHcCAQEEIFakeKeyDataHereThisIsNotARealKeyButHasPEMFormat
134
-
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----`)
135
-
136
-
err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, pemContent, 0600)
137
-
if err != nil {
138
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to write fake PEM key: %v", err)
139
-
}
140
-
141
-
// Verify file exists and is in PEM format
142
-
data, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
143
-
if err != nil {
144
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to read key file: %v", err)
145
-
}
146
-
147
-
if !isPEMFormat(data) {
148
-
t.Fatal("Expected key file to be in PEM format")
149
-
}
150
-
151
-
// Call GenerateOrLoadKey - should detect PEM and generate new K-256 key
152
-
key, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath)
153
-
if err != nil {
154
-
t.Fatalf("GenerateOrLoadKey failed during P-256 migration: %v", err)
155
-
}
156
-
157
-
if key == nil {
158
-
t.Fatal("Expected non-nil key after migration")
159
-
}
160
-
161
-
// Verify key file was replaced (no longer PEM)
162
-
newData, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
163
-
if err != nil {
164
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to read new key file: %v", err)
165
-
}
166
-
167
-
if isPEMFormat(newData) {
168
-
t.Error("Expected key file to no longer be in PEM format after migration")
169
-
}
170
-
171
-
// Verify new key is K-256 and works
172
-
testData := []byte("test after migration")
173
-
signature, err := key.HashAndSign(testData)
174
-
if err != nil {
175
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to sign with migrated key: %v", err)
176
-
}
177
-
178
-
pubKey, err := key.PublicKey()
179
-
if err != nil {
180
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to get public key: %v", err)
181
-
}
182
-
183
-
err = pubKey.HashAndVerify(testData, signature)
184
-
if err != nil {
185
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to verify signature from migrated key: %v", err)
186
-
}
187
-
}
188
-
189
-
// TestKeyPersistence tests that key bytes survive save/load cycle
190
-
func TestKeyPersistence(t *testing.T) {
191
-
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
192
-
keyPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "persist-key")
193
-
194
-
// Generate key
195
-
originalKey, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath)
196
-
if err != nil {
197
-
t.Fatalf("GenerateOrLoadKey failed: %v", err)
198
-
}
199
-
200
-
// Get original key bytes
201
-
originalBytes := originalKey.Bytes()
202
-
203
-
// Read key file directly
204
-
fileBytes, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
205
-
if err != nil {
206
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to read key file: %v", err)
207
-
}
208
-
209
-
// Verify file bytes match key bytes
210
-
if len(fileBytes) != len(originalBytes) {
211
-
t.Fatalf("File byte length mismatch: %d vs %d", len(fileBytes), len(originalBytes))
212
-
}
213
-
214
-
for i := range originalBytes {
215
-
if fileBytes[i] != originalBytes[i] {
216
-
t.Errorf("File byte mismatch at position %d: %x vs %x", i, fileBytes[i], originalBytes[i])
217
-
}
218
-
}
219
-
220
-
// Parse key directly from file bytes
221
-
parsedKey, err := atcrypto.ParsePrivateBytesK256(fileBytes)
222
-
if err != nil {
223
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to parse key from file bytes: %v", err)
224
-
}
225
-
226
-
// Verify parsed key matches original
227
-
parsedBytes := parsedKey.Bytes()
228
-
if len(parsedBytes) != len(originalBytes) {
229
-
t.Fatalf("Parsed key byte length mismatch: %d vs %d", len(parsedBytes), len(originalBytes))
230
-
}
231
-
232
-
for i := range originalBytes {
233
-
if parsedBytes[i] != originalBytes[i] {
234
-
t.Errorf("Parsed key byte mismatch at position %d: %x vs %x", i, parsedBytes[i], originalBytes[i])
235
-
}
236
-
}
237
-
}
238
-
239
-
// TestGenerateOrLoadKey_DirectoryCreation tests that parent directory is created
240
-
func TestGenerateOrLoadKey_DirectoryCreation(t *testing.T) {
241
-
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
242
-
keyPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "nested", "dir", "test-key")
243
-
244
-
// Verify nested directories don't exist
245
-
nestedDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "nested", "dir")
246
-
if _, err := os.Stat(nestedDir); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
247
-
t.Fatal("Expected nested directory to not exist")
248
-
}
249
-
250
-
// Generate key (should create directories)
251
-
key, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath)
252
-
if err != nil {
253
-
t.Fatalf("GenerateOrLoadKey failed: %v", err)
254
-
}
255
-
256
-
if key == nil {
257
-
t.Fatal("Expected non-nil key")
258
-
}
259
-
260
-
// Verify directories were created
261
-
if _, err := os.Stat(nestedDir); os.IsNotExist(err) {
262
-
t.Error("Expected nested directory to be created")
263
-
}
264
-
265
-
// Verify key file exists
266
-
if _, err := os.Stat(keyPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
267
-
t.Error("Expected key file to be created")
268
-
}
269
-
270
-
// Verify directory has restrictive permissions (0700)
271
-
dirInfo, err := os.Stat(nestedDir)
272
-
if err != nil {
273
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to stat directory: %v", err)
274
-
}
275
-
276
-
dirPerm := dirInfo.Mode().Perm()
277
-
expectedDirPerm := os.FileMode(0700)
278
-
if dirPerm != expectedDirPerm {
279
-
t.Errorf("Expected directory permissions %o, got %o", expectedDirPerm, dirPerm)
280
-
}
281
-
}
282
-
283
-
// TestIsPEMFormat tests the PEM format detection
284
-
func TestIsPEMFormat(t *testing.T) {
285
-
tests := []struct {
286
-
name string
287
-
data []byte
288
-
expected bool
289
-
}{
290
-
{
291
-
name: "Valid PEM",
292
-
data: []byte("-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\ndata\n-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----"),
293
-
expected: true,
294
-
},
295
-
{
296
-
name: "Valid PEM (RSA)",
297
-
data: []byte("-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\ndata\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"),
298
-
expected: true,
299
-
},
300
-
{
301
-
name: "Binary data",
302
-
data: []byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05},
303
-
expected: false,
304
-
},
305
-
{
306
-
name: "Empty data",
307
-
data: []byte{},
308
-
expected: false,
309
-
},
310
-
{
311
-
name: "Short data",
312
-
data: []byte("----"),
313
-
expected: false,
314
-
},
315
-
{
316
-
name: "Almost PEM (missing dashes)",
317
-
data: []byte("----BEGIN KEY-----"),
318
-
expected: false,
319
-
},
320
-
}
321
-
322
-
for _, tt := range tests {
323
-
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
324
-
result := isPEMFormat(tt.data)
325
-
if result != tt.expected {
326
-
t.Errorf("Expected isPEMFormat=%v, got %v", tt.expected, result)
327
-
}
328
-
})
329
-
}
330
-
}
331
-
332
-
// TestGenerateKey_UniqueKeys tests that each generated key is unique
333
-
func TestGenerateKey_UniqueKeys(t *testing.T) {
334
-
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
335
-
336
-
// Generate multiple keys
337
-
var keyBytes [][]byte
338
-
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
339
-
keyPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "key-"+string(rune('a'+i)))
340
-
key, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath)
341
-
if err != nil {
342
-
t.Fatalf("GenerateOrLoadKey failed for key %d: %v", i, err)
343
-
}
344
-
keyBytes = append(keyBytes, key.Bytes())
345
-
}
346
-
347
-
// Verify all keys are different
348
-
for i := 0; i < len(keyBytes); i++ {
349
-
for j := i + 1; j < len(keyBytes); j++ {
350
-
// Keys should be different
351
-
identical := true
352
-
if len(keyBytes[i]) != len(keyBytes[j]) {
353
-
identical = false
354
-
} else {
355
-
for k := range keyBytes[i] {
356
-
if keyBytes[i][k] != keyBytes[j][k] {
357
-
identical = false
358
-
break
359
-
}
360
-
}
361
-
}
362
-
363
-
if identical {
364
-
t.Errorf("Keys %d and %d are identical (expected unique keys)", i, j)
365
-
}
366
-
}
367
-
}
368
-
}
369
-
370
-
// TestLoadKey_InvalidFormat tests loading key with invalid format
371
-
func TestLoadKey_InvalidFormat(t *testing.T) {
372
-
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
373
-
keyPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "invalid-key")
374
-
375
-
// Write invalid data (not a valid K-256 key and not PEM)
376
-
invalidData := []byte("This is not a valid key format at all")
377
-
err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, invalidData, 0600)
378
-
if err != nil {
379
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to write invalid key: %v", err)
380
-
}
381
-
382
-
// Try to load (should fail with parse error, then try to generate new key)
383
-
// Since it's not PEM, it will try to parse as K-256 and fail,
384
-
// then NOT migrate (migration only happens for PEM), so it should error
385
-
_, err = GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath)
386
-
if err == nil {
387
-
t.Fatal("Expected error when loading invalid key format")
388
-
}
389
-
390
-
// Error should mention parsing failure
391
-
if err != nil && err.Error() == "" {
392
-
t.Error("Expected non-empty error message")
393
-
}
394
-
}
395
-
396
-
// TestGenerateOrLoadKey_CorruptedKey tests behavior with corrupted key file
397
-
func TestGenerateOrLoadKey_CorruptedKey(t *testing.T) {
398
-
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
399
-
keyPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "corrupted-key")
400
-
401
-
// Generate valid key first
402
-
key1, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath)
403
-
if err != nil {
404
-
t.Fatalf("GenerateOrLoadKey failed: %v", err)
405
-
}
406
-
407
-
originalBytes := key1.Bytes()
408
-
409
-
// Corrupt the key file (flip some bits in the middle)
410
-
corruptedBytes := make([]byte, len(originalBytes))
411
-
copy(corruptedBytes, originalBytes)
412
-
if len(corruptedBytes) > 10 {
413
-
corruptedBytes[5] ^= 0xFF
414
-
corruptedBytes[10] ^= 0xFF
415
-
}
416
-
417
-
err = os.WriteFile(keyPath, corruptedBytes, 0600)
418
-
if err != nil {
419
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to write corrupted key: %v", err)
420
-
}
421
-
422
-
// Try to load corrupted key
423
-
// Note: K256 keys are flexible, so slightly corrupted keys might still be valid
424
-
// We just verify that it either loads successfully or returns an error
425
-
key2, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath)
426
-
if err != nil {
427
-
// Expected - corrupted key failed to load
428
-
t.Logf("Corrupted key failed to load as expected: %v", err)
429
-
return
430
-
}
431
-
432
-
// If it loaded, verify it's different from the original
433
-
key2Bytes := key2.Bytes()
434
-
if bytes.Equal(originalBytes, key2Bytes) {
435
-
t.Error("Corrupted key loaded with same bytes as original (unexpected)")
436
-
}
437
-
}
+2
-1
pkg/hold/pds/server.go
+2
-1
pkg/hold/pds/server.go
···
9
9
"strings"
10
10
11
11
"atcr.io/pkg/atproto"
12
+
"atcr.io/pkg/auth/oauth"
12
13
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/atcrypto"
13
14
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/carstore"
14
15
lexutil "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/lex/util"
···
44
45
// NewHoldPDS creates or opens a hold PDS with SQLite carstore
45
46
func NewHoldPDS(ctx context.Context, did, publicURL, dbPath, keyPath string, enableBlueskyPosts bool) (*HoldPDS, error) {
46
47
// Generate or load signing key
47
-
signingKey, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(keyPath)
48
+
signingKey, err := oauth.GenerateOrLoadPDSKey(keyPath)
48
49
if err != nil {
49
50
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize signing key: %w", err)
50
51
}
+2
-1
pkg/hold/pds/status_test.go
+2
-1
pkg/hold/pds/status_test.go
···
12
12
"time"
13
13
14
14
"atcr.io/pkg/atproto"
15
+
"atcr.io/pkg/auth/oauth"
15
16
"atcr.io/pkg/s3"
16
17
bsky "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/api/bsky"
17
18
)
···
265
266
266
267
// Generate one signing key to be reused across all tests in the package
267
268
sharedTestKeyPath = filepath.Join(tmpDir, "shared-signing-key")
268
-
privateKey, err := GenerateOrLoadKey(sharedTestKeyPath)
269
+
privateKey, err := oauth.GenerateOrLoadPDSKey(sharedTestKeyPath)
269
270
if err != nil {
270
271
panic(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to generate shared signing key: %v", err))
271
272
}