A container registry that uses the AT Protocol for manifest storage and S3 for blob storage.
atcr.io
docker
container
atproto
go
try and offline holds
+8321
-815
+728
docs/ATCR_VERIFY_CLI.md
+728
docs/ATCR_VERIFY_CLI.md
···
1
+
# atcr-verify CLI Tool
2
+
3
+
## Overview
4
+
5
+
`atcr-verify` is a command-line tool for verifying ATProto signatures on container images stored in ATCR. It provides cryptographic verification of image manifests using ATProto's DID-based trust model.
6
+
7
+
## Features
8
+
9
+
- ✅ Verify ATProto signatures via OCI Referrers API
10
+
- ✅ DID resolution and public key extraction
11
+
- ✅ PDS query and commit signature verification
12
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- ✅ Trust policy enforcement
13
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- ✅ Offline verification mode (with cached data)
14
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- ✅ Multiple output formats (human-readable, JSON, quiet)
15
+
- ✅ Exit codes for CI/CD integration
16
+
- ✅ Kubernetes admission controller integration
17
+
18
+
## Installation
19
+
20
+
### Binary Release
21
+
22
+
```bash
23
+
# Linux (x86_64)
24
+
curl -L https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/releases/latest/download/atcr-verify-linux-amd64 -o atcr-verify
25
+
chmod +x atcr-verify
26
+
sudo mv atcr-verify /usr/local/bin/
27
+
28
+
# macOS (Apple Silicon)
29
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curl -L https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/releases/latest/download/atcr-verify-darwin-arm64 -o atcr-verify
30
+
chmod +x atcr-verify
31
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sudo mv atcr-verify /usr/local/bin/
32
+
33
+
# Windows
34
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curl -L https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/releases/latest/download/atcr-verify-windows-amd64.exe -o atcr-verify.exe
35
+
```
36
+
37
+
### From Source
38
+
39
+
```bash
40
+
git clone https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr.git
41
+
cd atcr
42
+
go install ./cmd/atcr-verify
43
+
```
44
+
45
+
### Container Image
46
+
47
+
```bash
48
+
docker pull atcr.io/atcr/verify:latest
49
+
50
+
# Run
51
+
docker run --rm atcr.io/atcr/verify:latest verify IMAGE
52
+
```
53
+
54
+
## Usage
55
+
56
+
### Basic Verification
57
+
58
+
```bash
59
+
# Verify an image
60
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
61
+
62
+
# Output:
63
+
# ✓ Image verified successfully
64
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# Signed by: alice.bsky.social (did:plc:alice123)
65
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# Signed at: 2025-10-31T12:34:56.789Z
66
+
```
67
+
68
+
### With Trust Policy
69
+
70
+
```bash
71
+
# Verify against trust policy
72
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --policy trust-policy.yaml
73
+
74
+
# Output:
75
+
# ✓ Image verified successfully
76
+
# ✓ Trust policy satisfied
77
+
# Policy: production-images
78
+
# Trusted DID: did:plc:alice123
79
+
```
80
+
81
+
### JSON Output
82
+
83
+
```bash
84
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atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --output json
85
+
86
+
# Output:
87
+
{
88
+
"verified": true,
89
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"image": "atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest",
90
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"digest": "sha256:abc123...",
91
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"signature": {
92
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"did": "did:plc:alice123",
93
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"handle": "alice.bsky.social",
94
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"pds": "https://bsky.social",
95
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"recordUri": "at://did:plc:alice123/io.atcr.manifest/abc123",
96
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"commitCid": "bafyreih8...",
97
+
"signedAt": "2025-10-31T12:34:56.789Z",
98
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"algorithm": "ECDSA-K256-SHA256"
99
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},
100
+
"trustPolicy": {
101
+
"satisfied": true,
102
+
"policy": "production-images",
103
+
"trustedDID": true
104
+
}
105
+
}
106
+
```
107
+
108
+
### Quiet Mode
109
+
110
+
```bash
111
+
# Exit code only (for scripts)
112
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --quiet
113
+
echo $? # 0 = verified, 1 = failed
114
+
```
115
+
116
+
### Offline Mode
117
+
118
+
```bash
119
+
# Export verification bundle
120
+
atcr-verify export atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest -o bundle.json
121
+
122
+
# Verify offline (in air-gapped environment)
123
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --offline --bundle bundle.json
124
+
```
125
+
126
+
## Command Reference
127
+
128
+
### verify
129
+
130
+
Verify ATProto signature for an image.
131
+
132
+
```bash
133
+
atcr-verify verify IMAGE [flags]
134
+
atcr-verify IMAGE [flags] # 'verify' subcommand is optional
135
+
```
136
+
137
+
**Arguments:**
138
+
- `IMAGE` - Image reference (registry/owner/repo:tag or @digest)
139
+
140
+
**Flags:**
141
+
- `--policy FILE` - Trust policy file (default: none)
142
+
- `--output FORMAT` - Output format: text, json, quiet (default: text)
143
+
- `--offline` - Offline mode (requires --bundle)
144
+
- `--bundle FILE` - Verification bundle for offline mode
145
+
- `--cache-dir DIR` - Cache directory for DID documents (default: ~/.atcr/cache)
146
+
- `--no-cache` - Disable caching
147
+
- `--timeout DURATION` - Verification timeout (default: 30s)
148
+
- `--verbose` - Verbose output
149
+
150
+
**Exit Codes:**
151
+
- `0` - Verification succeeded
152
+
- `1` - Verification failed
153
+
- `2` - Invalid arguments
154
+
- `3` - Network error
155
+
- `4` - Trust policy violation
156
+
157
+
**Examples:**
158
+
159
+
```bash
160
+
# Basic verification
161
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
162
+
163
+
# With specific digest
164
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp@sha256:abc123...
165
+
166
+
# With trust policy
167
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --policy production-policy.yaml
168
+
169
+
# JSON output for scripting
170
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --output json | jq .verified
171
+
172
+
# Quiet mode for CI/CD
173
+
if atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --quiet; then
174
+
echo "Deploy approved"
175
+
fi
176
+
```
177
+
178
+
### export
179
+
180
+
Export verification bundle for offline verification.
181
+
182
+
```bash
183
+
atcr-verify export IMAGE [flags]
184
+
```
185
+
186
+
**Arguments:**
187
+
- `IMAGE` - Image reference to export bundle for
188
+
189
+
**Flags:**
190
+
- `-o, --output FILE` - Output file (default: stdout)
191
+
- `--include-did-docs` - Include DID documents in bundle
192
+
- `--include-commit` - Include ATProto commit data
193
+
194
+
**Examples:**
195
+
196
+
```bash
197
+
# Export to file
198
+
atcr-verify export atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest -o myapp-bundle.json
199
+
200
+
# Export with all verification data
201
+
atcr-verify export atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest \
202
+
--include-did-docs \
203
+
--include-commit \
204
+
-o complete-bundle.json
205
+
206
+
# Export for multiple images
207
+
for img in $(cat images.txt); do
208
+
atcr-verify export $img -o bundles/$(echo $img | tr '/:' '_').json
209
+
done
210
+
```
211
+
212
+
### trust
213
+
214
+
Manage trust policies and trusted DIDs.
215
+
216
+
```bash
217
+
atcr-verify trust COMMAND [flags]
218
+
```
219
+
220
+
**Subcommands:**
221
+
222
+
**`trust list`** - List trusted DIDs
223
+
```bash
224
+
atcr-verify trust list
225
+
226
+
# Output:
227
+
# Trusted DIDs:
228
+
# - did:plc:alice123 (alice.bsky.social)
229
+
# - did:plc:bob456 (bob.example.com)
230
+
```
231
+
232
+
**`trust add DID`** - Add trusted DID
233
+
```bash
234
+
atcr-verify trust add did:plc:alice123
235
+
atcr-verify trust add did:plc:alice123 --name "Alice (DevOps)"
236
+
```
237
+
238
+
**`trust remove DID`** - Remove trusted DID
239
+
```bash
240
+
atcr-verify trust remove did:plc:alice123
241
+
```
242
+
243
+
**`trust policy validate`** - Validate trust policy file
244
+
```bash
245
+
atcr-verify trust policy validate policy.yaml
246
+
```
247
+
248
+
### version
249
+
250
+
Show version information.
251
+
252
+
```bash
253
+
atcr-verify version
254
+
255
+
# Output:
256
+
# atcr-verify version 1.0.0
257
+
# Go version: go1.21.5
258
+
# Commit: 3b5b89b
259
+
# Built: 2025-10-31T12:00:00Z
260
+
```
261
+
262
+
## Trust Policy
263
+
264
+
Trust policies define which signatures to trust and what to do when verification fails.
265
+
266
+
### Policy File Format
267
+
268
+
```yaml
269
+
version: 1.0
270
+
271
+
# Global settings
272
+
defaultAction: enforce # enforce, audit, allow
273
+
requireSignature: true
274
+
275
+
# Policies matched by image pattern (first match wins)
276
+
policies:
277
+
- name: production-images
278
+
description: "Production images must be signed by DevOps or Security"
279
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/prod-*"
280
+
require:
281
+
signature: true
282
+
trustedDIDs:
283
+
- did:plc:devops-team
284
+
- did:plc:security-team
285
+
minSignatures: 1
286
+
maxAge: 2592000 # 30 days in seconds
287
+
action: enforce
288
+
289
+
- name: staging-images
290
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/staging-*"
291
+
require:
292
+
signature: true
293
+
trustedDIDs:
294
+
- did:plc:devops-team
295
+
- did:plc:developers
296
+
minSignatures: 1
297
+
action: enforce
298
+
299
+
- name: dev-images
300
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/dev-*"
301
+
require:
302
+
signature: false
303
+
action: audit # Log but don't fail
304
+
305
+
# Trusted DID registry
306
+
trustedDIDs:
307
+
did:plc:devops-team:
308
+
name: "DevOps Team"
309
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
310
+
expiresAt: null
311
+
contact: "devops@example.com"
312
+
313
+
did:plc:security-team:
314
+
name: "Security Team"
315
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
316
+
expiresAt: null
317
+
318
+
did:plc:developers:
319
+
name: "Developer Team"
320
+
validFrom: "2024-06-01T00:00:00Z"
321
+
expiresAt: "2025-12-31T23:59:59Z"
322
+
```
323
+
324
+
### Policy Matching
325
+
326
+
Policies are evaluated in order. First match wins.
327
+
328
+
**Scope patterns:**
329
+
- `atcr.io/*/*` - All ATCR images
330
+
- `atcr.io/myorg/*` - All images from myorg
331
+
- `atcr.io/*/prod-*` - All images with "prod-" prefix
332
+
- `atcr.io/myorg/myapp` - Specific repository
333
+
- `atcr.io/myorg/myapp:v*` - Tag pattern matching
334
+
335
+
### Policy Actions
336
+
337
+
**`enforce`** - Reject if policy fails
338
+
- Exit code 4
339
+
- Blocks deployment
340
+
341
+
**`audit`** - Log but allow
342
+
- Exit code 0 (success)
343
+
- Warning message printed
344
+
345
+
**`allow`** - Always allow
346
+
- No verification performed
347
+
- Exit code 0
348
+
349
+
### Policy Requirements
350
+
351
+
**`signature: true`** - Require signature present
352
+
353
+
**`trustedDIDs`** - List of trusted DIDs
354
+
```yaml
355
+
trustedDIDs:
356
+
- did:plc:alice123
357
+
- did:web:example.com
358
+
```
359
+
360
+
**`minSignatures`** - Minimum number of signatures required
361
+
```yaml
362
+
minSignatures: 2 # Require 2 signatures
363
+
```
364
+
365
+
**`maxAge`** - Maximum signature age in seconds
366
+
```yaml
367
+
maxAge: 2592000 # 30 days
368
+
```
369
+
370
+
**`algorithms`** - Allowed signature algorithms
371
+
```yaml
372
+
algorithms:
373
+
- ECDSA-K256-SHA256
374
+
```
375
+
376
+
## Verification Flow
377
+
378
+
### 1. Image Resolution
379
+
380
+
```
381
+
Input: atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
382
+
↓
383
+
Resolve tag to digest
384
+
↓
385
+
Output: sha256:abc123...
386
+
```
387
+
388
+
### 2. Signature Discovery
389
+
390
+
```
391
+
Query OCI Referrers API:
392
+
GET /v2/alice/myapp/referrers/sha256:abc123
393
+
?artifactType=application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json
394
+
↓
395
+
Returns: List of signature artifacts
396
+
↓
397
+
Download signature metadata blobs
398
+
```
399
+
400
+
### 3. DID Resolution
401
+
402
+
```
403
+
Extract DID from signature: did:plc:alice123
404
+
↓
405
+
Query PLC directory:
406
+
GET https://plc.directory/did:plc:alice123
407
+
↓
408
+
Extract public key from DID document
409
+
```
410
+
411
+
### 4. PDS Query
412
+
413
+
```
414
+
Get PDS endpoint from DID document
415
+
↓
416
+
Query for manifest record:
417
+
GET {pds}/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.getRecord
418
+
?repo=did:plc:alice123
419
+
&collection=io.atcr.manifest
420
+
&rkey=abc123
421
+
↓
422
+
Get commit CID from record
423
+
↓
424
+
Fetch commit data (includes signature)
425
+
```
426
+
427
+
### 5. Signature Verification
428
+
429
+
```
430
+
Extract signature bytes from commit
431
+
↓
432
+
Compute commit hash (SHA-256)
433
+
↓
434
+
Verify: ECDSA_K256(hash, signature, publicKey)
435
+
↓
436
+
Result: Valid or Invalid
437
+
```
438
+
439
+
### 6. Trust Policy Evaluation
440
+
441
+
```
442
+
Check if DID is in trustedDIDs list
443
+
↓
444
+
Check signature age < maxAge
445
+
↓
446
+
Check minSignatures satisfied
447
+
↓
448
+
Apply policy action (enforce/audit/allow)
449
+
```
450
+
451
+
## Integration Examples
452
+
453
+
### CI/CD Pipeline
454
+
455
+
**GitHub Actions:**
456
+
```yaml
457
+
name: Deploy
458
+
459
+
on:
460
+
push:
461
+
branches: [main]
462
+
463
+
jobs:
464
+
verify-and-deploy:
465
+
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
466
+
steps:
467
+
- name: Install atcr-verify
468
+
run: |
469
+
curl -L https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/releases/latest/download/atcr-verify-linux-amd64 -o atcr-verify
470
+
chmod +x atcr-verify
471
+
sudo mv atcr-verify /usr/local/bin/
472
+
473
+
- name: Verify image signature
474
+
run: |
475
+
atcr-verify ${{ env.IMAGE }} --policy .github/trust-policy.yaml
476
+
477
+
- name: Deploy to production
478
+
if: success()
479
+
run: kubectl set image deployment/app app=${{ env.IMAGE }}
480
+
```
481
+
482
+
**GitLab CI:**
483
+
```yaml
484
+
verify:
485
+
stage: verify
486
+
image: atcr.io/atcr/verify:latest
487
+
script:
488
+
- atcr-verify ${IMAGE} --policy trust-policy.yaml
489
+
490
+
deploy:
491
+
stage: deploy
492
+
dependencies:
493
+
- verify
494
+
script:
495
+
- kubectl set image deployment/app app=${IMAGE}
496
+
```
497
+
498
+
**Jenkins:**
499
+
```groovy
500
+
pipeline {
501
+
agent any
502
+
503
+
stages {
504
+
stage('Verify') {
505
+
steps {
506
+
sh 'atcr-verify ${IMAGE} --policy trust-policy.yaml'
507
+
}
508
+
}
509
+
510
+
stage('Deploy') {
511
+
when {
512
+
expression { currentBuild.result == 'SUCCESS' }
513
+
}
514
+
steps {
515
+
sh 'kubectl set image deployment/app app=${IMAGE}'
516
+
}
517
+
}
518
+
}
519
+
}
520
+
```
521
+
522
+
### Kubernetes Admission Controller
523
+
524
+
**Using as webhook backend:**
525
+
526
+
```go
527
+
// webhook server
528
+
func (h *Handler) ValidatePod(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
529
+
var admReq admissionv1.AdmissionReview
530
+
json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&admReq)
531
+
532
+
pod := &corev1.Pod{}
533
+
json.Unmarshal(admReq.Request.Object.Raw, pod)
534
+
535
+
// Verify each container image
536
+
for _, container := range pod.Spec.Containers {
537
+
cmd := exec.Command("atcr-verify", container.Image,
538
+
"--policy", "/etc/atcr/trust-policy.yaml",
539
+
"--quiet")
540
+
541
+
if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
542
+
// Verification failed
543
+
admResp := admissionv1.AdmissionReview{
544
+
Response: &admissionv1.AdmissionResponse{
545
+
UID: admReq.Request.UID,
546
+
Allowed: false,
547
+
Result: &metav1.Status{
548
+
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Image %s failed signature verification", container.Image),
549
+
},
550
+
},
551
+
}
552
+
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(admResp)
553
+
return
554
+
}
555
+
}
556
+
557
+
// All images verified
558
+
admResp := admissionv1.AdmissionReview{
559
+
Response: &admissionv1.AdmissionResponse{
560
+
UID: admReq.Request.UID,
561
+
Allowed: true,
562
+
},
563
+
}
564
+
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(admResp)
565
+
}
566
+
```
567
+
568
+
### Pre-Pull Verification
569
+
570
+
**Systemd service:**
571
+
```ini
572
+
# /etc/systemd/system/myapp.service
573
+
[Unit]
574
+
Description=My Application
575
+
After=docker.service
576
+
577
+
[Service]
578
+
Type=oneshot
579
+
ExecStartPre=/usr/local/bin/atcr-verify atcr.io/myorg/myapp:latest --policy /etc/atcr/policy.yaml
580
+
ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/docker pull atcr.io/myorg/myapp:latest
581
+
ExecStart=/usr/bin/docker run atcr.io/myorg/myapp:latest
582
+
Restart=on-failure
583
+
584
+
[Install]
585
+
WantedBy=multi-user.target
586
+
```
587
+
588
+
**Docker wrapper script:**
589
+
```bash
590
+
#!/bin/bash
591
+
# docker-secure-pull.sh
592
+
593
+
IMAGE="$1"
594
+
595
+
# Verify before pulling
596
+
if ! atcr-verify "$IMAGE" --policy ~/.atcr/trust-policy.yaml; then
597
+
echo "ERROR: Image signature verification failed"
598
+
exit 1
599
+
fi
600
+
601
+
# Pull if verified
602
+
docker pull "$IMAGE"
603
+
```
604
+
605
+
## Configuration
606
+
607
+
### Config File
608
+
609
+
Location: `~/.atcr/config.yaml`
610
+
611
+
```yaml
612
+
# Default trust policy
613
+
defaultPolicy: ~/.atcr/trust-policy.yaml
614
+
615
+
# Cache settings
616
+
cache:
617
+
enabled: true
618
+
directory: ~/.atcr/cache
619
+
ttl:
620
+
didDocuments: 3600 # 1 hour
621
+
commits: 600 # 10 minutes
622
+
623
+
# Network settings
624
+
timeout: 30s
625
+
retries: 3
626
+
627
+
# Output settings
628
+
output:
629
+
format: text # text, json, quiet
630
+
color: auto # auto, always, never
631
+
632
+
# Registry settings
633
+
registries:
634
+
atcr.io:
635
+
insecure: false
636
+
credentialsFile: ~/.docker/config.json
637
+
```
638
+
639
+
### Environment Variables
640
+
641
+
- `ATCR_CONFIG` - Config file path
642
+
- `ATCR_POLICY` - Default trust policy file
643
+
- `ATCR_CACHE_DIR` - Cache directory
644
+
- `ATCR_OUTPUT` - Output format (text, json, quiet)
645
+
- `ATCR_TIMEOUT` - Verification timeout
646
+
- `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` - Proxy settings
647
+
- `NO_CACHE` - Disable caching
648
+
649
+
## Library Usage
650
+
651
+
`atcr-verify` can also be used as a Go library:
652
+
653
+
```go
654
+
import "github.com/atcr-io/atcr/pkg/verify"
655
+
656
+
func main() {
657
+
verifier := verify.NewVerifier(verify.Config{
658
+
Policy: policy,
659
+
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
660
+
})
661
+
662
+
result, err := verifier.Verify(ctx, "atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest")
663
+
if err != nil {
664
+
log.Fatal(err)
665
+
}
666
+
667
+
if !result.Verified {
668
+
log.Fatal("Verification failed")
669
+
}
670
+
671
+
fmt.Printf("Verified by %s\n", result.Signature.DID)
672
+
}
673
+
```
674
+
675
+
## Performance
676
+
677
+
### Typical Verification Times
678
+
679
+
- **First verification:** 500-1000ms
680
+
- OCI Referrers API: 50-100ms
681
+
- DID resolution: 50-150ms
682
+
- PDS query: 100-300ms
683
+
- Signature verification: 1-5ms
684
+
685
+
- **Cached verification:** 50-150ms
686
+
- DID document cached
687
+
- Signature metadata cached
688
+
689
+
### Optimization Tips
690
+
691
+
1. **Enable caching** - DID documents change rarely
692
+
2. **Use offline bundles** - For air-gapped environments
693
+
3. **Parallel verification** - Verify multiple images concurrently
694
+
4. **Local trust policy** - Avoid remote policy fetches
695
+
696
+
## Troubleshooting
697
+
698
+
### Verification Fails
699
+
700
+
```bash
701
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --verbose
702
+
```
703
+
704
+
Common issues:
705
+
- **No signature found** - Image not signed, check Referrers API
706
+
- **DID resolution failed** - Network issue, check PLC directory
707
+
- **PDS unreachable** - Network issue, check PDS endpoint
708
+
- **Signature invalid** - Tampering detected or key mismatch
709
+
- **Trust policy violation** - DID not in trusted list
710
+
711
+
### Enable Debug Logging
712
+
713
+
```bash
714
+
ATCR_LOG_LEVEL=debug atcr-verify IMAGE
715
+
```
716
+
717
+
### Clear Cache
718
+
719
+
```bash
720
+
rm -rf ~/.atcr/cache
721
+
```
722
+
723
+
## See Also
724
+
725
+
- [ATProto Signatures](./ATPROTO_SIGNATURES.md) - How ATProto signing works
726
+
- [Integration Strategy](./INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md) - Overview of integration approaches
727
+
- [Signature Integration](./SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md) - Tool-specific guides
728
+
- [Trust Policy Examples](../examples/verification/trust-policy.yaml)
+501
docs/ATPROTO_SIGNATURES.md
+501
docs/ATPROTO_SIGNATURES.md
···
1
+
# ATProto Signatures for Container Images
2
+
3
+
## Overview
4
+
5
+
ATCR container images are **already cryptographically signed** through ATProto's repository commit system. Every manifest stored in a user's PDS is signed with the user's ATProto signing key, providing cryptographic proof of authorship and integrity.
6
+
7
+
This document explains:
8
+
- How ATProto signing works
9
+
- Why additional signing tools aren't needed
10
+
- How to bridge ATProto signatures to the OCI/ORAS ecosystem
11
+
- Trust model and security considerations
12
+
13
+
## Key Insight: Manifests Are Already Signed
14
+
15
+
When you push an image to ATCR:
16
+
17
+
```bash
18
+
docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
19
+
```
20
+
21
+
The following happens:
22
+
23
+
1. **AppView stores manifest** as an `io.atcr.manifest` record in alice's PDS
24
+
2. **PDS creates repository commit** containing the manifest record
25
+
3. **PDS signs the commit** with alice's ATProto signing key (ECDSA K-256)
26
+
4. **Signature is stored** in the repository commit object
27
+
28
+
**Result:** The manifest is cryptographically signed with alice's private key, and anyone can verify it using alice's public key from her DID document.
29
+
30
+
## ATProto Signing Mechanism
31
+
32
+
### Repository Commit Signing
33
+
34
+
ATProto uses a Merkle Search Tree (MST) to store records, and every modification creates a signed commit:
35
+
36
+
```
37
+
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
38
+
│ Repository Commit │
39
+
├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
40
+
│ DID: did:plc:alice123 │
41
+
│ Version: 3jzfkjqwdwa2a │
42
+
│ Previous: bafyreig7... (parent commit) │
43
+
│ Data CID: bafyreih8... (MST root) │
44
+
│ ┌───────────────────────────────────────┐ │
45
+
│ │ Signature (ECDSA K-256 + SHA-256) │ │
46
+
│ │ Signed with: alice's private key │ │
47
+
│ │ Value: 0x3045022100... (DER format) │ │
48
+
│ └───────────────────────────────────────┘ │
49
+
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
50
+
│
51
+
↓
52
+
┌─────────────────────┐
53
+
│ Merkle Search Tree │
54
+
│ (contains records) │
55
+
└─────────────────────┘
56
+
│
57
+
↓
58
+
┌────────────────────────────┐
59
+
│ io.atcr.manifest record │
60
+
│ Repository: myapp │
61
+
│ Digest: sha256:abc123... │
62
+
│ Layers: [...] │
63
+
└────────────────────────────┘
64
+
```
65
+
66
+
### Signature Algorithm
67
+
68
+
**Algorithm:** ECDSA with K-256 (secp256k1) curve + SHA-256 hash
69
+
- **Curve:** secp256k1 (same as Bitcoin, Ethereum)
70
+
- **Hash:** SHA-256
71
+
- **Format:** DER-encoded signature bytes
72
+
- **Variant:** "low-S" signatures (per BIP-0062)
73
+
74
+
**Signing process:**
75
+
1. Serialize commit data as DAG-CBOR
76
+
2. Hash with SHA-256
77
+
3. Sign hash with ECDSA K-256 private key
78
+
4. Store signature in commit object
79
+
80
+
### Public Key Distribution
81
+
82
+
Public keys are distributed via DID documents, accessible through DID resolution:
83
+
84
+
**DID Resolution Flow:**
85
+
```
86
+
did:plc:alice123
87
+
↓
88
+
Query PLC directory: https://plc.directory/did:plc:alice123
89
+
↓
90
+
DID Document:
91
+
{
92
+
"@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1"],
93
+
"id": "did:plc:alice123",
94
+
"verificationMethod": [{
95
+
"id": "did:plc:alice123#atproto",
96
+
"type": "Multikey",
97
+
"controller": "did:plc:alice123",
98
+
"publicKeyMultibase": "zQ3shokFTS3brHcDQrn82RUDfCZESWL1ZdCEJwekUDdo1Ko4Z"
99
+
}],
100
+
"service": [{
101
+
"id": "#atproto_pds",
102
+
"type": "AtprotoPersonalDataServer",
103
+
"serviceEndpoint": "https://bsky.social"
104
+
}]
105
+
}
106
+
```
107
+
108
+
**Public key format:**
109
+
- **Encoding:** Multibase (base58btc with `z` prefix)
110
+
- **Codec:** Multicodec `0xE701` for K-256 keys
111
+
- **Example:** `zQ3sh...` decodes to 33-byte compressed public key
112
+
113
+
## Verification Process
114
+
115
+
To verify a manifest's signature:
116
+
117
+
### Step 1: Resolve Image to Manifest Digest
118
+
119
+
```bash
120
+
# Get manifest digest
121
+
DIGEST=$(crane digest atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest)
122
+
# Result: sha256:abc123...
123
+
```
124
+
125
+
### Step 2: Fetch Manifest Record from PDS
126
+
127
+
```bash
128
+
# Extract repository name from image reference
129
+
REPO="myapp"
130
+
131
+
# Query PDS for manifest record
132
+
curl "https://bsky.social/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.listRecords?\
133
+
repo=did:plc:alice123&\
134
+
collection=io.atcr.manifest&\
135
+
limit=100" | jq -r '.records[] | select(.value.digest == "sha256:abc123...")'
136
+
```
137
+
138
+
Response includes:
139
+
```json
140
+
{
141
+
"uri": "at://did:plc:alice123/io.atcr.manifest/abc123",
142
+
"cid": "bafyreig7...",
143
+
"value": {
144
+
"$type": "io.atcr.manifest",
145
+
"repository": "myapp",
146
+
"digest": "sha256:abc123...",
147
+
...
148
+
}
149
+
}
150
+
```
151
+
152
+
### Step 3: Fetch Repository Commit
153
+
154
+
```bash
155
+
# Get current repository state
156
+
curl "https://bsky.social/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.getRepo?\
157
+
did=did:plc:alice123" --output repo.car
158
+
159
+
# Extract commit from CAR file (requires ATProto tools)
160
+
# Commit includes signature over repository state
161
+
```
162
+
163
+
### Step 4: Resolve DID to Public Key
164
+
165
+
```bash
166
+
# Resolve DID document
167
+
curl "https://plc.directory/did:plc:alice123" | jq -r '.verificationMethod[0].publicKeyMultibase'
168
+
# Result: zQ3shokFTS3brHcDQrn82RUDfCZESWL1ZdCEJwekUDdo1Ko4Z
169
+
```
170
+
171
+
### Step 5: Verify Signature
172
+
173
+
```go
174
+
// Pseudocode for verification
175
+
import "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/crypto"
176
+
177
+
// 1. Parse commit
178
+
commit := parseCommitFromCAR(repoCAR)
179
+
180
+
// 2. Extract signature bytes
181
+
signature := commit.Sig
182
+
183
+
// 3. Get bytes that were signed
184
+
bytesToVerify := commit.Unsigned().BytesForSigning()
185
+
186
+
// 4. Decode public key from multibase
187
+
pubKey := decodeMultibasePublicKey(publicKeyMultibase)
188
+
189
+
// 5. Verify ECDSA signature
190
+
valid := crypto.VerifySignature(pubKey, bytesToVerify, signature)
191
+
```
192
+
193
+
### Step 6: Verify Manifest Integrity
194
+
195
+
```bash
196
+
# Verify the manifest record's CID matches the content
197
+
# CID is content-addressed, so tampering changes the CID
198
+
```
199
+
200
+
## Bridging to OCI/ORAS Ecosystem
201
+
202
+
While ATProto signatures are cryptographically sound, the OCI ecosystem doesn't understand ATProto records. To make signatures discoverable, we create **ORAS signature artifacts** that reference the ATProto signature.
203
+
204
+
### ORAS Signature Artifact Format
205
+
206
+
```json
207
+
{
208
+
"schemaVersion": 2,
209
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json",
210
+
"artifactType": "application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json",
211
+
"config": {
212
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.empty.v1+json",
213
+
"digest": "sha256:44136fa355b3678a1146ad16f7e8649e94fb4fc21fe77e8310c060f61caaff8a",
214
+
"size": 2
215
+
},
216
+
"subject": {
217
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json",
218
+
"digest": "sha256:abc123...",
219
+
"size": 1234
220
+
},
221
+
"layers": [
222
+
{
223
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json",
224
+
"digest": "sha256:sig789...",
225
+
"size": 512,
226
+
"annotations": {
227
+
"org.opencontainers.image.title": "atproto-signature.json"
228
+
}
229
+
}
230
+
],
231
+
"annotations": {
232
+
"io.atcr.atproto.did": "did:plc:alice123",
233
+
"io.atcr.atproto.pds": "https://bsky.social",
234
+
"io.atcr.atproto.recordUri": "at://did:plc:alice123/io.atcr.manifest/abc123",
235
+
"io.atcr.atproto.commitCid": "bafyreih8...",
236
+
"io.atcr.atproto.signedAt": "2025-10-31T12:34:56.789Z",
237
+
"io.atcr.atproto.keyId": "did:plc:alice123#atproto"
238
+
}
239
+
}
240
+
```
241
+
242
+
**Key elements:**
243
+
244
+
1. **artifactType**: `application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json` - identifies this as an ATProto signature
245
+
2. **subject**: Links to the image manifest being signed
246
+
3. **layers**: Contains signature metadata blob
247
+
4. **annotations**: Quick-access metadata for verification
248
+
249
+
### Signature Metadata Blob
250
+
251
+
The layer blob contains detailed verification information:
252
+
253
+
```json
254
+
{
255
+
"$type": "io.atcr.atproto.signature",
256
+
"version": "1.0",
257
+
"subject": {
258
+
"digest": "sha256:abc123...",
259
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json"
260
+
},
261
+
"atproto": {
262
+
"did": "did:plc:alice123",
263
+
"handle": "alice.bsky.social",
264
+
"pdsEndpoint": "https://bsky.social",
265
+
"recordUri": "at://did:plc:alice123/io.atcr.manifest/abc123",
266
+
"recordCid": "bafyreig7...",
267
+
"commitCid": "bafyreih8...",
268
+
"commitRev": "3jzfkjqwdwa2a",
269
+
"signedAt": "2025-10-31T12:34:56.789Z"
270
+
},
271
+
"signature": {
272
+
"algorithm": "ECDSA-K256-SHA256",
273
+
"keyId": "did:plc:alice123#atproto",
274
+
"publicKeyMultibase": "zQ3shokFTS3brHcDQrn82RUDfCZESWL1ZdCEJwekUDdo1Ko4Z"
275
+
},
276
+
"verification": {
277
+
"method": "atproto-repo-commit",
278
+
"instructions": "Fetch repository commit from PDS and verify signature using public key from DID document"
279
+
}
280
+
}
281
+
```
282
+
283
+
### Discovery via Referrers API
284
+
285
+
ORAS artifacts are discoverable via the OCI Referrers API:
286
+
287
+
```bash
288
+
# Query for signature artifacts
289
+
curl "https://atcr.io/v2/alice/myapp/referrers/sha256:abc123?\
290
+
artifactType=application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json"
291
+
```
292
+
293
+
Response:
294
+
```json
295
+
{
296
+
"schemaVersion": 2,
297
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json",
298
+
"manifests": [
299
+
{
300
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json",
301
+
"digest": "sha256:sig789...",
302
+
"size": 1234,
303
+
"artifactType": "application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json",
304
+
"annotations": {
305
+
"io.atcr.atproto.did": "did:plc:alice123",
306
+
"io.atcr.atproto.signedAt": "2025-10-31T12:34:56.789Z"
307
+
}
308
+
}
309
+
]
310
+
}
311
+
```
312
+
313
+
## Trust Model
314
+
315
+
### What ATProto Signatures Prove
316
+
317
+
✅ **Authenticity**: Image was published by the DID owner
318
+
✅ **Integrity**: Image manifest hasn't been tampered with since signing
319
+
✅ **Non-repudiation**: Only the DID owner could have created this signature
320
+
✅ **Timestamp**: When the image was signed (commit timestamp)
321
+
322
+
### What ATProto Signatures Don't Prove
323
+
324
+
❌ **Safety**: Image doesn't contain vulnerabilities (use vulnerability scanning)
325
+
❌ **DID trustworthiness**: Whether the DID owner is trustworthy (trust policy decision)
326
+
❌ **Key security**: Private key wasn't compromised (same limitation as all PKI)
327
+
❌ **PDS honesty**: PDS operator serves correct data (verify across multiple sources)
328
+
329
+
### Trust Dependencies
330
+
331
+
1. **DID Resolution**: Must correctly resolve DID to public key
332
+
- **Mitigation**: Use multiple resolvers, cache DID documents
333
+
334
+
2. **PDS Availability**: Must query PDS to verify signatures
335
+
- **Mitigation**: Embed signature bytes in ORAS blob for offline verification
336
+
337
+
3. **PDS Honesty**: PDS could serve fake/unsigned records
338
+
- **Mitigation**: Signature verification prevents this (can't forge signature)
339
+
340
+
4. **Key Security**: User's private key could be compromised
341
+
- **Mitigation**: Key rotation via DID document updates, short-lived credentials
342
+
343
+
5. **Algorithm Security**: ECDSA K-256 must remain secure
344
+
- **Status**: Well-studied, same as Bitcoin/Ethereum (widely trusted)
345
+
346
+
### Comparison with Other Signing Systems
347
+
348
+
| Aspect | ATProto Signatures | Cosign (Keyless) | Notary v2 |
349
+
|--------|-------------------|------------------|-----------|
350
+
| **Identity** | DID (decentralized) | OIDC (federated) | X.509 (PKI) |
351
+
| **Key Management** | PDS signing keys | Ephemeral (Fulcio) | User-managed |
352
+
| **Trust Anchor** | DID resolution | Fulcio CA + Rekor | Certificate chain |
353
+
| **Transparency Log** | ATProto firehose | Rekor | Optional |
354
+
| **Offline Verification** | Limited* | No | Yes |
355
+
| **Decentralization** | High | Medium | Low |
356
+
| **Complexity** | Low | High | Medium |
357
+
358
+
*Can be improved by embedding signature bytes in ORAS blob
359
+
360
+
### Security Considerations
361
+
362
+
**Threat: Man-in-the-Middle Attack**
363
+
- **Attack**: Intercept PDS queries, serve fake records
364
+
- **Defense**: TLS for PDS communication, verify signature with public key from DID document
365
+
- **Result**: Attacker can't forge signature without private key
366
+
367
+
**Threat: Compromised PDS**
368
+
- **Attack**: PDS operator serves unsigned/fake manifests
369
+
- **Defense**: Signature verification fails (PDS can't sign without user's private key)
370
+
- **Result**: Protected
371
+
372
+
**Threat: Key Compromise**
373
+
- **Attack**: Attacker steals user's ATProto signing key
374
+
- **Defense**: Key rotation via DID document, revoke old keys
375
+
- **Result**: Same as any PKI system (rotate keys quickly)
376
+
377
+
**Threat: Replay Attack**
378
+
- **Attack**: Replay old signed manifest to rollback to vulnerable version
379
+
- **Defense**: Check commit timestamp, verify commit is in current repository DAG
380
+
- **Result**: Protected (commits form immutable chain)
381
+
382
+
**Threat: DID Takeover**
383
+
- **Attack**: Attacker gains control of user's DID (rotation keys)
384
+
- **Defense**: Monitor DID document changes, verify key history
385
+
- **Result**: Serious but requires compromising rotation keys (harder than signing keys)
386
+
387
+
## Implementation Strategy
388
+
389
+
### Automatic Signature Artifact Creation
390
+
391
+
When AppView stores a manifest in a user's PDS:
392
+
393
+
1. **Store manifest record** (existing behavior)
394
+
2. **Get commit response** with commit CID and revision
395
+
3. **Create ORAS signature artifact**:
396
+
- Build metadata blob (JSON)
397
+
- Upload blob to hold storage
398
+
- Create ORAS manifest with subject = image manifest
399
+
- Store ORAS manifest (creates referrer link)
400
+
401
+
### Storage Location
402
+
403
+
Signature artifacts follow the same pattern as SBOMs:
404
+
- **Metadata blobs**: Stored in hold's blob storage
405
+
- **ORAS manifests**: Stored in hold's embedded PDS
406
+
- **Discovery**: Via OCI Referrers API
407
+
408
+
### Verification Tools
409
+
410
+
**Option 1: Custom CLI tool (`atcr-verify`)**
411
+
```bash
412
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
413
+
# → Queries referrers API
414
+
# → Fetches signature metadata
415
+
# → Resolves DID → public key
416
+
# → Queries PDS for commit
417
+
# → Verifies signature
418
+
```
419
+
420
+
**Option 2: Shell script (curl + jq)**
421
+
- See `docs/SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md` for examples
422
+
423
+
**Option 3: Kubernetes admission controller**
424
+
- Custom webhook that runs verification
425
+
- Rejects pods with unsigned/invalid signatures
426
+
427
+
## Benefits of ATProto Signatures
428
+
429
+
### Compared to No Signing
430
+
431
+
✅ **Cryptographic proof** of image authorship
432
+
✅ **Tamper detection** for manifests
433
+
✅ **Identity binding** via DIDs
434
+
✅ **Audit trail** via ATProto repository history
435
+
436
+
### Compared to Cosign/Notary
437
+
438
+
✅ **No additional signing required** (already signed by PDS)
439
+
✅ **Decentralized identity** (DIDs, not CAs)
440
+
✅ **Simpler infrastructure** (no Fulcio, no Rekor, no TUF)
441
+
✅ **Consistent with ATCR's architecture** (ATProto-native)
442
+
✅ **Lower operational overhead** (reuse existing PDS infrastructure)
443
+
444
+
### Trade-offs
445
+
446
+
⚠️ **Custom verification tools required** (standard tools won't work)
447
+
⚠️ **Online verification preferred** (need to query PDS)
448
+
⚠️ **Different trust model** (trust DIDs, not CAs)
449
+
⚠️ **Ecosystem maturity** (newer approach, less tooling)
450
+
451
+
## Future Enhancements
452
+
453
+
### Short-term
454
+
455
+
1. **Offline verification**: Embed signature bytes in ORAS blob
456
+
2. **Multi-PDS verification**: Check signature across multiple PDSs
457
+
3. **Key rotation support**: Handle historical key validity
458
+
459
+
### Medium-term
460
+
461
+
4. **Timestamp service**: RFC 3161 timestamps for long-term validity
462
+
5. **Multi-signature**: Require N signatures from M DIDs
463
+
6. **Transparency log integration**: Record verifications in public log
464
+
465
+
### Long-term
466
+
467
+
7. **IANA registration**: Register `application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json`
468
+
8. **Standards proposal**: ATProto signature spec to ORAS/OCI
469
+
9. **Cross-ecosystem bridges**: Convert to Cosign/Notary formats
470
+
471
+
## Conclusion
472
+
473
+
ATCR images are already cryptographically signed through ATProto's repository commit system. By creating ORAS signature artifacts that reference these existing signatures, we can:
474
+
475
+
- ✅ Make signatures discoverable to OCI tooling
476
+
- ✅ Maintain ATProto as the source of truth
477
+
- ✅ Provide verification tools for users and clusters
478
+
- ✅ Avoid duplicating signing infrastructure
479
+
480
+
This approach leverages ATProto's strengths (decentralized identity, built-in signing) while bridging to the OCI ecosystem through standard ORAS artifacts.
481
+
482
+
## References
483
+
484
+
### ATProto Specifications
485
+
- [ATProto Repository Specification](https://atproto.com/specs/repository)
486
+
- [ATProto Data Model](https://atproto.com/specs/data-model)
487
+
- [ATProto DID Methods](https://atproto.com/specs/did)
488
+
489
+
### OCI/ORAS Specifications
490
+
- [OCI Distribution Specification](https://github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec)
491
+
- [OCI Referrers API](https://github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec/blob/main/spec.md#listing-referrers)
492
+
- [ORAS Artifacts](https://oras.land/docs/)
493
+
494
+
### Cryptography
495
+
- [ECDSA (secp256k1)](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Secp256k1)
496
+
- [Multibase Encoding](https://github.com/multiformats/multibase)
497
+
- [Multicodec](https://github.com/multiformats/multicodec)
498
+
499
+
### Related Documentation
500
+
- [SBOM Scanning](./SBOM_SCANNING.md) - Similar ORAS artifact pattern
501
+
- [Signature Integration](./SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md) - Practical integration examples
+728
docs/DEVELOPMENT.md
+728
docs/DEVELOPMENT.md
···
1
+
# Development Workflow for ATCR
2
+
3
+
## The Problem
4
+
5
+
**Current development cycle with Docker:**
6
+
1. Edit CSS, JS, template, or Go file
7
+
2. Run `docker compose build` (rebuilds entire image)
8
+
3. Run `docker compose up` (restart container)
9
+
4. Wait **2-3 minutes** for changes to appear
10
+
5. Test, find issue, repeat...
11
+
12
+
**Why it's slow:**
13
+
- All assets embedded via `embed.FS` at compile time
14
+
- Multi-stage Docker build compiles everything from scratch
15
+
- No development mode exists
16
+
- Final image uses `scratch` base (no tools, no hot reload)
17
+
18
+
## The Solution
19
+
20
+
**Development setup combining:**
21
+
1. **Dockerfile.devel** - Development-focused container (golang base, not scratch)
22
+
2. **Volume mounts** - Live code editing (changes appear instantly in container)
23
+
3. **DirFS** - Skip embed, read templates/CSS/JS from filesystem
24
+
4. **Air** - Auto-rebuild on Go code changes
25
+
26
+
**Results:**
27
+
- CSS/JS/Template changes: **Instant** (0 seconds, just refresh browser)
28
+
- Go code changes: **2-5 seconds** (vs 2-3 minutes)
29
+
- Production builds: **Unchanged** (still optimized with embed.FS)
30
+
31
+
## How It Works
32
+
33
+
### Architecture Flow
34
+
35
+
```
36
+
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
37
+
│ Your Editor (VSCode, etc) │
38
+
│ Edit: style.css, app.js, *.html, *.go files │
39
+
└─────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘
40
+
│ (files saved to disk)
41
+
▼
42
+
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
43
+
│ Volume Mount (docker-compose.dev.yml) │
44
+
│ volumes: │
45
+
│ - .:/app (entire codebase mounted) │
46
+
└─────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘
47
+
│ (changes appear instantly in container)
48
+
▼
49
+
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
50
+
│ Container (golang:1.25.2 base, has all tools) │
51
+
│ │
52
+
│ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ │
53
+
│ │ Air (hot reload tool) │ │
54
+
│ │ Watches: *.go, *.html, *.css, *.js │ │
55
+
│ │ │ │
56
+
│ │ On change: │ │
57
+
│ │ - *.go → rebuild binary (2-5s) │ │
58
+
│ │ - templates/css/js → restart only │ │
59
+
│ └──────────────────────────────────────┘ │
60
+
│ │ │
61
+
│ ▼ │
62
+
│ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ │
63
+
│ │ ATCR AppView (ATCR_DEV_MODE=true) │ │
64
+
│ │ │ │
65
+
│ │ ui.go checks DEV_MODE: │ │
66
+
│ │ if DEV_MODE: │ │
67
+
│ │ templatesFS = os.DirFS("...") │ │
68
+
│ │ staticFS = os.DirFS("...") │ │
69
+
│ │ else: │ │
70
+
│ │ use embed.FS (production) │ │
71
+
│ │ │ │
72
+
│ │ Result: Reads from mounted files │ │
73
+
│ └──────────────────────────────────────┘ │
74
+
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
75
+
```
76
+
77
+
### Change Scenarios
78
+
79
+
#### Scenario 1: Edit CSS/JS/Templates
80
+
```
81
+
1. Edit pkg/appview/static/css/style.css in VSCode
82
+
2. Save file
83
+
3. Change appears in container via volume mount (instant)
84
+
4. App uses os.DirFS → reads new file from disk (instant)
85
+
5. Refresh browser → see changes
86
+
```
87
+
**Time:** **Instant** (0 seconds)
88
+
**No rebuild, no restart!**
89
+
90
+
#### Scenario 2: Edit Go Code
91
+
```
92
+
1. Edit pkg/appview/handlers/home.go
93
+
2. Save file
94
+
3. Air detects .go file change
95
+
4. Air runs: go build -o ./tmp/atcr-appview ./cmd/appview
96
+
5. Air kills old process and starts new binary
97
+
6. App runs with new code
98
+
```
99
+
**Time:** **2-5 seconds**
100
+
**Fast incremental build!**
101
+
102
+
## Implementation
103
+
104
+
### Step 1: Create Dockerfile.devel
105
+
106
+
Create `Dockerfile.devel` in project root:
107
+
108
+
```dockerfile
109
+
# Development Dockerfile with hot reload support
110
+
FROM golang:1.25.2-trixie
111
+
112
+
# Install Air for hot reload
113
+
RUN go install github.com/cosmtrek/air@latest
114
+
115
+
# Install SQLite (required for CGO in ATCR)
116
+
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
117
+
sqlite3 \
118
+
libsqlite3-dev \
119
+
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
120
+
121
+
WORKDIR /app
122
+
123
+
# Copy dependency files and download (cached layer)
124
+
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
125
+
RUN go mod download
126
+
127
+
# Note: Source code comes from volume mount
128
+
# (no COPY . . needed - that's the whole point!)
129
+
130
+
# Air will handle building and running
131
+
CMD ["air", "-c", ".air.toml"]
132
+
```
133
+
134
+
### Step 2: Create docker-compose.dev.yml
135
+
136
+
Create `docker-compose.dev.yml` in project root:
137
+
138
+
```yaml
139
+
version: '3.8'
140
+
141
+
services:
142
+
atcr-appview:
143
+
build:
144
+
context: .
145
+
dockerfile: Dockerfile.devel
146
+
volumes:
147
+
# Mount entire codebase (live editing)
148
+
- .:/app
149
+
# Cache Go modules (faster rebuilds)
150
+
- go-cache:/go/pkg/mod
151
+
# Persist SQLite database
152
+
- atcr-ui-dev:/var/lib/atcr
153
+
environment:
154
+
# Enable development mode (uses os.DirFS)
155
+
ATCR_DEV_MODE: "true"
156
+
157
+
# AppView configuration
158
+
ATCR_HTTP_ADDR: ":5000"
159
+
ATCR_BASE_URL: "http://localhost:5000"
160
+
ATCR_DEFAULT_HOLD_DID: "did:web:hold01.atcr.io"
161
+
162
+
# Database
163
+
ATCR_UI_DATABASE_PATH: "/var/lib/atcr/ui.db"
164
+
165
+
# Auth
166
+
ATCR_AUTH_KEY_PATH: "/var/lib/atcr/auth/private-key.pem"
167
+
168
+
# UI
169
+
ATCR_UI_ENABLED: "true"
170
+
171
+
# Jetstream (optional)
172
+
# JETSTREAM_URL: "wss://jetstream2.us-east.bsky.network/subscribe"
173
+
# ATCR_BACKFILL_ENABLED: "false"
174
+
ports:
175
+
- "5000:5000"
176
+
networks:
177
+
- atcr-dev
178
+
179
+
# Add other services as needed (postgres, hold, etc)
180
+
# atcr-hold:
181
+
# ...
182
+
183
+
networks:
184
+
atcr-dev:
185
+
driver: bridge
186
+
187
+
volumes:
188
+
go-cache:
189
+
atcr-ui-dev:
190
+
```
191
+
192
+
### Step 3: Create .air.toml
193
+
194
+
Create `.air.toml` in project root:
195
+
196
+
```toml
197
+
# Air configuration for hot reload
198
+
# https://github.com/cosmtrek/air
199
+
200
+
root = "."
201
+
testdata_dir = "testdata"
202
+
tmp_dir = "tmp"
203
+
204
+
[build]
205
+
# Arguments to pass to binary (AppView needs "serve")
206
+
args_bin = ["serve"]
207
+
208
+
# Where to output the built binary
209
+
bin = "./tmp/atcr-appview"
210
+
211
+
# Build command
212
+
cmd = "go build -o ./tmp/atcr-appview ./cmd/appview"
213
+
214
+
# Delay before rebuilding (ms) - debounce rapid saves
215
+
delay = 1000
216
+
217
+
# Directories to exclude from watching
218
+
exclude_dir = [
219
+
"tmp",
220
+
"vendor",
221
+
"bin",
222
+
".git",
223
+
"node_modules",
224
+
"testdata"
225
+
]
226
+
227
+
# Files to exclude from watching
228
+
exclude_file = []
229
+
230
+
# Regex patterns to exclude
231
+
exclude_regex = ["_test\\.go"]
232
+
233
+
# Don't rebuild if file content unchanged
234
+
exclude_unchanged = false
235
+
236
+
# Follow symlinks
237
+
follow_symlink = false
238
+
239
+
# Full command to run (leave empty to use cmd + bin)
240
+
full_bin = ""
241
+
242
+
# Directories to include (empty = all)
243
+
include_dir = []
244
+
245
+
# File extensions to watch
246
+
include_ext = ["go", "html", "css", "js"]
247
+
248
+
# Specific files to watch
249
+
include_file = []
250
+
251
+
# Delay before killing old process (s)
252
+
kill_delay = "0s"
253
+
254
+
# Log file for build errors
255
+
log = "build-errors.log"
256
+
257
+
# Use polling instead of fsnotify (for Docker/VM)
258
+
poll = false
259
+
poll_interval = 0
260
+
261
+
# Rerun binary if it exits
262
+
rerun = false
263
+
rerun_delay = 500
264
+
265
+
# Send interrupt signal instead of kill
266
+
send_interrupt = false
267
+
268
+
# Stop on build error
269
+
stop_on_error = false
270
+
271
+
[color]
272
+
# Colorize output
273
+
app = ""
274
+
build = "yellow"
275
+
main = "magenta"
276
+
runner = "green"
277
+
watcher = "cyan"
278
+
279
+
[log]
280
+
# Show only app logs (not build logs)
281
+
main_only = false
282
+
283
+
# Add timestamp to logs
284
+
time = false
285
+
286
+
[misc]
287
+
# Clean tmp directory on exit
288
+
clean_on_exit = false
289
+
290
+
[screen]
291
+
# Clear screen on rebuild
292
+
clear_on_rebuild = false
293
+
294
+
# Keep scrollback
295
+
keep_scroll = true
296
+
```
297
+
298
+
### Step 4: Modify pkg/appview/ui.go
299
+
300
+
Add conditional filesystem loading to `pkg/appview/ui.go`:
301
+
302
+
```go
303
+
package appview
304
+
305
+
import (
306
+
"embed"
307
+
"html/template"
308
+
"io/fs"
309
+
"log"
310
+
"net/http"
311
+
"os"
312
+
)
313
+
314
+
// Embedded assets (used in production)
315
+
//go:embed templates/**/*.html
316
+
var embeddedTemplatesFS embed.FS
317
+
318
+
//go:embed static
319
+
var embeddedStaticFS embed.FS
320
+
321
+
// Actual filesystems used at runtime (conditional)
322
+
var templatesFS fs.FS
323
+
var staticFS fs.FS
324
+
325
+
func init() {
326
+
// Development mode: read from filesystem for instant updates
327
+
if os.Getenv("ATCR_DEV_MODE") == "true" {
328
+
log.Println("🔧 DEV MODE: Using filesystem for templates and static assets")
329
+
templatesFS = os.DirFS("pkg/appview/templates")
330
+
staticFS = os.DirFS("pkg/appview/static")
331
+
} else {
332
+
// Production mode: use embedded assets
333
+
log.Println("📦 PRODUCTION MODE: Using embedded assets")
334
+
templatesFS = embeddedTemplatesFS
335
+
staticFS = embeddedStaticFS
336
+
}
337
+
}
338
+
339
+
// Templates returns parsed HTML templates
340
+
func Templates() *template.Template {
341
+
tmpl, err := template.ParseFS(templatesFS, "templates/**/*.html")
342
+
if err != nil {
343
+
log.Fatalf("Failed to parse templates: %v", err)
344
+
}
345
+
return tmpl
346
+
}
347
+
348
+
// StaticHandler returns a handler for static files
349
+
func StaticHandler() http.Handler {
350
+
sub, err := fs.Sub(staticFS, "static")
351
+
if err != nil {
352
+
log.Fatalf("Failed to create static sub-filesystem: %v", err)
353
+
}
354
+
return http.FileServer(http.FS(sub))
355
+
}
356
+
```
357
+
358
+
**Important:** Update the `Templates()` function to NOT cache templates in dev mode:
359
+
360
+
```go
361
+
// Templates returns parsed HTML templates
362
+
func Templates() *template.Template {
363
+
// In dev mode, reparse templates on every request (instant updates)
364
+
// In production, this could be cached
365
+
tmpl, err := template.ParseFS(templatesFS, "templates/**/*.html")
366
+
if err != nil {
367
+
log.Fatalf("Failed to parse templates: %v", err)
368
+
}
369
+
return tmpl
370
+
}
371
+
```
372
+
373
+
If you're caching templates, wrap it with a dev mode check:
374
+
375
+
```go
376
+
var templateCache *template.Template
377
+
378
+
func Templates() *template.Template {
379
+
// Development: reparse every time (instant updates)
380
+
if os.Getenv("ATCR_DEV_MODE") == "true" {
381
+
tmpl, err := template.ParseFS(templatesFS, "templates/**/*.html")
382
+
if err != nil {
383
+
log.Printf("Template parse error: %v", err)
384
+
return template.New("error")
385
+
}
386
+
return tmpl
387
+
}
388
+
389
+
// Production: use cached templates
390
+
if templateCache == nil {
391
+
tmpl, err := template.ParseFS(templatesFS, "templates/**/*.html")
392
+
if err != nil {
393
+
log.Fatalf("Failed to parse templates: %v", err)
394
+
}
395
+
templateCache = tmpl
396
+
}
397
+
return templateCache
398
+
}
399
+
```
400
+
401
+
### Step 5: Add to .gitignore
402
+
403
+
Add Air's temporary directory to `.gitignore`:
404
+
405
+
```
406
+
# Air hot reload
407
+
tmp/
408
+
build-errors.log
409
+
```
410
+
411
+
## Usage
412
+
413
+
### Starting Development Environment
414
+
415
+
```bash
416
+
# Build and start dev container
417
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml up --build
418
+
419
+
# Or run in background
420
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml up -d
421
+
422
+
# View logs
423
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml logs -f atcr-appview
424
+
```
425
+
426
+
You should see Air starting:
427
+
428
+
```
429
+
atcr-appview | 🔧 DEV MODE: Using filesystem for templates and static assets
430
+
atcr-appview |
431
+
atcr-appview | __ _ ___
432
+
atcr-appview | / /\ | | | |_)
433
+
atcr-appview | /_/--\ |_| |_| \_ , built with Go
434
+
atcr-appview |
435
+
atcr-appview | watching .
436
+
atcr-appview | !exclude tmp
437
+
atcr-appview | building...
438
+
atcr-appview | running...
439
+
```
440
+
441
+
### Development Workflow
442
+
443
+
#### 1. Edit Templates/CSS/JS (Instant Updates)
444
+
445
+
```bash
446
+
# Edit any template, CSS, or JS file
447
+
vim pkg/appview/templates/pages/home.html
448
+
vim pkg/appview/static/css/style.css
449
+
vim pkg/appview/static/js/app.js
450
+
451
+
# Save file → changes appear instantly
452
+
# Just refresh browser (Cmd+R / Ctrl+R)
453
+
```
454
+
455
+
**No rebuild, no restart!** Air might restart the app, but it's instant since no compilation is needed.
456
+
457
+
#### 2. Edit Go Code (Fast Rebuild)
458
+
459
+
```bash
460
+
# Edit any Go file
461
+
vim pkg/appview/handlers/home.go
462
+
463
+
# Save file → Air detects change
464
+
# Air output shows:
465
+
# building...
466
+
# build successful in 2.3s
467
+
# restarting...
468
+
469
+
# Refresh browser to see changes
470
+
```
471
+
472
+
**2-5 second rebuild** instead of 2-3 minutes!
473
+
474
+
### Stopping Development Environment
475
+
476
+
```bash
477
+
# Stop containers
478
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml down
479
+
480
+
# Stop and remove volumes (fresh start)
481
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml down -v
482
+
```
483
+
484
+
## Production Builds
485
+
486
+
**Production builds are completely unchanged:**
487
+
488
+
```bash
489
+
# Production uses normal Dockerfile (embed.FS, scratch base)
490
+
docker compose build
491
+
492
+
# Or specific service
493
+
docker compose build atcr-appview
494
+
495
+
# Run production
496
+
docker compose up
497
+
```
498
+
499
+
**Why it works:**
500
+
- Production doesn't set `ATCR_DEV_MODE=true`
501
+
- `ui.go` defaults to embedded assets when env var is unset
502
+
- Production Dockerfile still uses multi-stage build to scratch
503
+
- No development dependencies in production image
504
+
505
+
## Comparison
506
+
507
+
| Change Type | Before (docker compose) | After (dev setup) | Improvement |
508
+
|-------------|------------------------|-------------------|-------------|
509
+
| Edit CSS | 2-3 minutes | **Instant (0s)** | ♾️x faster |
510
+
| Edit JS | 2-3 minutes | **Instant (0s)** | ♾️x faster |
511
+
| Edit Template | 2-3 minutes | **Instant (0s)** | ♾️x faster |
512
+
| Edit Go Code | 2-3 minutes | **2-5 seconds** | 24-90x faster |
513
+
| Production Build | Same | **Same** | No change |
514
+
515
+
## Advanced: Local Development (No Docker)
516
+
517
+
For even faster development, run locally without Docker:
518
+
519
+
```bash
520
+
# Set environment variables
521
+
export ATCR_DEV_MODE=true
522
+
export ATCR_HTTP_ADDR=:5000
523
+
export ATCR_BASE_URL=http://localhost:5000
524
+
export ATCR_DEFAULT_HOLD_DID=did:web:hold01.atcr.io
525
+
export ATCR_UI_DATABASE_PATH=/tmp/atcr-ui.db
526
+
export ATCR_AUTH_KEY_PATH=/tmp/atcr-auth-key.pem
527
+
export ATCR_UI_ENABLED=true
528
+
529
+
# Or use .env file
530
+
source .env.appview
531
+
532
+
# Run with Air
533
+
air -c .air.toml
534
+
535
+
# Or run directly (no hot reload)
536
+
go run ./cmd/appview serve
537
+
```
538
+
539
+
**Advantages:**
540
+
- Even faster (no Docker overhead)
541
+
- Native debugging with delve
542
+
- Direct filesystem access
543
+
- Full IDE integration
544
+
545
+
**Disadvantages:**
546
+
- Need to manage dependencies locally (SQLite, etc)
547
+
- May differ from production environment
548
+
549
+
## Troubleshooting
550
+
551
+
### Air Not Rebuilding
552
+
553
+
**Problem:** Air doesn't detect changes
554
+
555
+
**Solution:**
556
+
```bash
557
+
# Check if Air is actually running
558
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml logs atcr-appview
559
+
560
+
# Check .air.toml include_ext includes your file type
561
+
# Default: ["go", "html", "css", "js"]
562
+
563
+
# Restart container
564
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml restart atcr-appview
565
+
```
566
+
567
+
### Templates Not Updating
568
+
569
+
**Problem:** Template changes don't appear
570
+
571
+
**Solution:**
572
+
```bash
573
+
# Check ATCR_DEV_MODE is set
574
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml exec atcr-appview env | grep DEV_MODE
575
+
576
+
# Should output: ATCR_DEV_MODE=true
577
+
578
+
# Check templates aren't cached (see Step 4 above)
579
+
# Templates() should reparse in dev mode
580
+
```
581
+
582
+
### Go Build Failing
583
+
584
+
**Problem:** Air shows build errors
585
+
586
+
**Solution:**
587
+
```bash
588
+
# Check build logs
589
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml logs atcr-appview
590
+
591
+
# Or check build-errors.log in container
592
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml exec atcr-appview cat build-errors.log
593
+
594
+
# Fix the Go error, save file, Air will retry
595
+
```
596
+
597
+
### Volume Mount Not Working
598
+
599
+
**Problem:** Changes don't appear in container
600
+
601
+
**Solution:**
602
+
```bash
603
+
# Verify volume mount
604
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml exec atcr-appview ls -la /app
605
+
606
+
# Should show your source files
607
+
608
+
# On Windows/Mac, check Docker Desktop file sharing settings
609
+
# Settings → Resources → File Sharing → add project directory
610
+
```
611
+
612
+
### Permission Errors
613
+
614
+
**Problem:** Cannot write to /var/lib/atcr
615
+
616
+
**Solution:**
617
+
```bash
618
+
# In Dockerfile.devel, add:
619
+
RUN mkdir -p /var/lib/atcr && chmod 777 /var/lib/atcr
620
+
621
+
# Or use named volumes (already in docker-compose.dev.yml)
622
+
volumes:
623
+
- atcr-ui-dev:/var/lib/atcr
624
+
```
625
+
626
+
### Slow Builds Even with Air
627
+
628
+
**Problem:** Air rebuilds slowly
629
+
630
+
**Solution:**
631
+
```bash
632
+
# Use Go module cache volume (already in docker-compose.dev.yml)
633
+
volumes:
634
+
- go-cache:/go/pkg/mod
635
+
636
+
# Increase Air delay to debounce rapid saves
637
+
# In .air.toml:
638
+
delay = 2000 # 2 seconds
639
+
640
+
# Or check if CGO is slowing builds
641
+
# AppView needs CGO for SQLite, but you can try:
642
+
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build # (won't work for ATCR, but good to know)
643
+
```
644
+
645
+
## Tips & Tricks
646
+
647
+
### Browser Auto-Reload (LiveReload)
648
+
649
+
Add LiveReload for automatic browser refresh:
650
+
651
+
```bash
652
+
# Install browser extension
653
+
# Chrome: https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/livereload
654
+
# Firefox: https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/livereload-web-extension/
655
+
656
+
# Add livereload to .air.toml (future Air feature)
657
+
# Or use a separate tool like browsersync
658
+
```
659
+
660
+
### Database Resets
661
+
662
+
Development database is in a named volume:
663
+
664
+
```bash
665
+
# Reset database (fresh start)
666
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml down -v
667
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml up
668
+
669
+
# Or delete specific volume
670
+
docker volume rm atcr_atcr-ui-dev
671
+
```
672
+
673
+
### Multiple Environments
674
+
675
+
Run dev and production side-by-side:
676
+
677
+
```bash
678
+
# Development on port 5000
679
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml up -d
680
+
681
+
# Production on port 5001
682
+
docker compose up -d
683
+
684
+
# Now you can compare behavior
685
+
```
686
+
687
+
### Debugging with Delve
688
+
689
+
Add delve to Dockerfile.devel:
690
+
691
+
```dockerfile
692
+
RUN go install github.com/go-delve/delve/cmd/dlv@latest
693
+
694
+
# Change CMD to use delve
695
+
CMD ["dlv", "debug", "./cmd/appview", "--headless", "--listen=:2345", "--api-version=2", "--accept-multiclient", "--", "serve"]
696
+
```
697
+
698
+
Then connect with VSCode or GoLand.
699
+
700
+
## Summary
701
+
702
+
**Development Setup (One-Time):**
703
+
1. Create `Dockerfile.devel`
704
+
2. Create `docker-compose.dev.yml`
705
+
3. Create `.air.toml`
706
+
4. Modify `pkg/appview/ui.go` for conditional DirFS
707
+
5. Add `tmp/` to `.gitignore`
708
+
709
+
**Daily Development:**
710
+
```bash
711
+
# Start
712
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml up
713
+
714
+
# Edit files in your editor
715
+
# Changes appear instantly (CSS/JS/templates)
716
+
# Or in 2-5 seconds (Go code)
717
+
718
+
# Stop
719
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml down
720
+
```
721
+
722
+
**Production (Unchanged):**
723
+
```bash
724
+
docker compose build
725
+
docker compose up
726
+
```
727
+
728
+
**Result:** 100x faster development iteration! 🚀
+756
docs/HOLD_AS_CA.md
+756
docs/HOLD_AS_CA.md
···
1
+
# Hold-as-Certificate-Authority Architecture
2
+
3
+
## ⚠️ Important Notice
4
+
5
+
This document describes an **optional enterprise feature** for X.509 PKI compliance. The hold-as-CA approach introduces **centralization trade-offs** that contradict ATProto's decentralized philosophy.
6
+
7
+
**Default Recommendation:** Use [plugin-based integration](./INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md) instead. Only implement hold-as-CA if your organization has specific X.509 PKI compliance requirements.
8
+
9
+
## Overview
10
+
11
+
The hold-as-CA architecture allows ATCR to generate Notation/Notary v2-compatible signatures by having hold services act as Certificate Authorities that issue X.509 certificates for users.
12
+
13
+
### The Problem
14
+
15
+
- **ATProto signatures** use K-256 (secp256k1) elliptic curve
16
+
- **Notation** only supports P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves
17
+
- **Cannot convert** K-256 signatures to P-256 (different cryptographic curves)
18
+
- **Must re-sign** with P-256 keys for Notation compatibility
19
+
20
+
### The Solution
21
+
22
+
Hold services act as trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs):
23
+
24
+
1. User pushes image → Manifest signed by PDS with K-256 (ATProto)
25
+
2. Hold verifies ATProto signature is valid
26
+
3. Hold generates ephemeral P-256 key pair for user
27
+
4. Hold issues X.509 certificate to user's DID
28
+
5. Hold signs manifest with P-256 key
29
+
6. Hold creates Notation signature envelope (JWS format)
30
+
7. Stores both ATProto and Notation signatures
31
+
32
+
**Result:** Images have two signatures:
33
+
- **ATProto signature** (K-256) - Decentralized, DID-based
34
+
- **Notation signature** (P-256) - Centralized, X.509 PKI
35
+
36
+
## Architecture
37
+
38
+
### Certificate Chain
39
+
40
+
```
41
+
Hold Root CA Certificate (self-signed, P-256)
42
+
└── User Certificate (issued to DID, P-256)
43
+
└── Image Manifest Signature
44
+
```
45
+
46
+
**Hold Root CA:**
47
+
```
48
+
Subject: CN=ATCR Hold CA - did:web:hold01.atcr.io
49
+
Issuer: Self (self-signed)
50
+
Key Usage: Digital Signature, Certificate Sign
51
+
Basic Constraints: CA=true, pathLen=1
52
+
Algorithm: ECDSA P-256
53
+
Validity: 10 years
54
+
```
55
+
56
+
**User Certificate:**
57
+
```
58
+
Subject: CN=did:plc:alice123
59
+
SAN: URI:did:plc:alice123
60
+
Issuer: Hold Root CA
61
+
Key Usage: Digital Signature
62
+
Extended Key Usage: Code Signing
63
+
Algorithm: ECDSA P-256
64
+
Validity: 24 hours (short-lived)
65
+
```
66
+
67
+
### Push Flow
68
+
69
+
```
70
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
71
+
│ 1. User: docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest │
72
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
73
+
↓
74
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
75
+
│ 2. AppView stores manifest in alice's PDS │
76
+
│ - PDS signs with K-256 (ATProto standard) │
77
+
│ - Signature stored in repository commit │
78
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
79
+
↓
80
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
81
+
│ 3. AppView requests hold to co-sign │
82
+
│ POST /xrpc/io.atcr.hold.coSignManifest │
83
+
│ { │
84
+
│ "userDid": "did:plc:alice123", │
85
+
│ "manifestDigest": "sha256:abc123...", │
86
+
│ "atprotoSignature": {...} │
87
+
│ } │
88
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
89
+
↓
90
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
91
+
│ 4. Hold verifies ATProto signature │
92
+
│ a. Resolve alice's DID → public key │
93
+
│ b. Fetch commit from alice's PDS │
94
+
│ c. Verify K-256 signature │
95
+
│ d. Ensure signature is valid │
96
+
│ │
97
+
│ If verification fails → REJECT │
98
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
99
+
↓
100
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
101
+
│ 5. Hold generates ephemeral P-256 key pair │
102
+
│ privateKey := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256()) │
103
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
104
+
↓
105
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
106
+
│ 6. Hold issues X.509 certificate │
107
+
│ Subject: CN=did:plc:alice123 │
108
+
│ SAN: URI:did:plc:alice123 │
109
+
│ Issuer: Hold CA │
110
+
│ NotBefore: now │
111
+
│ NotAfter: now + 24 hours │
112
+
│ KeyUsage: Digital Signature │
113
+
│ ExtKeyUsage: Code Signing │
114
+
│ │
115
+
│ Sign certificate with hold's CA private key │
116
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
117
+
↓
118
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
119
+
│ 7. Hold signs manifest digest │
120
+
│ hash := SHA256(manifestBytes) │
121
+
│ signature := ECDSA_P256(hash, privateKey) │
122
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
123
+
↓
124
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
125
+
│ 8. Hold creates Notation JWS envelope │
126
+
│ { │
127
+
│ "protected": {...}, │
128
+
│ "payload": "base64(manifestDigest)", │
129
+
│ "signature": "base64(p256Signature)", │
130
+
│ "header": { │
131
+
│ "x5c": [ │
132
+
│ "base64(userCert)", │
133
+
│ "base64(holdCACert)" │
134
+
│ ] │
135
+
│ } │
136
+
│ } │
137
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
138
+
↓
139
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
140
+
│ 9. Hold returns signature to AppView │
141
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
142
+
↓
143
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
144
+
│ 10. AppView stores Notation signature │
145
+
│ - Create ORAS artifact manifest │
146
+
│ - Upload JWS envelope as layer blob │
147
+
│ - Link to image via subject field │
148
+
│ - artifactType: application/vnd.cncf.notary... │
149
+
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
150
+
```
151
+
152
+
### Verification Flow
153
+
154
+
```
155
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
156
+
│ User: notation verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest │
157
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
158
+
↓
159
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
160
+
│ 1. Notation queries Referrers API │
161
+
│ GET /v2/alice/myapp/referrers/sha256:abc123 │
162
+
│ → Discovers Notation signature artifact │
163
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
164
+
↓
165
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
166
+
│ 2. Notation downloads JWS envelope │
167
+
│ - Parses JSON Web Signature │
168
+
│ - Extracts certificate chain from x5c header │
169
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
170
+
↓
171
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
172
+
│ 3. Notation validates certificate chain │
173
+
│ a. User cert issued by Hold CA? ✓ │
174
+
│ b. Hold CA cert in trust store? ✓ │
175
+
│ c. Certificate not expired? ✓ │
176
+
│ d. Key usage correct? ✓ │
177
+
│ e. Subject matches policy? ✓ │
178
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
179
+
↓
180
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
181
+
│ 4. Notation verifies signature │
182
+
│ a. Extract public key from user certificate │
183
+
│ b. Compute manifest hash: SHA256(manifest) │
184
+
│ c. Verify: ECDSA_P256(hash, sig, pubKey) ✓ │
185
+
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
186
+
↓
187
+
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
188
+
│ 5. Success: Image verified ✓ │
189
+
│ Signed by: did:plc:alice123 (via Hold CA) │
190
+
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
191
+
```
192
+
193
+
## Implementation
194
+
195
+
### Hold CA Certificate Generation
196
+
197
+
```go
198
+
// cmd/hold/main.go - CA initialization
199
+
func (h *Hold) initializeCA(ctx context.Context) error {
200
+
caKeyPath := filepath.Join(h.config.DataDir, "ca-private-key.pem")
201
+
caCertPath := filepath.Join(h.config.DataDir, "ca-certificate.pem")
202
+
203
+
// Load existing CA or generate new one
204
+
if exists(caKeyPath) && exists(caCertPath) {
205
+
h.caKey = loadPrivateKey(caKeyPath)
206
+
h.caCert = loadCertificate(caCertPath)
207
+
return nil
208
+
}
209
+
210
+
// Generate P-256 key pair for CA
211
+
caKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
212
+
if err != nil {
213
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate CA key: %w", err)
214
+
}
215
+
216
+
// Create CA certificate template
217
+
serialNumber, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128))
218
+
219
+
template := &x509.Certificate{
220
+
SerialNumber: serialNumber,
221
+
Subject: pkix.Name{
222
+
CommonName: fmt.Sprintf("ATCR Hold CA - %s", h.DID),
223
+
},
224
+
NotBefore: time.Now(),
225
+
NotAfter: time.Now().AddDate(10, 0, 0), // 10 years
226
+
227
+
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
228
+
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
229
+
IsCA: true,
230
+
MaxPathLen: 1, // Can only issue end-entity certificates
231
+
}
232
+
233
+
// Self-sign
234
+
certDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(
235
+
rand.Reader,
236
+
template,
237
+
template, // Self-signed: issuer = subject
238
+
&caKey.PublicKey,
239
+
caKey,
240
+
)
241
+
if err != nil {
242
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create CA certificate: %w", err)
243
+
}
244
+
245
+
caCert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(certDER)
246
+
247
+
// Save to disk (0600 permissions)
248
+
savePrivateKey(caKeyPath, caKey)
249
+
saveCertificate(caCertPath, caCert)
250
+
251
+
h.caKey = caKey
252
+
h.caCert = caCert
253
+
254
+
log.Info("Generated new CA certificate", "did", h.DID, "expires", caCert.NotAfter)
255
+
return nil
256
+
}
257
+
```
258
+
259
+
### User Certificate Issuance
260
+
261
+
```go
262
+
// pkg/hold/cosign.go
263
+
func (h *Hold) issueUserCertificate(userDID string) (*x509.Certificate, *ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
264
+
// Generate ephemeral P-256 key for user
265
+
userKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
266
+
if err != nil {
267
+
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate user key: %w", err)
268
+
}
269
+
270
+
serialNumber, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128))
271
+
272
+
// Parse DID for SAN
273
+
sanURI, _ := url.Parse(userDID)
274
+
275
+
template := &x509.Certificate{
276
+
SerialNumber: serialNumber,
277
+
Subject: pkix.Name{
278
+
CommonName: userDID,
279
+
},
280
+
URIs: []*url.URL{sanURI}, // Subject Alternative Name
281
+
282
+
NotBefore: time.Now(),
283
+
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour), // Short-lived: 24 hours
284
+
285
+
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
286
+
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning},
287
+
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
288
+
IsCA: false,
289
+
}
290
+
291
+
// Sign with hold's CA key
292
+
certDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(
293
+
rand.Reader,
294
+
template,
295
+
h.caCert, // Issuer: Hold CA
296
+
&userKey.PublicKey,
297
+
h.caKey, // Sign with CA private key
298
+
)
299
+
if err != nil {
300
+
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create user certificate: %w", err)
301
+
}
302
+
303
+
userCert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(certDER)
304
+
305
+
return userCert, userKey, nil
306
+
}
307
+
```
308
+
309
+
### Co-Signing XRPC Endpoint
310
+
311
+
```go
312
+
// pkg/hold/oci/xrpc.go
313
+
func (s *Server) handleCoSignManifest(ctx context.Context, req *CoSignRequest) (*CoSignResponse, error) {
314
+
// 1. Verify caller is authenticated
315
+
did, err := s.auth.VerifyToken(ctx, req.Token)
316
+
if err != nil {
317
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: %w", err)
318
+
}
319
+
320
+
// 2. Verify ATProto signature
321
+
valid, err := s.verifyATProtoSignature(ctx, req.UserDID, req.ManifestDigest, req.ATProtoSignature)
322
+
if err != nil || !valid {
323
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ATProto signature verification failed: %w", err)
324
+
}
325
+
326
+
// 3. Issue certificate for user
327
+
userCert, userKey, err := s.hold.issueUserCertificate(req.UserDID)
328
+
if err != nil {
329
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to issue certificate: %w", err)
330
+
}
331
+
332
+
// 4. Sign manifest with user's key
333
+
manifestHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(req.ManifestDigest))
334
+
signature, err := ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, userKey, manifestHash[:])
335
+
if err != nil {
336
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign manifest: %w", err)
337
+
}
338
+
339
+
// 5. Create JWS envelope
340
+
jws, err := s.createJWSEnvelope(signature, userCert, s.hold.caCert, req.ManifestDigest)
341
+
if err != nil {
342
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create JWS: %w", err)
343
+
}
344
+
345
+
return &CoSignResponse{
346
+
JWS: jws,
347
+
Certificate: encodeCertificate(userCert),
348
+
CACertificate: encodeCertificate(s.hold.caCert),
349
+
}, nil
350
+
}
351
+
```
352
+
353
+
## Trust Model
354
+
355
+
### Centralization Analysis
356
+
357
+
**ATProto Model (Decentralized):**
358
+
- Each PDS is independent
359
+
- User controls which PDS to use
360
+
- Trust user's DID, not specific infrastructure
361
+
- PDS compromise affects only that PDS's users
362
+
- Multiple PDSs provide redundancy
363
+
364
+
**Hold-as-CA Model (Centralized):**
365
+
- Hold acts as single Certificate Authority
366
+
- All users must trust hold's CA certificate
367
+
- Hold compromise = attacker can issue certificates for ANY user
368
+
- Hold becomes single point of failure
369
+
- Users depend on hold operator honesty
370
+
371
+
### What Hold Vouches For
372
+
373
+
When hold issues a certificate, it attests:
374
+
375
+
✅ **"I verified that [DID] signed this manifest with ATProto"**
376
+
- Hold validated ATProto signature
377
+
- Hold confirmed signature matches user's DID
378
+
- Hold checked signature at specific time
379
+
380
+
❌ **"This image is safe"**
381
+
- Hold does NOT audit image contents
382
+
- Certificate ≠ vulnerability scan
383
+
- Signature ≠ security guarantee
384
+
385
+
❌ **"I control this DID"**
386
+
- Hold does NOT control user's DID
387
+
- DID ownership is independent
388
+
- Hold cannot revoke DIDs
389
+
390
+
### Threat Model
391
+
392
+
**Scenario 1: Hold Private Key Compromise**
393
+
394
+
**Attack:**
395
+
- Attacker steals hold's CA private key
396
+
- Can issue certificates for any DID
397
+
- Can sign malicious images as any user
398
+
399
+
**Impact:**
400
+
- **CRITICAL** - All users affected
401
+
- Attacker can impersonate any user
402
+
- All signatures become untrustworthy
403
+
404
+
**Detection:**
405
+
- Certificate Transparency logs (if implemented)
406
+
- Unusual certificate issuance patterns
407
+
- Users report unexpected signatures
408
+
409
+
**Mitigation:**
410
+
- Store CA key in Hardware Security Module (HSM)
411
+
- Strict access controls
412
+
- Audit logging
413
+
- Regular key rotation
414
+
415
+
**Recovery:**
416
+
- Revoke compromised CA certificate
417
+
- Generate new CA certificate
418
+
- Re-issue all active certificates
419
+
- Notify all users
420
+
- Update trust stores
421
+
422
+
---
423
+
424
+
**Scenario 2: Malicious Hold Operator**
425
+
426
+
**Attack:**
427
+
- Hold operator issues certificates without verifying ATProto signatures
428
+
- Hold operator signs malicious images
429
+
- Hold operator backdates certificates
430
+
431
+
**Impact:**
432
+
- **HIGH** - Trust model broken
433
+
- Users receive signed malicious images
434
+
- Difficult to detect without ATProto cross-check
435
+
436
+
**Detection:**
437
+
- Compare Notation signature timestamp with ATProto commit time
438
+
- Verify ATProto signature exists independently
439
+
- Monitor hold's signing patterns
440
+
441
+
**Mitigation:**
442
+
- Audit trail linking certificates to ATProto signatures
443
+
- Public transparency logs
444
+
- Multi-signature requirements
445
+
- Periodically verify ATProto signatures
446
+
447
+
**Recovery:**
448
+
- Identify malicious certificates
449
+
- Revoke hold's CA trust
450
+
- Switch to different hold
451
+
- Re-verify all images
452
+
453
+
---
454
+
455
+
**Scenario 3: Certificate Theft**
456
+
457
+
**Attack:**
458
+
- Attacker steals issued user certificate + private key
459
+
- Uses it to sign malicious images
460
+
461
+
**Impact:**
462
+
- **LOW-MEDIUM** - Limited scope
463
+
- Affects only specific user/image
464
+
- Short validity period (24 hours)
465
+
466
+
**Detection:**
467
+
- Unexpected signature timestamps
468
+
- Images signed from unknown locations
469
+
470
+
**Mitigation:**
471
+
- Short certificate validity (24 hours)
472
+
- Ephemeral keys (not stored long-term)
473
+
- Certificate revocation if detected
474
+
475
+
**Recovery:**
476
+
- Wait for certificate expiration (24 hours)
477
+
- Revoke specific certificate
478
+
- Investigate compromise source
479
+
480
+
## Certificate Management
481
+
482
+
### Expiration Strategy
483
+
484
+
**Short-Lived Certificates (24 hours):**
485
+
486
+
**Pros:**
487
+
- ✅ Minimal revocation infrastructure needed
488
+
- ✅ Compromise window is tiny
489
+
- ✅ Automatic cleanup
490
+
- ✅ Lower CRL/OCSP overhead
491
+
492
+
**Cons:**
493
+
- ❌ Old images become unverifiable quickly
494
+
- ❌ Requires re-signing for historical verification
495
+
- ❌ Storage: multiple signatures for same image
496
+
497
+
**Solution: On-Demand Re-Signing**
498
+
```
499
+
User pulls old image → Notation verification fails (expired cert)
500
+
→ User requests re-signing: POST /xrpc/io.atcr.hold.reSignManifest
501
+
→ Hold verifies ATProto signature still valid
502
+
→ Hold issues new certificate (24 hours)
503
+
→ Hold creates new Notation signature
504
+
→ User can verify with fresh certificate
505
+
```
506
+
507
+
### Revocation
508
+
509
+
**Certificate Revocation List (CRL):**
510
+
```
511
+
Hold publishes CRL at: https://hold01.atcr.io/ca.crl
512
+
513
+
Notation configured to check CRL:
514
+
{
515
+
"trustPolicies": [{
516
+
"name": "atcr-images",
517
+
"signatureVerification": {
518
+
"verificationLevel": "strict",
519
+
"override": {
520
+
"revocationValidation": "strict"
521
+
}
522
+
}
523
+
}]
524
+
}
525
+
```
526
+
527
+
**OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol):**
528
+
- Hold runs OCSP responder: `https://hold01.atcr.io/ocsp`
529
+
- Real-time certificate status checks
530
+
- Lower overhead than CRL downloads
531
+
532
+
**Revocation Triggers:**
533
+
- Key compromise detected
534
+
- Malicious signing detected
535
+
- User request
536
+
- DID ownership change
537
+
538
+
### CA Key Rotation
539
+
540
+
**Rotation Procedure:**
541
+
542
+
1. **Generate new CA key pair**
543
+
2. **Create new CA certificate**
544
+
3. **Cross-sign old CA with new CA** (transition period)
545
+
4. **Distribute new CA certificate** to all users
546
+
5. **Begin issuing with new CA** for new signatures
547
+
6. **Grace period** (30 days): Accept both old and new CA
548
+
7. **Retire old CA** after grace period
549
+
550
+
**Frequency:** Every 2-3 years (longer than short-lived certs)
551
+
552
+
## Trust Store Distribution
553
+
554
+
### Problem
555
+
556
+
Users must add hold's CA certificate to their Notation trust store for verification to work.
557
+
558
+
### Manual Distribution
559
+
560
+
```bash
561
+
# 1. Download hold's CA certificate
562
+
curl https://hold01.atcr.io/ca.crt -o hold01-ca.crt
563
+
564
+
# 2. Verify fingerprint (out-of-band)
565
+
openssl x509 -in hold01-ca.crt -fingerprint -noout
566
+
# Compare with published fingerprint
567
+
568
+
# 3. Add to Notation trust store
569
+
notation cert add --type ca --store atcr-holds hold01-ca.crt
570
+
```
571
+
572
+
### Automated Distribution
573
+
574
+
**ATCR CLI tool:**
575
+
```bash
576
+
atcr trust add hold01.atcr.io
577
+
# → Fetches CA certificate
578
+
# → Verifies via HTTPS + DNSSEC
579
+
# → Adds to Notation trust store
580
+
# → Configures trust policy
581
+
582
+
atcr trust list
583
+
# → Shows trusted holds with fingerprints
584
+
```
585
+
586
+
### System-Wide Trust
587
+
588
+
**For enterprise deployments:**
589
+
590
+
**Debian/Ubuntu:**
591
+
```bash
592
+
# Install CA certificate system-wide
593
+
cp hold01-ca.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/atcr-hold01.crt
594
+
update-ca-certificates
595
+
```
596
+
597
+
**RHEL/CentOS:**
598
+
```bash
599
+
cp hold01-ca.crt /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/
600
+
update-ca-trust
601
+
```
602
+
603
+
**Container images:**
604
+
```dockerfile
605
+
FROM ubuntu:22.04
606
+
COPY hold01-ca.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/
607
+
RUN update-ca-certificates
608
+
```
609
+
610
+
## Configuration
611
+
612
+
### Hold Service
613
+
614
+
**Environment variables:**
615
+
```bash
616
+
# Enable co-signing feature
617
+
HOLD_COSIGN_ENABLED=true
618
+
619
+
# CA certificate and key paths
620
+
HOLD_CA_CERT_PATH=/var/lib/atcr/hold/ca-certificate.pem
621
+
HOLD_CA_KEY_PATH=/var/lib/atcr/hold/ca-private-key.pem
622
+
623
+
# Certificate validity
624
+
HOLD_CERT_VALIDITY_HOURS=24
625
+
626
+
# OCSP responder
627
+
HOLD_OCSP_ENABLED=true
628
+
HOLD_OCSP_URL=https://hold01.atcr.io/ocsp
629
+
630
+
# CRL distribution
631
+
HOLD_CRL_ENABLED=true
632
+
HOLD_CRL_URL=https://hold01.atcr.io/ca.crl
633
+
```
634
+
635
+
### Notation Trust Policy
636
+
637
+
```json
638
+
{
639
+
"version": "1.0",
640
+
"trustPolicies": [{
641
+
"name": "atcr-images",
642
+
"registryScopes": ["atcr.io/*/*"],
643
+
"signatureVerification": {
644
+
"level": "strict",
645
+
"override": {
646
+
"revocationValidation": "strict"
647
+
}
648
+
},
649
+
"trustStores": ["ca:atcr-holds"],
650
+
"trustedIdentities": [
651
+
"x509.subject: CN=did:plc:*",
652
+
"x509.subject: CN=did:web:*"
653
+
]
654
+
}]
655
+
}
656
+
```
657
+
658
+
## When to Use Hold-as-CA
659
+
660
+
### ✅ Use When
661
+
662
+
**Enterprise X.509 PKI Compliance:**
663
+
- Organization requires standard X.509 certificates
664
+
- Existing security policies mandate PKI
665
+
- Audit requirements for certificate chains
666
+
- Integration with existing CA infrastructure
667
+
668
+
**Tool Compatibility:**
669
+
- Must use standard Notation without plugins
670
+
- Cannot deploy custom verification tools
671
+
- Existing tooling expects X.509 signatures
672
+
673
+
**Centralized Trust Acceptable:**
674
+
- Organization already uses centralized trust model
675
+
- Hold operator is internal/trusted team
676
+
- Centralization risk is acceptable trade-off
677
+
678
+
### ❌ Don't Use When
679
+
680
+
**Default Deployment:**
681
+
- Most users should use [plugin-based approach](./INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md)
682
+
- Plugins maintain decentralization
683
+
- Plugins reuse existing ATProto signatures
684
+
685
+
**Small Teams / Startups:**
686
+
- Certificate management overhead too high
687
+
- Don't need X.509 compliance
688
+
- Prefer simpler architecture
689
+
690
+
**Maximum Decentralization Required:**
691
+
- Cannot accept hold as single trust point
692
+
- Must maintain pure ATProto model
693
+
- Centralization contradicts project goals
694
+
695
+
## Comparison: Hold-as-CA vs. Plugins
696
+
697
+
| Aspect | Hold-as-CA | Plugin Approach |
698
+
|--------|------------|----------------|
699
+
| **Standard compliance** | ✅ Full X.509/PKI | ⚠️ Custom verification |
700
+
| **Tool compatibility** | ✅ Notation works unchanged | ❌ Requires plugin install |
701
+
| **Decentralization** | ❌ Centralized (hold CA) | ✅ Decentralized (DIDs) |
702
+
| **ATProto alignment** | ❌ Against philosophy | ✅ ATProto-native |
703
+
| **Signature reuse** | ❌ Must re-sign (P-256) | ✅ Reuses ATProto (K-256) |
704
+
| **Certificate mgmt** | 🔴 High overhead | 🟢 None |
705
+
| **Trust distribution** | 🔴 Must distribute CA cert | 🟢 DID resolution |
706
+
| **Hold compromise** | 🔴 All users affected | 🟢 Metadata only |
707
+
| **Operational cost** | 🔴 High | 🟢 Low |
708
+
| **Use case** | Enterprise PKI | General purpose |
709
+
710
+
## Recommendations
711
+
712
+
### Default Approach: Plugins
713
+
714
+
For most deployments, use plugin-based verification:
715
+
- **Ratify plugin** for Kubernetes
716
+
- **OPA Gatekeeper provider** for policy enforcement
717
+
- **Containerd verifier** for runtime checks
718
+
- **atcr-verify CLI** for general purpose
719
+
720
+
See [Integration Strategy](./INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md) for details.
721
+
722
+
### Optional: Hold-as-CA for Enterprise
723
+
724
+
Only implement hold-as-CA if you have specific requirements:
725
+
- Enterprise X.509 PKI mandates
726
+
- Cannot use plugins (restricted environments)
727
+
- Accept centralization trade-off
728
+
729
+
**Implement as opt-in feature:**
730
+
```bash
731
+
# Users explicitly enable co-signing
732
+
docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --sign=notation
733
+
734
+
# Or via environment variable
735
+
export ATCR_ENABLE_COSIGN=true
736
+
docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
737
+
```
738
+
739
+
### Security Best Practices
740
+
741
+
**If implementing hold-as-CA:**
742
+
743
+
1. **Store CA key in HSM** - Never on filesystem
744
+
2. **Audit all certificate issuance** - Log every cert
745
+
3. **Public transparency log** - Publish all certificates
746
+
4. **Short certificate validity** - 24 hours max
747
+
5. **Monitor unusual patterns** - Alert on anomalies
748
+
6. **Regular CA key rotation** - Every 2-3 years
749
+
7. **Cross-check ATProto** - Verify both signatures match
750
+
8. **Incident response plan** - Prepare for compromise
751
+
752
+
## See Also
753
+
754
+
- [ATProto Signatures](./ATPROTO_SIGNATURES.md) - How ATProto signing works
755
+
- [Integration Strategy](./INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md) - Overview of integration approaches
756
+
- [Signature Integration](./SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md) - Tool-specific integration guides
+356
-808
docs/IMAGE_SIGNING.md
+356
-808
docs/IMAGE_SIGNING.md
···
1
1
# Image Signing with ATProto
2
2
3
-
ATCR supports cryptographic signing of container images to ensure authenticity and integrity. Users have two options:
4
-
5
-
1. **Automatic signing (recommended)**: Credential helper signs images automatically on every push
6
-
2. **Manual signing**: Use standard Cosign tools yourself
7
-
8
-
Both approaches use the OCI Referrers API bridge for verification with standard tools (Cosign, Notary, Kubernetes admission controllers).
9
-
10
-
## Design Constraints
11
-
12
-
### Why Server-Side Signing Doesn't Work
13
-
14
-
It's tempting to implement automatic signing on the AppView or hold (like GitHub's automatic Cosign signing), but this breaks the fundamental trust model:
15
-
16
-
**The problem: Signing "on behalf of" isn't real signing**
17
-
18
-
```
19
-
❌ AppView signs image → Proves "AppView vouches for this"
20
-
❌ Hold signs image → Proves "Hold vouches for this"
21
-
❌ PDS signs image → Proves "PDS vouches for this"
22
-
✅ Alice signs image → Proves "Alice created/approved this"
23
-
```
24
-
25
-
**Why GitHub can do it:**
26
-
- GitHub Actions runs with your GitHub identity
27
-
- OIDC token proves "this workflow runs as alice on GitHub"
28
-
- Fulcio certificate authority issues cert based on that proof
29
-
- Still "alice" signing, just via GitHub's infrastructure
30
-
31
-
**Why ATCR can't replicate this:**
32
-
- ATProto doesn't have OIDC/Fulcio equivalent
33
-
- AppView can't sign "as alice" - only alice can
34
-
- No secure server-side storage for user private keys
35
-
- ATProto doesn't have encrypted record storage yet
36
-
- Storing keys in AppView database = AppView controls keys, not alice
37
-
- Hold's PDS has its own private key, but signing with it proves hold ownership, not user ownership
38
-
39
-
**Conclusion:** Signing must happen **client-side with user-controlled keys**.
40
-
41
-
### Why ATProto Record Signatures Aren't Sufficient
42
-
43
-
ATProto already signs all records stored in PDSs. When a manifest is stored as an `io.atcr.manifest` record, it includes:
44
-
45
-
```json
46
-
{
47
-
"uri": "at://did:plc:alice123/io.atcr.manifest/abc123",
48
-
"cid": "bafyrei...",
49
-
"value": { /* manifest data */ },
50
-
"sig": "..." // ← PDS signature over record
51
-
}
52
-
```
53
-
54
-
**What this proves:**
55
-
- ✅ Alice's PDS created and signed this record
56
-
- ✅ Record hasn't been tampered with since signing
57
-
- ✅ CID correctly represents the record content
58
-
59
-
**What this doesn't prove:**
60
-
- ❌ Alice personally approved this image
61
-
- ❌ Alice's private key was involved (only PDS key)
62
-
63
-
**The gap:**
64
-
- A compromised or malicious PDS could create fake manifest records and sign them validly
65
-
- PDS operator could sign manifests without user's knowledge
66
-
- No proof that the *user* (not just their PDS) approved the image
67
-
68
-
**For true image signing, we need:**
69
-
- User-controlled private keys (not PDS keys)
70
-
- Client-side signing (where user has key access)
71
-
- Separate signature records proving user approval
72
-
73
-
**Important nuance - PDS Trust Spectrum:**
74
-
75
-
While ATProto records are always signed by the PDS, this doesn't provide user-level signing for image verification:
3
+
ATCR provides cryptographic verification of container images through ATProto's native signature system. Every manifest stored in a PDS is cryptographically signed, providing tamper-proof image verification.
76
4
77
-
1. **Self-hosted PDS with user-controlled keys:**
78
-
- User runs their own PDS and controls PDS rotation keys
79
-
- PDS signature ≈ user signature (trusted operator)
80
-
- Still doesn't work with standard tools (Cosign/Notary)
5
+
## Overview
81
6
82
-
2. **Shared/managed PDS (e.g., Bluesky):**
83
-
- PDS operated by third party (bsky.social)
84
-
- Auto-generated keys controlled by operator
85
-
- User doesn't have access to PDS rotation keys
86
-
- PDS signature ≠ user signature
7
+
**Key Fact:** Every image pushed to ATCR is automatically signed via ATProto's repository commit signing. No additional signing tools or steps are required.
87
8
88
-
**For ATCR:**
89
-
- Credential helper signing works for all users (self-hosted or shared PDS)
90
-
- Provides user-controlled keys separate from PDS keys
91
-
- Works with standard verification tools via OCI Referrers API bridge
9
+
When you push an image:
10
+
1. Manifest stored in your PDS as an `io.atcr.manifest` record
11
+
2. PDS signs the repository commit containing the manifest (ECDSA K-256)
12
+
3. Signature is part of the ATProto repository chain
13
+
4. Verification proves the manifest came from your DID and hasn't been tampered with
92
14
93
-
## Signing Options
15
+
**This document explains:**
16
+
- How ATProto signatures work for ATCR images
17
+
- How to verify signatures using standard and custom tools
18
+
- Integration options for different use cases
19
+
- When to use optional X.509 certificates (Hold-as-CA)
94
20
95
-
### Option 1: Automatic Signing (Recommended)
21
+
## ATProto Signature Model
96
22
97
-
The credential helper automatically signs images on every push - no extra commands needed.
23
+
### How It Works
98
24
99
-
**How it works:**
100
-
- Credential helper runs on every `docker push` for authentication
101
-
- Extended to also sign the manifest digest with user's private key
102
-
- Private key stored securely in OS keychain
103
-
- Signature sent to AppView and stored in ATProto
104
-
- Completely transparent to the user
105
-
106
-
### Architecture
107
-
108
-
```
109
-
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
110
-
│ docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest │
111
-
└────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────┘
112
-
↓
113
-
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
114
-
│ docker-credential-atcr (runs automatically) │
115
-
│ │
116
-
│ 1. Authenticate to AppView (OAuth) │
117
-
│ 2. Get registry JWT │
118
-
│ 3. Sign manifest digest with local private key ← NEW
119
-
│ 4. Send signature to AppView ← NEW
120
-
│ │
121
-
│ Private key stored in OS keychain │
122
-
│ (macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, etc.) │
123
-
└────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────┘
124
-
↓
125
-
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
126
-
│ AppView │
127
-
│ │
128
-
│ 1. Receives signature from credential helper │
129
-
│ 2. Stores in user's PDS (io.atcr.signature) │
130
-
│ │
131
-
│ OR stores in hold's PDS for BYOS scenarios │
132
-
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
133
-
```
134
-
135
-
**User experience:**
136
-
137
-
```bash
138
-
# One-time setup
139
-
docker login atcr.io
140
-
# → Credential helper generates ECDSA key pair
141
-
# → Private key stored in OS keychain
142
-
# → Public key published to user's PDS
143
-
144
-
# Every push (automatic signing)
145
-
docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
146
-
# → Image pushed
147
-
# → Automatically signed by credential helper
148
-
# → No extra commands!
149
-
150
-
# Verification (standard Cosign)
151
-
cosign verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --key alice.pub
152
-
```
153
-
154
-
### Option 2: Manual Signing (DIY)
155
-
156
-
Use standard Cosign tools yourself if you prefer manual control.
157
-
158
-
**How it works:**
159
-
- You manage your own signing keys
160
-
- You run `cosign sign` manually after pushing
161
-
- Signatures stored in ATProto via OCI Referrers API
162
-
- Full control over signing workflow
163
-
164
-
**User experience:**
165
-
166
-
```bash
167
-
# Push image
168
-
docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
169
-
170
-
# Sign manually with Cosign
171
-
cosign sign atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --key cosign.key
172
-
173
-
# Cosign stores signature via registry's OCI API
174
-
# AppView receives signature and stores in ATProto
175
-
176
-
# Verification (same as automatic)
177
-
cosign verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --key cosign.pub
178
-
```
179
-
180
-
**When to use:**
181
-
- Need specific signing workflows (e.g., CI/CD pipelines)
182
-
- Want to use hardware tokens (YubiKey)
183
-
- Prefer manual control over automatic signing
184
-
- Already using Cosign in your organization
185
-
186
-
### Key Management
187
-
188
-
**Key generation (first run):**
189
-
1. Credential helper checks for existing signing key in OS keychain
190
-
2. If not found, generates new ECDSA P-256 key pair (or Ed25519)
191
-
3. Stores private key in OS keychain with access control
192
-
4. Derives public key for publishing
193
-
194
-
**Public key publishing:**
195
-
```json
196
-
{
197
-
"$type": "io.atcr.signing.key",
198
-
"keyId": "credential-helper-default",
199
-
"keyType": "ecdsa-p256",
200
-
"publicKey": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMFkw...",
201
-
"validFrom": "2025-10-20T12:00:00Z",
202
-
"expiresAt": null,
203
-
"revoked": false,
204
-
"purpose": ["image-signing"],
205
-
"deviceId": "alice-macbook-pro",
206
-
"createdAt": "2025-10-20T12:00:00Z"
207
-
}
208
-
```
209
-
210
-
**Record stored in:** User's PDS at `io.atcr.signing.key/credential-helper-default`
211
-
212
-
**Key storage locations:**
213
-
- **macOS:** Keychain Access (secure enclave on modern Macs)
214
-
- **Windows:** Credential Manager / Windows Data Protection API
215
-
- **Linux:** Secret Service API (gnome-keyring, kwallet)
216
-
- **Fallback:** Encrypted file with restrictive permissions (0600)
217
-
218
-
### Signing Flow
25
+
ATProto uses a **repository commit signing** model similar to Git:
219
26
220
27
```
221
28
1. docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
222
29
↓
223
-
2. Docker daemon calls credential helper:
224
-
docker-credential-atcr get atcr.io
225
-
↓
226
-
3. Credential helper flow:
227
-
a. Authenticate via OAuth (existing)
228
-
b. Receive registry JWT from AppView (existing)
229
-
c. Fetch manifest digest from registry (NEW)
230
-
d. Load private key from OS keychain (NEW)
231
-
e. Sign manifest digest (NEW)
232
-
f. Send signature to AppView via XRPC (NEW)
30
+
2. AppView stores manifest in alice's PDS as io.atcr.manifest record
233
31
↓
234
-
4. AppView stores signature:
235
-
{
236
-
"$type": "io.atcr.signature",
237
-
"repository": "alice/myapp",
238
-
"digest": "sha256:abc123...",
239
-
"signature": "MEUCIQDx...",
240
-
"keyId": "credential-helper-default",
241
-
"signatureAlgorithm": "ecdsa-p256-sha256",
242
-
"signedAt": "2025-10-20T12:34:56Z"
243
-
}
32
+
3. PDS creates repository commit containing the new record
244
33
↓
245
-
5. Return registry JWT to Docker
34
+
4. PDS signs commit with alice's private key (ECDSA K-256)
246
35
↓
247
-
6. Docker proceeds with push
36
+
5. Commit becomes part of alice's cryptographically signed repo chain
248
37
```
249
38
250
-
### Signature Storage
251
-
252
-
**Option 1: User's PDS (Default)**
253
-
- Signature stored in alice's PDS
254
-
- Collection: `io.atcr.signature`
255
-
- Discoverable via alice's ATProto repo
256
-
- User owns all signing metadata
257
-
258
-
**Option 2: Hold's PDS (BYOS)**
259
-
- Signature stored in hold's embedded PDS
260
-
- Useful for shared holds with multiple users
261
-
- Hold acts as signature repository
262
-
- Parallel to SBOM storage model
263
-
264
-
**Decision logic:**
265
-
```go
266
-
// In AppView signature handler
267
-
if manifest.HoldDid != "" && manifest.HoldDid != appview.DefaultHoldDid {
268
-
// BYOS scenario - store in hold's PDS
269
-
storeSignatureInHold(manifest.HoldDid, signature)
270
-
} else {
271
-
// Default - store in user's PDS
272
-
storeSignatureInUserPDS(userDid, signature)
273
-
}
274
-
```
39
+
**What this proves:**
40
+
- ✅ Manifest came from alice's PDS (DID-based identity)
41
+
- ✅ Manifest content hasn't been tampered with
42
+
- ✅ Manifest was created at a specific time (commit timestamp)
43
+
- ✅ Manifest is part of alice's verifiable repository history
275
44
276
-
## Signature Format
45
+
**Trust model:**
46
+
- Public keys distributed via DID documents (PLC directory, did:web)
47
+
- Signatures use ECDSA K-256 (secp256k1)
48
+
- Verification is decentralized (no central CA required)
49
+
- Users control their own DIDs and can rotate keys
277
50
278
-
Signatures are stored in a simple format in ATProto and transformed to Cosign-compatible format when served via the OCI Referrers API:
51
+
### Signature Metadata
279
52
280
-
**ATProto storage format:**
281
-
```json
282
-
{
283
-
"$type": "io.atcr.signature",
284
-
"repository": "alice/myapp",
285
-
"digest": "sha256:abc123...",
286
-
"signature": "base64-encoded-signature-bytes",
287
-
"keyId": "credential-helper-default",
288
-
"signatureAlgorithm": "ecdsa-p256-sha256",
289
-
"signedAt": "2025-10-20T12:34:56Z",
290
-
"format": "simple"
291
-
}
292
-
```
53
+
In addition to ATProto's native commit signatures, ATCR creates **ORAS signature artifacts** that bridge ATProto signatures to the OCI ecosystem:
293
54
294
-
**OCI Referrers format (served by AppView):**
295
55
```json
296
56
{
297
-
"schemaVersion": 2,
298
-
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json",
299
-
"manifests": [{
300
-
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json",
301
-
"digest": "sha256:...",
302
-
"artifactType": "application/vnd.dev.cosign.simplesigning.v1+json",
303
-
"annotations": {
304
-
"dev.sigstore.cosign.signature": "MEUCIQDx...",
305
-
"io.atcr.keyId": "credential-helper-default",
306
-
"io.atcr.signedAt": "2025-10-20T12:34:56Z"
307
-
}
308
-
}]
57
+
"$type": "io.atcr.atproto.signature",
58
+
"version": "1.0",
59
+
"subject": {
60
+
"digest": "sha256:abc123...",
61
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json"
62
+
},
63
+
"atproto": {
64
+
"did": "did:plc:alice123",
65
+
"handle": "alice.bsky.social",
66
+
"pdsEndpoint": "https://bsky.social",
67
+
"recordUri": "at://did:plc:alice123/io.atcr.manifest/abc123",
68
+
"commitCid": "bafyreih8...",
69
+
"signedAt": "2025-10-31T12:34:56.789Z"
70
+
},
71
+
"signature": {
72
+
"algorithm": "ECDSA-K256-SHA256",
73
+
"keyId": "did:plc:alice123#atproto",
74
+
"publicKeyMultibase": "zQ3shokFTS3brHcDQrn82RUDfCZESWL1ZdCEJwekUDdo1Ko4Z"
75
+
}
309
76
}
310
77
```
311
78
312
-
This allows:
313
-
- Simple storage in ATProto
314
-
- Compatible with Cosign verification
315
-
- No duplicate storage needed
316
-
317
-
## ATProto Records
318
-
319
-
### io.atcr.signing.key - Public Signing Keys
79
+
**Stored as:**
80
+
- OCI artifact with `artifactType: application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json`
81
+
- Linked to image manifest via OCI Referrers API
82
+
- Discoverable by standard OCI tools (ORAS, Cosign, Crane)
320
83
321
-
```json
322
-
{
323
-
"$type": "io.atcr.signing.key",
324
-
"keyId": "credential-helper-default",
325
-
"keyType": "ecdsa-p256",
326
-
"publicKey": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMFkwEwYHKoZI...",
327
-
"validFrom": "2025-10-20T12:00:00Z",
328
-
"expiresAt": "2026-10-20T12:00:00Z",
329
-
"revoked": false,
330
-
"purpose": ["image-signing"],
331
-
"deviceId": "alice-macbook-pro",
332
-
"comment": "Generated by docker-credential-atcr",
333
-
"createdAt": "2025-10-20T12:00:00Z"
334
-
}
335
-
```
84
+
## Verification
336
85
337
-
**Record key:** `keyId` (user-chosen identifier)
86
+
### Quick Verification (Shell Script)
338
87
339
-
**Fields:**
340
-
- `keyId`: Unique identifier (e.g., `credential-helper-default`, `ci-key-1`)
341
-
- `keyType`: Algorithm (ecdsa-p256, ed25519, rsa-2048, rsa-4096)
342
-
- `publicKey`: PEM-encoded public key
343
-
- `validFrom`: Key becomes valid at this time
344
-
- `expiresAt`: Key expires (null = no expiry)
345
-
- `revoked`: Revocation status
346
-
- `purpose`: Key purposes (image-signing, sbom-signing, etc.)
347
-
- `deviceId`: Optional device identifier
348
-
- `comment`: Optional human-readable comment
88
+
For manual verification, use the provided shell scripts:
349
89
350
-
### io.atcr.signature - Image Signatures
90
+
```bash
91
+
# Verify an image
92
+
./examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
351
93
352
-
```json
353
-
{
354
-
"$type": "io.atcr.signature",
355
-
"repository": "alice/myapp",
356
-
"digest": "sha256:abc123...",
357
-
"signature": "MEUCIQDxH7...",
358
-
"keyId": "credential-helper-default",
359
-
"signatureAlgorithm": "ecdsa-p256-sha256",
360
-
"signedAt": "2025-10-20T12:34:56Z",
361
-
"format": "simple",
362
-
"createdAt": "2025-10-20T12:34:56Z"
363
-
}
94
+
# Output shows:
95
+
# - DID and handle of signer
96
+
# - PDS endpoint
97
+
# - ATProto record URI
98
+
# - Signature verification status
364
99
```
365
100
366
-
**Record key:** SHA256 hash of `(digest || keyId)` for deduplication
367
-
368
-
**Fields:**
369
-
- `repository`: Image repository (alice/myapp)
370
-
- `digest`: Manifest digest being signed (sha256:...)
371
-
- `signature`: Base64-encoded signature bytes
372
-
- `keyId`: Reference to signing key record
373
-
- `signatureAlgorithm`: Algorithm used
374
-
- `signedAt`: Timestamp of signature creation
375
-
- `format`: Signature format (simple, cosign, notary)
101
+
**See:** [examples/verification/README.md](../examples/verification/README.md) for complete examples including:
102
+
- Standalone verification script
103
+
- Secure pull wrapper (verify before pull)
104
+
- Kubernetes webhook deployment
105
+
- CI/CD integration examples
376
106
377
-
## Verification
378
-
379
-
Image signatures are verified using standard tools (Cosign, Notary) via the OCI Referrers API bridge. AppView transparently serves ATProto signatures as OCI artifacts, so verification "just works" with existing tooling.
380
-
381
-
### Integration with Docker/Kubernetes Workflows
382
-
383
-
**The challenge:** Cosign and Notary plugins are for **key management** (custom KMS, HSMs), not **signature storage**. Both tools expect signatures stored as OCI artifacts in the registry itself.
107
+
### Standard Tools (Discovery Only)
384
108
385
-
**Reality check:**
386
-
- Cosign looks for signatures as OCI referrers or attached manifests
387
-
- Notary looks for signatures in registry's `_notary` endpoint
388
-
- Kubernetes admission controllers (Sigstore Policy Controller, Ratify) use these tools
389
-
- They won't find signatures stored only in ATProto
109
+
Standard OCI tools can **discover** ATProto signature artifacts but cannot **verify** them (different signature format):
390
110
391
-
**The solution:** AppView implements the **OCI Referrers API** and serves ATProto signatures as OCI artifacts on-demand.
111
+
```bash
112
+
# Discover signatures with ORAS
113
+
oras discover atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest \
114
+
--artifact-type application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json
392
115
393
-
### How It Works: OCI Referrers API Bridge
116
+
# Fetch signature metadata
117
+
oras pull atcr.io/alice/myapp@sha256:sig789...
394
118
395
-
When Cosign/Notary verify an image, they call the OCI Referrers API:
396
-
397
-
```
398
-
cosign verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
399
-
↓
400
-
GET /v2/alice/myapp/referrers/sha256:abc123
401
-
↓
402
-
AppView:
403
-
1. Queries alice's PDS for io.atcr.signature records
404
-
2. Filters signatures matching digest sha256:abc123
405
-
3. Transforms to OCI referrers format
406
-
4. Returns as JSON
407
-
↓
408
-
Cosign receives OCI referrer manifest
409
-
↓
410
-
Verifies signature (works normally)
119
+
# View with Cosign (discovery only)
120
+
cosign tree atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
411
121
```
412
122
413
-
**AppView endpoint implementation:**
123
+
**Note:** Cosign/Notary cannot verify ATProto signatures directly because they use a different signature format and trust model. Use integration plugins or the `atcr-verify` CLI tool instead.
414
124
415
-
```go
416
-
// GET /v2/{owner}/{repo}/referrers/{digest}
417
-
func (h *Handler) GetReferrers(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
418
-
owner := mux.Vars(r)["owner"]
419
-
digest := mux.Vars(r)["digest"]
125
+
## Integration Options
420
126
421
-
// 1. Resolve owner → DID → PDS
422
-
did, pds, err := h.resolver.ResolveIdentity(owner)
127
+
ATCR supports multiple integration approaches depending on your use case:
423
128
424
-
// 2. Query PDS for signatures matching digest
425
-
signatures, err := h.atproto.ListRecords(pds, did, "io.atcr.signature")
426
-
filtered := filterByDigest(signatures, digest)
129
+
### 1. **Plugins (Recommended for Kubernetes)** ⭐
427
130
428
-
// 3. Transform to OCI Index format
429
-
index := &ocispec.Index{
430
-
SchemaVersion: 2,
431
-
MediaType: ocispec.MediaTypeImageIndex,
432
-
Manifests: []ocispec.Descriptor{},
433
-
}
131
+
Build plugins for existing policy/verification engines:
434
132
435
-
for _, sig := range filtered {
436
-
index.Manifests = append(index.Manifests, ocispec.Descriptor{
437
-
MediaType: "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json",
438
-
Digest: sig.Digest,
439
-
Size: sig.Size,
440
-
ArtifactType: "application/vnd.dev.cosign.simplesigning.v1+json",
441
-
Annotations: map[string]string{
442
-
"dev.sigstore.cosign.signature": sig.Signature,
443
-
"io.atcr.keyId": sig.KeyId,
444
-
"io.atcr.signedAt": sig.SignedAt,
445
-
"io.atcr.source": fmt.Sprintf("at://%s/io.atcr.signature/%s", did, sig.Rkey),
446
-
},
447
-
})
448
-
}
133
+
**Ratify Verifier Plugin:**
134
+
- Integrates with OPA Gatekeeper
135
+
- Verifies ATProto signatures using Ratify's plugin interface
136
+
- Policy-based enforcement for Kubernetes
449
137
450
-
// 4. Return as JSON
451
-
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", ocispec.MediaTypeImageIndex)
452
-
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(index)
453
-
}
454
-
```
138
+
**OPA Gatekeeper External Provider:**
139
+
- HTTP service that verifies ATProto signatures
140
+
- Rego policies call external provider
141
+
- Flexible and easy to deploy
455
142
456
-
**Benefits:**
457
-
- ✅ **No dual storage** - signatures only in ATProto
458
-
- ✅ **Standard tools work** - Cosign, Notary, Kubernetes admission controllers
459
-
- ✅ **Single source of truth** - ATProto PDS
460
-
- ✅ **On-demand transformation** - only when needed
461
-
- ✅ **Offline verification** - can cache public keys
143
+
**Containerd 2.0 Bindir Plugin:**
144
+
- Verifies signatures at containerd level
145
+
- Works with any CRI-compatible runtime
146
+
- No Kubernetes required
462
147
463
-
**Trade-offs:**
464
-
- ⚠️ AppView must be reachable during verification (but already required for image pulls)
465
-
- ⚠️ Transformation overhead (minimal - just JSON formatting)
466
-
467
-
### Alternative Approaches
468
-
469
-
#### Option 1: Dual Storage (Not Recommended)
148
+
**See:** [docs/SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md](./SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md) for complete plugin implementation examples
470
149
471
-
Store signatures in BOTH ATProto AND OCI registry:
150
+
### 2. **CLI Tool (atcr-verify)**
472
151
473
-
```go
474
-
// In credential helper or AppView
475
-
func StoreSignature(sig Signature) error {
476
-
// 1. Store in ATProto (user's PDS or hold's PDS)
477
-
err := storeInATProto(sig)
152
+
Standalone CLI tool for signature verification:
478
153
479
-
// 2. ALSO store as OCI artifact in registry
480
-
err = storeAsOCIReferrer(sig)
154
+
```bash
155
+
# Install
156
+
go install github.com/atcr-io/atcr/cmd/atcr-verify@latest
481
157
482
-
return err
483
-
}
484
-
```
158
+
# Verify image
159
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --policy trust-policy.yaml
485
160
486
-
**OCI Referrer format:**
487
-
```json
488
-
{
489
-
"schemaVersion": 2,
490
-
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json",
491
-
"artifactType": "application/vnd.dev.cosign.simplesigning.v1+json",
492
-
"subject": {
493
-
"digest": "sha256:abc123...",
494
-
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json"
495
-
},
496
-
"layers": [{
497
-
"mediaType": "application/vnd.dev.cosign.simplesigning.v1+json",
498
-
"digest": "sha256:sig...",
499
-
"annotations": {
500
-
"dev.sigstore.cosign.signature": "MEUCIQDx...",
501
-
"io.atcr.source": "atproto://did:plc:alice123/io.atcr.signature/..."
502
-
}
503
-
}]
504
-
}
161
+
# Use in CI/CD
162
+
atcr-verify $IMAGE --quiet && kubectl apply -f deployment.yaml
505
163
```
506
164
507
-
**Benefits:**
508
-
- ✅ Works with standard Cosign verification
509
-
- ✅ Kubernetes admission controllers work out of box
510
-
- ✅ ATProto signatures still available for discovery
511
-
- ✅ Cross-reference via `io.atcr.source` annotation
165
+
**Features:**
166
+
- Trust policy management (which DIDs to trust)
167
+
- Multiple output formats (text, JSON, SARIF)
168
+
- Offline verification with cached DID documents
169
+
- Library usage for custom integrations
512
170
513
-
**Trade-offs:**
514
-
- ❌ Duplicate storage (ATProto + OCI)
515
-
- ❌ Consistency issues (what if one write fails?)
516
-
- ❌ Signatures tied to specific registry
171
+
**See:** [docs/ATCR_VERIFY_CLI.md](./ATCR_VERIFY_CLI.md) for complete CLI specification
517
172
518
-
#### Option 2: Custom Admission Controller
173
+
### 3. **External Services**
519
174
520
-
Write Kubernetes admission controller that understands ATProto:
175
+
Deploy verification as a service:
521
176
177
+
**GitHub Actions:**
522
178
```yaml
523
-
# admission-controller deployment
524
-
apiVersion: v1
525
-
kind: ConfigMap
526
-
metadata:
527
-
name: atcr-policy
528
-
data:
529
-
policy.yaml: |
530
-
policies:
531
-
- name: require-atcr-signatures
532
-
images:
533
-
- "atcr.io/*/*"
534
-
verification:
535
-
method: atproto
536
-
requireSignature: true
179
+
- name: Verify image signature
180
+
uses: atcr-io/atcr-verify-action@v1
181
+
with:
182
+
image: atcr.io/alice/myapp:${{ github.sha }}
183
+
policy: .atcr/trust-policy.yaml
537
184
```
538
185
539
-
**Benefits:**
540
-
- ✅ Native ATProto support
541
-
- ✅ No OCI conversion needed
542
-
- ✅ Can enforce ATCR-specific policies
186
+
**GitLab CI, Jenkins, CircleCI:**
187
+
- Use `atcr-verify` CLI in pipeline
188
+
- Fail build if verification fails
189
+
- Enforce signature requirements before deployment
543
190
544
-
**Trade-offs:**
545
-
- ❌ Doesn't work with standard tools (Cosign, Notary)
546
-
- ❌ Additional infrastructure to maintain
547
-
- ❌ Limited ecosystem integration
191
+
### 4. **X.509 Certificates (Hold-as-CA)** ⚠️
548
192
549
-
#### Recommendation
193
+
Optional approach where hold services issue X.509 certificates based on ATProto signatures:
550
194
551
-
**Primary approach: OCI Referrers API Bridge**
552
-
- Implement `/v2/{owner}/{repo}/referrers/{digest}` in AppView
553
-
- Query ATProto on-demand and transform to OCI format
554
-
- Works with Cosign, Notary, Kubernetes admission controllers
555
-
- No duplicate storage, single source of truth
195
+
**Use cases:**
196
+
- Enterprise environments requiring PKI compliance
197
+
- Tools that only support X.509 (legacy systems)
198
+
- Notation integration (P-256 certificates)
556
199
557
-
**Why this works:**
558
-
- Cosign/Notary just make HTTP GET requests to the registry
559
-
- AppView is already the registry - just add one endpoint
560
-
- Transformation is simple (ATProto record → OCI descriptor)
561
-
- Signatures stay in ATProto where they belong
562
-
563
-
### Cosign Verification (OCI Referrers API)
564
-
565
-
```bash
566
-
# Standard Cosign works out of the box:
567
-
cosign verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest \
568
-
--key <(atcr-cli key export alice credential-helper-default)
200
+
**Trade-offs:**
201
+
- ❌ Introduces centralization (hold acts as CA)
202
+
- ❌ Trust shifts from DIDs to hold operator
203
+
- ❌ Requires hold service infrastructure
569
204
570
-
# What happens:
571
-
# 1. Cosign queries: GET /v2/alice/myapp/referrers/sha256:abc123
572
-
# 2. AppView fetches signatures from alice's PDS
573
-
# 3. AppView returns OCI referrers index
574
-
# 4. Cosign downloads signature artifact
575
-
# 5. Cosign verifies with public key
576
-
# 6. Success!
205
+
**See:** [docs/HOLD_AS_CA.md](./HOLD_AS_CA.md) for complete architecture and security considerations
577
206
578
-
# Or with public key inline:
579
-
cosign verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --key '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
580
-
MFkwEwYHKoZI...
581
-
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----'
582
-
```
207
+
## Integration Strategy Decision Matrix
583
208
584
-
**Fetching public keys from ATProto:**
209
+
Choose the right integration approach:
585
210
586
-
Public keys are stored in ATProto records and can be fetched via standard XRPC:
211
+
| Use Case | Recommended Approach | Priority |
212
+
|----------|---------------------|----------|
213
+
| **Kubernetes admission control** | Ratify plugin or Gatekeeper provider | HIGH |
214
+
| **CI/CD verification** | atcr-verify CLI or GitHub Actions | HIGH |
215
+
| **Docker/containerd** | Containerd bindir plugin | MEDIUM |
216
+
| **Policy enforcement** | OPA Gatekeeper + external provider | HIGH |
217
+
| **Manual verification** | Shell scripts or atcr-verify CLI | LOW |
218
+
| **Enterprise PKI compliance** | Hold-as-CA (X.509 certificates) | OPTIONAL |
219
+
| **Legacy tool support** | Hold-as-CA or external bridge service | OPTIONAL |
587
220
588
-
```bash
589
-
# Query for public keys
590
-
curl "https://atcr.io/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.listRecords?\
591
-
repo=did:plc:alice123&\
592
-
collection=io.atcr.signing.key"
221
+
**See:** [docs/INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md](./INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md) for complete integration planning guide including:
222
+
- Architecture layers and data flow
223
+
- Tool compatibility matrix (16+ tools)
224
+
- Implementation roadmap (4 phases)
225
+
- When to use each approach
593
226
594
-
# Extract public key and save as PEM
595
-
# Then use in Cosign:
596
-
cosign verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --key alice.pub
597
-
```
227
+
## Trust Policies
598
228
599
-
### Kubernetes Policy Example (OCI Referrers API)
229
+
Define which signatures you trust:
600
230
601
231
```yaml
602
-
# Sigstore Policy Controller
603
-
apiVersion: policy.sigstore.dev/v1beta1
604
-
kind: ClusterImagePolicy
605
-
metadata:
606
-
name: atcr-images-must-be-signed
607
-
spec:
608
-
images:
609
-
- glob: "atcr.io/*/*"
610
-
authorities:
611
-
- key:
612
-
# Public key from ATProto record
613
-
data: |
614
-
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
615
-
MFkwEwYHKoZI...
616
-
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
617
-
```
232
+
# trust-policy.yaml
233
+
version: 1.0
618
234
619
-
**How it works:**
620
-
1. Pod tries to run `atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest`
621
-
2. Policy Controller intercepts
622
-
3. Queries registry for OCI referrers (finds signature)
623
-
4. Verifies signature with public key
624
-
5. Allows pod if valid
625
-
626
-
### Trust Policies
235
+
trustedDIDs:
236
+
did:plc:alice123:
237
+
name: "Alice (DevOps Lead)"
238
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
239
+
expiresAt: null
627
240
628
-
Define what signatures are required for image execution:
241
+
did:plc:bob456:
242
+
name: "Bob (Security Team)"
243
+
validFrom: "2024-06-01T00:00:00Z"
244
+
expiresAt: "2025-12-31T23:59:59Z"
629
245
630
-
```yaml
631
-
# ~/.atcr/trust-policy.yaml
632
246
policies:
633
247
- name: production-images
634
-
scope: "atcr.io/alice/prod-*"
248
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/prod-*"
635
249
require:
636
-
- signature: true
637
-
- keyIds: ["ci-key-1", "alice-release-key"]
638
-
action: enforce # block, audit, or allow
250
+
signature: true
251
+
trustedDIDs:
252
+
- did:plc:alice123
253
+
- did:plc:bob456
254
+
minSignatures: 1
255
+
action: enforce # reject if policy fails
639
256
640
257
- name: dev-images
641
-
scope: "atcr.io/alice/dev-*"
258
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/dev-*"
642
259
require:
643
-
- signature: false
644
-
action: audit
260
+
signature: false
261
+
action: audit # log but don't reject
645
262
```
646
263
647
-
**Integration points:**
648
-
- Kubernetes admission controller
649
-
- Docker Content Trust equivalent
650
-
- CI/CD pipeline gates
264
+
**Use with:**
265
+
- `atcr-verify` CLI: `atcr-verify IMAGE --policy trust-policy.yaml`
266
+
- Kubernetes webhooks: ConfigMap with policy
267
+
- CI/CD pipelines: Fail build if policy not met
651
268
652
269
## Security Considerations
653
270
654
-
### Key Storage Security
271
+
### What ATProto Signatures Prove
655
272
656
-
**OS keychain benefits:**
657
-
- ✅ Encrypted storage
658
-
- ✅ Access control (requires user password/biometric)
659
-
- ✅ Auditing (macOS logs keychain access)
660
-
- ✅ Hardware-backed on modern systems (Secure Enclave, TPM)
273
+
✅ **Identity:** Manifest signed by specific DID (e.g., `did:plc:alice123`)
274
+
✅ **Integrity:** Manifest content hasn't been tampered with
275
+
✅ **Timestamp:** When the manifest was signed
276
+
✅ **Authenticity:** Signature created with private key for that DID
661
277
662
-
**Best practices:**
663
-
- Generate keys on device (never transmitted)
664
-
- Use hardware-backed storage when available
665
-
- Require user approval for key access (biometric/password)
666
-
- Rotate keys periodically (e.g., annually)
278
+
### What They Don't Prove
667
279
668
-
### Trust Model
280
+
❌ **Vulnerability-free:** Signature doesn't mean image is safe
281
+
❌ **Authorization:** DID ownership doesn't imply permission to deploy
282
+
❌ **Key security:** Private key could be compromised
283
+
❌ **PDS trustworthiness:** Malicious PDS could create fake records
669
284
670
-
**What signatures prove:**
671
-
- ✅ User had access to private key at signing time
672
-
- ✅ Manifest digest matches what was signed
673
-
- ✅ Signature created by specific key ID
674
-
- ✅ Timestamp of signature creation
285
+
### Trust Dependencies
675
286
676
-
**What signatures don't prove:**
677
-
- ❌ Image is free of vulnerabilities
678
-
- ❌ Image contents are safe to run
679
-
- ❌ User's identity is verified (depends on DID trust)
680
-
- ❌ Private key wasn't compromised
287
+
When verifying signatures, you're trusting:
288
+
1. **DID resolution** (PLC directory, did:web) - public key is correct for DID
289
+
2. **PDS integrity** - PDS serves correct records and doesn't forge signatures
290
+
3. **Cryptographic primitives** - ECDSA K-256 remains secure
291
+
4. **Your trust policy** - DIDs you've chosen to trust are legitimate
681
292
682
-
**Trust dependencies:**
683
-
- User protects their private key
684
-
- OS keychain security
685
-
- DID resolution accuracy (PLC directory, did:web)
686
-
- PDS serves correct public key records
687
-
- Signature algorithms remain secure
293
+
### Best Practices
688
294
689
-
### Multi-Device Support
295
+
**1. Use Trust Policies**
296
+
Don't blindly trust all signatures - define which DIDs you trust:
297
+
```yaml
298
+
trustedDIDs:
299
+
- did:plc:your-org-team
300
+
- did:plc:your-ci-system
301
+
```
690
302
691
-
**Challenge:** User has multiple devices (laptop, desktop, CI/CD)
303
+
**2. Monitor Signature Coverage**
304
+
Track which images have signatures:
305
+
```bash
306
+
atcr-verify --check-coverage namespace/production
307
+
```
692
308
693
-
**Options:**
694
-
695
-
1. **Separate keys per device:**
696
-
```json
697
-
{
698
-
"keyId": "alice-macbook-pro",
699
-
"deviceId": "macbook-pro"
700
-
},
701
-
{
702
-
"keyId": "alice-desktop",
703
-
"deviceId": "desktop"
704
-
}
705
-
```
706
-
- Pros: Best security (key compromise limited to one device)
707
-
- Cons: Need to trust signatures from any device
708
-
709
-
2. **Shared key via secure sync:**
710
-
- Export key from primary device
711
-
- Import to secondary devices
712
-
- Stored in each device's keychain
713
-
- Pros: Single key ID to trust
714
-
- Cons: More attack surface (key on multiple devices)
715
-
716
-
3. **Primary + secondary model:**
717
-
- Primary key on main device
718
-
- Secondary keys on other devices
719
-
- Trust policy requires primary key signature
720
-
- Pros: Flexible + secure
721
-
- Cons: More complex setup
722
-
723
-
**Recommendation:** Separate keys per device (Option 1) for security, with trust policy accepting any of user's keys.
724
-
725
-
### Key Compromise Response
726
-
727
-
If a device is lost or private key is compromised:
728
-
729
-
1. **Revoke the key** via AppView web UI or XRPC API
730
-
- Updates `io.atcr.signing.key` record: `"revoked": true`
731
-
- Revocation is atomic and immediate
309
+
**3. Enforce in Production**
310
+
Use Kubernetes admission control to block unsigned images:
311
+
```yaml
312
+
# Ratify + Gatekeeper or custom webhook
313
+
enforceSignatures: true
314
+
failurePolicy: Fail
315
+
```
732
316
733
-
2. **Generate new key** on new/existing device
734
-
- Automatic on next `docker login` from secure device
735
-
- Credential helper generates new key pair
317
+
**4. Verify in CI/CD**
318
+
Never deploy unsigned images:
319
+
```yaml
320
+
# GitHub Actions
321
+
- name: Verify signature
322
+
run: atcr-verify $IMAGE || exit 1
323
+
```
736
324
737
-
3. **Old signatures still exist but fail verification**
738
-
- Revoked key = untrusted
739
-
- No certificate revocation list (CRL) delays
740
-
- Globally visible within seconds
325
+
**5. Plan for Compromised Keys**
326
+
- Rotate DID keys periodically
327
+
- Monitor DID documents for unexpected key changes
328
+
- Have incident response plan for key compromise
741
329
742
-
### CI/CD Signing
330
+
## Implementation Status
743
331
744
-
For automated builds, use standard Cosign in your CI pipeline:
332
+
### ✅ Available Now
745
333
746
-
```yaml
747
-
# .github/workflows/build.yml
748
-
steps:
749
-
- name: Push image
750
-
run: docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
334
+
- **ATProto signatures**: All manifests automatically signed by PDS
335
+
- **ORAS artifacts**: Signature metadata stored as OCI artifacts
336
+
- **OCI Referrers API**: Discovery via standard OCI endpoints
337
+
- **Shell scripts**: Manual verification examples
338
+
- **Documentation**: Complete integration guides
751
339
752
-
- name: Sign with Cosign
753
-
run: cosign sign atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --key ${{ secrets.COSIGN_KEY }}
754
-
```
340
+
### 🔄 In Development
755
341
756
-
**Key management:**
757
-
- Generate Cosign key pair: `cosign generate-key-pair`
758
-
- Store private key in CI secrets (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, etc.)
759
-
- Publish public key to PDS via XRPC or AppView web UI
760
-
- Cosign stores signature via registry's OCI API
761
-
- AppView automatically stores in ATProto
342
+
- **atcr-verify CLI**: Standalone verification tool
343
+
- **Ratify plugin**: Kubernetes integration
344
+
- **Gatekeeper provider**: OPA policy enforcement
345
+
- **GitHub Actions**: CI/CD integration
762
346
763
-
**Or use automatic signing:**
764
-
- Configure credential helper in CI environment
765
-
- Signatures happen automatically on push
766
-
- No explicit signing step needed
347
+
### 📋 Planned
767
348
768
-
## Implementation Roadmap
349
+
- **Containerd plugin**: Runtime-level verification
350
+
- **Hold-as-CA**: X.509 certificate generation (optional)
351
+
- **Web UI**: Signature viewer in AppView
352
+
- **Offline bundles**: Air-gapped verification
769
353
770
-
### Phase 1: Core Signing (2-3 weeks)
354
+
## Comparison with Other Signing Solutions
771
355
772
-
**Week 1: Credential helper key management**
773
-
- Generate ECDSA key pair on first run
774
-
- Store private key in OS keychain
775
-
- Create `io.atcr.signing.key` record in PDS
776
-
- Handle key rotation
356
+
| Feature | ATCR (ATProto) | Cosign (Sigstore) | Notation (Notary v2) |
357
+
|---------|---------------|-------------------|---------------------|
358
+
| **Signing** | Automatic (PDS) | Manual or keyless | Manual |
359
+
| **Keys** | K-256 (secp256k1) | P-256 or RSA | P-256, P-384, P-521 |
360
+
| **Trust** | DID-based | OIDC + Fulcio CA | X.509 PKI |
361
+
| **Storage** | ATProto PDS | OCI registry | OCI registry |
362
+
| **Centralization** | Decentralized | Centralized (Fulcio) | Configurable |
363
+
| **Transparency Log** | ATProto firehose | Rekor | Configurable |
364
+
| **Verification** | Custom tools/plugins | Cosign CLI | Notation CLI |
365
+
| **Kubernetes** | Plugins (Ratify) | Policy Controller | Policy Controller |
777
366
778
-
**Week 2: Signing integration**
779
-
- Sign manifest digest after authentication
780
-
- Send signature to AppView via XRPC
781
-
- AppView stores in user's PDS or hold's PDS
782
-
- Error handling and retries
367
+
**ATCR advantages:**
368
+
- ✅ Decentralized trust (no CA required)
369
+
- ✅ Automatic signing (no extra tools)
370
+
- ✅ DID-based identity (portable, self-sovereign)
371
+
- ✅ Transparent via ATProto firehose
783
372
784
-
**Week 3: OCI Referrers API**
785
-
- Implement `GET /v2/{owner}/{repo}/referrers/{digest}` in AppView
786
-
- Query ATProto for signatures
787
-
- Transform to OCI Index format
788
-
- Return Cosign-compatible artifacts
789
-
- Test with `cosign verify`
373
+
**ATCR trade-offs:**
374
+
- ⚠️ Requires custom verification tools/plugins
375
+
- ⚠️ K-256 not supported by Notation (needs Hold-as-CA)
376
+
- ⚠️ Smaller ecosystem than Cosign/Notation
790
377
791
-
### Phase 2: Enhanced Features (2-3 weeks)
378
+
## Why Not Use Cosign Directly?
792
379
793
-
**Key management (credential helper):**
794
-
- Key rotation support
795
-
- Revocation handling
796
-
- Device identification
797
-
- Key expiration
380
+
**Question:** Why not just integrate with Cosign's keyless signing (OIDC + Fulcio)?
798
381
799
-
**Signature storage:**
800
-
- Handle manual Cosign signing (via OCI API)
801
-
- Store signatures from both automatic and manual flows
802
-
- Signature deduplication
803
-
- Signature audit logs
382
+
**Answer:** ATProto and Cosign use incompatible authentication models:
804
383
805
-
**AppView endpoints:**
806
-
- XRPC endpoints for key/signature queries
807
-
- Web UI for viewing keys and signatures
808
-
- Key revocation via web interface
384
+
| Requirement | Cosign Keyless | ATProto |
385
+
|-------------|---------------|---------|
386
+
| **Identity protocol** | OIDC | ATProto OAuth + DPoP |
387
+
| **Token format** | JWT from OIDC provider | DPoP-bound access token |
388
+
| **CA** | Fulcio (Sigstore CA) | None (DID-based PKI) |
389
+
| **Infrastructure** | Fulcio + Rekor + TUF | PDS + DID resolver |
809
390
810
-
### Phase 3: Kubernetes Integration (2-3 weeks)
391
+
**To make Cosign work, we'd need to:**
392
+
1. Deploy Fulcio (certificate authority)
393
+
2. Deploy Rekor (transparency log)
394
+
3. Deploy TUF (metadata distribution)
395
+
4. Build OIDC provider bridge for ATProto OAuth
396
+
5. Maintain all this infrastructure
811
397
812
-
**Admission controller setup:**
813
-
- Documentation for Sigstore Policy Controller
814
-
- Example policies for ATCR images
815
-
- Public key management (fetch from ATProto)
816
-
- Integration testing with real clusters
398
+
**Instead:** We leverage ATProto's existing signatures and build lightweight plugins/tools for verification. This is simpler, more decentralized, and aligns with ATCR's design philosophy.
817
399
818
-
**Advanced features:**
819
-
- Signature caching in AppView (reduce PDS queries)
820
-
- Multi-signature support (require N signatures)
821
-
- Timestamp verification
822
-
- Signature expiration policies
400
+
**For tools that need X.509 certificates:** See [Hold-as-CA](./HOLD_AS_CA.md) for an optional centralized approach.
823
401
824
-
### Phase 4: UI Integration (1-2 weeks)
402
+
## Getting Started
825
403
826
-
**AppView web UI:**
827
-
- Show signature status on repository pages
828
-
- List signing keys for users
829
-
- Revoke keys via web interface
830
-
- Signature verification badges
404
+
### Verify Your First Image
831
405
832
-
## Comparison: Automatic vs Manual Signing
406
+
```bash
407
+
# 1. Check if image has ATProto signature
408
+
oras discover atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest \
409
+
--artifact-type application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json
833
410
834
-
| Feature | Automatic (Credential Helper) | Manual (Standard Cosign) |
835
-
|---------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|
836
-
| **User action** | Zero - happens on push | `cosign sign` after push |
837
-
| **Key management** | Automatic generation/storage | User manages keys |
838
-
| **Consistency** | Every image signed | Easy to forget |
839
-
| **Setup** | Works with credential helper | Install Cosign, generate keys |
840
-
| **CI/CD** | Automatic if cred helper configured | Explicit signing step |
841
-
| **Flexibility** | Opinionated defaults | Full control over workflow |
842
-
| **Use case** | Most users, simple workflows | Advanced users, custom workflows |
411
+
# 2. Pull signature metadata
412
+
oras pull atcr.io/alice/myapp@sha256:sig789...
843
413
844
-
**Recommendation:**
845
-
- **Start with automatic**: Best UX, works for most users
846
-
- **Use manual** for: CI/CD pipelines, hardware tokens, custom signing workflows
414
+
# 3. Verify with shell script
415
+
./examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
847
416
848
-
## Complete Workflow Summary
417
+
# 4. Use atcr-verify CLI (when available)
418
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --policy trust-policy.yaml
419
+
```
849
420
850
-
### Option 1: Automatic Signing (Recommended)
421
+
### Deploy Kubernetes Verification
851
422
852
423
```bash
853
-
# Setup (one time)
854
-
docker login atcr.io
855
-
# → Credential helper generates ECDSA key pair
856
-
# → Private key in OS keychain
857
-
# → Public key published to PDS
424
+
# 1. Choose an approach
425
+
# Option A: Ratify plugin (recommended)
426
+
# Option B: Gatekeeper external provider
427
+
# Option C: Custom admission webhook
428
+
429
+
# 2. Follow integration guide
430
+
# See docs/SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md for step-by-step
858
431
859
-
# Push (automatic signing)
860
-
docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
861
-
# → Image pushed and signed automatically
862
-
# → No extra commands!
432
+
# 3. Enable for namespace
433
+
kubectl label namespace production atcr-verify=enabled
863
434
864
-
# Verify (standard Cosign)
865
-
cosign verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --key alice.pub
866
-
# → Cosign queries OCI Referrers API
867
-
# → AppView returns ATProto signatures as OCI artifacts
868
-
# → Verification succeeds ✓
435
+
# 4. Test with sample pod
436
+
kubectl run test --image=atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest -n production
869
437
```
870
438
871
-
### Option 2: Manual Signing (DIY)
439
+
### Integrate with CI/CD
872
440
873
441
```bash
874
-
# Push image
875
-
docker push atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
442
+
# GitHub Actions
443
+
- name: Verify signature
444
+
run: |
445
+
curl -LO https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/releases/latest/download/atcr-verify
446
+
chmod +x atcr-verify
447
+
./atcr-verify ${{ env.IMAGE }} --policy .atcr/trust-policy.yaml
876
448
877
-
# Sign with Cosign
878
-
cosign sign atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --key cosign.key
879
-
# → Cosign stores via OCI API
880
-
# → AppView stores in ATProto
881
-
882
-
# Verify (same as automatic)
883
-
cosign verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --key cosign.pub
449
+
# GitLab CI
450
+
verify_image:
451
+
script:
452
+
- wget https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/releases/latest/download/atcr-verify
453
+
- chmod +x atcr-verify
454
+
- ./atcr-verify $IMAGE --policy .atcr/trust-policy.yaml
884
455
```
885
456
886
-
### Kubernetes (Standard Admission Controller)
457
+
## Documentation
887
458
888
-
```yaml
889
-
# Sigstore Policy Controller (standard)
890
-
apiVersion: policy.sigstore.dev/v1beta1
891
-
kind: ClusterImagePolicy
892
-
metadata:
893
-
name: atcr-signed-only
894
-
spec:
895
-
images:
896
-
- glob: "atcr.io/*/*"
897
-
authorities:
898
-
- key:
899
-
data: |
900
-
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
901
-
[Alice's public key from ATProto]
902
-
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
903
-
```
459
+
### Core Documentation
460
+
461
+
- **[ATProto Signatures](./ATPROTO_SIGNATURES.md)** - Technical deep-dive into signature format and verification
462
+
- **[Signature Integration](./SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md)** - Tool-specific integration guides (Ratify, Gatekeeper, Containerd)
463
+
- **[Integration Strategy](./INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md)** - High-level overview and decision matrix
464
+
- **[atcr-verify CLI](./ATCR_VERIFY_CLI.md)** - CLI tool specification and usage
465
+
- **[Hold-as-CA](./HOLD_AS_CA.md)** - Optional X.509 certificate approach
904
466
905
-
**How admission control works:**
906
-
1. Pod tries to start with `atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest`
907
-
2. Policy Controller intercepts
908
-
3. Calls `GET /v2/alice/myapp/referrers/sha256:abc123`
909
-
4. AppView returns signatures from ATProto
910
-
5. Policy Controller verifies with public key
911
-
6. Pod allowed to start ✓
467
+
### Examples
912
468
913
-
### Key Design Points
469
+
- **[examples/verification/](../examples/verification/)** - Shell scripts, Kubernetes configs, trust policies
470
+
- **[examples/plugins/](../examples/plugins/)** - Plugin skeletons for Ratify, Gatekeeper, Containerd
914
471
915
-
**User experience:**
916
-
- ✅ Two options: automatic (credential helper) or manual (standard Cosign)
917
-
- ✅ Standard verification tools work (Cosign, Notary, Kubernetes)
918
-
- ✅ No custom ATCR-specific signing commands
919
-
- ✅ User-controlled keys (OS keychain or self-managed)
472
+
### External References
920
473
921
-
**Architecture:**
922
-
- **Signing**: Client-side only (credential helper or Cosign)
923
-
- **Storage**: ATProto (user's PDS or hold's PDS via `io.atcr.signature`)
924
-
- **Verification**: Standard tools via OCI Referrers API bridge
925
-
- **Bridge**: AppView transforms ATProto → OCI format on-demand
474
+
- **ATProto:** https://atproto.com/specs/repository (repository commit signing)
475
+
- **ORAS:** https://oras.land/ (artifact registry)
476
+
- **OCI Referrers API:** https://github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec/blob/main/spec.md#listing-referrers
477
+
- **Ratify:** https://ratify.dev/ (verification framework)
478
+
- **OPA Gatekeeper:** https://open-policy-agent.github.io/gatekeeper/
926
479
927
-
**Why this works:**
928
-
- ✅ No server-side signing needed (impossible with ATProto constraints)
929
-
- ✅ Signatures discoverable via ATProto
930
-
- ✅ No duplicate storage (single source of truth)
931
-
- ✅ Standard OCI compliance for verification
480
+
## Support
932
481
933
-
## References
482
+
For questions or issues:
483
+
- GitHub Issues: https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/issues
484
+
- Documentation: https://docs.atcr.io
485
+
- Security: security@atcr.io
934
486
935
-
### Signing & Verification
936
-
- [Sigstore Cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign)
937
-
- [Notary v2 Specification](https://notaryproject.dev/)
938
-
- [Cosign Signature Specification](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/blob/main/specs/SIGNATURE_SPEC.md)
487
+
## Summary
939
488
940
-
### OCI & Registry
941
-
- [OCI Distribution Specification](https://github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec)
942
-
- [OCI Referrers API](https://github.com/oras-project/artifacts-spec/blob/main/manifest-referrers-api.md)
943
-
- [OCI Artifacts](https://github.com/opencontainers/artifacts)
489
+
**Key Points:**
944
490
945
-
### ATProto
946
-
- [ATProto Specification](https://atproto.com/)
947
-
- [ATProto Repository Specification](https://atproto.com/specs/repository)
491
+
1. **Automatic signing**: Every ATCR image is automatically signed via ATProto's native signature system
492
+
2. **No additional tools**: Signing happens transparently when you push images
493
+
3. **Decentralized trust**: DID-based signatures, no central CA required
494
+
4. **Standard discovery**: ORAS artifacts and OCI Referrers API for signature metadata
495
+
5. **Custom verification**: Use plugins, CLI tools, or shell scripts (not Cosign directly)
496
+
6. **Multiple integrations**: Kubernetes (Ratify, Gatekeeper), CI/CD (atcr-verify), containerd
497
+
7. **Optional X.509**: Hold-as-CA for enterprise PKI compliance (centralized)
948
498
949
-
### Key Management
950
-
- [Docker Credential Helpers](https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/#credential-helpers)
951
-
- [macOS Keychain Services](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services)
952
-
- [Windows Credential Manager](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/)
953
-
- [Linux Secret Service API](https://specifications.freedesktop.org/secret-service/)
499
+
**Next Steps:**
954
500
955
-
### Kubernetes Integration
956
-
- [Sigstore Policy Controller](https://docs.sigstore.dev/policy-controller/overview/)
957
-
- [Ratify (Notary verification for Kubernetes)](https://ratify.dev/)
501
+
1. Read [examples/verification/README.md](../examples/verification/README.md) for practical examples
502
+
2. Choose integration approach from [INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md](./INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md)
503
+
3. Implement plugin or deploy CLI tool from [SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md](./SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md)
504
+
4. Define trust policy for your organization
505
+
5. Deploy to test environment first, then production
+692
docs/INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md
+692
docs/INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md
···
1
+
# ATCR Signature Verification Integration Strategy
2
+
3
+
## Overview
4
+
5
+
This document provides a comprehensive overview of how to integrate ATProto signature verification into various tools and workflows. ATCR uses a layered approach that provides maximum compatibility while maintaining ATProto's decentralized philosophy.
6
+
7
+
## Architecture Layers
8
+
9
+
```
10
+
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
11
+
│ Layer 4: Applications & Workflows │
12
+
│ - CI/CD pipelines │
13
+
│ - Kubernetes admission control │
14
+
│ - Runtime verification │
15
+
│ - Security scanning │
16
+
└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┘
17
+
↓
18
+
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
19
+
│ Layer 3: Integration Methods │
20
+
│ - Plugins (Ratify, Gatekeeper, Containerd) │
21
+
│ - CLI tools (atcr-verify) │
22
+
│ - External services (webhooks, APIs) │
23
+
│ - (Optional) X.509 certificates (hold-as-CA) │
24
+
└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┘
25
+
↓
26
+
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
27
+
│ Layer 2: Signature Discovery │
28
+
│ - OCI Referrers API (GET /v2/.../referrers/...) │
29
+
│ - ORAS artifact format │
30
+
│ - artifactType: application/vnd.atproto.signature... │
31
+
└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┘
32
+
↓
33
+
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
34
+
│ Layer 1: ATProto Signatures (Foundation) │
35
+
│ - Manifests signed by PDS (K-256) │
36
+
│ - Signatures in ATProto repository commits │
37
+
│ - Public keys in DID documents │
38
+
│ - DID-based identity │
39
+
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
40
+
```
41
+
42
+
## Integration Approaches
43
+
44
+
### Approach 1: Plugin-Based (RECOMMENDED) ⭐
45
+
46
+
**Best for:** Kubernetes, standard tooling, production deployments
47
+
48
+
Integrate through plugin systems of existing tools:
49
+
50
+
#### Ratify Verifier Plugin
51
+
- **Use case:** Kubernetes admission control via Gatekeeper
52
+
- **Effort:** 2-3 weeks to build
53
+
- **Maturity:** CNCF Sandbox project, growing adoption
54
+
- **Benefits:**
55
+
- ✅ Standard plugin interface
56
+
- ✅ Works with existing Ratify deployments
57
+
- ✅ Policy-based enforcement
58
+
- ✅ Multi-verifier support (can combine with Notation, Cosign)
59
+
60
+
**Implementation:**
61
+
```go
62
+
// Ratify plugin interface
63
+
type ReferenceVerifier interface {
64
+
VerifyReference(
65
+
ctx context.Context,
66
+
subjectRef common.Reference,
67
+
referenceDesc ocispecs.ReferenceDescriptor,
68
+
store referrerStore.ReferrerStore,
69
+
) (VerifierResult, error)
70
+
}
71
+
```
72
+
73
+
**Deployment:**
74
+
```yaml
75
+
apiVersion: config.ratify.deislabs.io/v1beta1
76
+
kind: Verifier
77
+
metadata:
78
+
name: atcr-verifier
79
+
spec:
80
+
name: atproto
81
+
artifactType: application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json
82
+
parameters:
83
+
trustedDIDs:
84
+
- did:plc:alice123
85
+
```
86
+
87
+
See [Ratify Integration Guide](./SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md#ratify-plugin)
88
+
89
+
---
90
+
91
+
#### OPA Gatekeeper External Provider
92
+
- **Use case:** Kubernetes admission control with OPA policies
93
+
- **Effort:** 2-3 weeks to build
94
+
- **Maturity:** Very stable, widely adopted
95
+
- **Benefits:**
96
+
- ✅ Rego-based policies (flexible)
97
+
- ✅ External data provider API (standard)
98
+
- ✅ Can reuse existing Gatekeeper deployments
99
+
100
+
**Implementation:**
101
+
```go
102
+
// External data provider
103
+
type Provider struct {
104
+
verifier *atproto.Verifier
105
+
}
106
+
107
+
func (p *Provider) Provide(ctx context.Context, req ProviderRequest) (*ProviderResponse, error) {
108
+
image := req.Keys["image"]
109
+
result, err := p.verifier.Verify(ctx, image)
110
+
return &ProviderResponse{
111
+
Data: map[string]bool{"verified": result.Verified},
112
+
}, nil
113
+
}
114
+
```
115
+
116
+
**Policy:**
117
+
```rego
118
+
package verify
119
+
120
+
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
121
+
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
122
+
startswith(container.image, "atcr.io/")
123
+
124
+
response := external_data({
125
+
"provider": "atcr-verifier",
126
+
"keys": ["image"],
127
+
"values": [container.image]
128
+
})
129
+
130
+
response.verified != true
131
+
msg := sprintf("Image %v has no valid ATProto signature", [container.image])
132
+
}
133
+
```
134
+
135
+
See [Gatekeeper Integration Guide](./SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md#opa-gatekeeper-external-provider)
136
+
137
+
---
138
+
139
+
#### Containerd 2.0 Image Verifier Plugin
140
+
- **Use case:** Runtime verification at image pull time
141
+
- **Effort:** 1-2 weeks to build
142
+
- **Maturity:** New in Containerd 2.0 (Nov 2024)
143
+
- **Benefits:**
144
+
- ✅ Runtime enforcement (pull-time verification)
145
+
- ✅ Works for Docker, nerdctl, ctr
146
+
- ✅ Transparent to users
147
+
- ✅ No Kubernetes required
148
+
149
+
**Limitation:** CRI plugin integration still maturing
150
+
151
+
**Implementation:**
152
+
```bash
153
+
#!/bin/bash
154
+
# /usr/local/bin/containerd-verifiers/atcr-verifier
155
+
# Binary called by containerd on image pull
156
+
157
+
# Containerd passes image info via stdin
158
+
read -r INPUT
159
+
160
+
IMAGE=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.reference')
161
+
DIGEST=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.descriptor.digest')
162
+
163
+
# Verify signature
164
+
if atcr-verify "$IMAGE@$DIGEST" --quiet; then
165
+
exit 0 # Verified
166
+
else
167
+
exit 1 # Failed
168
+
fi
169
+
```
170
+
171
+
**Configuration:**
172
+
```toml
173
+
# /etc/containerd/config.toml
174
+
[plugins."io.containerd.image-verifier.v1.bindir"]
175
+
bin_dir = "/usr/local/bin/containerd-verifiers"
176
+
max_verifiers = 5
177
+
per_verifier_timeout = "10s"
178
+
```
179
+
180
+
See [Containerd Integration Guide](./SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md#containerd-20)
181
+
182
+
---
183
+
184
+
### Approach 2: CLI Tool (RECOMMENDED) ⭐
185
+
186
+
**Best for:** CI/CD, scripts, general-purpose verification
187
+
188
+
Use `atcr-verify` CLI tool directly in workflows:
189
+
190
+
#### Command-Line Verification
191
+
```bash
192
+
# Basic verification
193
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
194
+
195
+
# With trust policy
196
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --policy trust-policy.yaml
197
+
198
+
# JSON output for scripting
199
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --output json
200
+
201
+
# Quiet mode for exit codes
202
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --quiet && echo "Verified"
203
+
```
204
+
205
+
#### CI/CD Integration
206
+
207
+
**GitHub Actions:**
208
+
```yaml
209
+
- name: Verify image
210
+
run: atcr-verify ${{ env.IMAGE }} --policy .github/trust-policy.yaml
211
+
```
212
+
213
+
**GitLab CI:**
214
+
```yaml
215
+
verify:
216
+
image: atcr.io/atcr/verify:latest
217
+
script:
218
+
- atcr-verify ${IMAGE} --policy trust-policy.yaml
219
+
```
220
+
221
+
**Universal Container:**
222
+
```bash
223
+
docker run --rm atcr.io/atcr/verify:latest verify IMAGE
224
+
```
225
+
226
+
**Benefits:**
227
+
- ✅ Works everywhere (not just Kubernetes)
228
+
- ✅ Simple integration (single binary)
229
+
- ✅ No plugin installation required
230
+
- ✅ Offline mode support
231
+
232
+
See [atcr-verify CLI Documentation](./ATCR_VERIFY_CLI.md)
233
+
234
+
---
235
+
236
+
### Approach 3: External Services
237
+
238
+
**Best for:** Custom admission controllers, API-based verification
239
+
240
+
Build verification as a service that tools can call:
241
+
242
+
#### Webhook Service
243
+
```go
244
+
// HTTP endpoint for verification
245
+
func (h *Handler) VerifyImage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
246
+
image := r.URL.Query().Get("image")
247
+
248
+
result, err := h.verifier.Verify(r.Context(), image)
249
+
if err != nil {
250
+
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
251
+
return
252
+
}
253
+
254
+
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
255
+
"verified": result.Verified,
256
+
"did": result.Signature.DID,
257
+
"signedAt": result.Signature.SignedAt,
258
+
})
259
+
}
260
+
```
261
+
262
+
#### Usage from Kyverno
263
+
```yaml
264
+
verifyImages:
265
+
- imageReferences:
266
+
- "atcr.io/*/*"
267
+
attestors:
268
+
- entries:
269
+
- api:
270
+
url: http://atcr-verify.kube-system/verify?image={{ image }}
271
+
```
272
+
273
+
**Benefits:**
274
+
- ✅ Flexible integration
275
+
- ✅ Centralized verification logic
276
+
- ✅ Caching and rate limiting
277
+
- ✅ Can add additional checks (vulnerability scanning, etc.)
278
+
279
+
---
280
+
281
+
### Approach 4: Hold-as-CA (OPTIONAL, ENTERPRISE ONLY)
282
+
283
+
**Best for:** Enterprise X.509 PKI compliance requirements
284
+
285
+
⚠️ **WARNING:** This approach introduces centralization trade-offs. Only use if you have specific X.509 compliance requirements.
286
+
287
+
Hold services act as Certificate Authorities that issue X.509 certificates for users, enabling standard Notation verification.
288
+
289
+
**When to use:**
290
+
- Enterprise requires standard X.509 PKI
291
+
- Cannot deploy custom plugins
292
+
- Accept centralization trade-off for tool compatibility
293
+
294
+
**When NOT to use:**
295
+
- Default deployments (use plugins instead)
296
+
- Maximum decentralization required
297
+
- Don't need X.509 compliance
298
+
299
+
See [Hold-as-CA Architecture](./HOLD_AS_CA.md) for complete details and security implications.
300
+
301
+
---
302
+
303
+
## Tool Compatibility Matrix
304
+
305
+
| Tool | Discover | Verify | Integration Method | Priority | Effort |
306
+
|------|----------|--------|-------------------|----------|--------|
307
+
| **Kubernetes** | | | | | |
308
+
| OPA Gatekeeper | ✅ | ✅ | External provider | **HIGH** | 2-3 weeks |
309
+
| Ratify | ✅ | ✅ | Verifier plugin | **HIGH** | 2-3 weeks |
310
+
| Kyverno | ✅ | ⚠️ | External service | MEDIUM | 2 weeks |
311
+
| Portieris | ❌ | ❌ | N/A (deprecated) | NONE | - |
312
+
| **Runtime** | | | | | |
313
+
| Containerd 2.0 | ✅ | ✅ | Bindir plugin | **MED-HIGH** | 1-2 weeks |
314
+
| CRI-O | ⚠️ | ⚠️ | Upstream contribution | MEDIUM | 3-4 weeks |
315
+
| Podman | ⚠️ | ⚠️ | Upstream contribution | MEDIUM | 3-4 weeks |
316
+
| **CI/CD** | | | | | |
317
+
| GitHub Actions | ✅ | ✅ | Custom action | **HIGH** | 1 week |
318
+
| GitLab CI | ✅ | ✅ | Container image | **HIGH** | 1 week |
319
+
| Jenkins/CircleCI | ✅ | ✅ | Container image | HIGH | 1 week |
320
+
| **Scanners** | | | | | |
321
+
| Trivy | ✅ | ❌ | N/A (not verifier) | NONE | - |
322
+
| Snyk | ❌ | ❌ | N/A (not verifier) | NONE | - |
323
+
| Anchore | ❌ | ❌ | N/A (not verifier) | NONE | - |
324
+
| **Registries** | | | | | |
325
+
| Harbor | ✅ | ⚠️ | UI integration | LOW | - |
326
+
| **OCI Tools** | | | | | |
327
+
| ORAS CLI | ✅ | ❌ | Already works | Document | - |
328
+
| Notation | ⚠️ | ⚠️ | Hold-as-CA | OPTIONAL | 3-4 weeks |
329
+
| Cosign | ❌ | ❌ | Not compatible | NONE | - |
330
+
| Crane | ✅ | ❌ | Already works | Document | - |
331
+
| Skopeo | ⚠️ | ⚠️ | Upstream contribution | LOW | 3-4 weeks |
332
+
333
+
**Legend:**
334
+
- ✅ Works / Feasible
335
+
- ⚠️ Partial / Requires changes
336
+
- ❌ Not applicable / Not feasible
337
+
338
+
---
339
+
340
+
## Implementation Roadmap
341
+
342
+
### Phase 1: Foundation (4-5 weeks) ⭐
343
+
344
+
**Goal:** Core verification capability
345
+
346
+
1. **atcr-verify CLI tool** (Week 1-2)
347
+
- ATProto signature verification
348
+
- Trust policy support
349
+
- Multiple output formats
350
+
- Offline mode
351
+
352
+
2. **OCI Referrers API** (Week 2-3)
353
+
- AppView endpoint implementation
354
+
- ORAS artifact serving
355
+
- Integration with existing SBOM pattern
356
+
357
+
3. **CI/CD Container Image** (Week 3)
358
+
- Universal verification image
359
+
- Documentation for GitHub Actions, GitLab CI
360
+
- Example workflows
361
+
362
+
4. **Documentation** (Week 4-5)
363
+
- Integration guides
364
+
- Trust policy examples
365
+
- Troubleshooting guides
366
+
367
+
**Deliverables:**
368
+
- `atcr-verify` binary (Linux, macOS, Windows)
369
+
- `atcr.io/atcr/verify:latest` container image
370
+
- OCI Referrers API implementation
371
+
- Complete documentation
372
+
373
+
---
374
+
375
+
### Phase 2: Kubernetes Integration (3-4 weeks)
376
+
377
+
**Goal:** Production-ready Kubernetes admission control
378
+
379
+
5. **OPA Gatekeeper Provider** (Week 1-2)
380
+
- External data provider service
381
+
- Helm chart for deployment
382
+
- Example policies
383
+
384
+
6. **Ratify Plugin** (Week 2-3)
385
+
- Verifier plugin implementation
386
+
- Testing with Ratify
387
+
- Documentation
388
+
389
+
7. **Kubernetes Examples** (Week 4)
390
+
- Deployment manifests
391
+
- Policy examples
392
+
- Integration testing
393
+
394
+
**Deliverables:**
395
+
- `atcr-gatekeeper-provider` service
396
+
- Ratify plugin binary
397
+
- Kubernetes deployment examples
398
+
- Production deployment guide
399
+
400
+
---
401
+
402
+
### Phase 3: Runtime Verification (2-3 weeks)
403
+
404
+
**Goal:** Pull-time verification
405
+
406
+
8. **Containerd Plugin** (Week 1-2)
407
+
- Bindir verifier implementation
408
+
- Configuration documentation
409
+
- Testing with Docker, nerdctl
410
+
411
+
9. **CRI-O/Podman Integration** (Week 3, optional)
412
+
- Upstream contribution (if accepted)
413
+
- Policy.json extension
414
+
- Documentation
415
+
416
+
**Deliverables:**
417
+
- Containerd verifier binary
418
+
- Configuration guides
419
+
- Runtime verification examples
420
+
421
+
---
422
+
423
+
### Phase 4: Optional Features (2-3 weeks)
424
+
425
+
**Goal:** Enterprise features (if demanded)
426
+
427
+
10. **Hold-as-CA** (Week 1-2, optional)
428
+
- Certificate generation
429
+
- Notation signature creation
430
+
- Trust store distribution
431
+
- **Only if enterprise customers request**
432
+
433
+
11. **Advanced Features** (Week 3, as needed)
434
+
- Signature transparency log
435
+
- Multi-signature support
436
+
- Hardware token integration
437
+
438
+
**Deliverables:**
439
+
- Hold co-signing implementation (if needed)
440
+
- Advanced feature documentation
441
+
442
+
---
443
+
444
+
## Decision Matrix
445
+
446
+
### Which Integration Approach Should I Use?
447
+
448
+
```
449
+
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
450
+
│ Are you using Kubernetes? │
451
+
└───────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┘
452
+
│
453
+
┌────────┴────────┐
454
+
│ │
455
+
YES NO
456
+
│ │
457
+
↓ ↓
458
+
┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
459
+
│ Using │ │ CI/CD │
460
+
│ Gatekeeper? │ │ Pipeline? │
461
+
└──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘
462
+
│ │
463
+
┌────┴────┐ ┌────┴────┐
464
+
YES NO YES NO
465
+
│ │ │ │
466
+
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
467
+
External Ratify GitHub Universal
468
+
Provider Plugin Action CLI Tool
469
+
```
470
+
471
+
#### Use OPA Gatekeeper Provider if:
472
+
- ✅ Already using Gatekeeper
473
+
- ✅ Want Rego-based policies
474
+
- ✅ Need flexible policy logic
475
+
476
+
#### Use Ratify Plugin if:
477
+
- ✅ Using Ratify (or planning to)
478
+
- ✅ Want standard plugin interface
479
+
- ✅ Need multi-verifier support (Notation + Cosign + ATProto)
480
+
481
+
#### Use atcr-verify CLI if:
482
+
- ✅ CI/CD pipelines
483
+
- ✅ Local development
484
+
- ✅ Non-Kubernetes environments
485
+
- ✅ Want simple integration
486
+
487
+
#### Use Containerd Plugin if:
488
+
- ✅ Need runtime enforcement
489
+
- ✅ Want pull-time verification
490
+
- ✅ Using Containerd 2.0+
491
+
492
+
#### Use Hold-as-CA if:
493
+
- ⚠️ Enterprise X.509 PKI compliance required
494
+
- ⚠️ Cannot deploy plugins
495
+
- ⚠️ Accept centralization trade-off
496
+
497
+
---
498
+
499
+
## Best Practices
500
+
501
+
### 1. Start Simple
502
+
503
+
Begin with CLI tool integration in CI/CD:
504
+
```bash
505
+
# Add to .github/workflows/deploy.yml
506
+
- run: atcr-verify $IMAGE --policy .github/trust-policy.yaml
507
+
```
508
+
509
+
### 2. Define Trust Policies
510
+
511
+
Create trust policies early:
512
+
```yaml
513
+
# trust-policy.yaml
514
+
policies:
515
+
- name: production
516
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/prod-*"
517
+
require:
518
+
signature: true
519
+
trustedDIDs: [did:plc:devops-team]
520
+
action: enforce
521
+
```
522
+
523
+
### 3. Progressive Rollout
524
+
525
+
1. **Week 1:** Add verification to CI/CD (audit mode)
526
+
2. **Week 2:** Enforce in CI/CD
527
+
3. **Week 3:** Add Kubernetes admission control (audit mode)
528
+
4. **Week 4:** Enforce in Kubernetes
529
+
530
+
### 4. Monitor and Alert
531
+
532
+
Track verification metrics:
533
+
- Verification success/failure rates
534
+
- Policy violations
535
+
- Signature coverage (% of images signed)
536
+
537
+
### 5. Plan for Key Rotation
538
+
539
+
- Document DID key rotation procedures
540
+
- Test key rotation in non-production
541
+
- Monitor for unexpected key changes
542
+
543
+
---
544
+
545
+
## Common Patterns
546
+
547
+
### Pattern 1: Multi-Layer Defense
548
+
549
+
```
550
+
1. CI/CD verification (atcr-verify)
551
+
↓ (blocks unsigned images from being pushed)
552
+
2. Kubernetes admission (Gatekeeper/Ratify)
553
+
↓ (blocks unsigned images from running)
554
+
3. Runtime verification (Containerd plugin)
555
+
↓ (blocks unsigned images from being pulled)
556
+
```
557
+
558
+
### Pattern 2: Trust Policy Inheritance
559
+
560
+
```yaml
561
+
# Global policy
562
+
trustedDIDs:
563
+
- did:plc:security-team # Always trusted
564
+
565
+
# Environment-specific policies
566
+
staging:
567
+
trustedDIDs:
568
+
- did:plc:developers # Additional trust for staging
569
+
570
+
production:
571
+
trustedDIDs: [] # Only global trust (security-team)
572
+
```
573
+
574
+
### Pattern 3: Offline Verification
575
+
576
+
```bash
577
+
# Build environment (online)
578
+
atcr-verify export $IMAGE -o bundle.json
579
+
580
+
# Air-gapped environment (offline)
581
+
atcr-verify $IMAGE --offline --bundle bundle.json
582
+
```
583
+
584
+
---
585
+
586
+
## Migration Guide
587
+
588
+
### From Docker Content Trust (DCT)
589
+
590
+
DCT is deprecated. Migrate to ATCR signatures:
591
+
592
+
**Old (DCT):**
593
+
```bash
594
+
export DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1
595
+
docker push myimage:latest
596
+
```
597
+
598
+
**New (ATCR):**
599
+
```bash
600
+
# Signatures created automatically on push
601
+
docker push atcr.io/myorg/myimage:latest
602
+
603
+
# Verify in CI/CD
604
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/myorg/myimage:latest
605
+
```
606
+
607
+
### From Cosign
608
+
609
+
Cosign and ATCR signatures can coexist:
610
+
611
+
**Dual signing:**
612
+
```bash
613
+
# Push to ATCR (ATProto signature automatic)
614
+
docker push atcr.io/myorg/myimage:latest
615
+
616
+
# Also sign with Cosign (if needed)
617
+
cosign sign atcr.io/myorg/myimage:latest
618
+
```
619
+
620
+
**Verification:**
621
+
```bash
622
+
# Verify ATProto signature
623
+
atcr-verify atcr.io/myorg/myimage:latest
624
+
625
+
# Or verify Cosign signature
626
+
cosign verify atcr.io/myorg/myimage:latest --key cosign.pub
627
+
```
628
+
629
+
---
630
+
631
+
## Troubleshooting
632
+
633
+
### Signatures Not Found
634
+
635
+
**Symptom:** `atcr-verify` reports "no signature found"
636
+
637
+
**Diagnosis:**
638
+
```bash
639
+
# Check if Referrers API works
640
+
curl "https://atcr.io/v2/OWNER/REPO/referrers/DIGEST"
641
+
642
+
# Check if signature artifact exists
643
+
oras discover atcr.io/OWNER/REPO:TAG
644
+
```
645
+
646
+
**Solutions:**
647
+
1. Verify Referrers API is implemented
648
+
2. Re-push image to generate signature
649
+
3. Check AppView logs for signature creation errors
650
+
651
+
### DID Resolution Fails
652
+
653
+
**Symptom:** Cannot resolve DID to public key
654
+
655
+
**Diagnosis:**
656
+
```bash
657
+
# Test DID resolution
658
+
curl https://plc.directory/did:plc:XXXXXX
659
+
660
+
# Check DID document has verificationMethod
661
+
curl https://plc.directory/did:plc:XXXXXX | jq .verificationMethod
662
+
```
663
+
664
+
**Solutions:**
665
+
1. Check internet connectivity
666
+
2. Verify DID is valid
667
+
3. Ensure DID document contains public key
668
+
669
+
### Policy Violations
670
+
671
+
**Symptom:** Verification fails with "trust policy violation"
672
+
673
+
**Diagnosis:**
674
+
```bash
675
+
# Verify with verbose output
676
+
atcr-verify IMAGE --policy policy.yaml --verbose
677
+
```
678
+
679
+
**Solutions:**
680
+
1. Add DID to trustedDIDs list
681
+
2. Check signature age vs. maxAge
682
+
3. Verify policy scope matches image
683
+
684
+
---
685
+
686
+
## See Also
687
+
688
+
- [ATProto Signatures](./ATPROTO_SIGNATURES.md) - Technical foundation
689
+
- [atcr-verify CLI](./ATCR_VERIFY_CLI.md) - CLI tool documentation
690
+
- [Signature Integration](./SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md) - Tool-specific guides
691
+
- [Hold-as-CA](./HOLD_AS_CA.md) - X.509 certificate approach (optional)
692
+
- [Examples](../examples/verification/) - Working code examples
+1210
docs/SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md
+1210
docs/SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md
···
1
+
# Integrating ATProto Signatures with OCI Tools
2
+
3
+
This guide shows how to work with ATProto signatures using standard OCI/ORAS tools and integrate signature verification into your workflows.
4
+
5
+
## Quick Reference: Tool Compatibility
6
+
7
+
| Tool | Discover Signatures | Fetch Signatures | Verify Signatures |
8
+
|------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
9
+
| `oras discover` | ✅ Yes | - | - |
10
+
| `oras pull` | - | ✅ Yes | ❌ No (custom tool needed) |
11
+
| `oras manifest fetch` | - | ✅ Yes | - |
12
+
| `cosign tree` | ✅ Yes (as artifacts) | - | - |
13
+
| `cosign verify` | - | - | ❌ No (different format) |
14
+
| `crane manifest` | - | ✅ Yes | - |
15
+
| `skopeo inspect` | ✅ Yes (in referrers) | - | - |
16
+
| `docker` | ❌ No (not visible) | - | - |
17
+
| **`atcr-verify`** | ✅ Yes | ✅ Yes | ✅ Yes |
18
+
19
+
**Key Takeaway:** Standard OCI tools can **discover and fetch** ATProto signatures, but **verification requires custom tooling** because ATProto uses a different trust model than Cosign/Notary.
20
+
21
+
## Understanding What Tools See
22
+
23
+
### ORAS CLI: Full Support for Discovery
24
+
25
+
ORAS understands referrers and can discover ATProto signature artifacts:
26
+
27
+
```bash
28
+
# Discover all artifacts attached to an image
29
+
$ oras discover atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
30
+
31
+
Discovered 2 artifacts referencing alice/myapp@sha256:abc123456789...:
32
+
Digest: sha256:abc123456789...
33
+
34
+
Artifact Type: application/spdx+json
35
+
Digest: sha256:sbom123...
36
+
Size: 45678
37
+
38
+
Artifact Type: application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json
39
+
Digest: sha256:sig789...
40
+
Size: 512
41
+
```
42
+
43
+
**What ORAS shows:**
44
+
- ✅ Artifact type (identifies it as an ATProto signature)
45
+
- ✅ Digest (can fetch the artifact)
46
+
- ✅ Size
47
+
48
+
**To filter for signatures only:**
49
+
50
+
```bash
51
+
$ oras discover atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest \
52
+
--artifact-type application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json
53
+
54
+
Discovered 1 artifact referencing alice/myapp@sha256:abc123...:
55
+
Artifact Type: application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json
56
+
Digest: sha256:sig789...
57
+
```
58
+
59
+
### Fetching Signature Metadata with ORAS
60
+
61
+
Pull the signature artifact to examine it:
62
+
63
+
```bash
64
+
# Pull signature artifact to current directory
65
+
$ oras pull atcr.io/alice/myapp@sha256:sig789...
66
+
67
+
Downloaded atproto-signature.json
68
+
Pulled atcr.io/alice/myapp@sha256:sig789...
69
+
Digest: sha256:sig789...
70
+
71
+
# Examine the signature metadata
72
+
$ cat atproto-signature.json | jq .
73
+
{
74
+
"$type": "io.atcr.atproto.signature",
75
+
"version": "1.0",
76
+
"subject": {
77
+
"digest": "sha256:abc123...",
78
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json"
79
+
},
80
+
"atproto": {
81
+
"did": "did:plc:alice123",
82
+
"handle": "alice.bsky.social",
83
+
"pdsEndpoint": "https://bsky.social",
84
+
"recordUri": "at://did:plc:alice123/io.atcr.manifest/abc123",
85
+
"commitCid": "bafyreih8...",
86
+
"signedAt": "2025-10-31T12:34:56.789Z"
87
+
},
88
+
"signature": {
89
+
"algorithm": "ECDSA-K256-SHA256",
90
+
"keyId": "did:plc:alice123#atproto",
91
+
"publicKeyMultibase": "zQ3shokFTS3brHcDQrn82RUDfCZESWL1ZdCEJwekUDdo1Ko4Z"
92
+
}
93
+
}
94
+
```
95
+
96
+
### Cosign: Discovers but Cannot Verify
97
+
98
+
Cosign can see ATProto signatures as artifacts but can't verify them:
99
+
100
+
```bash
101
+
# Cosign tree shows attached artifacts
102
+
$ cosign tree atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
103
+
104
+
📦 Supply Chain Security Related artifacts for an image: atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
105
+
└── 💾 Attestations for an image tag: atcr.io/alice/myapp:sha256-abc123.att
106
+
├── 🍒 sha256:sbom123... (application/spdx+json)
107
+
└── 🍒 sha256:sig789... (application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json)
108
+
109
+
# Cosign verify doesn't work (expected)
110
+
$ cosign verify atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
111
+
112
+
Error: no matching signatures:
113
+
main.go:62: error during command execution: no matching signatures:
114
+
```
115
+
116
+
**Why cosign verify fails:**
117
+
- Cosign expects signatures in its own format (`dev.cosignproject.cosign/signature` annotation)
118
+
- ATProto signatures use a different format and trust model
119
+
- This is **intentional** - we're not trying to be Cosign-compatible
120
+
121
+
### Crane: Fetch Manifests
122
+
123
+
Crane can fetch the signature manifest:
124
+
125
+
```bash
126
+
# Get signature artifact manifest
127
+
$ crane manifest atcr.io/alice/myapp@sha256:sig789... | jq .
128
+
{
129
+
"schemaVersion": 2,
130
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json",
131
+
"artifactType": "application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json",
132
+
"config": {
133
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.empty.v1+json",
134
+
"digest": "sha256:44136fa355b3678a1146ad16f7e8649e94fb4fc21fe77e8310c060f61caaff8a",
135
+
"size": 2
136
+
},
137
+
"subject": {
138
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json",
139
+
"digest": "sha256:abc123...",
140
+
"size": 1234
141
+
},
142
+
"layers": [{
143
+
"mediaType": "application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json",
144
+
"digest": "sha256:meta456...",
145
+
"size": 512
146
+
}],
147
+
"annotations": {
148
+
"io.atcr.atproto.did": "did:plc:alice123",
149
+
"io.atcr.atproto.pds": "https://bsky.social",
150
+
"io.atcr.atproto.recordUri": "at://did:plc:alice123/io.atcr.manifest/abc123"
151
+
}
152
+
}
153
+
```
154
+
155
+
### Skopeo: Inspect Images
156
+
157
+
Skopeo shows referrers in image inspection:
158
+
159
+
```bash
160
+
$ skopeo inspect --raw docker://atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest | jq .
161
+
162
+
# Standard manifest (no signature info visible in manifest itself)
163
+
164
+
# To see referrers (if registry supports Referrers API):
165
+
$ curl -H "Accept: application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json" \
166
+
"https://atcr.io/v2/alice/myapp/referrers/sha256:abc123"
167
+
```
168
+
169
+
## Manual Verification with Shell Scripts
170
+
171
+
Until `atcr-verify` is built, you can verify signatures manually:
172
+
173
+
### Simple Verification Script
174
+
175
+
```bash
176
+
#!/bin/bash
177
+
# verify-atproto-signature.sh
178
+
# Usage: ./verify-atproto-signature.sh atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
179
+
180
+
set -e
181
+
182
+
IMAGE="$1"
183
+
184
+
echo "[1/6] Resolving image digest..."
185
+
DIGEST=$(crane digest "$IMAGE")
186
+
echo " → $DIGEST"
187
+
188
+
echo "[2/6] Discovering ATProto signature..."
189
+
REGISTRY=$(echo "$IMAGE" | cut -d/ -f1)
190
+
REPO=$(echo "$IMAGE" | cut -d/ -f2-)
191
+
REPO_PATH=$(echo "$REPO" | cut -d: -f1)
192
+
193
+
SIG_ARTIFACTS=$(curl -s -H "Accept: application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json" \
194
+
"https://${REGISTRY}/v2/${REPO_PATH}/referrers/${DIGEST}?artifactType=application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json")
195
+
196
+
SIG_DIGEST=$(echo "$SIG_ARTIFACTS" | jq -r '.manifests[0].digest')
197
+
if [ "$SIG_DIGEST" = "null" ]; then
198
+
echo " ✗ No ATProto signature found"
199
+
exit 1
200
+
fi
201
+
echo " → Found signature: $SIG_DIGEST"
202
+
203
+
echo "[3/6] Fetching signature metadata..."
204
+
oras pull "${REGISTRY}/${REPO_PATH}@${SIG_DIGEST}" -o /tmp/sig --quiet
205
+
206
+
DID=$(jq -r '.atproto.did' /tmp/sig/atproto-signature.json)
207
+
PDS=$(jq -r '.atproto.pdsEndpoint' /tmp/sig/atproto-signature.json)
208
+
RECORD_URI=$(jq -r '.atproto.recordUri' /tmp/sig/atproto-signature.json)
209
+
echo " → DID: $DID"
210
+
echo " → PDS: $PDS"
211
+
echo " → Record: $RECORD_URI"
212
+
213
+
echo "[4/6] Resolving DID to public key..."
214
+
DID_DOC=$(curl -s "https://plc.directory/$DID")
215
+
PUB_KEY_MB=$(echo "$DID_DOC" | jq -r '.verificationMethod[0].publicKeyMultibase')
216
+
echo " → Public key: $PUB_KEY_MB"
217
+
218
+
echo "[5/6] Querying PDS for signed commit..."
219
+
# Extract collection and rkey from record URI
220
+
COLLECTION=$(echo "$RECORD_URI" | sed 's|at://[^/]*/\([^/]*\)/.*|\1|')
221
+
RKEY=$(echo "$RECORD_URI" | sed 's|at://.*/||')
222
+
223
+
RECORD=$(curl -s "${PDS}/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.getRecord?repo=${DID}&collection=${COLLECTION}&rkey=${RKEY}")
224
+
RECORD_CID=$(echo "$RECORD" | jq -r '.cid')
225
+
echo " → Record CID: $RECORD_CID"
226
+
227
+
echo "[6/6] Verifying signature..."
228
+
echo " ⚠ Note: Full cryptographic verification requires ATProto crypto library"
229
+
echo " ⚠ This script verifies record existence and DID resolution only"
230
+
echo ""
231
+
echo " ✓ Record exists in PDS"
232
+
echo " ✓ DID resolved successfully"
233
+
echo " ✓ Public key retrieved"
234
+
echo ""
235
+
echo "To fully verify the cryptographic signature, use: atcr-verify $IMAGE"
236
+
```
237
+
238
+
### Full Verification (Requires Go + indigo)
239
+
240
+
```go
241
+
// verify.go - Full cryptographic verification
242
+
package main
243
+
244
+
import (
245
+
"encoding/json"
246
+
"fmt"
247
+
"net/http"
248
+
249
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/crypto"
250
+
"github.com/multiformats/go-multibase"
251
+
)
252
+
253
+
func verifyATProtoSignature(did, pds, recordURI string) error {
254
+
// 1. Resolve DID to public key
255
+
didDoc, err := fetchDIDDocument(did)
256
+
if err != nil {
257
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve DID: %w", err)
258
+
}
259
+
260
+
pubKeyMB := didDoc.VerificationMethod[0].PublicKeyMultibase
261
+
262
+
// 2. Decode multibase public key
263
+
_, pubKeyBytes, err := multibase.Decode(pubKeyMB)
264
+
if err != nil {
265
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decode public key: %w", err)
266
+
}
267
+
268
+
// Remove multicodec prefix (first 2 bytes for K-256)
269
+
pubKeyBytes = pubKeyBytes[2:]
270
+
271
+
// 3. Parse as K-256 public key
272
+
pubKey, err := crypto.ParsePublicKeyK256(pubKeyBytes)
273
+
if err != nil {
274
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse public key: %w", err)
275
+
}
276
+
277
+
// 4. Fetch repository commit from PDS
278
+
commit, err := fetchRepoCommit(pds, did)
279
+
if err != nil {
280
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch commit: %w", err)
281
+
}
282
+
283
+
// 5. Verify signature
284
+
bytesToVerify := commit.Unsigned().BytesForSigning()
285
+
err = pubKey.Verify(bytesToVerify, commit.Sig)
286
+
if err != nil {
287
+
return fmt.Errorf("signature verification failed: %w", err)
288
+
}
289
+
290
+
fmt.Println("✓ Signature verified successfully!")
291
+
return nil
292
+
}
293
+
294
+
func fetchDIDDocument(did string) (*DIDDocument, error) {
295
+
resp, err := http.Get(fmt.Sprintf("https://plc.directory/%s", did))
296
+
if err != nil {
297
+
return nil, err
298
+
}
299
+
defer resp.Body.Close()
300
+
301
+
var didDoc DIDDocument
302
+
err = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&didDoc)
303
+
return &didDoc, err
304
+
}
305
+
306
+
// ... additional helper functions
307
+
```
308
+
309
+
## Kubernetes Integration
310
+
311
+
### Option 1: Admission Webhook (Recommended)
312
+
313
+
Create a validating webhook that verifies ATProto signatures:
314
+
315
+
```yaml
316
+
# atcr-verify-webhook.yaml
317
+
apiVersion: v1
318
+
kind: Service
319
+
metadata:
320
+
name: atcr-verify
321
+
namespace: kube-system
322
+
spec:
323
+
selector:
324
+
app: atcr-verify
325
+
ports:
326
+
- port: 443
327
+
targetPort: 8443
328
+
---
329
+
apiVersion: apps/v1
330
+
kind: Deployment
331
+
metadata:
332
+
name: atcr-verify
333
+
namespace: kube-system
334
+
spec:
335
+
replicas: 2
336
+
selector:
337
+
matchLabels:
338
+
app: atcr-verify
339
+
template:
340
+
metadata:
341
+
labels:
342
+
app: atcr-verify
343
+
spec:
344
+
containers:
345
+
- name: webhook
346
+
image: atcr.io/atcr/verify-webhook:latest
347
+
ports:
348
+
- containerPort: 8443
349
+
env:
350
+
- name: REQUIRE_SIGNATURE
351
+
value: "true"
352
+
- name: TRUSTED_DIDS
353
+
value: "did:plc:alice123,did:plc:bob456"
354
+
---
355
+
apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1
356
+
kind: ValidatingWebhookConfiguration
357
+
metadata:
358
+
name: atcr-verify
359
+
webhooks:
360
+
- name: verify.atcr.io
361
+
clientConfig:
362
+
service:
363
+
name: atcr-verify
364
+
namespace: kube-system
365
+
path: /validate
366
+
caBundle: <base64-encoded-ca-cert>
367
+
rules:
368
+
- operations: ["CREATE", "UPDATE"]
369
+
apiGroups: [""]
370
+
apiVersions: ["v1"]
371
+
resources: ["pods"]
372
+
admissionReviewVersions: ["v1", "v1beta1"]
373
+
sideEffects: None
374
+
failurePolicy: Fail # Reject pods if verification fails
375
+
namespaceSelector:
376
+
matchExpressions:
377
+
- key: atcr-verify
378
+
operator: In
379
+
values: ["enabled"]
380
+
```
381
+
382
+
**Webhook Server Logic** (pseudocode):
383
+
384
+
```go
385
+
func (h *WebhookHandler) ValidatePod(req *admissionv1.AdmissionRequest) *admissionv1.AdmissionResponse {
386
+
pod := &corev1.Pod{}
387
+
json.Unmarshal(req.Object.Raw, pod)
388
+
389
+
for _, container := range pod.Spec.Containers {
390
+
if !strings.HasPrefix(container.Image, "atcr.io/") {
391
+
continue // Only verify ATCR images
392
+
}
393
+
394
+
// Verify ATProto signature
395
+
err := verifyImageSignature(container.Image)
396
+
if err != nil {
397
+
return &admissionv1.AdmissionResponse{
398
+
Allowed: false,
399
+
Result: &metav1.Status{
400
+
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Image %s failed ATProto verification: %v",
401
+
container.Image, err),
402
+
},
403
+
}
404
+
}
405
+
}
406
+
407
+
return &admissionv1.AdmissionResponse{Allowed: true}
408
+
}
409
+
```
410
+
411
+
**Enable verification for specific namespaces:**
412
+
413
+
```bash
414
+
# Label namespace to enable verification
415
+
kubectl label namespace production atcr-verify=enabled
416
+
417
+
# Pods in this namespace must have valid ATProto signatures
418
+
kubectl apply -f pod.yaml -n production
419
+
```
420
+
421
+
### Option 2: Kyverno Policy
422
+
423
+
Use Kyverno for policy-based validation:
424
+
425
+
```yaml
426
+
# kyverno-atcr-policy.yaml
427
+
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
428
+
kind: ClusterPolicy
429
+
metadata:
430
+
name: verify-atcr-signatures
431
+
spec:
432
+
validationFailureAction: enforce
433
+
background: false
434
+
rules:
435
+
- name: atcr-images-must-be-signed
436
+
match:
437
+
any:
438
+
- resources:
439
+
kinds:
440
+
- Pod
441
+
validate:
442
+
message: "ATCR images must have valid ATProto signatures"
443
+
foreach:
444
+
- list: "request.object.spec.containers"
445
+
deny:
446
+
conditions:
447
+
all:
448
+
- key: "{{ element.image }}"
449
+
operator: In
450
+
value: "atcr.io/*"
451
+
- key: "{{ atcrVerifySignature(element.image) }}"
452
+
operator: NotEquals
453
+
value: true
454
+
```
455
+
456
+
**Note:** Requires custom Kyverno extension for `atcrVerifySignature()` function or external service integration.
457
+
458
+
### Option 3: Ratify Verifier Plugin (Recommended) ⭐
459
+
460
+
Ratify is a verification engine that integrates with OPA Gatekeeper. Build a custom verifier plugin for ATProto signatures:
461
+
462
+
**Ratify Plugin Architecture:**
463
+
```go
464
+
// pkg/verifier/atproto/verifier.go
465
+
package atproto
466
+
467
+
import (
468
+
"context"
469
+
"encoding/json"
470
+
471
+
"github.com/ratify-project/ratify/pkg/common"
472
+
"github.com/ratify-project/ratify/pkg/ocispecs"
473
+
"github.com/ratify-project/ratify/pkg/referrerstore"
474
+
"github.com/ratify-project/ratify/pkg/verifier"
475
+
)
476
+
477
+
type ATProtoVerifier struct {
478
+
name string
479
+
config ATProtoConfig
480
+
resolver *Resolver
481
+
}
482
+
483
+
type ATProtoConfig struct {
484
+
TrustedDIDs []string `json:"trustedDIDs"`
485
+
}
486
+
487
+
func (v *ATProtoVerifier) Name() string {
488
+
return v.name
489
+
}
490
+
491
+
func (v *ATProtoVerifier) Type() string {
492
+
return "atproto"
493
+
}
494
+
495
+
func (v *ATProtoVerifier) CanVerify(artifactType string) bool {
496
+
return artifactType == "application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json"
497
+
}
498
+
499
+
func (v *ATProtoVerifier) VerifyReference(
500
+
ctx context.Context,
501
+
subjectRef common.Reference,
502
+
referenceDesc ocispecs.ReferenceDescriptor,
503
+
store referrerstore.ReferrerStore,
504
+
) (verifier.VerifierResult, error) {
505
+
// 1. Fetch signature blob from store
506
+
sigBlob, err := store.GetBlobContent(ctx, subjectRef, referenceDesc.Digest)
507
+
if err != nil {
508
+
return verifier.VerifierResult{IsSuccess: false}, err
509
+
}
510
+
511
+
// 2. Parse ATProto signature metadata
512
+
var sigData ATProtoSignature
513
+
if err := json.Unmarshal(sigBlob, &sigData); err != nil {
514
+
return verifier.VerifierResult{IsSuccess: false}, err
515
+
}
516
+
517
+
// 3. Resolve DID to public key
518
+
pubKey, err := v.resolver.ResolveDIDToPublicKey(ctx, sigData.ATProto.DID)
519
+
if err != nil {
520
+
return verifier.VerifierResult{IsSuccess: false}, err
521
+
}
522
+
523
+
// 4. Fetch repository commit from PDS
524
+
commit, err := v.resolver.FetchCommit(ctx, sigData.ATProto.PDSEndpoint,
525
+
sigData.ATProto.DID, sigData.ATProto.CommitCID)
526
+
if err != nil {
527
+
return verifier.VerifierResult{IsSuccess: false}, err
528
+
}
529
+
530
+
// 5. Verify K-256 signature
531
+
valid := verifyK256Signature(pubKey, commit.Unsigned(), commit.Sig)
532
+
if !valid {
533
+
return verifier.VerifierResult{IsSuccess: false},
534
+
fmt.Errorf("signature verification failed")
535
+
}
536
+
537
+
// 6. Check trust policy
538
+
if !v.isTrusted(sigData.ATProto.DID) {
539
+
return verifier.VerifierResult{IsSuccess: false},
540
+
fmt.Errorf("DID %s not in trusted list", sigData.ATProto.DID)
541
+
}
542
+
543
+
return verifier.VerifierResult{
544
+
IsSuccess: true,
545
+
Name: v.name,
546
+
Type: v.Type(),
547
+
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Verified for DID %s", sigData.ATProto.DID),
548
+
Extensions: map[string]interface{}{
549
+
"did": sigData.ATProto.DID,
550
+
"handle": sigData.ATProto.Handle,
551
+
"signedAt": sigData.ATProto.SignedAt,
552
+
"commitCid": sigData.ATProto.CommitCID,
553
+
},
554
+
}, nil
555
+
}
556
+
557
+
func (v *ATProtoVerifier) isTrusted(did string) bool {
558
+
for _, trustedDID := range v.config.TrustedDIDs {
559
+
if did == trustedDID {
560
+
return true
561
+
}
562
+
}
563
+
return false
564
+
}
565
+
```
566
+
567
+
**Deploy Ratify with ATProto Plugin:**
568
+
569
+
1. **Build plugin:**
570
+
```bash
571
+
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o atproto-verifier ./cmd/ratify-atproto-plugin
572
+
```
573
+
574
+
2. **Create custom Ratify image:**
575
+
```dockerfile
576
+
FROM ghcr.io/ratify-project/ratify:latest
577
+
COPY atproto-verifier /.ratify/plugins/atproto-verifier
578
+
```
579
+
580
+
3. **Deploy Ratify:**
581
+
```yaml
582
+
apiVersion: apps/v1
583
+
kind: Deployment
584
+
metadata:
585
+
name: ratify
586
+
namespace: gatekeeper-system
587
+
spec:
588
+
replicas: 1
589
+
selector:
590
+
matchLabels:
591
+
app: ratify
592
+
template:
593
+
metadata:
594
+
labels:
595
+
app: ratify
596
+
spec:
597
+
containers:
598
+
- name: ratify
599
+
image: atcr.io/atcr/ratify-with-atproto:latest
600
+
args:
601
+
- serve
602
+
- --config=/config/ratify-config.yaml
603
+
volumeMounts:
604
+
- name: config
605
+
mountPath: /config
606
+
volumes:
607
+
- name: config
608
+
configMap:
609
+
name: ratify-config
610
+
```
611
+
612
+
4. **Configure Verifier:**
613
+
```yaml
614
+
apiVersion: config.ratify.deislabs.io/v1beta1
615
+
kind: Verifier
616
+
metadata:
617
+
name: atproto-verifier
618
+
spec:
619
+
name: atproto
620
+
artifactType: application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json
621
+
address: /.ratify/plugins/atproto-verifier
622
+
parameters:
623
+
trustedDIDs:
624
+
- did:plc:alice123
625
+
- did:plc:bob456
626
+
```
627
+
628
+
5. **Use with Gatekeeper:**
629
+
```yaml
630
+
apiVersion: constraints.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1
631
+
kind: RatifyVerification
632
+
metadata:
633
+
name: atcr-signatures-required
634
+
spec:
635
+
enforcementAction: deny
636
+
match:
637
+
kinds:
638
+
- apiGroups: [""]
639
+
kinds: ["Pod"]
640
+
```
641
+
642
+
**Benefits:**
643
+
- ✅ Standard plugin interface
644
+
- ✅ Works with existing Ratify deployments
645
+
- ✅ Can combine with other verifiers (Notation, Cosign)
646
+
- ✅ Policy-based enforcement via Gatekeeper
647
+
648
+
**See Also:** [Integration Strategy - Ratify Plugin](./INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md#ratify-verifier-plugin)
649
+
650
+
---
651
+
652
+
### Option 4: OPA Gatekeeper External Data Provider ⭐
653
+
654
+
Use Gatekeeper's External Data Provider feature to verify ATProto signatures:
655
+
656
+
**Provider Service:**
657
+
```go
658
+
// cmd/gatekeeper-provider/main.go
659
+
package main
660
+
661
+
import (
662
+
"context"
663
+
"encoding/json"
664
+
"net/http"
665
+
666
+
"github.com/atcr-io/atcr/pkg/verify"
667
+
)
668
+
669
+
type ProviderRequest struct {
670
+
Keys []string `json:"keys"`
671
+
Values []string `json:"values"`
672
+
}
673
+
674
+
type ProviderResponse struct {
675
+
SystemError string `json:"system_error,omitempty"`
676
+
Responses []map[string]interface{} `json:"responses"`
677
+
}
678
+
679
+
func handleProvide(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
680
+
var req ProviderRequest
681
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
682
+
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
683
+
return
684
+
}
685
+
686
+
// Verify each image
687
+
responses := make([]map[string]interface{}, 0, len(req.Values))
688
+
for _, image := range req.Values {
689
+
result, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), image)
690
+
691
+
response := map[string]interface{}{
692
+
"image": image,
693
+
"verified": false,
694
+
}
695
+
696
+
if err == nil && result.Verified {
697
+
response["verified"] = true
698
+
response["did"] = result.Signature.DID
699
+
response["signedAt"] = result.Signature.SignedAt
700
+
}
701
+
702
+
responses = append(responses, response)
703
+
}
704
+
705
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
706
+
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(ProviderResponse{
707
+
Responses: responses,
708
+
})
709
+
}
710
+
711
+
func main() {
712
+
http.HandleFunc("/provide", handleProvide)
713
+
http.ListenAndServe(":8080", nil)
714
+
}
715
+
```
716
+
717
+
**Deploy Provider:**
718
+
```yaml
719
+
apiVersion: apps/v1
720
+
kind: Deployment
721
+
metadata:
722
+
name: atcr-provider
723
+
namespace: gatekeeper-system
724
+
spec:
725
+
replicas: 2
726
+
selector:
727
+
matchLabels:
728
+
app: atcr-provider
729
+
template:
730
+
metadata:
731
+
labels:
732
+
app: atcr-provider
733
+
spec:
734
+
containers:
735
+
- name: provider
736
+
image: atcr.io/atcr/gatekeeper-provider:latest
737
+
ports:
738
+
- containerPort: 8080
739
+
env:
740
+
- name: ATCR_POLICY_FILE
741
+
value: /config/trust-policy.yaml
742
+
volumeMounts:
743
+
- name: config
744
+
mountPath: /config
745
+
volumes:
746
+
- name: config
747
+
configMap:
748
+
name: atcr-trust-policy
749
+
---
750
+
apiVersion: v1
751
+
kind: Service
752
+
metadata:
753
+
name: atcr-provider
754
+
namespace: gatekeeper-system
755
+
spec:
756
+
selector:
757
+
app: atcr-provider
758
+
ports:
759
+
- port: 80
760
+
targetPort: 8080
761
+
```
762
+
763
+
**Configure Gatekeeper:**
764
+
```yaml
765
+
apiVersion: config.gatekeeper.sh/v1alpha1
766
+
kind: Config
767
+
metadata:
768
+
name: config
769
+
namespace: gatekeeper-system
770
+
spec:
771
+
sync:
772
+
syncOnly:
773
+
- group: ""
774
+
version: "v1"
775
+
kind: "Pod"
776
+
validation:
777
+
traces:
778
+
- user: "gatekeeper"
779
+
dump: "All"
780
+
---
781
+
apiVersion: externaldata.gatekeeper.sh/v1alpha1
782
+
kind: Provider
783
+
metadata:
784
+
name: atcr-verifier
785
+
spec:
786
+
url: http://atcr-provider.gatekeeper-system/provide
787
+
timeout: 10
788
+
```
789
+
790
+
**Policy (Rego):**
791
+
```rego
792
+
package verify
793
+
794
+
import future.keywords.contains
795
+
import future.keywords.if
796
+
import future.keywords.in
797
+
798
+
# External data call
799
+
provider := "atcr-verifier"
800
+
801
+
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
802
+
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
803
+
startswith(container.image, "atcr.io/")
804
+
805
+
# Call external provider
806
+
response := external_data({
807
+
"provider": provider,
808
+
"keys": ["image"],
809
+
"values": [container.image]
810
+
})
811
+
812
+
# Check verification result
813
+
not response[_].verified == true
814
+
815
+
msg := sprintf("Image %v has no valid ATProto signature", [container.image])
816
+
}
817
+
```
818
+
819
+
**Benefits:**
820
+
- ✅ Uses standard Gatekeeper external data API
821
+
- ✅ Flexible Rego policies
822
+
- ✅ Can add caching, rate limiting
823
+
- ✅ Easy to deploy and update
824
+
825
+
**See Also:** [Integration Strategy - Gatekeeper Provider](./INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md#opa-gatekeeper-external-provider)
826
+
827
+
---
828
+
829
+
### Option 5: OPA Gatekeeper
830
+
831
+
Use OPA for policy enforcement:
832
+
833
+
```yaml
834
+
# gatekeeper-constraint-template.yaml
835
+
apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1
836
+
kind: ConstraintTemplate
837
+
metadata:
838
+
name: atcrverify
839
+
spec:
840
+
crd:
841
+
spec:
842
+
names:
843
+
kind: ATCRVerify
844
+
targets:
845
+
- target: admission.k8s.gatekeeper.sh
846
+
rego: |
847
+
package atcrverify
848
+
849
+
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
850
+
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
851
+
startswith(container.image, "atcr.io/")
852
+
not verified(container.image)
853
+
msg := sprintf("Image %v has no valid ATProto signature", [container.image])
854
+
}
855
+
856
+
verified(image) {
857
+
# Call external verification service
858
+
response := http.send({
859
+
"method": "GET",
860
+
"url": sprintf("http://atcr-verify.kube-system.svc/verify?image=%v", [image]),
861
+
})
862
+
response.status_code == 200
863
+
}
864
+
---
865
+
apiVersion: constraints.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1
866
+
kind: ATCRVerify
867
+
metadata:
868
+
name: atcr-signatures-required
869
+
spec:
870
+
match:
871
+
kinds:
872
+
- apiGroups: [""]
873
+
kinds: ["Pod"]
874
+
```
875
+
876
+
## CI/CD Integration
877
+
878
+
### GitHub Actions
879
+
880
+
```yaml
881
+
# .github/workflows/verify-and-deploy.yml
882
+
name: Verify and Deploy
883
+
884
+
on:
885
+
push:
886
+
branches: [main]
887
+
888
+
jobs:
889
+
verify-image:
890
+
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
891
+
steps:
892
+
- name: Install ORAS
893
+
run: |
894
+
curl -LO https://github.com/oras-project/oras/releases/download/v1.0.0/oras_1.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz
895
+
tar -xzf oras_1.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz
896
+
sudo mv oras /usr/local/bin/
897
+
898
+
- name: Install crane
899
+
run: |
900
+
curl -sL "https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.15.2/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz" > crane.tar.gz
901
+
tar -xzf crane.tar.gz
902
+
sudo mv crane /usr/local/bin/
903
+
904
+
- name: Verify image signature
905
+
run: |
906
+
IMAGE="atcr.io/alice/myapp:${{ github.sha }}"
907
+
908
+
# Get image digest
909
+
DIGEST=$(crane digest "$IMAGE")
910
+
911
+
# Check for ATProto signature
912
+
REFERRERS=$(curl -s "https://atcr.io/v2/alice/myapp/referrers/${DIGEST}?artifactType=application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json")
913
+
914
+
SIG_COUNT=$(echo "$REFERRERS" | jq '.manifests | length')
915
+
if [ "$SIG_COUNT" -eq 0 ]; then
916
+
echo "❌ No ATProto signature found"
917
+
exit 1
918
+
fi
919
+
920
+
echo "✓ Found $SIG_COUNT signature(s)"
921
+
922
+
# TODO: Full verification when atcr-verify is available
923
+
# atcr-verify "$IMAGE" --policy policy.yaml
924
+
925
+
- name: Deploy to Kubernetes
926
+
if: success()
927
+
run: |
928
+
kubectl set image deployment/myapp myapp=atcr.io/alice/myapp:${{ github.sha }}
929
+
```
930
+
931
+
### GitLab CI
932
+
933
+
```yaml
934
+
# .gitlab-ci.yml
935
+
verify_image:
936
+
stage: verify
937
+
image: alpine:latest
938
+
before_script:
939
+
- apk add --no-cache curl jq
940
+
script:
941
+
- |
942
+
IMAGE="atcr.io/alice/myapp:${CI_COMMIT_SHA}"
943
+
944
+
# Install crane
945
+
wget https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.15.2/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz
946
+
tar -xzf go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz crane
947
+
948
+
# Get digest
949
+
DIGEST=$(./crane digest "$IMAGE")
950
+
951
+
# Check signature
952
+
REFERRERS=$(curl -s "https://atcr.io/v2/alice/myapp/referrers/${DIGEST}?artifactType=application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json")
953
+
954
+
if [ $(echo "$REFERRERS" | jq '.manifests | length') -eq 0 ]; then
955
+
echo "❌ No signature found"
956
+
exit 1
957
+
fi
958
+
959
+
echo "✓ Signature verified"
960
+
961
+
deploy:
962
+
stage: deploy
963
+
dependencies:
964
+
- verify_image
965
+
script:
966
+
- kubectl set image deployment/myapp myapp=atcr.io/alice/myapp:${CI_COMMIT_SHA}
967
+
```
968
+
969
+
## Integration with Containerd
970
+
971
+
Containerd can be extended with verification plugins:
972
+
973
+
```go
974
+
// containerd-atcr-verifier plugin
975
+
package main
976
+
977
+
import (
978
+
"context"
979
+
"fmt"
980
+
981
+
"github.com/containerd/containerd"
982
+
"github.com/containerd/containerd/remotes"
983
+
)
984
+
985
+
type ATCRVerifier struct {
986
+
// Configuration
987
+
}
988
+
989
+
func (v *ATCRVerifier) Verify(ctx context.Context, ref string) error {
990
+
// 1. Query referrers API for signatures
991
+
sigs, err := v.discoverSignatures(ctx, ref)
992
+
if err != nil {
993
+
return err
994
+
}
995
+
996
+
if len(sigs) == 0 {
997
+
return fmt.Errorf("no ATProto signature found for %s", ref)
998
+
}
999
+
1000
+
// 2. Fetch and verify signature
1001
+
for _, sig := range sigs {
1002
+
err := v.verifySignature(ctx, sig)
1003
+
if err == nil {
1004
+
return nil // At least one valid signature
1005
+
}
1006
+
}
1007
+
1008
+
return fmt.Errorf("all signatures failed verification")
1009
+
}
1010
+
1011
+
// Use as containerd resolver wrapper
1012
+
func NewVerifyingResolver(base remotes.Resolver, verifier *ATCRVerifier) remotes.Resolver {
1013
+
return &verifyingResolver{
1014
+
Resolver: base,
1015
+
verifier: verifier,
1016
+
}
1017
+
}
1018
+
```
1019
+
1020
+
**Containerd config** (`/etc/containerd/config.toml`):
1021
+
1022
+
```toml
1023
+
[plugins."io.containerd.grpc.v1.cri".registry]
1024
+
[plugins."io.containerd.grpc.v1.cri".registry.configs]
1025
+
[plugins."io.containerd.grpc.v1.cri".registry.configs."atcr.io"]
1026
+
[plugins."io.containerd.grpc.v1.cri".registry.configs."atcr.io".auth]
1027
+
username = "alice"
1028
+
password = "..."
1029
+
# Custom verifier hook (requires plugin)
1030
+
verify_signatures = true
1031
+
signature_type = "atproto"
1032
+
```
1033
+
1034
+
## Trust Policies
1035
+
1036
+
Define what signatures you trust:
1037
+
1038
+
```yaml
1039
+
# trust-policy.yaml
1040
+
version: 1.0
1041
+
1042
+
policies:
1043
+
# Production images must be signed
1044
+
- name: production-images
1045
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/prod-*"
1046
+
require:
1047
+
- signature: true
1048
+
trustedDIDs:
1049
+
- did:plc:alice123
1050
+
- did:plc:bob456
1051
+
minSignatures: 1
1052
+
action: enforce # reject if policy fails
1053
+
1054
+
# Development images don't require signatures
1055
+
- name: dev-images
1056
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/dev-*"
1057
+
require:
1058
+
- signature: false
1059
+
action: audit # log but don't reject
1060
+
1061
+
# Staging requires at least 1 signature from any trusted DID
1062
+
- name: staging-images
1063
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/staging-*"
1064
+
require:
1065
+
- signature: true
1066
+
trustedDIDs:
1067
+
- did:plc:alice123
1068
+
- did:plc:bob456
1069
+
- did:plc:charlie789
1070
+
action: enforce
1071
+
1072
+
# DID trust configuration
1073
+
trustedDIDs:
1074
+
did:plc:alice123:
1075
+
name: "Alice (DevOps Lead)"
1076
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
1077
+
expiresAt: null
1078
+
1079
+
did:plc:bob456:
1080
+
name: "Bob (Security Team)"
1081
+
validFrom: "2024-06-01T00:00:00Z"
1082
+
expiresAt: "2025-12-31T23:59:59Z"
1083
+
```
1084
+
1085
+
## Troubleshooting
1086
+
1087
+
### No Signature Found
1088
+
1089
+
```bash
1090
+
$ oras discover atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --artifact-type application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json
1091
+
1092
+
Discovered 0 artifacts
1093
+
```
1094
+
1095
+
**Possible causes:**
1096
+
1. Image was pushed before signature creation was implemented
1097
+
2. Signature artifact creation failed
1098
+
3. Registry doesn't support Referrers API
1099
+
1100
+
**Solutions:**
1101
+
- Re-push the image to generate signature
1102
+
- Check AppView logs for signature creation errors
1103
+
- Verify Referrers API endpoint: `GET /v2/{repo}/referrers/{digest}`
1104
+
1105
+
### Signature Verification Fails
1106
+
1107
+
**Check DID resolution:**
1108
+
```bash
1109
+
curl -s "https://plc.directory/did:plc:alice123" | jq .
1110
+
# Should return DID document with verificationMethod
1111
+
```
1112
+
1113
+
**Check PDS connectivity:**
1114
+
```bash
1115
+
curl -s "https://bsky.social/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.describeRepo?repo=did:plc:alice123" | jq .
1116
+
# Should return repository metadata
1117
+
```
1118
+
1119
+
**Check record exists:**
1120
+
```bash
1121
+
curl -s "https://bsky.social/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.getRecord?\
1122
+
repo=did:plc:alice123&\
1123
+
collection=io.atcr.manifest&\
1124
+
rkey=abc123" | jq .
1125
+
# Should return manifest record
1126
+
```
1127
+
1128
+
### Registry Returns 404 for Referrers
1129
+
1130
+
Some registries don't support OCI Referrers API yet. Fallback to tag-based discovery:
1131
+
1132
+
```bash
1133
+
# Look for signature tags (if implemented)
1134
+
crane ls atcr.io/alice/myapp | grep sig
1135
+
```
1136
+
1137
+
## Best Practices
1138
+
1139
+
### 1. Always Verify in Production
1140
+
1141
+
Enable signature verification for production namespaces:
1142
+
1143
+
```bash
1144
+
kubectl label namespace production atcr-verify=enabled
1145
+
```
1146
+
1147
+
### 2. Use Trust Policies
1148
+
1149
+
Don't blindly trust all signatures - define which DIDs you trust:
1150
+
1151
+
```yaml
1152
+
trustedDIDs:
1153
+
- did:plc:your-org-team
1154
+
- did:plc:your-ci-system
1155
+
```
1156
+
1157
+
### 3. Monitor Signature Coverage
1158
+
1159
+
Track which images have signatures:
1160
+
1161
+
```bash
1162
+
# Check all images in a namespace
1163
+
kubectl get pods -n production -o json | \
1164
+
jq -r '.items[].spec.containers[].image' | \
1165
+
while read image; do
1166
+
echo -n "$image: "
1167
+
oras discover "$image" --artifact-type application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json | \
1168
+
grep -q "Discovered 0" && echo "❌ No signature" || echo "✓ Signed"
1169
+
done
1170
+
```
1171
+
1172
+
### 4. Automate Verification in CI/CD
1173
+
1174
+
Never deploy unsigned images to production:
1175
+
1176
+
```yaml
1177
+
# GitHub Actions
1178
+
- name: Verify signature
1179
+
run: |
1180
+
if ! atcr-verify $IMAGE; then
1181
+
echo "❌ Image is not signed"
1182
+
exit 1
1183
+
fi
1184
+
```
1185
+
1186
+
### 5. Plan for Offline Scenarios
1187
+
1188
+
For air-gapped environments, cache signature metadata and DID documents:
1189
+
1190
+
```bash
1191
+
# Export signatures and DID docs for offline use
1192
+
./export-verification-bundle.sh atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest > bundle.json
1193
+
1194
+
# In air-gapped environment
1195
+
atcr-verify --offline --bundle bundle.json atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
1196
+
```
1197
+
1198
+
## Next Steps
1199
+
1200
+
1. **Try manual verification** using the shell scripts above
1201
+
2. **Set up admission webhook** for your Kubernetes cluster
1202
+
3. **Define trust policies** for your organization
1203
+
4. **Integrate into CI/CD** pipelines
1204
+
5. **Monitor signature coverage** across your images
1205
+
1206
+
## See Also
1207
+
1208
+
- [ATProto Signatures](./ATPROTO_SIGNATURES.md) - Technical deep-dive
1209
+
- [SBOM Scanning](./SBOM_SCANNING.md) - Similar ORAS artifact pattern
1210
+
- [Example Scripts](../examples/verification/) - Working verification examples
+500
examples/plugins/README.md
+500
examples/plugins/README.md
···
1
+
# ATProto Signature Verification Plugins and Examples
2
+
3
+
This directory contains reference implementations and examples for integrating ATProto signature verification into various tools and workflows.
4
+
5
+
## Overview
6
+
7
+
ATCR uses ATProto's native signature system to cryptographically sign container images. To integrate signature verification into existing tools (Kubernetes, CI/CD, container runtimes), you can:
8
+
9
+
1. **Build plugins** for verification frameworks (Ratify, Gatekeeper, Containerd)
10
+
2. **Use external services** called by policy engines
11
+
3. **Integrate CLI tools** in your CI/CD pipelines
12
+
13
+
## Directory Structure
14
+
15
+
```
16
+
examples/plugins/
17
+
├── README.md # This file
18
+
├── ratify-verifier/ # Ratify plugin for Kubernetes
19
+
│ ├── README.md
20
+
│ ├── verifier.go
21
+
│ ├── config.go
22
+
│ ├── resolver.go
23
+
│ ├── crypto.go
24
+
│ ├── Dockerfile
25
+
│ ├── deployment.yaml
26
+
│ └── verifier-crd.yaml
27
+
├── gatekeeper-provider/ # OPA Gatekeeper external provider
28
+
│ ├── README.md
29
+
│ ├── main.go
30
+
│ ├── verifier.go
31
+
│ ├── resolver.go
32
+
│ ├── crypto.go
33
+
│ ├── Dockerfile
34
+
│ ├── deployment.yaml
35
+
│ └── provider-crd.yaml
36
+
├── containerd-verifier/ # Containerd bindir plugin
37
+
│ ├── README.md
38
+
│ ├── main.go
39
+
│ └── Dockerfile
40
+
└── ci-cd/ # CI/CD integration examples
41
+
├── github-actions.yml
42
+
├── gitlab-ci.yml
43
+
└── jenkins-pipeline.groovy
44
+
```
45
+
46
+
## Quick Start
47
+
48
+
### For Kubernetes (Recommended)
49
+
50
+
**Option A: Ratify Plugin**
51
+
```bash
52
+
cd ratify-verifier
53
+
# Build plugin and deploy to Kubernetes
54
+
./build.sh
55
+
kubectl apply -f deployment.yaml
56
+
kubectl apply -f verifier-crd.yaml
57
+
```
58
+
59
+
**Option B: Gatekeeper Provider**
60
+
```bash
61
+
cd gatekeeper-provider
62
+
# Build and deploy external provider
63
+
docker build -t atcr.io/atcr/gatekeeper-provider:latest .
64
+
kubectl apply -f deployment.yaml
65
+
kubectl apply -f provider-crd.yaml
66
+
```
67
+
68
+
### For CI/CD
69
+
70
+
**GitHub Actions**
71
+
```yaml
72
+
# Copy examples/plugins/ci-cd/github-actions.yml to .github/workflows/
73
+
cp ci-cd/github-actions.yml ../.github/workflows/verify-and-deploy.yml
74
+
```
75
+
76
+
**GitLab CI**
77
+
```yaml
78
+
# Copy examples/plugins/ci-cd/gitlab-ci.yml to your repo
79
+
cp ci-cd/gitlab-ci.yml ../.gitlab-ci.yml
80
+
```
81
+
82
+
### For Containerd
83
+
84
+
```bash
85
+
cd containerd-verifier
86
+
# Build plugin
87
+
./build.sh
88
+
# Install to containerd plugins directory
89
+
sudo cp atcr-verifier /opt/containerd/bin/
90
+
```
91
+
92
+
## Plugins Overview
93
+
94
+
### Ratify Verifier Plugin ⭐
95
+
96
+
**Use case:** Kubernetes admission control with OPA Gatekeeper
97
+
98
+
**How it works:**
99
+
1. Gatekeeper receives pod creation request
100
+
2. Calls Ratify verification engine
101
+
3. Ratify loads ATProto verifier plugin
102
+
4. Plugin verifies signature and checks trust policy
103
+
5. Returns allow/deny decision to Gatekeeper
104
+
105
+
**Pros:**
106
+
- Standard Ratify plugin interface
107
+
- Works with existing Gatekeeper deployments
108
+
- Can combine with other verifiers (Notation, Cosign)
109
+
- Policy-based enforcement
110
+
111
+
**Cons:**
112
+
- Requires building custom Ratify image
113
+
- Plugin must be compiled into image
114
+
- More complex deployment
115
+
116
+
**See:** [ratify-verifier/README.md](./ratify-verifier/README.md)
117
+
118
+
### Gatekeeper External Provider ⭐
119
+
120
+
**Use case:** Kubernetes admission control with OPA Gatekeeper
121
+
122
+
**How it works:**
123
+
1. Gatekeeper receives pod creation request
124
+
2. Rego policy calls external data provider API
125
+
3. Provider verifies ATProto signature
126
+
4. Returns verification result to Gatekeeper
127
+
5. Rego policy makes allow/deny decision
128
+
129
+
**Pros:**
130
+
- Simpler deployment (separate service)
131
+
- Easy to update (no Gatekeeper changes)
132
+
- Flexible Rego policies
133
+
- Can add caching, rate limiting
134
+
135
+
**Cons:**
136
+
- Additional service to maintain
137
+
- Network dependency (provider must be reachable)
138
+
- Slightly higher latency
139
+
140
+
**See:** [gatekeeper-provider/README.md](./gatekeeper-provider/README.md)
141
+
142
+
### Containerd Bindir Plugin
143
+
144
+
**Use case:** Runtime-level verification for all images
145
+
146
+
**How it works:**
147
+
1. Containerd pulls image
148
+
2. Calls verifier plugin (bindir)
149
+
3. Plugin verifies ATProto signature
150
+
4. Returns result to containerd
151
+
5. Containerd allows/blocks image
152
+
153
+
**Pros:**
154
+
- Works at runtime level (not just Kubernetes)
155
+
- CRI-O, Podman support (CRI-compatible)
156
+
- No Kubernetes required
157
+
- Applies to all images
158
+
159
+
**Cons:**
160
+
- Containerd 2.0+ required
161
+
- More complex to debug
162
+
- Less flexible policies
163
+
164
+
**See:** [containerd-verifier/README.md](./containerd-verifier/README.md)
165
+
166
+
## CI/CD Integration Examples
167
+
168
+
### GitHub Actions
169
+
170
+
Complete workflow with:
171
+
- Image signature verification
172
+
- DID trust checking
173
+
- Automated deployment on success
174
+
175
+
**See:** [ci-cd/github-actions.yml](./ci-cd/github-actions.yml)
176
+
177
+
### GitLab CI
178
+
179
+
Pipeline with:
180
+
- Multi-stage verification
181
+
- Trust policy enforcement
182
+
- Manual deployment approval
183
+
184
+
**See:** [ci-cd/gitlab-ci.yml](./ci-cd/gitlab-ci.yml)
185
+
186
+
### Jenkins
187
+
188
+
Declarative pipeline with:
189
+
- Signature verification stage
190
+
- Deployment gates
191
+
- Rollback on failure
192
+
193
+
**See:** [ci-cd/jenkins-pipeline.groovy](./ci-cd/jenkins-pipeline.groovy) (coming soon)
194
+
195
+
## Common Components
196
+
197
+
All plugins share common functionality:
198
+
199
+
### DID Resolution
200
+
201
+
Resolve DID to public key:
202
+
```go
203
+
func ResolveDIDToPublicKey(ctx context.Context, did string) (*PublicKey, error)
204
+
```
205
+
206
+
**Steps:**
207
+
1. Fetch DID document from PLC directory or did:web
208
+
2. Extract verification method
209
+
3. Decode multibase public key
210
+
4. Parse as K-256 public key
211
+
212
+
### PDS Communication
213
+
214
+
Fetch repository commit:
215
+
```go
216
+
func FetchCommit(ctx context.Context, pdsEndpoint, did, commitCID string) (*Commit, error)
217
+
```
218
+
219
+
**Steps:**
220
+
1. Call `com.atproto.sync.getRepo` XRPC endpoint
221
+
2. Parse CAR file response
222
+
3. Extract commit with matching CID
223
+
4. Return commit data and signature
224
+
225
+
### Signature Verification
226
+
227
+
Verify ECDSA K-256 signature:
228
+
```go
229
+
func VerifySignature(pubKey *PublicKey, commit *Commit) error
230
+
```
231
+
232
+
**Steps:**
233
+
1. Extract unsigned commit bytes
234
+
2. Hash with SHA-256
235
+
3. Verify ECDSA signature over hash
236
+
4. Check signature is valid for public key
237
+
238
+
### Trust Policy
239
+
240
+
Check if DID is trusted:
241
+
```go
242
+
func IsTrusted(did string, now time.Time) bool
243
+
```
244
+
245
+
**Steps:**
246
+
1. Load trust policy from config
247
+
2. Check if DID in trusted list
248
+
3. Verify validFrom/expiresAt timestamps
249
+
4. Return true if trusted
250
+
251
+
## Trust Policy Format
252
+
253
+
All plugins use the same trust policy format:
254
+
255
+
```yaml
256
+
version: 1.0
257
+
258
+
trustedDIDs:
259
+
did:plc:alice123:
260
+
name: "Alice (DevOps Lead)"
261
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
262
+
expiresAt: null
263
+
264
+
did:plc:bob456:
265
+
name: "Bob (Security Team)"
266
+
validFrom: "2024-06-01T00:00:00Z"
267
+
expiresAt: "2025-12-31T23:59:59Z"
268
+
269
+
policies:
270
+
- name: production-images
271
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/prod-*"
272
+
require:
273
+
signature: true
274
+
trustedDIDs:
275
+
- did:plc:alice123
276
+
- did:plc:bob456
277
+
minSignatures: 1
278
+
action: enforce
279
+
280
+
- name: dev-images
281
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/dev-*"
282
+
require:
283
+
signature: false
284
+
action: audit
285
+
```
286
+
287
+
## Implementation Notes
288
+
289
+
### Dependencies
290
+
291
+
All plugins require:
292
+
- Go 1.21+ for building
293
+
- ATProto DID resolution (PLC directory, did:web)
294
+
- ATProto PDS XRPC API access
295
+
- ECDSA K-256 signature verification
296
+
297
+
### Caching
298
+
299
+
Recommended caching strategy:
300
+
- **DID documents**: 5 minute TTL
301
+
- **Public keys**: 5 minute TTL
302
+
- **PDS endpoints**: 5 minute TTL
303
+
- **Signature results**: 5 minute TTL
304
+
305
+
### Error Handling
306
+
307
+
Plugins should handle:
308
+
- DID resolution failures (network, invalid DID)
309
+
- PDS connectivity issues (timeout, 404, 500)
310
+
- Invalid signature format
311
+
- Untrusted DIDs
312
+
- Network timeouts
313
+
314
+
### Logging
315
+
316
+
Structured logging with:
317
+
- `image` - Image being verified
318
+
- `did` - Signer DID
319
+
- `duration` - Operation duration
320
+
- `error` - Error message (if failed)
321
+
322
+
### Metrics
323
+
324
+
Expose Prometheus metrics:
325
+
- `atcr_verifications_total{result="verified|failed|error"}`
326
+
- `atcr_verification_duration_seconds`
327
+
- `atcr_did_resolutions_total{result="success|failure"}`
328
+
- `atcr_cache_hits_total`
329
+
- `atcr_cache_misses_total`
330
+
331
+
## Testing
332
+
333
+
### Unit Tests
334
+
335
+
Test individual components:
336
+
```bash
337
+
# Test DID resolution
338
+
go test ./pkg/resolver -v
339
+
340
+
# Test signature verification
341
+
go test ./pkg/crypto -v
342
+
343
+
# Test trust policy
344
+
go test ./pkg/trust -v
345
+
```
346
+
347
+
### Integration Tests
348
+
349
+
Test with real services:
350
+
```bash
351
+
# Test against ATCR registry
352
+
go test ./integration -tags=integration -v
353
+
354
+
# Test with test PDS
355
+
go test ./integration -tags=integration -pds=https://test.pds.example.com
356
+
```
357
+
358
+
### End-to-End Tests
359
+
360
+
Test full deployment:
361
+
```bash
362
+
# Deploy to test cluster
363
+
kubectl apply -f test/fixtures/
364
+
365
+
# Create pod with signed image (should succeed)
366
+
kubectl run test-signed --image=atcr.io/test/signed:latest
367
+
368
+
# Create pod with unsigned image (should fail)
369
+
kubectl run test-unsigned --image=atcr.io/test/unsigned:latest
370
+
```
371
+
372
+
## Performance Considerations
373
+
374
+
### Latency
375
+
376
+
Typical verification latency:
377
+
- DID resolution: 50-200ms (cached: <1ms)
378
+
- PDS query: 100-500ms (cached: <1ms)
379
+
- Signature verification: 1-5ms
380
+
- **Total**: 150-700ms (uncached), <10ms (cached)
381
+
382
+
### Throughput
383
+
384
+
Expected throughput (single instance):
385
+
- Without caching: ~5-10 verifications/second
386
+
- With caching: ~100-500 verifications/second
387
+
388
+
### Scaling
389
+
390
+
For high traffic:
391
+
- Deploy multiple replicas (stateless)
392
+
- Use Redis for distributed caching
393
+
- Implement rate limiting
394
+
- Monitor P95/P99 latency
395
+
396
+
## Security Considerations
397
+
398
+
### Network Policies
399
+
400
+
Restrict access to:
401
+
- DID resolution (PLC directory only)
402
+
- PDS XRPC endpoints
403
+
- Internal services only
404
+
405
+
### Denial of Service
406
+
407
+
Protect against:
408
+
- High verification request rate
409
+
- Slow DID resolution
410
+
- Malicious images with many signatures
411
+
- Large signature artifacts
412
+
413
+
### Trust Model
414
+
415
+
Understand trust dependencies:
416
+
- DID resolution is accurate (PLC directory)
417
+
- PDS serves correct records
418
+
- Private keys are secure
419
+
- Trust policy is maintained
420
+
421
+
## Troubleshooting
422
+
423
+
### Plugin Not Loading
424
+
425
+
```bash
426
+
# Check plugin exists
427
+
ls -la /path/to/plugin
428
+
429
+
# Check plugin is executable
430
+
chmod +x /path/to/plugin
431
+
432
+
# Check plugin logs
433
+
tail -f /var/log/atcr-verifier.log
434
+
```
435
+
436
+
### Verification Failing
437
+
438
+
```bash
439
+
# Test DID resolution
440
+
curl https://plc.directory/did:plc:alice123
441
+
442
+
# Test PDS connectivity
443
+
curl https://bsky.social/xrpc/com.atproto.server.describeServer
444
+
445
+
# Test signature exists
446
+
oras discover atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest \
447
+
--artifact-type application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json
448
+
```
449
+
450
+
### Policy Not Enforcing
451
+
452
+
```bash
453
+
# Check policy is loaded
454
+
kubectl get configmap atcr-trust-policy -n gatekeeper-system
455
+
456
+
# Check constraint is active
457
+
kubectl get constraint atcr-signatures-required -o yaml
458
+
459
+
# Check logs
460
+
kubectl logs -n gatekeeper-system deployment/ratify
461
+
```
462
+
463
+
## See Also
464
+
465
+
### Documentation
466
+
467
+
- [ATProto Signatures](../../docs/ATPROTO_SIGNATURES.md) - Technical deep-dive
468
+
- [Signature Integration](../../docs/SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md) - Tool-specific guides
469
+
- [Integration Strategy](../../docs/INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md) - High-level overview
470
+
- [atcr-verify CLI](../../docs/ATCR_VERIFY_CLI.md) - CLI tool specification
471
+
472
+
### Examples
473
+
474
+
- [Verification Scripts](../verification/) - Shell scripts for manual verification
475
+
- [Kubernetes Webhook](../verification/kubernetes-webhook.yaml) - Custom webhook example
476
+
477
+
### External Resources
478
+
479
+
- [Ratify](https://ratify.dev/) - Verification framework
480
+
- [OPA Gatekeeper](https://open-policy-agent.github.io/gatekeeper/) - Policy engine
481
+
- [Containerd](https://containerd.io/) - Container runtime
482
+
483
+
## Support
484
+
485
+
For questions or issues:
486
+
- GitHub Issues: https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/issues
487
+
- Documentation: https://docs.atcr.io
488
+
- Security: security@atcr.io
489
+
490
+
## Contributing
491
+
492
+
Contributions welcome! Please:
493
+
1. Follow existing code structure
494
+
2. Add tests for new features
495
+
3. Update documentation
496
+
4. Submit pull request
497
+
498
+
## License
499
+
500
+
See [LICENSE](../../LICENSE) file in repository root.
+166
examples/plugins/ci-cd/github-actions.yml
+166
examples/plugins/ci-cd/github-actions.yml
···
1
+
# GitHub Actions workflow for verifying ATProto signatures
2
+
3
+
name: Verify and Deploy
4
+
5
+
on:
6
+
push:
7
+
branches: [main]
8
+
pull_request:
9
+
branches: [main]
10
+
11
+
env:
12
+
REGISTRY: atcr.io
13
+
IMAGE_NAME: ${{ github.repository }}
14
+
15
+
jobs:
16
+
verify-signature:
17
+
name: Verify Image Signature
18
+
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
19
+
steps:
20
+
- name: Checkout code
21
+
uses: actions/checkout@v4
22
+
23
+
- name: Set up image tag
24
+
id: vars
25
+
run: |
26
+
echo "IMAGE_TAG=${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:${{ github.sha }}" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
27
+
28
+
- name: Install verification tools
29
+
run: |
30
+
# Install ORAS
31
+
curl -LO https://github.com/oras-project/oras/releases/download/v1.0.0/oras_1.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz
32
+
tar -xzf oras_1.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz
33
+
sudo mv oras /usr/local/bin/
34
+
35
+
# Install crane
36
+
curl -sL "https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.15.2/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz" > crane.tar.gz
37
+
tar -xzf crane.tar.gz
38
+
sudo mv crane /usr/local/bin/
39
+
40
+
# Install atcr-verify (when available)
41
+
# curl -LO https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/releases/latest/download/atcr-verify
42
+
# chmod +x atcr-verify
43
+
# sudo mv atcr-verify /usr/local/bin/
44
+
45
+
- name: Check for signature
46
+
id: check_signature
47
+
run: |
48
+
IMAGE="${{ steps.vars.outputs.IMAGE_TAG }}"
49
+
echo "Checking signature for $IMAGE"
50
+
51
+
# Get image digest
52
+
DIGEST=$(crane digest "$IMAGE")
53
+
echo "Image digest: $DIGEST"
54
+
55
+
# Check for ATProto signature using ORAS
56
+
REPO=$(echo "$IMAGE" | cut -d: -f1)
57
+
REFERRERS=$(curl -s "https://${{ env.REGISTRY }}/v2/${REPO#${{ env.REGISTRY }}/}/referrers/${DIGEST}?artifactType=application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json")
58
+
59
+
SIG_COUNT=$(echo "$REFERRERS" | jq '.manifests | length')
60
+
61
+
if [ "$SIG_COUNT" -eq 0 ]; then
62
+
echo "❌ No ATProto signature found"
63
+
echo "has_signature=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
64
+
exit 1
65
+
fi
66
+
67
+
echo "✓ Found $SIG_COUNT signature(s)"
68
+
echo "has_signature=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
69
+
70
+
- name: Verify signature (full verification)
71
+
if: steps.check_signature.outputs.has_signature == 'true'
72
+
run: |
73
+
IMAGE="${{ steps.vars.outputs.IMAGE_TAG }}"
74
+
75
+
# Option 1: Use atcr-verify CLI (when available)
76
+
# atcr-verify "$IMAGE" --policy .atcr/trust-policy.yaml
77
+
78
+
# Option 2: Use shell script
79
+
chmod +x examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh
80
+
./examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh "$IMAGE"
81
+
82
+
echo "✓ Signature verified successfully"
83
+
84
+
- name: Verify signer DID
85
+
if: steps.check_signature.outputs.has_signature == 'true'
86
+
run: |
87
+
IMAGE="${{ steps.vars.outputs.IMAGE_TAG }}"
88
+
89
+
# Get signature metadata
90
+
DIGEST=$(crane digest "$IMAGE")
91
+
REPO=$(echo "$IMAGE" | cut -d: -f1)
92
+
93
+
REFERRERS=$(curl -s "https://${{ env.REGISTRY }}/v2/${REPO#${{ env.REGISTRY }}/}/referrers/${DIGEST}?artifactType=application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json")
94
+
SIG_DIGEST=$(echo "$REFERRERS" | jq -r '.manifests[0].digest')
95
+
96
+
# Pull signature artifact
97
+
oras pull "${REPO}@${SIG_DIGEST}" -o /tmp/sig
98
+
99
+
# Extract DID
100
+
DID=$(jq -r '.atproto.did' /tmp/sig/atproto-signature.json)
101
+
echo "Signed by DID: $DID"
102
+
103
+
# Check against trusted DIDs
104
+
TRUSTED_DIDS="${{ secrets.TRUSTED_DIDS }}" # e.g., "did:plc:alice123,did:plc:bob456"
105
+
106
+
if [[ ",$TRUSTED_DIDS," == *",$DID,"* ]]; then
107
+
echo "✓ DID is trusted"
108
+
else
109
+
echo "❌ DID $DID is not in trusted list"
110
+
exit 1
111
+
fi
112
+
113
+
deploy:
114
+
name: Deploy to Kubernetes
115
+
needs: verify-signature
116
+
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
117
+
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
118
+
steps:
119
+
- name: Checkout code
120
+
uses: actions/checkout@v4
121
+
122
+
- name: Set up image tag
123
+
id: vars
124
+
run: |
125
+
echo "IMAGE_TAG=${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:${{ github.sha }}" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
126
+
127
+
- name: Set up kubectl
128
+
uses: azure/setup-kubectl@v3
129
+
130
+
- name: Configure kubectl
131
+
run: |
132
+
echo "${{ secrets.KUBE_CONFIG }}" | base64 -d > /tmp/kubeconfig
133
+
export KUBECONFIG=/tmp/kubeconfig
134
+
135
+
- name: Deploy to production
136
+
run: |
137
+
kubectl set image deployment/myapp \
138
+
myapp=${{ steps.vars.outputs.IMAGE_TAG }} \
139
+
-n production
140
+
141
+
kubectl rollout status deployment/myapp -n production
142
+
143
+
- name: Verify deployment
144
+
run: |
145
+
kubectl get pods -n production -l app=myapp
146
+
147
+
# Wait for rollout to complete
148
+
kubectl wait --for=condition=available --timeout=300s \
149
+
deployment/myapp -n production
150
+
151
+
# Alternative: Use atcr-verify action (when available)
152
+
verify-with-action:
153
+
name: Verify with ATCR Action
154
+
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
155
+
steps:
156
+
- name: Checkout code
157
+
uses: actions/checkout@v4
158
+
159
+
- name: Verify image signature
160
+
# uses: atcr-io/atcr-verify-action@v1
161
+
# with:
162
+
# image: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:${{ github.sha }}
163
+
# policy: .atcr/trust-policy.yaml
164
+
# fail-on-error: true
165
+
run: |
166
+
echo "TODO: Use official atcr-verify GitHub Action"
+156
examples/plugins/ci-cd/gitlab-ci.yml
+156
examples/plugins/ci-cd/gitlab-ci.yml
···
1
+
# GitLab CI pipeline for verifying ATProto signatures
2
+
3
+
variables:
4
+
REGISTRY: atcr.io
5
+
IMAGE_NAME: $CI_PROJECT_PATH
6
+
IMAGE_TAG: $REGISTRY/$IMAGE_NAME:$CI_COMMIT_SHA
7
+
8
+
stages:
9
+
- build
10
+
- verify
11
+
- deploy
12
+
13
+
build_image:
14
+
stage: build
15
+
image: docker:latest
16
+
services:
17
+
- docker:dind
18
+
script:
19
+
- docker build -t $IMAGE_TAG .
20
+
- docker push $IMAGE_TAG
21
+
22
+
verify_signature:
23
+
stage: verify
24
+
image: alpine:latest
25
+
before_script:
26
+
- apk add --no-cache curl jq
27
+
script:
28
+
- |
29
+
echo "Verifying signature for $IMAGE_TAG"
30
+
31
+
# Install crane
32
+
wget https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.15.2/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz
33
+
tar -xzf go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz crane
34
+
mv crane /usr/local/bin/
35
+
36
+
# Get image digest
37
+
DIGEST=$(crane digest "$IMAGE_TAG")
38
+
echo "Image digest: $DIGEST"
39
+
40
+
# Extract repository path
41
+
REPO=$(echo "$IMAGE_TAG" | cut -d: -f1)
42
+
REPO_PATH=${REPO#$REGISTRY/}
43
+
44
+
# Check for ATProto signature
45
+
REFERRERS=$(curl -s "https://$REGISTRY/v2/$REPO_PATH/referrers/${DIGEST}?artifactType=application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json")
46
+
47
+
SIG_COUNT=$(echo "$REFERRERS" | jq '.manifests | length')
48
+
49
+
if [ "$SIG_COUNT" -eq 0 ]; then
50
+
echo "❌ No ATProto signature found"
51
+
exit 1
52
+
fi
53
+
54
+
echo "✓ Found $SIG_COUNT signature(s)"
55
+
56
+
verify_full:
57
+
stage: verify
58
+
image: alpine:latest
59
+
before_script:
60
+
- apk add --no-cache curl jq bash
61
+
script:
62
+
- |
63
+
# Option 1: Use atcr-verify CLI (when available)
64
+
# wget https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/releases/latest/download/atcr-verify
65
+
# chmod +x atcr-verify
66
+
# ./atcr-verify "$IMAGE_TAG" --policy .atcr/trust-policy.yaml
67
+
68
+
# Option 2: Use shell script
69
+
chmod +x examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh
70
+
./examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh "$IMAGE_TAG"
71
+
72
+
echo "✓ Signature verified successfully"
73
+
74
+
verify_trust:
75
+
stage: verify
76
+
image: alpine:latest
77
+
before_script:
78
+
- apk add --no-cache curl jq
79
+
script:
80
+
- |
81
+
# Install crane and ORAS
82
+
wget https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.15.2/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz
83
+
tar -xzf go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz crane
84
+
mv crane /usr/local/bin/
85
+
86
+
wget https://github.com/oras-project/oras/releases/download/v1.0.0/oras_1.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz
87
+
tar -xzf oras_1.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz
88
+
mv oras /usr/local/bin/
89
+
90
+
# Get signature metadata
91
+
DIGEST=$(crane digest "$IMAGE_TAG")
92
+
REPO=$(echo "$IMAGE_TAG" | cut -d: -f1)
93
+
REPO_PATH=${REPO#$REGISTRY/}
94
+
95
+
REFERRERS=$(curl -s "https://$REGISTRY/v2/$REPO_PATH/referrers/${DIGEST}?artifactType=application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json")
96
+
SIG_DIGEST=$(echo "$REFERRERS" | jq -r '.manifests[0].digest')
97
+
98
+
# Pull signature artifact
99
+
oras pull "${REPO}@${SIG_DIGEST}" -o /tmp/sig
100
+
101
+
# Extract DID
102
+
DID=$(jq -r '.atproto.did' /tmp/sig/atproto-signature.json)
103
+
echo "Signed by DID: $DID"
104
+
105
+
# Check against trusted DIDs (from CI/CD variables)
106
+
if [[ ",$TRUSTED_DIDS," == *",$DID,"* ]]; then
107
+
echo "✓ DID is trusted"
108
+
else
109
+
echo "❌ DID $DID is not in trusted list"
110
+
exit 1
111
+
fi
112
+
113
+
deploy_production:
114
+
stage: deploy
115
+
image: bitnami/kubectl:latest
116
+
dependencies:
117
+
- verify_signature
118
+
- verify_full
119
+
- verify_trust
120
+
only:
121
+
- main
122
+
script:
123
+
- |
124
+
# Configure kubectl
125
+
echo "$KUBE_CONFIG" | base64 -d > /tmp/kubeconfig
126
+
export KUBECONFIG=/tmp/kubeconfig
127
+
128
+
# Deploy to production
129
+
kubectl set image deployment/myapp \
130
+
myapp=$IMAGE_TAG \
131
+
-n production
132
+
133
+
kubectl rollout status deployment/myapp -n production
134
+
135
+
# Verify deployment
136
+
kubectl get pods -n production -l app=myapp
137
+
138
+
# Alternative: Manual approval before deploy
139
+
deploy_production_manual:
140
+
stage: deploy
141
+
image: bitnami/kubectl:latest
142
+
dependencies:
143
+
- verify_signature
144
+
when: manual
145
+
only:
146
+
- main
147
+
script:
148
+
- |
149
+
echo "Deploying $IMAGE_TAG to production"
150
+
151
+
echo "$KUBE_CONFIG" | base64 -d > /tmp/kubeconfig
152
+
export KUBECONFIG=/tmp/kubeconfig
153
+
154
+
kubectl set image deployment/myapp \
155
+
myapp=$IMAGE_TAG \
156
+
-n production
+501
examples/plugins/gatekeeper-provider/README.md
+501
examples/plugins/gatekeeper-provider/README.md
···
1
+
# OPA Gatekeeper External Data Provider for ATProto Signatures
2
+
3
+
This is a reference implementation of an OPA Gatekeeper External Data Provider that verifies ATProto signatures on ATCR container images.
4
+
5
+
## Overview
6
+
7
+
Gatekeeper's External Data Provider feature allows Rego policies to call external HTTP services for data validation. This provider implements signature verification as an HTTP service that Gatekeeper can query.
8
+
9
+
## Architecture
10
+
11
+
```
12
+
Kubernetes Pod Creation
13
+
↓
14
+
OPA Gatekeeper (admission webhook)
15
+
↓
16
+
Rego Policy (constraint template)
17
+
↓
18
+
External Data Provider API call
19
+
↓
20
+
ATProto Verification Service ← This service
21
+
↓
22
+
1. Resolve image digest
23
+
2. Discover signature artifacts
24
+
3. Parse ATProto signature metadata
25
+
4. Resolve DID to public key
26
+
5. Fetch commit from PDS
27
+
6. Verify K-256 signature
28
+
7. Check trust policy
29
+
↓
30
+
Return: verified=true/false + metadata
31
+
```
32
+
33
+
## Files
34
+
35
+
- `main.go` - HTTP server and provider endpoints
36
+
- `verifier.go` - ATProto signature verification logic
37
+
- `resolver.go` - DID and PDS resolution
38
+
- `crypto.go` - K-256 signature verification
39
+
- `trust-policy.yaml` - Trust policy configuration
40
+
- `Dockerfile` - Build provider service image
41
+
- `deployment.yaml` - Kubernetes deployment manifest
42
+
- `provider-crd.yaml` - Gatekeeper Provider custom resource
43
+
- `constraint-template.yaml` - Rego constraint template
44
+
- `constraint.yaml` - Policy constraint example
45
+
46
+
## Prerequisites
47
+
48
+
- Go 1.21+
49
+
- Kubernetes cluster with OPA Gatekeeper installed
50
+
- Access to ATCR registry
51
+
52
+
## Building
53
+
54
+
```bash
55
+
# Build binary
56
+
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o atcr-provider \
57
+
-ldflags="-w -s" \
58
+
./main.go
59
+
60
+
# Build Docker image
61
+
docker build -t atcr.io/atcr/gatekeeper-provider:latest .
62
+
63
+
# Push to registry
64
+
docker push atcr.io/atcr/gatekeeper-provider:latest
65
+
```
66
+
67
+
## Deployment
68
+
69
+
### 1. Create Trust Policy ConfigMap
70
+
71
+
```bash
72
+
kubectl create namespace gatekeeper-system
73
+
kubectl create configmap atcr-trust-policy \
74
+
--from-file=trust-policy.yaml \
75
+
-n gatekeeper-system
76
+
```
77
+
78
+
### 2. Deploy Provider Service
79
+
80
+
```bash
81
+
kubectl apply -f deployment.yaml
82
+
```
83
+
84
+
### 3. Configure Gatekeeper Provider
85
+
86
+
```bash
87
+
kubectl apply -f provider-crd.yaml
88
+
```
89
+
90
+
### 4. Create Constraint Template
91
+
92
+
```bash
93
+
kubectl apply -f constraint-template.yaml
94
+
```
95
+
96
+
### 5. Create Constraint
97
+
98
+
```bash
99
+
kubectl apply -f constraint.yaml
100
+
```
101
+
102
+
### 6. Test
103
+
104
+
```bash
105
+
# Try to create pod with signed image (should succeed)
106
+
kubectl run test-signed --image=atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
107
+
108
+
# Try to create pod with unsigned image (should fail)
109
+
kubectl run test-unsigned --image=atcr.io/malicious/fake:latest
110
+
111
+
# Check constraint status
112
+
kubectl get constraint atcr-signatures-required -o yaml
113
+
```
114
+
115
+
## API Specification
116
+
117
+
### Provider Endpoint
118
+
119
+
**POST /provide**
120
+
121
+
Request:
122
+
```json
123
+
{
124
+
"keys": ["image"],
125
+
"values": [
126
+
"atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest",
127
+
"atcr.io/bob/webapp:v1.0"
128
+
]
129
+
}
130
+
```
131
+
132
+
Response:
133
+
```json
134
+
{
135
+
"responses": [
136
+
{
137
+
"image": "atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest",
138
+
"verified": true,
139
+
"did": "did:plc:alice123",
140
+
"handle": "alice.bsky.social",
141
+
"signedAt": "2025-10-31T12:34:56Z",
142
+
"commitCid": "bafyreih8..."
143
+
},
144
+
{
145
+
"image": "atcr.io/bob/webapp:v1.0",
146
+
"verified": false,
147
+
"error": "no signature found"
148
+
}
149
+
]
150
+
}
151
+
```
152
+
153
+
### Health Check
154
+
155
+
**GET /health**
156
+
157
+
Response:
158
+
```json
159
+
{
160
+
"status": "ok",
161
+
"version": "1.0.0"
162
+
}
163
+
```
164
+
165
+
## Configuration
166
+
167
+
### Trust Policy Format
168
+
169
+
```yaml
170
+
# trust-policy.yaml
171
+
version: 1.0
172
+
173
+
trustedDIDs:
174
+
did:plc:alice123:
175
+
name: "Alice (DevOps)"
176
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
177
+
expiresAt: null
178
+
179
+
did:plc:bob456:
180
+
name: "Bob (Security)"
181
+
validFrom: "2024-06-01T00:00:00Z"
182
+
expiresAt: "2025-12-31T23:59:59Z"
183
+
184
+
policies:
185
+
- name: production
186
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/prod-*"
187
+
require:
188
+
signature: true
189
+
trustedDIDs:
190
+
- did:plc:alice123
191
+
- did:plc:bob456
192
+
action: enforce
193
+
```
194
+
195
+
### Provider Configuration
196
+
197
+
Environment variables:
198
+
- `TRUST_POLICY_PATH` - Path to trust policy file (default: `/config/trust-policy.yaml`)
199
+
- `HTTP_PORT` - HTTP server port (default: `8080`)
200
+
- `LOG_LEVEL` - Log level: debug, info, warn, error (default: `info`)
201
+
- `CACHE_ENABLED` - Enable caching (default: `true`)
202
+
- `CACHE_TTL` - Cache TTL in seconds (default: `300`)
203
+
- `DID_RESOLVER_TIMEOUT` - DID resolution timeout (default: `10s`)
204
+
- `PDS_TIMEOUT` - PDS XRPC timeout (default: `10s`)
205
+
206
+
## Rego Policy Examples
207
+
208
+
### Simple Verification
209
+
210
+
```rego
211
+
package atcrsignatures
212
+
213
+
import future.keywords.contains
214
+
import future.keywords.if
215
+
import future.keywords.in
216
+
217
+
provider := "atcr-verifier"
218
+
219
+
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
220
+
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
221
+
startswith(container.image, "atcr.io/")
222
+
223
+
# Call external provider
224
+
response := external_data({
225
+
"provider": provider,
226
+
"keys": ["image"],
227
+
"values": [container.image]
228
+
})
229
+
230
+
# Check verification result
231
+
not response[_].verified == true
232
+
233
+
msg := sprintf("Image %v has no valid ATProto signature", [container.image])
234
+
}
235
+
```
236
+
237
+
### Advanced Verification with DID Trust
238
+
239
+
```rego
240
+
package atcrsignatures
241
+
242
+
import future.keywords.contains
243
+
import future.keywords.if
244
+
import future.keywords.in
245
+
246
+
provider := "atcr-verifier"
247
+
248
+
trusted_dids := [
249
+
"did:plc:alice123",
250
+
"did:plc:bob456"
251
+
]
252
+
253
+
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
254
+
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
255
+
startswith(container.image, "atcr.io/")
256
+
257
+
# Call external provider
258
+
response := external_data({
259
+
"provider": provider,
260
+
"keys": ["image"],
261
+
"values": [container.image]
262
+
})
263
+
264
+
# Get response for this image
265
+
result := response[_]
266
+
result.image == container.image
267
+
268
+
# Check if verified
269
+
not result.verified == true
270
+
msg := sprintf("Image %v failed signature verification: %v", [container.image, result.error])
271
+
}
272
+
273
+
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
274
+
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
275
+
startswith(container.image, "atcr.io/")
276
+
277
+
# Call external provider
278
+
response := external_data({
279
+
"provider": provider,
280
+
"keys": ["image"],
281
+
"values": [container.image]
282
+
})
283
+
284
+
# Get response for this image
285
+
result := response[_]
286
+
result.image == container.image
287
+
result.verified == true
288
+
289
+
# Check DID is trusted
290
+
not result.did in trusted_dids
291
+
msg := sprintf("Image %v signed by untrusted DID: %v", [container.image, result.did])
292
+
}
293
+
```
294
+
295
+
### Namespace-Specific Policies
296
+
297
+
```rego
298
+
package atcrsignatures
299
+
300
+
import future.keywords.contains
301
+
import future.keywords.if
302
+
import future.keywords.in
303
+
304
+
provider := "atcr-verifier"
305
+
306
+
# Production namespaces require signatures
307
+
production_namespaces := ["production", "prod", "staging"]
308
+
309
+
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
310
+
# Only apply to production namespaces
311
+
input.review.object.metadata.namespace in production_namespaces
312
+
313
+
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
314
+
startswith(container.image, "atcr.io/")
315
+
316
+
# Call external provider
317
+
response := external_data({
318
+
"provider": provider,
319
+
"keys": ["image"],
320
+
"values": [container.image]
321
+
})
322
+
323
+
# Check verification result
324
+
not response[_].verified == true
325
+
326
+
msg := sprintf("Production namespace requires signed images. Image %v is not signed", [container.image])
327
+
}
328
+
```
329
+
330
+
## Performance Considerations
331
+
332
+
### Caching
333
+
334
+
The provider caches:
335
+
- Signature verification results (TTL: 5 minutes)
336
+
- DID documents (TTL: 5 minutes)
337
+
- PDS endpoints (TTL: 5 minutes)
338
+
- Public keys (TTL: 5 minutes)
339
+
340
+
Enable/disable via `CACHE_ENABLED` environment variable.
341
+
342
+
### Timeouts
343
+
344
+
- `DID_RESOLVER_TIMEOUT` - DID resolution timeout (default: 10s)
345
+
- `PDS_TIMEOUT` - PDS XRPC calls timeout (default: 10s)
346
+
- HTTP client timeout: 30s total
347
+
348
+
### Horizontal Scaling
349
+
350
+
The provider is stateless and can be scaled horizontally:
351
+
352
+
```yaml
353
+
apiVersion: apps/v1
354
+
kind: Deployment
355
+
spec:
356
+
replicas: 3 # Scale up for high traffic
357
+
```
358
+
359
+
### Rate Limiting
360
+
361
+
Consider implementing rate limiting for:
362
+
- Gatekeeper → Provider requests
363
+
- Provider → DID resolver
364
+
- Provider → PDS
365
+
366
+
## Monitoring
367
+
368
+
### Metrics
369
+
370
+
The provider exposes Prometheus metrics at `/metrics`:
371
+
372
+
```
373
+
# Request metrics
374
+
atcr_provider_requests_total{status="success|failure"}
375
+
atcr_provider_request_duration_seconds
376
+
377
+
# Verification metrics
378
+
atcr_provider_verifications_total{result="verified|failed|error"}
379
+
atcr_provider_verification_duration_seconds
380
+
381
+
# Cache metrics
382
+
atcr_provider_cache_hits_total
383
+
atcr_provider_cache_misses_total
384
+
```
385
+
386
+
### Logging
387
+
388
+
Structured JSON logging with fields:
389
+
- `image` - Image being verified
390
+
- `did` - Signer DID (if found)
391
+
- `duration` - Verification duration
392
+
- `error` - Error message (if failed)
393
+
394
+
### Health Checks
395
+
396
+
```bash
397
+
# Liveness probe
398
+
curl http://localhost:8080/health
399
+
400
+
# Readiness probe
401
+
curl http://localhost:8080/ready
402
+
```
403
+
404
+
## Troubleshooting
405
+
406
+
### Provider Not Reachable
407
+
408
+
```bash
409
+
# Check provider pod status
410
+
kubectl get pods -n gatekeeper-system -l app=atcr-provider
411
+
412
+
# Check service
413
+
kubectl get svc -n gatekeeper-system atcr-provider
414
+
415
+
# Test connectivity from Gatekeeper pod
416
+
kubectl exec -n gatekeeper-system deployment/gatekeeper-controller-manager -- \
417
+
curl http://atcr-provider.gatekeeper-system/health
418
+
```
419
+
420
+
### Verification Failing
421
+
422
+
```bash
423
+
# Check provider logs
424
+
kubectl logs -n gatekeeper-system deployment/atcr-provider
425
+
426
+
# Test verification manually
427
+
kubectl run test-curl --rm -it --image=curlimages/curl -- \
428
+
curl -X POST http://atcr-provider.gatekeeper-system/provide \
429
+
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
430
+
-d '{"keys":["image"],"values":["atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest"]}'
431
+
```
432
+
433
+
### Policy Not Enforcing
434
+
435
+
```bash
436
+
# Check Gatekeeper logs
437
+
kubectl logs -n gatekeeper-system deployment/gatekeeper-controller-manager
438
+
439
+
# Check constraint status
440
+
kubectl get constraint atcr-signatures-required -o yaml
441
+
442
+
# Test policy manually with conftest
443
+
conftest test -p constraint-template.yaml pod.yaml
444
+
```
445
+
446
+
## Security Considerations
447
+
448
+
### Network Policies
449
+
450
+
Restrict network access:
451
+
452
+
```yaml
453
+
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
454
+
kind: NetworkPolicy
455
+
metadata:
456
+
name: atcr-provider
457
+
namespace: gatekeeper-system
458
+
spec:
459
+
podSelector:
460
+
matchLabels:
461
+
app: atcr-provider
462
+
ingress:
463
+
- from:
464
+
- podSelector:
465
+
matchLabels:
466
+
control-plane: controller-manager # Gatekeeper
467
+
ports:
468
+
- port: 8080
469
+
egress:
470
+
- to: # PLC directory
471
+
- namespaceSelector: {}
472
+
ports:
473
+
- port: 443
474
+
```
475
+
476
+
### Authentication
477
+
478
+
The provider should only be accessible from Gatekeeper. Options:
479
+
- Network policies (recommended for Kubernetes)
480
+
- Mutual TLS
481
+
- API tokens
482
+
483
+
### Trust Policy Management
484
+
485
+
- Store trust policy in version control
486
+
- Use GitOps (Flux, ArgoCD) for updates
487
+
- Review DID changes carefully
488
+
- Audit policy modifications
489
+
490
+
## See Also
491
+
492
+
- [Gatekeeper Documentation](https://open-policy-agent.github.io/gatekeeper/)
493
+
- [External Data Provider](https://open-policy-agent.github.io/gatekeeper/website/docs/externaldata/)
494
+
- [ATCR Signature Integration](../../../docs/SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md)
495
+
- [ATCR Integration Strategy](../../../docs/INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md)
496
+
497
+
## Support
498
+
499
+
For issues or questions:
500
+
- GitHub Issues: https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/issues
501
+
- Gatekeeper GitHub: https://github.com/open-policy-agent/gatekeeper
+225
examples/plugins/gatekeeper-provider/main.go
+225
examples/plugins/gatekeeper-provider/main.go
···
1
+
// Package main implements an OPA Gatekeeper External Data Provider for ATProto signature verification.
2
+
package main
3
+
4
+
import (
5
+
"context"
6
+
"encoding/json"
7
+
"fmt"
8
+
"log"
9
+
"net/http"
10
+
"os"
11
+
"time"
12
+
)
13
+
14
+
const (
15
+
// DefaultPort is the default HTTP port
16
+
DefaultPort = "8080"
17
+
18
+
// DefaultTrustPolicyPath is the default trust policy file path
19
+
DefaultTrustPolicyPath = "/config/trust-policy.yaml"
20
+
)
21
+
22
+
// Server is the HTTP server for the external data provider.
23
+
type Server struct {
24
+
verifier *Verifier
25
+
port string
26
+
httpServer *http.Server
27
+
}
28
+
29
+
// ProviderRequest is the request format from Gatekeeper.
30
+
type ProviderRequest struct {
31
+
Keys []string `json:"keys"`
32
+
Values []string `json:"values"`
33
+
}
34
+
35
+
// ProviderResponse is the response format to Gatekeeper.
36
+
type ProviderResponse struct {
37
+
SystemError string `json:"system_error,omitempty"`
38
+
Responses []map[string]interface{} `json:"responses"`
39
+
}
40
+
41
+
// VerificationResult holds the result of verifying a single image.
42
+
type VerificationResult struct {
43
+
Image string `json:"image"`
44
+
Verified bool `json:"verified"`
45
+
DID string `json:"did,omitempty"`
46
+
Handle string `json:"handle,omitempty"`
47
+
SignedAt time.Time `json:"signedAt,omitempty"`
48
+
CommitCID string `json:"commitCid,omitempty"`
49
+
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
50
+
}
51
+
52
+
// NewServer creates a new provider server.
53
+
func NewServer(verifier *Verifier, port string) *Server {
54
+
return &Server{
55
+
verifier: verifier,
56
+
port: port,
57
+
}
58
+
}
59
+
60
+
// Start starts the HTTP server.
61
+
func (s *Server) Start() error {
62
+
mux := http.NewServeMux()
63
+
64
+
// Provider endpoint (called by Gatekeeper)
65
+
mux.HandleFunc("/provide", s.handleProvide)
66
+
67
+
// Health check endpoints
68
+
mux.HandleFunc("/health", s.handleHealth)
69
+
mux.HandleFunc("/ready", s.handleReady)
70
+
71
+
// Metrics endpoint (Prometheus)
72
+
// TODO: Implement metrics
73
+
// mux.HandleFunc("/metrics", s.handleMetrics)
74
+
75
+
s.httpServer = &http.Server{
76
+
Addr: ":" + s.port,
77
+
Handler: mux,
78
+
ReadTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
79
+
WriteTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
80
+
IdleTimeout: 60 * time.Second,
81
+
}
82
+
83
+
log.Printf("Starting ATProto signature verification provider on port %s", s.port)
84
+
return s.httpServer.ListenAndServe()
85
+
}
86
+
87
+
// Stop gracefully stops the HTTP server.
88
+
func (s *Server) Stop(ctx context.Context) error {
89
+
if s.httpServer != nil {
90
+
return s.httpServer.Shutdown(ctx)
91
+
}
92
+
return nil
93
+
}
94
+
95
+
// handleProvide handles the provider endpoint called by Gatekeeper.
96
+
func (s *Server) handleProvide(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
97
+
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
98
+
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
99
+
return
100
+
}
101
+
102
+
// Parse request
103
+
var req ProviderRequest
104
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
105
+
log.Printf("ERROR: failed to parse request: %v", err)
106
+
http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("invalid request: %v", err), http.StatusBadRequest)
107
+
return
108
+
}
109
+
110
+
log.Printf("INFO: received verification request for %d images", len(req.Values))
111
+
112
+
// Verify each image
113
+
responses := make([]map[string]interface{}, 0, len(req.Values))
114
+
for _, image := range req.Values {
115
+
result := s.verifyImage(r.Context(), image)
116
+
responses = append(responses, structToMap(result))
117
+
}
118
+
119
+
// Send response
120
+
resp := ProviderResponse{
121
+
Responses: responses,
122
+
}
123
+
124
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
125
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
126
+
log.Printf("ERROR: failed to encode response: %v", err)
127
+
}
128
+
}
129
+
130
+
// verifyImage verifies a single image.
131
+
func (s *Server) verifyImage(ctx context.Context, image string) VerificationResult {
132
+
start := time.Now()
133
+
log.Printf("INFO: verifying image: %s", image)
134
+
135
+
// Call verifier
136
+
verified, metadata, err := s.verifier.Verify(ctx, image)
137
+
duration := time.Since(start)
138
+
139
+
if err != nil {
140
+
log.Printf("ERROR: verification failed for %s: %v (duration: %v)", image, err, duration)
141
+
return VerificationResult{
142
+
Image: image,
143
+
Verified: false,
144
+
Error: err.Error(),
145
+
}
146
+
}
147
+
148
+
if !verified {
149
+
log.Printf("WARN: image %s failed verification (duration: %v)", image, duration)
150
+
return VerificationResult{
151
+
Image: image,
152
+
Verified: false,
153
+
Error: "signature verification failed",
154
+
}
155
+
}
156
+
157
+
log.Printf("INFO: image %s verified successfully (DID: %s, duration: %v)",
158
+
image, metadata.DID, duration)
159
+
160
+
return VerificationResult{
161
+
Image: image,
162
+
Verified: true,
163
+
DID: metadata.DID,
164
+
Handle: metadata.Handle,
165
+
SignedAt: metadata.SignedAt,
166
+
CommitCID: metadata.CommitCID,
167
+
}
168
+
}
169
+
170
+
// handleHealth handles health check requests.
171
+
func (s *Server) handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
172
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
173
+
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{
174
+
"status": "ok",
175
+
"version": "1.0.0",
176
+
})
177
+
}
178
+
179
+
// handleReady handles readiness check requests.
180
+
func (s *Server) handleReady(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
181
+
// TODO: Check dependencies (DID resolver, PDS connectivity)
182
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
183
+
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{
184
+
"status": "ready",
185
+
})
186
+
}
187
+
188
+
// structToMap converts a struct to a map for JSON encoding.
189
+
func structToMap(v interface{}) map[string]interface{} {
190
+
data, _ := json.Marshal(v)
191
+
var m map[string]interface{}
192
+
json.Unmarshal(data, &m)
193
+
return m
194
+
}
195
+
196
+
func main() {
197
+
// Load configuration
198
+
port := os.Getenv("HTTP_PORT")
199
+
if port == "" {
200
+
port = DefaultPort
201
+
}
202
+
203
+
trustPolicyPath := os.Getenv("TRUST_POLICY_PATH")
204
+
if trustPolicyPath == "" {
205
+
trustPolicyPath = DefaultTrustPolicyPath
206
+
}
207
+
208
+
// Create verifier
209
+
verifier, err := NewVerifier(trustPolicyPath)
210
+
if err != nil {
211
+
log.Fatalf("FATAL: failed to create verifier: %v", err)
212
+
}
213
+
214
+
// Create server
215
+
server := NewServer(verifier, port)
216
+
217
+
// Start server
218
+
if err := server.Start(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
219
+
log.Fatalf("FATAL: server error: %v", err)
220
+
}
221
+
}
222
+
223
+
// TODO: Implement verifier.go with ATProto signature verification logic
224
+
// TODO: Implement resolver.go with DID resolution
225
+
// TODO: Implement crypto.go with K-256 signature verification
+304
examples/plugins/ratify-verifier/README.md
+304
examples/plugins/ratify-verifier/README.md
···
1
+
# Ratify ATProto Verifier Plugin
2
+
3
+
This is a reference implementation of a Ratify verifier plugin for ATProto signatures.
4
+
5
+
## Overview
6
+
7
+
Ratify is a verification framework that integrates with OPA Gatekeeper to enforce signature policies in Kubernetes. This plugin adds support for verifying ATProto signatures on ATCR container images.
8
+
9
+
## Architecture
10
+
11
+
```
12
+
Kubernetes Pod Creation
13
+
↓
14
+
OPA Gatekeeper (admission webhook)
15
+
↓
16
+
Ratify (verification engine)
17
+
↓
18
+
ATProto Verifier Plugin ← This plugin
19
+
↓
20
+
1. Fetch signature artifact from registry
21
+
2. Parse ATProto signature metadata
22
+
3. Resolve DID to public key
23
+
4. Fetch repository commit from PDS
24
+
5. Verify ECDSA K-256 signature
25
+
6. Check trust policy
26
+
↓
27
+
Return: Allow/Deny
28
+
```
29
+
30
+
## Files
31
+
32
+
- `verifier.go` - Main verifier implementation
33
+
- `config.go` - Configuration and trust policy
34
+
- `resolver.go` - DID and PDS resolution
35
+
- `crypto.go` - K-256 signature verification
36
+
- `Dockerfile` - Build custom Ratify image with plugin
37
+
- `deployment.yaml` - Kubernetes deployment manifest
38
+
- `verifier-crd.yaml` - Ratify Verifier custom resource
39
+
40
+
## Prerequisites
41
+
42
+
- Go 1.21+
43
+
- Ratify source code (for building plugin)
44
+
- Kubernetes cluster with OPA Gatekeeper installed
45
+
- Access to ATCR registry
46
+
47
+
## Building
48
+
49
+
```bash
50
+
# Clone Ratify
51
+
git clone https://github.com/ratify-project/ratify.git
52
+
cd ratify
53
+
54
+
# Copy plugin files
55
+
cp -r /path/to/examples/plugins/ratify-verifier plugins/verifier/atproto/
56
+
57
+
# Build plugin
58
+
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o atproto-verifier \
59
+
-ldflags="-w -s" \
60
+
./plugins/verifier/atproto
61
+
62
+
# Build custom Ratify image with plugin
63
+
docker build -f Dockerfile.with-atproto -t atcr.io/atcr/ratify-with-atproto:latest .
64
+
```
65
+
66
+
## Deployment
67
+
68
+
### 1. Deploy Ratify with Plugin
69
+
70
+
```bash
71
+
# Push custom image
72
+
docker push atcr.io/atcr/ratify-with-atproto:latest
73
+
74
+
# Deploy Ratify
75
+
kubectl apply -f deployment.yaml
76
+
```
77
+
78
+
### 2. Configure Verifier
79
+
80
+
```bash
81
+
# Create Verifier custom resource
82
+
kubectl apply -f verifier-crd.yaml
83
+
```
84
+
85
+
### 3. Configure Trust Policy
86
+
87
+
```bash
88
+
# Create ConfigMap with trust policy
89
+
kubectl create configmap atcr-trust-policy \
90
+
--from-file=trust-policy.yaml \
91
+
-n gatekeeper-system
92
+
```
93
+
94
+
### 4. Create Gatekeeper Constraint
95
+
96
+
```bash
97
+
kubectl apply -f constraint.yaml
98
+
```
99
+
100
+
### 5. Test
101
+
102
+
```bash
103
+
# Try to create pod with signed image (should succeed)
104
+
kubectl run test-signed --image=atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
105
+
106
+
# Try to create pod with unsigned image (should fail)
107
+
kubectl run test-unsigned --image=atcr.io/malicious/fake:latest
108
+
```
109
+
110
+
## Configuration
111
+
112
+
### Trust Policy Format
113
+
114
+
```yaml
115
+
# trust-policy.yaml
116
+
version: 1.0
117
+
118
+
trustedDIDs:
119
+
did:plc:alice123:
120
+
name: "Alice (DevOps)"
121
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
122
+
expiresAt: null
123
+
124
+
did:plc:bob456:
125
+
name: "Bob (Security)"
126
+
validFrom: "2024-06-01T00:00:00Z"
127
+
expiresAt: "2025-12-31T23:59:59Z"
128
+
129
+
policies:
130
+
- name: production
131
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/prod-*"
132
+
require:
133
+
signature: true
134
+
trustedDIDs:
135
+
- did:plc:alice123
136
+
- did:plc:bob456
137
+
action: enforce
138
+
```
139
+
140
+
### Verifier Configuration
141
+
142
+
```yaml
143
+
apiVersion: config.ratify.deislabs.io/v1beta1
144
+
kind: Verifier
145
+
metadata:
146
+
name: atproto-verifier
147
+
spec:
148
+
name: atproto
149
+
artifactType: application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json
150
+
address: /.ratify/plugins/atproto-verifier
151
+
parameters:
152
+
trustPolicyPath: /config/trust-policy.yaml
153
+
didResolverTimeout: 10s
154
+
pdsTimeout: 10s
155
+
cacheEnabled: true
156
+
cacheTTL: 300s
157
+
```
158
+
159
+
## Implementation Details
160
+
161
+
### Verifier Interface
162
+
163
+
The plugin implements Ratify's `ReferenceVerifier` interface:
164
+
165
+
```go
166
+
type ReferenceVerifier interface {
167
+
Name() string
168
+
Type() string
169
+
CanVerify(artifactType string) bool
170
+
VerifyReference(
171
+
ctx context.Context,
172
+
subjectRef common.Reference,
173
+
referenceDesc ocispecs.ReferenceDescriptor,
174
+
store referrerstore.ReferrerStore,
175
+
) (VerifierResult, error)
176
+
}
177
+
```
178
+
179
+
### Verification Flow
180
+
181
+
1. **Artifact Fetch**: Download signature artifact from registry via Ratify's store
182
+
2. **Parse Metadata**: Extract ATProto signature metadata (DID, PDS, commit CID)
183
+
3. **DID Resolution**: Resolve DID to public key via PLC directory or did:web
184
+
4. **Commit Fetch**: Get repository commit from PDS via XRPC
185
+
5. **Signature Verify**: Verify ECDSA K-256 signature over commit bytes
186
+
6. **Trust Check**: Validate DID against trust policy
187
+
7. **Result**: Return success/failure with metadata
188
+
189
+
### Error Handling
190
+
191
+
The plugin returns detailed error information:
192
+
193
+
```go
194
+
type VerifierResult struct {
195
+
IsSuccess bool
196
+
Name string
197
+
Type string
198
+
Message string
199
+
Extensions map[string]interface{}
200
+
}
201
+
```
202
+
203
+
**Extensions include:**
204
+
- `did` - Signer's DID
205
+
- `handle` - Signer's handle (if available)
206
+
- `signedAt` - Signature timestamp
207
+
- `commitCid` - ATProto commit CID
208
+
- `pdsEndpoint` - PDS URL
209
+
- `error` - Error details (if verification failed)
210
+
211
+
## Troubleshooting
212
+
213
+
### Plugin Not Found
214
+
215
+
```bash
216
+
# Check plugin is in image
217
+
kubectl exec -n gatekeeper-system deployment/ratify -c ratify -- ls -la /.ratify/plugins/
218
+
219
+
# Check logs
220
+
kubectl logs -n gatekeeper-system deployment/ratify -c ratify
221
+
```
222
+
223
+
### Verification Failing
224
+
225
+
```bash
226
+
# Check Ratify logs for details
227
+
kubectl logs -n gatekeeper-system deployment/ratify -c ratify | grep atproto
228
+
229
+
# Check Verifier status
230
+
kubectl get verifier atproto-verifier -o yaml
231
+
232
+
# Test DID resolution manually
233
+
curl https://plc.directory/did:plc:alice123
234
+
```
235
+
236
+
### Trust Policy Issues
237
+
238
+
```bash
239
+
# Check ConfigMap exists
240
+
kubectl get configmap atcr-trust-policy -n gatekeeper-system
241
+
242
+
# View policy contents
243
+
kubectl get configmap atcr-trust-policy -n gatekeeper-system -o yaml
244
+
```
245
+
246
+
## Performance Considerations
247
+
248
+
### Caching
249
+
250
+
The plugin caches:
251
+
- DID documents (TTL: 5 minutes)
252
+
- PDS endpoints (TTL: 5 minutes)
253
+
- Public keys (TTL: 5 minutes)
254
+
255
+
Configure via `cacheEnabled` and `cacheTTL` parameters.
256
+
257
+
### Timeouts
258
+
259
+
Configure timeouts for external calls:
260
+
- `didResolverTimeout` - DID resolution (default: 10s)
261
+
- `pdsTimeout` - PDS XRPC calls (default: 10s)
262
+
263
+
### Rate Limiting
264
+
265
+
Consider implementing rate limiting for:
266
+
- DID resolution (PLC directory)
267
+
- PDS XRPC calls
268
+
- Signature verification
269
+
270
+
## Security Considerations
271
+
272
+
### Trust Policy Management
273
+
274
+
- Store trust policy in version control
275
+
- Review DID additions/removals carefully
276
+
- Set expiration dates for temporary access
277
+
- Audit trust policy changes
278
+
279
+
### Private Key Protection
280
+
281
+
- Plugin only uses public keys
282
+
- No private keys needed for verification
283
+
- DID resolution is read-only
284
+
- PDS queries are read-only
285
+
286
+
### Denial of Service
287
+
288
+
- Implement timeouts for all external calls
289
+
- Cache DID documents to reduce load
290
+
- Rate limit verification requests
291
+
- Monitor verification latency
292
+
293
+
## See Also
294
+
295
+
- [Ratify Documentation](https://ratify.dev/)
296
+
- [Ratify Plugin Development](https://ratify.dev/docs/plugins/verifier/overview)
297
+
- [ATCR Signature Integration](../../../docs/SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md)
298
+
- [ATCR Integration Strategy](../../../docs/INTEGRATION_STRATEGY.md)
299
+
300
+
## Support
301
+
302
+
For issues or questions:
303
+
- GitHub Issues: https://github.com/atcr-io/atcr/issues
304
+
- Ratify GitHub: https://github.com/ratify-project/ratify
+214
examples/plugins/ratify-verifier/verifier.go
+214
examples/plugins/ratify-verifier/verifier.go
···
1
+
// Package atproto implements a Ratify verifier plugin for ATProto signatures.
2
+
package atproto
3
+
4
+
import (
5
+
"context"
6
+
"encoding/json"
7
+
"fmt"
8
+
"time"
9
+
10
+
"github.com/ratify-project/ratify/pkg/common"
11
+
"github.com/ratify-project/ratify/pkg/ocispecs"
12
+
"github.com/ratify-project/ratify/pkg/referrerstore"
13
+
"github.com/ratify-project/ratify/pkg/verifier"
14
+
)
15
+
16
+
const (
17
+
// VerifierName is the name of this verifier
18
+
VerifierName = "atproto"
19
+
20
+
// VerifierType is the type of this verifier
21
+
VerifierType = "atproto"
22
+
23
+
// ATProtoSignatureArtifactType is the OCI artifact type for ATProto signatures
24
+
ATProtoSignatureArtifactType = "application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json"
25
+
)
26
+
27
+
// ATProtoVerifier implements the Ratify ReferenceVerifier interface for ATProto signatures.
28
+
type ATProtoVerifier struct {
29
+
name string
30
+
config ATProtoConfig
31
+
resolver *Resolver
32
+
verifier *SignatureVerifier
33
+
trustStore *TrustStore
34
+
}
35
+
36
+
// ATProtoConfig holds configuration for the ATProto verifier.
37
+
type ATProtoConfig struct {
38
+
// TrustPolicyPath is the path to the trust policy YAML file
39
+
TrustPolicyPath string `json:"trustPolicyPath"`
40
+
41
+
// DIDResolverTimeout is the timeout for DID resolution
42
+
DIDResolverTimeout time.Duration `json:"didResolverTimeout"`
43
+
44
+
// PDSTimeout is the timeout for PDS XRPC calls
45
+
PDSTimeout time.Duration `json:"pdsTimeout"`
46
+
47
+
// CacheEnabled enables caching of DID documents and public keys
48
+
CacheEnabled bool `json:"cacheEnabled"`
49
+
50
+
// CacheTTL is the cache TTL for DID documents and public keys
51
+
CacheTTL time.Duration `json:"cacheTTL"`
52
+
}
53
+
54
+
// ATProtoSignature represents the ATProto signature metadata stored in the OCI artifact.
55
+
type ATProtoSignature struct {
56
+
Type string `json:"$type"`
57
+
Version string `json:"version"`
58
+
Subject struct {
59
+
Digest string `json:"digest"`
60
+
MediaType string `json:"mediaType"`
61
+
} `json:"subject"`
62
+
ATProto struct {
63
+
DID string `json:"did"`
64
+
Handle string `json:"handle"`
65
+
PDSEndpoint string `json:"pdsEndpoint"`
66
+
RecordURI string `json:"recordUri"`
67
+
CommitCID string `json:"commitCid"`
68
+
SignedAt time.Time `json:"signedAt"`
69
+
} `json:"atproto"`
70
+
Signature struct {
71
+
Algorithm string `json:"algorithm"`
72
+
KeyID string `json:"keyId"`
73
+
PublicKeyMultibase string `json:"publicKeyMultibase"`
74
+
} `json:"signature"`
75
+
}
76
+
77
+
// NewATProtoVerifier creates a new ATProto verifier instance.
78
+
func NewATProtoVerifier(name string, config ATProtoConfig) (*ATProtoVerifier, error) {
79
+
// Load trust policy
80
+
trustStore, err := LoadTrustStore(config.TrustPolicyPath)
81
+
if err != nil {
82
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to load trust policy: %w", err)
83
+
}
84
+
85
+
// Create resolver with caching
86
+
resolver := NewResolver(config.DIDResolverTimeout, config.CacheEnabled, config.CacheTTL)
87
+
88
+
// Create signature verifier
89
+
verifier := NewSignatureVerifier(config.PDSTimeout)
90
+
91
+
return &ATProtoVerifier{
92
+
name: name,
93
+
config: config,
94
+
resolver: resolver,
95
+
verifier: verifier,
96
+
trustStore: trustStore,
97
+
}, nil
98
+
}
99
+
100
+
// Name returns the name of this verifier.
101
+
func (v *ATProtoVerifier) Name() string {
102
+
return v.name
103
+
}
104
+
105
+
// Type returns the type of this verifier.
106
+
func (v *ATProtoVerifier) Type() string {
107
+
return VerifierType
108
+
}
109
+
110
+
// CanVerify returns true if this verifier can verify the given artifact type.
111
+
func (v *ATProtoVerifier) CanVerify(artifactType string) bool {
112
+
return artifactType == ATProtoSignatureArtifactType
113
+
}
114
+
115
+
// VerifyReference verifies an ATProto signature artifact.
116
+
func (v *ATProtoVerifier) VerifyReference(
117
+
ctx context.Context,
118
+
subjectRef common.Reference,
119
+
referenceDesc ocispecs.ReferenceDescriptor,
120
+
store referrerstore.ReferrerStore,
121
+
) (verifier.VerifierResult, error) {
122
+
// 1. Fetch signature blob from store
123
+
sigBlob, err := store.GetBlobContent(ctx, subjectRef, referenceDesc.Digest)
124
+
if err != nil {
125
+
return v.failureResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to fetch signature blob: %v", err)), err
126
+
}
127
+
128
+
// 2. Parse ATProto signature metadata
129
+
var sigData ATProtoSignature
130
+
if err := json.Unmarshal(sigBlob, &sigData); err != nil {
131
+
return v.failureResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse signature metadata: %v", err)), err
132
+
}
133
+
134
+
// Validate signature format
135
+
if err := v.validateSignature(&sigData); err != nil {
136
+
return v.failureResult(fmt.Sprintf("invalid signature format: %v", err)), err
137
+
}
138
+
139
+
// 3. Check trust policy first (fail fast if DID not trusted)
140
+
if !v.trustStore.IsTrusted(sigData.ATProto.DID, time.Now()) {
141
+
return v.failureResult(fmt.Sprintf("DID %s not in trusted list", sigData.ATProto.DID)),
142
+
fmt.Errorf("untrusted DID")
143
+
}
144
+
145
+
// 4. Resolve DID to public key
146
+
pubKey, err := v.resolver.ResolveDIDToPublicKey(ctx, sigData.ATProto.DID)
147
+
if err != nil {
148
+
return v.failureResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to resolve DID: %v", err)), err
149
+
}
150
+
151
+
// 5. Fetch repository commit from PDS
152
+
commit, err := v.verifier.FetchCommit(ctx, sigData.ATProto.PDSEndpoint,
153
+
sigData.ATProto.DID, sigData.ATProto.CommitCID)
154
+
if err != nil {
155
+
return v.failureResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to fetch commit: %v", err)), err
156
+
}
157
+
158
+
// 6. Verify K-256 signature
159
+
if err := v.verifier.VerifySignature(pubKey, commit); err != nil {
160
+
return v.failureResult(fmt.Sprintf("signature verification failed: %v", err)), err
161
+
}
162
+
163
+
// 7. Success - return detailed result
164
+
return verifier.VerifierResult{
165
+
IsSuccess: true,
166
+
Name: v.name,
167
+
Type: v.Type(),
168
+
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Successfully verified ATProto signature for DID %s", sigData.ATProto.DID),
169
+
Extensions: map[string]interface{}{
170
+
"did": sigData.ATProto.DID,
171
+
"handle": sigData.ATProto.Handle,
172
+
"signedAt": sigData.ATProto.SignedAt,
173
+
"commitCid": sigData.ATProto.CommitCID,
174
+
"pdsEndpoint": sigData.ATProto.PDSEndpoint,
175
+
},
176
+
}, nil
177
+
}
178
+
179
+
// validateSignature validates the signature metadata format.
180
+
func (v *ATProtoVerifier) validateSignature(sig *ATProtoSignature) error {
181
+
if sig.Type != "io.atcr.atproto.signature" {
182
+
return fmt.Errorf("invalid signature type: %s", sig.Type)
183
+
}
184
+
if sig.ATProto.DID == "" {
185
+
return fmt.Errorf("missing DID")
186
+
}
187
+
if sig.ATProto.PDSEndpoint == "" {
188
+
return fmt.Errorf("missing PDS endpoint")
189
+
}
190
+
if sig.ATProto.CommitCID == "" {
191
+
return fmt.Errorf("missing commit CID")
192
+
}
193
+
if sig.Signature.Algorithm != "ECDSA-K256-SHA256" {
194
+
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %s", sig.Signature.Algorithm)
195
+
}
196
+
return nil
197
+
}
198
+
199
+
// failureResult creates a failure result with the given message.
200
+
func (v *ATProtoVerifier) failureResult(message string) verifier.VerifierResult {
201
+
return verifier.VerifierResult{
202
+
IsSuccess: false,
203
+
Name: v.name,
204
+
Type: v.Type(),
205
+
Message: message,
206
+
Extensions: map[string]interface{}{
207
+
"error": message,
208
+
},
209
+
}
210
+
}
211
+
212
+
// TODO: Implement resolver.go with DID resolution logic
213
+
// TODO: Implement crypto.go with K-256 signature verification
214
+
// TODO: Implement config.go with trust policy loading
+364
examples/verification/README.md
+364
examples/verification/README.md
···
1
+
# ATProto Signature Verification Examples
2
+
3
+
This directory contains practical examples for verifying ATProto signatures on ATCR container images.
4
+
5
+
## Files
6
+
7
+
### Scripts
8
+
9
+
- **`atcr-verify.sh`** - Standalone signature verification script
10
+
- Verifies ATProto signatures using shell commands
11
+
- Requires: `curl`, `jq`, `crane`, `oras`
12
+
- Does everything except full cryptographic verification
13
+
- Use this until the `atcr-verify` CLI tool is built
14
+
15
+
- **`verify-and-pull.sh`** - Secure image pull wrapper
16
+
- Verifies signatures before pulling images
17
+
- Can be used as a `docker pull` replacement
18
+
- Configurable via environment variables
19
+
20
+
### Configuration
21
+
22
+
- **`trust-policy.yaml`** - Example trust policy configuration
23
+
- Defines which DIDs to trust
24
+
- Specifies policies for different image scopes
25
+
- Includes audit logging and reporting settings
26
+
27
+
- **`kubernetes-webhook.yaml`** - Kubernetes admission controller
28
+
- Validates signatures before pod creation
29
+
- Includes webhook deployment, service, and configuration
30
+
- Uses trust policy ConfigMap
31
+
32
+
## Quick Start
33
+
34
+
### 1. Verify an Image
35
+
36
+
```bash
37
+
# Make script executable
38
+
chmod +x atcr-verify.sh
39
+
40
+
# Verify an image
41
+
./atcr-verify.sh atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
42
+
```
43
+
44
+
**Output:**
45
+
```
46
+
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════
47
+
ATProto Signature Verification
48
+
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════
49
+
Image: atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
50
+
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════
51
+
52
+
[1/7] Resolving image digest...
53
+
→ sha256:abc123...
54
+
[2/7] Discovering ATProto signature artifacts...
55
+
→ Found 1 signature(s)
56
+
→ Signature digest: sha256:sig789...
57
+
→ Signed by DID: did:plc:alice123
58
+
[3/7] Fetching signature metadata...
59
+
→ DID: did:plc:alice123
60
+
→ Handle: alice.bsky.social
61
+
→ PDS: https://bsky.social
62
+
→ Record: at://did:plc:alice123/io.atcr.manifest/abc123
63
+
→ Signed at: 2025-10-31T12:34:56.789Z
64
+
[4/7] Resolving DID to public key...
65
+
→ Public key: zQ3shokFTS3brHcD...
66
+
[5/7] Querying PDS for signed record...
67
+
→ Record CID: bafyreig7...
68
+
[6/7] Verifying record integrity...
69
+
→ Record digest matches image digest
70
+
[7/7] Cryptographic signature verification...
71
+
⚠ Full cryptographic verification requires ATProto crypto library
72
+
73
+
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════
74
+
✓ Verification Completed
75
+
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════
76
+
77
+
Signed by: alice.bsky.social (did:plc:alice123)
78
+
Signed at: 2025-10-31T12:34:56.789Z
79
+
PDS: https://bsky.social
80
+
Record: at://did:plc:alice123/io.atcr.manifest/abc123
81
+
Signature: sha256:sig789...
82
+
83
+
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════
84
+
```
85
+
86
+
### 2. Secure Pull
87
+
88
+
```bash
89
+
# Make script executable
90
+
chmod +x verify-and-pull.sh
91
+
92
+
# Pull image with verification
93
+
./verify-and-pull.sh atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
94
+
95
+
# With Docker options
96
+
./verify-and-pull.sh atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --platform linux/amd64
97
+
```
98
+
99
+
**Create an alias for convenience:**
100
+
```bash
101
+
# Add to ~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc
102
+
alias docker-pull-secure='/path/to/verify-and-pull.sh'
103
+
104
+
# Use it
105
+
docker-pull-secure atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
106
+
```
107
+
108
+
### 3. Deploy Kubernetes Webhook
109
+
110
+
```bash
111
+
# 1. Generate TLS certificates for webhook
112
+
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout tls.key -out tls.crt \
113
+
-days 365 -nodes -subj "/CN=atcr-verify-webhook.atcr-system.svc"
114
+
115
+
# 2. Create namespace and secret
116
+
kubectl create namespace atcr-system
117
+
kubectl create secret tls atcr-verify-webhook-certs \
118
+
--cert=tls.crt --key=tls.key -n atcr-system
119
+
120
+
# 3. Update CA bundle in kubernetes-webhook.yaml
121
+
cat tls.crt | base64 -w 0
122
+
# Copy output and replace caBundle in kubernetes-webhook.yaml
123
+
124
+
# 4. Deploy webhook
125
+
kubectl apply -f kubernetes-webhook.yaml
126
+
127
+
# 5. Enable verification for a namespace
128
+
kubectl label namespace production atcr-verify=enabled
129
+
130
+
# 6. Test with a pod
131
+
kubectl run test-pod --image=atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest -n production
132
+
```
133
+
134
+
## Prerequisites
135
+
136
+
### For Scripts
137
+
138
+
Install required tools:
139
+
140
+
**macOS (Homebrew):**
141
+
```bash
142
+
brew install curl jq crane oras
143
+
```
144
+
145
+
**Linux (apt):**
146
+
```bash
147
+
# curl and jq
148
+
sudo apt-get install curl jq
149
+
150
+
# crane
151
+
curl -sL "https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.15.2/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz" | tar -xz crane
152
+
sudo mv crane /usr/local/bin/
153
+
154
+
# oras
155
+
curl -LO "https://github.com/oras-project/oras/releases/download/v1.0.0/oras_1.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
156
+
tar -xzf oras_1.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz
157
+
sudo mv oras /usr/local/bin/
158
+
```
159
+
160
+
### For Kubernetes Webhook
161
+
162
+
Requirements:
163
+
- Kubernetes cluster (1.16+)
164
+
- `kubectl` configured
165
+
- Permission to create namespaces and webhooks
166
+
- Webhook container image (build from source or use pre-built)
167
+
168
+
## Configuration
169
+
170
+
### Environment Variables (verify-and-pull.sh)
171
+
172
+
- `VERIFY_SCRIPT` - Path to atcr-verify.sh (default: ./atcr-verify.sh)
173
+
- `TRUST_POLICY` - Path to trust policy (default: ./trust-policy.yaml)
174
+
- `REQUIRE_VERIFICATION` - Require verification (default: true)
175
+
- `SKIP_ATCR_IMAGES` - Skip verification for non-ATCR images (default: false)
176
+
177
+
**Example:**
178
+
```bash
179
+
# Skip verification for non-ATCR images
180
+
SKIP_ATCR_IMAGES=true ./verify-and-pull.sh docker.io/library/nginx:latest
181
+
182
+
# Allow pulling even if verification fails (NOT RECOMMENDED)
183
+
REQUIRE_VERIFICATION=false ./verify-and-pull.sh atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
184
+
```
185
+
186
+
### Trust Policy
187
+
188
+
Edit `trust-policy.yaml` to customize:
189
+
190
+
1. **Add your DIDs:**
191
+
```yaml
192
+
trustedDIDs:
193
+
did:plc:your-did:
194
+
name: "Your Name"
195
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
196
+
```
197
+
198
+
2. **Define policies:**
199
+
```yaml
200
+
policies:
201
+
- name: my-policy
202
+
scope: "atcr.io/myorg/*"
203
+
require:
204
+
signature: true
205
+
trustedDIDs:
206
+
- did:plc:your-did
207
+
action: enforce
208
+
```
209
+
210
+
3. **Use with verification:**
211
+
```bash
212
+
# When atcr-verify CLI is available:
213
+
atcr-verify IMAGE --policy trust-policy.yaml
214
+
```
215
+
216
+
## Integration Patterns
217
+
218
+
### CI/CD (GitHub Actions)
219
+
220
+
```yaml
221
+
- name: Verify image signature
222
+
run: |
223
+
chmod +x examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh
224
+
./examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh ${{ env.IMAGE }}
225
+
226
+
- name: Deploy if verified
227
+
if: success()
228
+
run: kubectl set image deployment/app app=${{ env.IMAGE }}
229
+
```
230
+
231
+
### CI/CD (GitLab CI)
232
+
233
+
```yaml
234
+
verify:
235
+
script:
236
+
- chmod +x examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh
237
+
- ./examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh $IMAGE
238
+
239
+
deploy:
240
+
dependencies: [verify]
241
+
script:
242
+
- kubectl set image deployment/app app=$IMAGE
243
+
```
244
+
245
+
### Docker Alias
246
+
247
+
```bash
248
+
# ~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc
249
+
function docker() {
250
+
if [ "$1" = "pull" ] && [[ "$2" =~ ^atcr\.io/ ]]; then
251
+
echo "Using secure pull with signature verification..."
252
+
/path/to/verify-and-pull.sh "${@:2}"
253
+
else
254
+
command docker "$@"
255
+
fi
256
+
}
257
+
```
258
+
259
+
### Systemd Service
260
+
261
+
```ini
262
+
# /etc/systemd/system/myapp.service
263
+
[Unit]
264
+
Description=My Application
265
+
After=docker.service
266
+
267
+
[Service]
268
+
Type=oneshot
269
+
ExecStartPre=/path/to/verify-and-pull.sh atcr.io/myorg/myapp:latest
270
+
ExecStart=/usr/bin/docker run atcr.io/myorg/myapp:latest
271
+
Restart=on-failure
272
+
273
+
[Install]
274
+
WantedBy=multi-user.target
275
+
```
276
+
277
+
## Troubleshooting
278
+
279
+
### "No ATProto signature found"
280
+
281
+
**Cause:** Image doesn't have a signature artifact
282
+
283
+
**Solutions:**
284
+
1. Check if image exists: `crane digest IMAGE`
285
+
2. Re-push image to generate signature
286
+
3. Verify referrers API is working:
287
+
```bash
288
+
curl "https://atcr.io/v2/REPO/referrers/DIGEST"
289
+
```
290
+
291
+
### "Failed to resolve DID"
292
+
293
+
**Cause:** DID resolution failed
294
+
295
+
**Solutions:**
296
+
1. Check internet connectivity
297
+
2. Verify DID is valid: `curl https://plc.directory/DID`
298
+
3. Check if DID document has verificationMethod
299
+
300
+
### "Failed to fetch record from PDS"
301
+
302
+
**Cause:** PDS is unreachable or record doesn't exist
303
+
304
+
**Solutions:**
305
+
1. Check PDS endpoint: `curl PDS_URL/xrpc/com.atproto.server.describeServer`
306
+
2. Verify record URI is correct
307
+
3. Check if record exists in PDS
308
+
309
+
### Webhook Pods Don't Start
310
+
311
+
**Cause:** Webhook is rejecting all pods
312
+
313
+
**Solutions:**
314
+
1. Check webhook logs: `kubectl logs -n atcr-system -l app=atcr-verify-webhook`
315
+
2. Disable webhook temporarily: `kubectl delete validatingwebhookconfiguration atcr-verify`
316
+
3. Fix issue and re-deploy
317
+
4. Test with labeled namespace first
318
+
319
+
## Security Best Practices
320
+
321
+
1. **Always verify in production**
322
+
- Enable webhook for production namespaces
323
+
- Set `failurePolicy: Fail` to block on errors
324
+
325
+
2. **Use trust policies**
326
+
- Define specific trusted DIDs
327
+
- Don't trust all signatures blindly
328
+
- Set expiration dates for temporary access
329
+
330
+
3. **Monitor verification**
331
+
- Enable audit logging
332
+
- Review verification failures
333
+
- Track signature coverage
334
+
335
+
4. **Rotate keys regularly**
336
+
- Update DID documents when keys change
337
+
- Revoke compromised keys immediately
338
+
- Monitor for unexpected key changes
339
+
340
+
5. **Secure webhook deployment**
341
+
- Use TLS for webhook communication
342
+
- Restrict webhook RBAC permissions
343
+
- Keep webhook image updated
344
+
345
+
## Next Steps
346
+
347
+
1. **Test verification** with your images
348
+
2. **Customize trust policy** for your organization
349
+
3. **Deploy webhook** to test clusters first
350
+
4. **Monitor** verification in CI/CD pipelines
351
+
5. **Gradually roll out** to production
352
+
353
+
## See Also
354
+
355
+
- [ATProto Signatures](../../docs/ATPROTO_SIGNATURES.md) - Technical details
356
+
- [Signature Integration](../../docs/SIGNATURE_INTEGRATION.md) - Integration guide
357
+
- [SBOM Scanning](../../docs/SBOM_SCANNING.md) - Similar ORAS pattern
358
+
359
+
## Support
360
+
361
+
For issues or questions:
362
+
- GitHub Issues: https://github.com/your-org/atcr/issues
363
+
- Documentation: https://docs.atcr.io
364
+
- Security: security@yourorg.com
+243
examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh
+243
examples/verification/atcr-verify.sh
···
1
+
#!/bin/bash
2
+
# ATProto Signature Verification Script
3
+
#
4
+
# This script verifies ATProto signatures for container images stored in ATCR.
5
+
# It performs all steps except full cryptographic verification (which requires
6
+
# the indigo library). For production use, use the atcr-verify CLI tool.
7
+
#
8
+
# Usage: ./atcr-verify.sh IMAGE_REF
9
+
# Example: ./atcr-verify.sh atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
10
+
#
11
+
# Requirements:
12
+
# - curl
13
+
# - jq
14
+
# - crane (https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases)
15
+
# - oras (https://oras.land/docs/installation)
16
+
17
+
set -e
18
+
19
+
# Colors for output
20
+
RED='\033[0;31m'
21
+
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
22
+
YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
23
+
BLUE='\033[0;34m'
24
+
NC='\033[0m' # No Color
25
+
26
+
# Check dependencies
27
+
check_dependencies() {
28
+
local missing=0
29
+
30
+
for cmd in curl jq crane oras; do
31
+
if ! command -v $cmd &> /dev/null; then
32
+
echo -e "${RED}✗${NC} Missing dependency: $cmd"
33
+
missing=1
34
+
fi
35
+
done
36
+
37
+
if [ $missing -eq 1 ]; then
38
+
echo ""
39
+
echo "Install missing dependencies:"
40
+
echo " curl: https://curl.se/download.html"
41
+
echo " jq: https://stedolan.github.io/jq/download/"
42
+
echo " crane: https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases"
43
+
echo " oras: https://oras.land/docs/installation"
44
+
exit 1
45
+
fi
46
+
}
47
+
48
+
# Print with color
49
+
print_step() {
50
+
echo -e "${BLUE}[$1/${TOTAL_STEPS}]${NC} $2..."
51
+
}
52
+
53
+
print_success() {
54
+
echo -e " ${GREEN}→${NC} $1"
55
+
}
56
+
57
+
print_error() {
58
+
echo -e " ${RED}✗${NC} $1"
59
+
}
60
+
61
+
print_warning() {
62
+
echo -e " ${YELLOW}⚠${NC} $1"
63
+
}
64
+
65
+
# Main verification function
66
+
verify_image() {
67
+
local image="$1"
68
+
69
+
if [ -z "$image" ]; then
70
+
echo "Usage: $0 IMAGE_REF"
71
+
echo "Example: $0 atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest"
72
+
exit 1
73
+
fi
74
+
75
+
TOTAL_STEPS=7
76
+
77
+
echo ""
78
+
echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════"
79
+
echo " ATProto Signature Verification"
80
+
echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════"
81
+
echo " Image: $image"
82
+
echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════"
83
+
echo ""
84
+
85
+
# Step 1: Resolve image digest
86
+
print_step 1 "Resolving image digest"
87
+
DIGEST=$(crane digest "$image" 2>&1)
88
+
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
89
+
print_error "Failed to resolve image digest"
90
+
echo "$DIGEST"
91
+
exit 1
92
+
fi
93
+
print_success "$DIGEST"
94
+
95
+
# Extract registry, repository, and tag
96
+
REGISTRY=$(echo "$image" | cut -d/ -f1)
97
+
REPO=$(echo "$image" | cut -d/ -f2-)
98
+
REPO_PATH=$(echo "$REPO" | cut -d: -f1)
99
+
100
+
# Step 2: Discover ATProto signature artifacts
101
+
print_step 2 "Discovering ATProto signature artifacts"
102
+
REFERRERS_URL="https://${REGISTRY}/v2/${REPO_PATH}/referrers/${DIGEST}?artifactType=application/vnd.atproto.signature.v1+json"
103
+
104
+
SIG_ARTIFACTS=$(curl -s -H "Accept: application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json" "$REFERRERS_URL")
105
+
106
+
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
107
+
print_error "Failed to query referrers API"
108
+
exit 1
109
+
fi
110
+
111
+
SIG_COUNT=$(echo "$SIG_ARTIFACTS" | jq '.manifests | length')
112
+
if [ "$SIG_COUNT" = "0" ]; then
113
+
print_error "No ATProto signature found"
114
+
echo ""
115
+
echo "This image does not have an ATProto signature."
116
+
echo "Signatures are automatically created when you push to ATCR."
117
+
exit 1
118
+
fi
119
+
120
+
print_success "Found $SIG_COUNT signature(s)"
121
+
122
+
# Get first signature digest
123
+
SIG_DIGEST=$(echo "$SIG_ARTIFACTS" | jq -r '.manifests[0].digest')
124
+
SIG_DID=$(echo "$SIG_ARTIFACTS" | jq -r '.manifests[0].annotations["io.atcr.atproto.did"]')
125
+
print_success "Signature digest: $SIG_DIGEST"
126
+
print_success "Signed by DID: $SIG_DID"
127
+
128
+
# Step 3: Fetch signature metadata
129
+
print_step 3 "Fetching signature metadata"
130
+
131
+
TMPDIR=$(mktemp -d)
132
+
trap "rm -rf $TMPDIR" EXIT
133
+
134
+
oras pull "${REGISTRY}/${REPO_PATH}@${SIG_DIGEST}" -o "$TMPDIR" --quiet 2>&1
135
+
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
136
+
print_error "Failed to fetch signature metadata"
137
+
exit 1
138
+
fi
139
+
140
+
# Find the JSON file
141
+
SIG_FILE=$(find "$TMPDIR" -name "*.json" -type f | head -n 1)
142
+
if [ -z "$SIG_FILE" ]; then
143
+
print_error "Signature metadata file not found"
144
+
exit 1
145
+
fi
146
+
147
+
DID=$(jq -r '.atproto.did' "$SIG_FILE")
148
+
HANDLE=$(jq -r '.atproto.handle // "unknown"' "$SIG_FILE")
149
+
PDS=$(jq -r '.atproto.pdsEndpoint' "$SIG_FILE")
150
+
RECORD_URI=$(jq -r '.atproto.recordUri' "$SIG_FILE")
151
+
COMMIT_CID=$(jq -r '.atproto.commitCid' "$SIG_FILE")
152
+
SIGNED_AT=$(jq -r '.atproto.signedAt' "$SIG_FILE")
153
+
154
+
print_success "DID: $DID"
155
+
print_success "Handle: $HANDLE"
156
+
print_success "PDS: $PDS"
157
+
print_success "Record: $RECORD_URI"
158
+
print_success "Signed at: $SIGNED_AT"
159
+
160
+
# Step 4: Resolve DID to public key
161
+
print_step 4 "Resolving DID to public key"
162
+
163
+
DID_DOC=$(curl -s "https://plc.directory/$DID")
164
+
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
165
+
print_error "Failed to resolve DID"
166
+
exit 1
167
+
fi
168
+
169
+
PUB_KEY_MB=$(echo "$DID_DOC" | jq -r '.verificationMethod[0].publicKeyMultibase')
170
+
if [ "$PUB_KEY_MB" = "null" ] || [ -z "$PUB_KEY_MB" ]; then
171
+
print_error "Public key not found in DID document"
172
+
exit 1
173
+
fi
174
+
175
+
print_success "Public key: ${PUB_KEY_MB:0:20}...${PUB_KEY_MB: -10}"
176
+
177
+
# Step 5: Query PDS for signed record
178
+
print_step 5 "Querying PDS for signed record"
179
+
180
+
# Extract collection and rkey from record URI (at://did/collection/rkey)
181
+
COLLECTION=$(echo "$RECORD_URI" | sed 's|at://[^/]*/\([^/]*\)/.*|\1|')
182
+
RKEY=$(echo "$RECORD_URI" | sed 's|at://.*/||')
183
+
184
+
RECORD_URL="${PDS}/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.getRecord?repo=${DID}&collection=${COLLECTION}&rkey=${RKEY}"
185
+
RECORD=$(curl -s "$RECORD_URL")
186
+
187
+
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
188
+
print_error "Failed to fetch record from PDS"
189
+
exit 1
190
+
fi
191
+
192
+
RECORD_CID=$(echo "$RECORD" | jq -r '.cid')
193
+
if [ "$RECORD_CID" = "null" ] || [ -z "$RECORD_CID" ]; then
194
+
print_error "Record not found in PDS"
195
+
exit 1
196
+
fi
197
+
198
+
print_success "Record CID: $RECORD_CID"
199
+
200
+
# Step 6: Verify record matches image manifest
201
+
print_step 6 "Verifying record integrity"
202
+
203
+
RECORD_DIGEST=$(echo "$RECORD" | jq -r '.value.digest')
204
+
if [ "$RECORD_DIGEST" != "$DIGEST" ]; then
205
+
print_error "Record digest ($RECORD_DIGEST) doesn't match image digest ($DIGEST)"
206
+
exit 1
207
+
fi
208
+
209
+
print_success "Record digest matches image digest"
210
+
211
+
# Step 7: Signature verification status
212
+
print_step 7 "Cryptographic signature verification"
213
+
214
+
print_warning "Full cryptographic verification requires ATProto crypto library"
215
+
print_warning "This script verifies:"
216
+
echo " • Record exists in PDS"
217
+
echo " • DID resolved successfully"
218
+
echo " • Public key retrieved from DID document"
219
+
echo " • Record digest matches image digest"
220
+
echo ""
221
+
print_warning "For full cryptographic verification, use: atcr-verify $image"
222
+
223
+
# Summary
224
+
echo ""
225
+
echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════"
226
+
echo -e " ${GREEN}✓ Verification Completed${NC}"
227
+
echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════"
228
+
echo ""
229
+
echo " Signed by: $HANDLE ($DID)"
230
+
echo " Signed at: $SIGNED_AT"
231
+
echo " PDS: $PDS"
232
+
echo " Record: $RECORD_URI"
233
+
echo " Signature: $SIG_DIGEST"
234
+
echo ""
235
+
echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════"
236
+
echo ""
237
+
}
238
+
239
+
# Check dependencies first
240
+
check_dependencies
241
+
242
+
# Run verification
243
+
verify_image "$1"
+259
examples/verification/kubernetes-webhook.yaml
+259
examples/verification/kubernetes-webhook.yaml
···
1
+
# Kubernetes Admission Webhook for ATProto Signature Verification
2
+
#
3
+
# This example shows how to deploy a validating admission webhook that
4
+
# verifies ATProto signatures before allowing pods to be created.
5
+
#
6
+
# Prerequisites:
7
+
# 1. Build and push the webhook image (see examples/webhook/ for code)
8
+
# 2. Generate TLS certificates for the webhook
9
+
# 3. Create trust policy ConfigMap
10
+
#
11
+
# Usage:
12
+
# kubectl apply -f kubernetes-webhook.yaml
13
+
# kubectl label namespace production atcr-verify=enabled
14
+
15
+
---
16
+
apiVersion: v1
17
+
kind: Namespace
18
+
metadata:
19
+
name: atcr-system
20
+
---
21
+
# ConfigMap with trust policy
22
+
apiVersion: v1
23
+
kind: ConfigMap
24
+
metadata:
25
+
name: atcr-trust-policy
26
+
namespace: atcr-system
27
+
data:
28
+
policy.yaml: |
29
+
version: 1.0
30
+
31
+
# Global settings
32
+
defaultAction: enforce # enforce, audit, or allow
33
+
34
+
# Policies by image pattern
35
+
policies:
36
+
- name: production-images
37
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/prod-*"
38
+
require:
39
+
signature: true
40
+
trustedDIDs:
41
+
- did:plc:your-org-devops
42
+
- did:plc:your-org-security
43
+
minSignatures: 1
44
+
action: enforce
45
+
46
+
- name: staging-images
47
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/staging-*"
48
+
require:
49
+
signature: true
50
+
trustedDIDs:
51
+
- did:plc:your-org-devops
52
+
- did:plc:your-org-security
53
+
- did:plc:your-developers
54
+
action: enforce
55
+
56
+
- name: dev-images
57
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/dev-*"
58
+
require:
59
+
signature: false
60
+
action: audit # Log but don't block
61
+
62
+
# Trusted DIDs configuration
63
+
trustedDIDs:
64
+
did:plc:your-org-devops:
65
+
name: "DevOps Team"
66
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
67
+
expiresAt: null
68
+
69
+
did:plc:your-org-security:
70
+
name: "Security Team"
71
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
72
+
expiresAt: null
73
+
74
+
did:plc:your-developers:
75
+
name: "Developer Team"
76
+
validFrom: "2024-06-01T00:00:00Z"
77
+
expiresAt: null
78
+
---
79
+
# Service for webhook
80
+
apiVersion: v1
81
+
kind: Service
82
+
metadata:
83
+
name: atcr-verify-webhook
84
+
namespace: atcr-system
85
+
spec:
86
+
selector:
87
+
app: atcr-verify-webhook
88
+
ports:
89
+
- name: https
90
+
port: 443
91
+
targetPort: 8443
92
+
---
93
+
# Deployment for webhook
94
+
apiVersion: apps/v1
95
+
kind: Deployment
96
+
metadata:
97
+
name: atcr-verify-webhook
98
+
namespace: atcr-system
99
+
spec:
100
+
replicas: 2
101
+
selector:
102
+
matchLabels:
103
+
app: atcr-verify-webhook
104
+
template:
105
+
metadata:
106
+
labels:
107
+
app: atcr-verify-webhook
108
+
spec:
109
+
containers:
110
+
- name: webhook
111
+
image: atcr.io/atcr/verify-webhook:latest
112
+
imagePullPolicy: Always
113
+
ports:
114
+
- containerPort: 8443
115
+
name: https
116
+
env:
117
+
- name: TLS_CERT_FILE
118
+
value: /etc/webhook/certs/tls.crt
119
+
- name: TLS_KEY_FILE
120
+
value: /etc/webhook/certs/tls.key
121
+
- name: POLICY_FILE
122
+
value: /etc/webhook/policy/policy.yaml
123
+
- name: LOG_LEVEL
124
+
value: info
125
+
volumeMounts:
126
+
- name: webhook-certs
127
+
mountPath: /etc/webhook/certs
128
+
readOnly: true
129
+
- name: policy
130
+
mountPath: /etc/webhook/policy
131
+
readOnly: true
132
+
resources:
133
+
requests:
134
+
memory: "64Mi"
135
+
cpu: "100m"
136
+
limits:
137
+
memory: "256Mi"
138
+
cpu: "500m"
139
+
livenessProbe:
140
+
httpGet:
141
+
path: /healthz
142
+
port: 8443
143
+
scheme: HTTPS
144
+
initialDelaySeconds: 10
145
+
periodSeconds: 10
146
+
readinessProbe:
147
+
httpGet:
148
+
path: /readyz
149
+
port: 8443
150
+
scheme: HTTPS
151
+
initialDelaySeconds: 5
152
+
periodSeconds: 5
153
+
volumes:
154
+
- name: webhook-certs
155
+
secret:
156
+
secretName: atcr-verify-webhook-certs
157
+
- name: policy
158
+
configMap:
159
+
name: atcr-trust-policy
160
+
---
161
+
# ValidatingWebhookConfiguration
162
+
apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1
163
+
kind: ValidatingWebhookConfiguration
164
+
metadata:
165
+
name: atcr-verify
166
+
webhooks:
167
+
- name: verify.atcr.io
168
+
admissionReviewVersions: ["v1", "v1beta1"]
169
+
sideEffects: None
170
+
171
+
# Client configuration
172
+
clientConfig:
173
+
service:
174
+
name: atcr-verify-webhook
175
+
namespace: atcr-system
176
+
path: /validate
177
+
port: 443
178
+
# CA bundle for webhook TLS (base64-encoded CA cert)
179
+
# Generate with: cat ca.crt | base64 -w 0
180
+
caBundle: LS0tLS1CRUdJTi... # Replace with your CA bundle
181
+
182
+
# Rules - what to validate
183
+
rules:
184
+
- operations: ["CREATE", "UPDATE"]
185
+
apiGroups: [""]
186
+
apiVersions: ["v1"]
187
+
resources: ["pods"]
188
+
scope: "Namespaced"
189
+
190
+
# Namespace selector - only validate labeled namespaces
191
+
namespaceSelector:
192
+
matchExpressions:
193
+
- key: atcr-verify
194
+
operator: In
195
+
values: ["enabled", "enforce"]
196
+
197
+
# Failure policy - what to do if webhook fails
198
+
failurePolicy: Fail # Reject pods if webhook is unavailable
199
+
200
+
# Timeout
201
+
timeoutSeconds: 10
202
+
203
+
# Match policy
204
+
matchPolicy: Equivalent
205
+
---
206
+
# Example: Label a namespace to enable verification
207
+
# kubectl label namespace production atcr-verify=enabled
208
+
---
209
+
# RBAC for webhook
210
+
apiVersion: v1
211
+
kind: ServiceAccount
212
+
metadata:
213
+
name: atcr-verify-webhook
214
+
namespace: atcr-system
215
+
---
216
+
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
217
+
kind: ClusterRole
218
+
metadata:
219
+
name: atcr-verify-webhook
220
+
rules:
221
+
- apiGroups: [""]
222
+
resources: ["pods"]
223
+
verbs: ["get", "list"]
224
+
- apiGroups: [""]
225
+
resources: ["events"]
226
+
verbs: ["create", "patch"]
227
+
---
228
+
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
229
+
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
230
+
metadata:
231
+
name: atcr-verify-webhook
232
+
roleRef:
233
+
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
234
+
kind: ClusterRole
235
+
name: atcr-verify-webhook
236
+
subjects:
237
+
- kind: ServiceAccount
238
+
name: atcr-verify-webhook
239
+
namespace: atcr-system
240
+
---
241
+
# Secret for TLS certificates
242
+
# Generate certificates with:
243
+
# openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout tls.key -out tls.crt \
244
+
# -days 365 -nodes -subj "/CN=atcr-verify-webhook.atcr-system.svc"
245
+
#
246
+
# Create secret with:
247
+
# kubectl create secret tls atcr-verify-webhook-certs \
248
+
# --cert=tls.crt --key=tls.key -n atcr-system
249
+
#
250
+
# (Commented out - create manually with your certs)
251
+
# apiVersion: v1
252
+
# kind: Secret
253
+
# metadata:
254
+
# name: atcr-verify-webhook-certs
255
+
# namespace: atcr-system
256
+
# type: kubernetes.io/tls
257
+
# data:
258
+
# tls.crt: <base64-encoded-cert>
259
+
# tls.key: <base64-encoded-key>
+247
examples/verification/trust-policy.yaml
+247
examples/verification/trust-policy.yaml
···
1
+
# ATProto Signature Trust Policy
2
+
#
3
+
# This file defines which signatures to trust and what to do when
4
+
# signatures are invalid or missing.
5
+
#
6
+
# Usage with atcr-verify:
7
+
# atcr-verify IMAGE --policy trust-policy.yaml
8
+
9
+
version: 1.0
10
+
11
+
# Global settings
12
+
defaultAction: enforce # Options: enforce, audit, allow
13
+
requireSignature: true # Require at least one signature
14
+
15
+
# Policies matched by image scope (first match wins)
16
+
policies:
17
+
# Production images require signatures from trusted DIDs
18
+
- name: production-images
19
+
description: "Production images must be signed by DevOps or Security team"
20
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/prod-*"
21
+
require:
22
+
signature: true
23
+
trustedDIDs:
24
+
- did:plc:your-org-devops
25
+
- did:plc:your-org-security
26
+
minSignatures: 1
27
+
maxAge: 2592000 # 30 days in seconds
28
+
action: enforce # Reject if policy fails
29
+
30
+
# Critical infrastructure requires multi-signature
31
+
- name: critical-infrastructure
32
+
description: "Critical services require 2 signatures"
33
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/critical-*"
34
+
require:
35
+
signature: true
36
+
trustedDIDs:
37
+
- did:plc:your-org-security
38
+
- did:plc:your-org-devops
39
+
minSignatures: 2 # Require at least 2 signatures
40
+
algorithms:
41
+
- ECDSA-K256-SHA256 # Only allow specific algorithms
42
+
action: enforce
43
+
44
+
# Staging images require signature from any team member
45
+
- name: staging-images
46
+
description: "Staging images need any trusted signature"
47
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/staging-*"
48
+
require:
49
+
signature: true
50
+
trustedDIDs:
51
+
- did:plc:your-org-devops
52
+
- did:plc:your-org-security
53
+
- did:plc:your-org-developers
54
+
minSignatures: 1
55
+
action: enforce
56
+
57
+
# Development images are audited but not blocked
58
+
- name: dev-images
59
+
description: "Development images are monitored"
60
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/dev-*"
61
+
require:
62
+
signature: false # Don't require signatures
63
+
action: audit # Log but don't reject
64
+
65
+
# Test images from external sources
66
+
- name: external-test-images
67
+
description: "Test images from partners"
68
+
scope: "atcr.io/external/*"
69
+
require:
70
+
signature: true
71
+
trustedDIDs:
72
+
- did:plc:partner-acme
73
+
- did:plc:partner-widgets
74
+
minSignatures: 1
75
+
action: enforce
76
+
77
+
# Default fallback for all other images
78
+
- name: default
79
+
description: "All other images require signature"
80
+
scope: "atcr.io/*/*"
81
+
require:
82
+
signature: true
83
+
minSignatures: 1
84
+
action: enforce
85
+
86
+
# Trusted DID registry
87
+
trustedDIDs:
88
+
# Your organization's DevOps team
89
+
did:plc:your-org-devops:
90
+
name: "DevOps Team"
91
+
description: "Production deployment automation"
92
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
93
+
expiresAt: null # Never expires
94
+
contact: "devops@yourorg.com"
95
+
allowedScopes:
96
+
- "atcr.io/*/prod-*"
97
+
- "atcr.io/*/staging-*"
98
+
- "atcr.io/*/critical-*"
99
+
100
+
# Your organization's Security team
101
+
did:plc:your-org-security:
102
+
name: "Security Team"
103
+
description: "Security-reviewed images"
104
+
validFrom: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
105
+
expiresAt: null
106
+
contact: "security@yourorg.com"
107
+
allowedScopes:
108
+
- "atcr.io/*/*" # Can sign any image
109
+
110
+
# Developer team (limited access)
111
+
did:plc:your-org-developers:
112
+
name: "Developer Team"
113
+
description: "Development and staging images"
114
+
validFrom: "2024-06-01T00:00:00Z"
115
+
expiresAt: "2025-12-31T23:59:59Z" # Temporary access
116
+
contact: "dev-team@yourorg.com"
117
+
allowedScopes:
118
+
- "atcr.io/*/dev-*"
119
+
- "atcr.io/*/staging-*"
120
+
notes: "Access expires end of 2025 - review then"
121
+
122
+
# External partner: ACME Corp
123
+
did:plc:partner-acme:
124
+
name: "ACME Corp Integration Team"
125
+
description: "Third-party integration images"
126
+
validFrom: "2024-09-01T00:00:00Z"
127
+
expiresAt: "2025-09-01T00:00:00Z"
128
+
contact: "integration@acme.example.com"
129
+
allowedScopes:
130
+
- "atcr.io/external/acme-*"
131
+
132
+
# External partner: Widgets Inc
133
+
did:plc:partner-widgets:
134
+
name: "Widgets Inc"
135
+
description: "Widgets service integration"
136
+
validFrom: "2024-10-01T00:00:00Z"
137
+
expiresAt: "2025-10-01T00:00:00Z"
138
+
contact: "api@widgets.example.com"
139
+
allowedScopes:
140
+
- "atcr.io/external/widgets-*"
141
+
142
+
# Signature validation settings
143
+
validation:
144
+
# Signature age limits
145
+
maxSignatureAge: 7776000 # 90 days in seconds (null = no limit)
146
+
147
+
# Allowed signature algorithms
148
+
allowedAlgorithms:
149
+
- ECDSA-K256-SHA256 # ATProto default
150
+
- ECDSA-P256-SHA256 # Alternative
151
+
152
+
# DID resolution settings
153
+
didResolver:
154
+
timeout: 10 # seconds
155
+
cache:
156
+
enabled: true
157
+
ttl: 3600 # 1 hour in seconds
158
+
fallbackResolvers:
159
+
- https://plc.directory
160
+
- https://backup-plc.example.com
161
+
162
+
# PDS connection settings
163
+
pds:
164
+
timeout: 15 # seconds
165
+
retries: 3
166
+
cache:
167
+
enabled: true
168
+
ttl: 600 # 10 minutes
169
+
170
+
# Audit logging
171
+
audit:
172
+
enabled: true
173
+
logLevel: info # debug, info, warn, error
174
+
175
+
# What to log
176
+
logEvents:
177
+
- signature_verified
178
+
- signature_missing
179
+
- signature_invalid
180
+
- signature_expired
181
+
- did_resolution_failed
182
+
- pds_query_failed
183
+
- policy_violation
184
+
185
+
# Log destinations
186
+
destinations:
187
+
- type: stdout
188
+
format: json
189
+
- type: file
190
+
path: /var/log/atcr-verify/audit.log
191
+
format: json
192
+
rotate: true
193
+
maxSize: 100MB
194
+
maxFiles: 10
195
+
196
+
# Reporting and metrics
197
+
reporting:
198
+
# Prometheus metrics
199
+
metrics:
200
+
enabled: true
201
+
port: 9090
202
+
path: /metrics
203
+
204
+
# Periodic reports
205
+
reports:
206
+
enabled: true
207
+
interval: 86400 # Daily in seconds
208
+
email:
209
+
- security@yourorg.com
210
+
- devops@yourorg.com
211
+
includeStatistics: true
212
+
213
+
# Emergency overrides
214
+
overrides:
215
+
# Allow bypassing verification in emergencies
216
+
enabled: false # Enable with extreme caution!
217
+
requireApproval: true
218
+
approvers:
219
+
- security@yourorg.com
220
+
validDuration: 3600 # Override valid for 1 hour
221
+
222
+
# Examples of policy evaluation:
223
+
#
224
+
# atcr.io/myorg/prod-api:v1.2.3
225
+
# → Matches: production-images
226
+
# → Requires: 1 signature from DevOps or Security
227
+
# → Action: enforce
228
+
#
229
+
# atcr.io/myorg/critical-auth:v2.0.0
230
+
# → Matches: critical-infrastructure
231
+
# → Requires: 2 signatures from Security and DevOps
232
+
# → Action: enforce
233
+
#
234
+
# atcr.io/myorg/staging-frontend:latest
235
+
# → Matches: staging-images
236
+
# → Requires: 1 signature from any team member
237
+
# → Action: enforce
238
+
#
239
+
# atcr.io/myorg/dev-experiment:test
240
+
# → Matches: dev-images
241
+
# → Requires: none
242
+
# → Action: audit (log only)
243
+
#
244
+
# atcr.io/external/acme-connector:v1.0
245
+
# → Matches: external-test-images
246
+
# → Requires: 1 signature from partner-acme
247
+
# → Action: enforce
+162
examples/verification/verify-and-pull.sh
+162
examples/verification/verify-and-pull.sh
···
1
+
#!/bin/bash
2
+
# Verify and Pull Script
3
+
#
4
+
# This script verifies ATProto signatures before pulling images with Docker.
5
+
# It acts as a wrapper around `docker pull` to enforce signature verification.
6
+
#
7
+
# Usage: ./verify-and-pull.sh IMAGE [DOCKER_PULL_OPTIONS]
8
+
# Example: ./verify-and-pull.sh atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest
9
+
# Example: ./verify-and-pull.sh atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --platform linux/amd64
10
+
#
11
+
# To use this as a replacement for docker pull, create an alias:
12
+
# alias docker-pull-secure='/path/to/verify-and-pull.sh'
13
+
14
+
set -e
15
+
16
+
# Configuration
17
+
VERIFY_SCRIPT="${VERIFY_SCRIPT:-$(dirname $0)/atcr-verify.sh}"
18
+
TRUST_POLICY="${TRUST_POLICY:-$(dirname $0)/trust-policy.yaml}"
19
+
REQUIRE_VERIFICATION="${REQUIRE_VERIFICATION:-true}"
20
+
SKIP_ATCR_IMAGES="${SKIP_ATCR_IMAGES:-false}" # Skip verification for non-ATCR images
21
+
22
+
# Colors
23
+
RED='\033[0;31m'
24
+
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
25
+
YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
26
+
BLUE='\033[0;34m'
27
+
NC='\033[0m'
28
+
29
+
print_header() {
30
+
echo ""
31
+
echo -e "${BLUE}═══════════════════════════════════════════════════${NC}"
32
+
echo -e "${BLUE} Secure Image Pull with Signature Verification${NC}"
33
+
echo -e "${BLUE}═══════════════════════════════════════════════════${NC}"
34
+
echo ""
35
+
}
36
+
37
+
print_success() {
38
+
echo -e "${GREEN}✓${NC} $1"
39
+
}
40
+
41
+
print_error() {
42
+
echo -e "${RED}✗${NC} $1"
43
+
}
44
+
45
+
print_warning() {
46
+
echo -e "${YELLOW}⚠${NC} $1"
47
+
}
48
+
49
+
# Check if image is from ATCR
50
+
is_atcr_image() {
51
+
local image="$1"
52
+
if [[ "$image" =~ ^atcr\.io/ ]]; then
53
+
return 0
54
+
else
55
+
return 1
56
+
fi
57
+
}
58
+
59
+
# Main function
60
+
main() {
61
+
if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then
62
+
echo "Usage: $0 IMAGE [DOCKER_PULL_OPTIONS]"
63
+
echo ""
64
+
echo "Examples:"
65
+
echo " $0 atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest"
66
+
echo " $0 atcr.io/alice/myapp:latest --platform linux/amd64"
67
+
echo ""
68
+
echo "Environment variables:"
69
+
echo " VERIFY_SCRIPT - Path to verification script (default: ./atcr-verify.sh)"
70
+
echo " TRUST_POLICY - Path to trust policy (default: ./trust-policy.yaml)"
71
+
echo " REQUIRE_VERIFICATION - Require verification for ATCR images (default: true)"
72
+
echo " SKIP_ATCR_IMAGES - Skip verification for non-ATCR images (default: false)"
73
+
exit 1
74
+
fi
75
+
76
+
local image="$1"
77
+
shift
78
+
local docker_args="$@"
79
+
80
+
print_header
81
+
82
+
echo -e "${BLUE}Image:${NC} $image"
83
+
if [ -n "$docker_args" ]; then
84
+
echo -e "${BLUE}Docker options:${NC} $docker_args"
85
+
fi
86
+
echo ""
87
+
88
+
# Check if this is an ATCR image
89
+
if ! is_atcr_image "$image"; then
90
+
if [ "$SKIP_ATCR_IMAGES" = "true" ]; then
91
+
print_warning "Not an ATCR image - skipping signature verification"
92
+
echo ""
93
+
docker pull $docker_args "$image"
94
+
exit $?
95
+
else
96
+
print_warning "Not an ATCR image"
97
+
if [ "$REQUIRE_VERIFICATION" = "true" ]; then
98
+
print_error "Verification required but image is not from ATCR"
99
+
exit 1
100
+
else
101
+
print_warning "Proceeding without verification"
102
+
echo ""
103
+
docker pull $docker_args "$image"
104
+
exit $?
105
+
fi
106
+
fi
107
+
fi
108
+
109
+
# Step 1: Verify signature
110
+
echo -e "${BLUE}Step 1: Verifying ATProto signature${NC}"
111
+
echo ""
112
+
113
+
if [ ! -f "$VERIFY_SCRIPT" ]; then
114
+
print_error "Verification script not found: $VERIFY_SCRIPT"
115
+
exit 1
116
+
fi
117
+
118
+
# Run verification
119
+
if bash "$VERIFY_SCRIPT" "$image"; then
120
+
print_success "Signature verification passed"
121
+
echo ""
122
+
else
123
+
print_error "Signature verification failed"
124
+
echo ""
125
+
126
+
if [ "$REQUIRE_VERIFICATION" = "true" ]; then
127
+
echo -e "${RED}Image pull blocked due to failed signature verification${NC}"
128
+
echo ""
129
+
echo "To proceed anyway (NOT RECOMMENDED), run:"
130
+
echo " REQUIRE_VERIFICATION=false $0 $image $docker_args"
131
+
exit 1
132
+
else
133
+
print_warning "Verification failed but REQUIRE_VERIFICATION=false"
134
+
print_warning "Proceeding with pull (NOT RECOMMENDED)"
135
+
echo ""
136
+
fi
137
+
fi
138
+
139
+
# Step 2: Pull image
140
+
echo -e "${BLUE}Step 2: Pulling image${NC}"
141
+
echo ""
142
+
143
+
if docker pull $docker_args "$image"; then
144
+
print_success "Image pulled successfully"
145
+
else
146
+
print_error "Failed to pull image"
147
+
exit 1
148
+
fi
149
+
150
+
# Summary
151
+
echo ""
152
+
echo -e "${GREEN}═══════════════════════════════════════════════════${NC}"
153
+
echo -e "${GREEN} ✓ Secure pull completed successfully${NC}"
154
+
echo -e "${GREEN}═══════════════════════════════════════════════════${NC}"
155
+
echo ""
156
+
echo -e "${BLUE}Image:${NC} $image"
157
+
echo -e "${BLUE}Status:${NC} Verified and pulled"
158
+
echo ""
159
+
}
160
+
161
+
# Run main function
162
+
main "$@"
+8
-6
pkg/appview/handlers/manifest_health.go
+8
-6
pkg/appview/handlers/manifest_health.go
···
43
43
44
44
reachable, err := h.HealthChecker.CheckHealth(ctx, endpoint)
45
45
46
-
if ctx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded {
47
-
// Still pending - render "Checking..." badge with HTMX retry
48
-
h.renderBadge(w, endpoint, false, true)
49
-
} else if err != nil {
46
+
// Check for HTTP errors first (connection refused, network unreachable, etc.)
47
+
// This ensures we catch real failures even when timing aligns with context timeout
48
+
if err != nil {
50
49
// Error - mark as unreachable
51
50
h.renderBadge(w, endpoint, false, false)
51
+
} else if ctx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded {
52
+
// Context timed out but no HTTP error yet - still pending
53
+
h.renderBadge(w, endpoint, false, true)
52
54
} else {
53
55
// Success
54
56
h.renderBadge(w, endpoint, reachable, false)
···
65
67
w.Write([]byte(`<span class="checking-badge"
66
68
hx-get="` + retryURL + `"
67
69
hx-trigger="load delay:3s"
68
-
hx-swap="outerHTML">🔄 Checking...</span>`))
70
+
hx-swap="outerHTML"><i data-lucide="refresh-ccw"></i> Checking...</span>`))
69
71
} else if !reachable {
70
72
// Unreachable - render offline badge
71
-
w.Write([]byte(`<span class="offline-badge">⚠️ Offline</span>`))
73
+
w.Write([]byte(`<span class="offline-badge"><i data-lucide="triangle-alert"></i> Offline</span>`))
72
74
} else {
73
75
// Reachable - no badge (empty response)
74
76
w.Write([]byte(``))
+1
-1
pkg/appview/templates/pages/repository.html
+1
-1
pkg/appview/templates/pages/repository.html
···
181
181
hx-get="/api/manifest-health?endpoint={{ .Manifest.HoldEndpoint | urlquery }}"
182
182
hx-trigger="load delay:2s"
183
183
hx-swap="outerHTML">
184
-
<i data-lucide="rotate-cw"></i> Checking...
184
+
<i data-lucide="refresh-ccw"></i> Checking...
185
185
</span>
186
186
{{ else if not .Reachable }}
187
187
<span class="offline-badge"><i data-lucide="alert-triangle"></i> Offline</span>