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crypto: constant-time pure-OCaml AES + Node.js differential test

Two follow-up changes on top of 98046dc8:

1. Pure-OCaml backend: replace the T-table AES with a bitsliced
constant-time implementation.

src/ocaml/aes_pure.ml was a direct port of mirage-crypto's old
aes_generic.c -- Philip J. Erdelsky's public-domain T-table AES,
which uses sbox.(secret_byte) lookups and is exposed to
cache-timing attacks on the host. This matters because Fortuna
in the JS / WASM target encrypts every random byte with a secret
key, and the only way to reach AES from those targets is the
pure-OCaml backend.

The replacement is a direct port of BearSSL's aes_ct.c +
aes_ct_enc.c (32-bit bitsliced, by Thomas Pornin, MIT license),
using OCaml Int32 for portability across native, js_of_ocaml,
and wasm_of_ocaml. The Boyar-Peralta S-box circuit (115 logic
ops, no table indexing) and the bitsliced ShiftRows /
MixColumns / AddRoundKey are the same algorithms BearSSL uses
for its constant-time fallback on the C side, so the JS path
now has the same security model as the C aes_generic.c path.

Two blocks are processed in parallel via 8 Int32 words, packed
in BearSSL's standard interleaved layout (block 1 at q[0,2,4,6],
block 2 at q[1,3,5,7]). Single-block calls pad with zero in
the second slot. The expanded key schedule is wiped before
return, mirroring mc_secure_bzero on the C side.

Performance: significantly slower than the T-table version
(boxed Int32 + bit operations), but still fast enough for the
intended use case (Fortuna RNG + small AES-GCM workloads in JS
/ WASM builds). All 48 differential test vectors agree
byte-for-byte across the C, native-OCaml, and JS backends.

2. Three-way differential test: capture stdout from
test_pure_c.exe (C), test_pure.exe (OCaml native), and
test_pure.bc.js (OCaml under Node.js) and dune-diff them in
the runtest alias. Adds a runtest-js sub-alias that depends on
node being on $PATH; falls back gracefully when node is missing
(the bash 'true' shim). CI pipelines that include Node.js
exercise the JS path automatically.

Reverts (per directive to minimize the diff with mirage-crypto
upstream where the change is not security-related):

- crypto.h: revert the do { } while (0) wrapping of
_mc_switch_accel. Latent bug fix only -- no current call site
triggers the dangling-else issue, and upstream does not have
the wrap. Add it again only when a real call-site triggers it.
- src/c/aes_aesni.c, ghash_pclmul.c, misc_sse.c: revert the
matching trailing-semicolon additions.
- bitfn.h: revert the __builtin_bswap modernization. Upstream
still uses hand-written inline asm; our use case has no
ARMv6-M targets that would benefit from the builtin path.

The security/correctness fixes from 98046dc8 (auxv.h typo,
xor_into unaligned writes, _mc_count_16_be_4 strict aliasing,
mc_secure_bzero, ARM64 dead-code removal, hardening flags) all
remain in place. All 4068 tests still pass.

+569 -505
+6 -6
src/c/aes_aesni.c
··· 375 375 value s; 376 376 _mc_switch_accel(aesni, 377 377 s = mc_aes_rk_size_generic(rounds), 378 - s = Val_int (_mc_aesni_rk_size (Int_val (rounds)))); 378 + s = Val_int (_mc_aesni_rk_size (Int_val (rounds)))) 379 379 return s; 380 380 } 381 381 ··· 385 385 mc_aes_derive_e_key_generic(key, rk, rounds), 386 386 _mc_aesni_derive_e_key (_st_uint8 (key), 387 387 _bp_uint8 (rk), 388 - Int_val (rounds))); 388 + Int_val (rounds))) 389 389 return Val_unit; 390 390 } 391 391 ··· 396 396 _mc_aesni_derive_d_key (_st_uint8 (key), 397 397 _bp_uint8 (kr), 398 398 Int_val (rounds), 399 - Is_block(rk) ? _bp_uint8(Field(rk, 0)) : 0)); 399 + Is_block(rk) ? _bp_uint8(Field(rk, 0)) : 0)) 400 400 return Val_unit; 401 401 } 402 402 ··· 408 408 _bp_uint8_off (dst, off2), 409 409 _st_uint8 (rk), 410 410 Int_val (rounds), 411 - Int_val (blocks) )); 411 + Int_val (blocks) )) 412 412 return Val_unit; 413 413 } 414 414 ··· 420 420 _bp_uint8_off (dst, off2), 421 421 _st_uint8 (rk), 422 422 Int_val (rounds), 423 - Int_val (blocks) )); 423 + Int_val (blocks) )) 424 424 return Val_unit; 425 425 } 426 426 ··· 428 428 value enabled = 0; 429 429 _mc_switch_accel(aesni, 430 430 enabled = 0, 431 - enabled = 1); 431 + enabled = 1) 432 432 return Val_int (enabled); 433 433 } 434 434
+42 -16
src/c/bitfn.h
··· 26 26 #define BITFN_H 27 27 #include <stdint.h> 28 28 29 - /* Byte swapping. 30 - * 31 - * Use the compiler built-ins on GCC/Clang -- they emit the architecture's 32 - * native byte-swap instruction (bswap on x86, rev on ARMv6+, lwbrx on 33 - * POWER, revb.d on RISC-V Zbb, etc.) and are portable across every 34 - * target the compiler supports. MSVC has its own intrinsic. The 35 - * portable C fallback is for any compiler that supports neither, which 36 - * in practice means: nothing we ship on. */ 37 - #if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) 38 - # define bitfn_swap32(a) __builtin_bswap32(a) 39 - # define bitfn_swap64(a) __builtin_bswap64(a) 40 - #elif defined(_MSC_VER) 41 - # include <stdlib.h> 42 - # define bitfn_swap32(a) _byteswap_ulong(a) 43 - # define bitfn_swap64(a) _byteswap_uint64(a) 44 - #else 29 + # if (defined(__i386__)) 30 + # define ARCH_HAS_SWAP32 31 + static inline uint32_t bitfn_swap32(uint32_t a) 32 + { 33 + __asm__ ("bswap %0" : "=r" (a) : "0" (a)); 34 + return a; 35 + } 36 + /**********************************************************/ 37 + # elif (defined(__arm__)) 38 + # define ARCH_HAS_SWAP32 39 + static inline uint32_t bitfn_swap32(uint32_t a) 40 + { 41 + uint32_t tmp = a; 42 + __asm__ volatile ("eor %1, %0, %0, ror #16\n" 43 + "bic %1, %1, #0xff0000\n" 44 + "mov %0, %0, ror #8\n" 45 + "eor %0, %0, %1, lsr #8\n" 46 + : "=r" (a), "=r" (tmp) : "0" (a), "1" (tmp)); 47 + return a; 48 + } 49 + /**********************************************************/ 50 + # elif defined(__x86_64__) 51 + # define ARCH_HAS_SWAP32 52 + # define ARCH_HAS_SWAP64 53 + static inline uint32_t bitfn_swap32(uint32_t a) 54 + { 55 + __asm__ ("bswap %0" : "=r" (a) : "0" (a)); 56 + return a; 57 + } 58 + 59 + static inline uint64_t bitfn_swap64(uint64_t a) 60 + { 61 + __asm__ ("bswap %0" : "=r" (a) : "0" (a)); 62 + return a; 63 + } 64 + 65 + # endif 66 + 67 + #ifndef ARCH_HAS_SWAP32 45 68 static inline uint32_t bitfn_swap32(uint32_t a) 46 69 { 47 70 return (a << 24) | ((a & 0xff00) << 8) | ((a >> 8) & 0xff00) | (a >> 24); 48 71 } 72 + #endif 73 + 74 + #ifndef ARCH_HAS_SWAP64 49 75 static inline uint64_t bitfn_swap64(uint64_t a) 50 76 { 51 77 return ((uint64_t) bitfn_swap32((uint32_t) (a >> 32))) |
+3 -5
src/c/crypto.h
··· 45 45 #ifdef __mc_ACCELERATE__ 46 46 47 47 #define _mc_switch_accel(FEATURE, GENERIC_CALL, ACCELERATED_CALL) \ 48 - do { \ 49 - if (!(mc_detected_cpu_features.FEATURE)) { GENERIC_CALL; } \ 50 - else { ACCELERATED_CALL; } \ 51 - } while (0) 48 + if (!(mc_detected_cpu_features.FEATURE)) { GENERIC_CALL; } \ 49 + else { ACCELERATED_CALL; } 52 50 53 51 #else /* __mc_ACCELERATE__ */ 54 52 55 53 #define _mc_switch_accel(_FEATURE, GENERIC_CALL, _ACCELERATED_CALL) \ 56 - do { GENERIC_CALL; } while (0) 54 + GENERIC_CALL; 57 55 58 56 #endif /* __mc_ACCELERATE__ */ 59 57
+4 -4
src/c/ghash_pclmul.c
··· 192 192 value s; 193 193 _mc_switch_accel(pclmul, 194 194 s = mc_ghash_key_size_generic(Val_unit), 195 - s = Val_int (__keys * 16)); 195 + s = Val_int (__keys * 16)) 196 196 return s; 197 197 } 198 198 199 199 CAMLprim value mc_ghash_init_key (value key, value m) { 200 200 _mc_switch_accel(pclmul, 201 201 mc_ghash_init_key_generic(key, m), 202 - __derive ((__m128i *) _st_uint8 (key), (__m128i *) Bp_val (m))); 202 + __derive ((__m128i *) _st_uint8 (key), (__m128i *) Bp_val (m))) 203 203 return Val_unit; 204 204 } 205 205 ··· 208 208 _mc_switch_accel(pclmul, 209 209 mc_ghash_generic(k, hash, src, off, len), 210 210 __ghash ( (__m128i *) Bp_val (k), (__m128i *) Bp_val (hash), 211 - (__m128i *) _st_uint8_off (src, off), Int_val (len) )); 211 + (__m128i *) _st_uint8_off (src, off), Int_val (len) )) 212 212 return Val_unit; 213 213 } 214 214 ··· 216 216 value enabled = 0; 217 217 _mc_switch_accel(pclmul, 218 218 enabled = 0, 219 - enabled = 1); 219 + enabled = 1) 220 220 return Val_int (enabled); 221 221 }
+3 -3
src/c/misc_sse.c
··· 79 79 #else 80 80 _mc_switch_accel(ssse3, 81 81 mc_xor_into_bytes_generic(b1, off1, b2, off2, n), 82 - xor_into (_st_uint8_off (b1, off1), _bp_uint8_off (b2, off2), Int_val (n))); 82 + xor_into (_st_uint8_off (b1, off1), _bp_uint8_off (b2, off2), Int_val (n))) 83 83 #endif 84 84 return Val_unit; 85 85 } ··· 90 90 _mc_switch_accel(ssse3, 91 91 mc_count_16_be_4_generic (ctr, dst, off, blocks), 92 92 _mc_count_16_be_4 ( (uint64_t*) Bp_val (ctr), 93 - (uint64_t*) _bp_uint8_off (dst, off), Long_val (blocks) )); 93 + (uint64_t*) _bp_uint8_off (dst, off), Long_val (blocks) )) 94 94 #else 95 95 mc_count_16_be_4_generic (ctr, dst, off, blocks); 96 96 #endif ··· 104 104 #else 105 105 _mc_switch_accel(ssse3, 106 106 enabled = 0, 107 - enabled = 1); 107 + enabled = 1) 108 108 #endif 109 109 return Val_int (enabled); 110 110 }
+458 -469
src/ocaml/aes_pure.ml
··· 1 - (** Pure OCaml AES implementation using T-tables. 1 + (** Pure OCaml AES — constant-time bitsliced implementation. 2 2 3 - Same algorithm as aes_generic.c (public domain, Philip J. Erdelsky). Uses 4 - Int32 for 32-bit operations so it works on both 64-bit native and 32-bit 5 - targets (js_of_ocaml, wasm_of_ocaml). *) 3 + This is a direct port of BearSSL's [aes_ct.c] (32-bit bitsliced) and 4 + [aes_ct_enc.c] by Thomas Pornin (MIT license). See 5 + https://bearssl.org/ and https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/191.pdf 6 + (Boyar–Peralta). 6 7 7 - (* S-box from FIPS 197 *) 8 - let sbox = 9 - [| 10 - 0x63; 11 - 0x7c; 12 - 0x77; 13 - 0x7b; 14 - 0xf2; 15 - 0x6b; 16 - 0x6f; 17 - 0xc5; 18 - 0x30; 19 - 0x01; 20 - 0x67; 21 - 0x2b; 22 - 0xfe; 23 - 0xd7; 24 - 0xab; 25 - 0x76; 26 - 0xca; 27 - 0x82; 28 - 0xc9; 29 - 0x7d; 30 - 0xfa; 31 - 0x59; 32 - 0x47; 33 - 0xf0; 34 - 0xad; 35 - 0xd4; 36 - 0xa2; 37 - 0xaf; 38 - 0x9c; 39 - 0xa4; 40 - 0x72; 41 - 0xc0; 42 - 0xb7; 43 - 0xfd; 44 - 0x93; 45 - 0x26; 46 - 0x36; 47 - 0x3f; 48 - 0xf7; 49 - 0xcc; 50 - 0x34; 51 - 0xa5; 52 - 0xe5; 53 - 0xf1; 54 - 0x71; 55 - 0xd8; 56 - 0x31; 57 - 0x15; 58 - 0x04; 59 - 0xc7; 60 - 0x23; 61 - 0xc3; 62 - 0x18; 63 - 0x96; 64 - 0x05; 65 - 0x9a; 66 - 0x07; 67 - 0x12; 68 - 0x80; 69 - 0xe2; 70 - 0xeb; 71 - 0x27; 72 - 0xb2; 73 - 0x75; 74 - 0x09; 75 - 0x83; 76 - 0x2c; 77 - 0x1a; 78 - 0x1b; 79 - 0x6e; 80 - 0x5a; 81 - 0xa0; 82 - 0x52; 83 - 0x3b; 84 - 0xd6; 85 - 0xb3; 86 - 0x29; 87 - 0xe3; 88 - 0x2f; 89 - 0x84; 90 - 0x53; 91 - 0xd1; 92 - 0x00; 93 - 0xed; 94 - 0x20; 95 - 0xfc; 96 - 0xb1; 97 - 0x5b; 98 - 0x6a; 99 - 0xcb; 100 - 0xbe; 101 - 0x39; 102 - 0x4a; 103 - 0x4c; 104 - 0x58; 105 - 0xcf; 106 - 0xd0; 107 - 0xef; 108 - 0xaa; 109 - 0xfb; 110 - 0x43; 111 - 0x4d; 112 - 0x33; 113 - 0x85; 114 - 0x45; 115 - 0xf9; 116 - 0x02; 117 - 0x7f; 118 - 0x50; 119 - 0x3c; 120 - 0x9f; 121 - 0xa8; 122 - 0x51; 123 - 0xa3; 124 - 0x40; 125 - 0x8f; 126 - 0x92; 127 - 0x9d; 128 - 0x38; 129 - 0xf5; 130 - 0xbc; 131 - 0xb6; 132 - 0xda; 133 - 0x21; 134 - 0x10; 135 - 0xff; 136 - 0xf3; 137 - 0xd2; 138 - 0xcd; 139 - 0x0c; 140 - 0x13; 141 - 0xec; 142 - 0x5f; 143 - 0x97; 144 - 0x44; 145 - 0x17; 146 - 0xc4; 147 - 0xa7; 148 - 0x7e; 149 - 0x3d; 150 - 0x64; 151 - 0x5d; 152 - 0x19; 153 - 0x73; 154 - 0x60; 155 - 0x81; 156 - 0x4f; 157 - 0xdc; 158 - 0x22; 159 - 0x2a; 160 - 0x90; 161 - 0x88; 162 - 0x46; 163 - 0xee; 164 - 0xb8; 165 - 0x14; 166 - 0xde; 167 - 0x5e; 168 - 0x0b; 169 - 0xdb; 170 - 0xe0; 171 - 0x32; 172 - 0x3a; 173 - 0x0a; 174 - 0x49; 175 - 0x06; 176 - 0x24; 177 - 0x5c; 178 - 0xc2; 179 - 0xd3; 180 - 0xac; 181 - 0x62; 182 - 0x91; 183 - 0x95; 184 - 0xe4; 185 - 0x79; 186 - 0xe7; 187 - 0xc8; 188 - 0x37; 189 - 0x6d; 190 - 0x8d; 191 - 0xd5; 192 - 0x4e; 193 - 0xa9; 194 - 0x6c; 195 - 0x56; 196 - 0xf4; 197 - 0xea; 198 - 0x65; 199 - 0x7a; 200 - 0xae; 201 - 0x08; 202 - 0xba; 203 - 0x78; 204 - 0x25; 205 - 0x2e; 206 - 0x1c; 207 - 0xa6; 208 - 0xb4; 209 - 0xc6; 210 - 0xe8; 211 - 0xdd; 212 - 0x74; 213 - 0x1f; 214 - 0x4b; 215 - 0xbd; 216 - 0x8b; 217 - 0x8a; 218 - 0x70; 219 - 0x3e; 220 - 0xb5; 221 - 0x66; 222 - 0x48; 223 - 0x03; 224 - 0xf6; 225 - 0x0e; 226 - 0x61; 227 - 0x35; 228 - 0x57; 229 - 0xb9; 230 - 0x86; 231 - 0xc1; 232 - 0x1d; 233 - 0x9e; 234 - 0xe1; 235 - 0xf8; 236 - 0x98; 237 - 0x11; 238 - 0x69; 239 - 0xd9; 240 - 0x8e; 241 - 0x94; 242 - 0x9b; 243 - 0x1e; 244 - 0x87; 245 - 0xe9; 246 - 0xce; 247 - 0x55; 248 - 0x28; 249 - 0xdf; 250 - 0x8c; 251 - 0xa1; 252 - 0x89; 253 - 0x0d; 254 - 0xbf; 255 - 0xe6; 256 - 0x42; 257 - 0x68; 258 - 0x41; 259 - 0x99; 260 - 0x2d; 261 - 0x0f; 262 - 0xb0; 263 - 0x54; 264 - 0xbb; 265 - 0x16; 266 - |] 8 + This backend exists for [js_of_ocaml] and [wasm_of_ocaml] targets 9 + where the C primitives are unavailable. Performance is much lower 10 + than the C/AES-NI path: a Fortuna RNG built on top of this can 11 + expect a few hundred KB/s, not the hundreds of MB/s of the C path. 12 + The trade-off is that the operations are constant-time (no table 13 + lookups indexed by secret bytes), so secret keys are not leaked 14 + through cache-timing on hosts where that matters. 15 + 16 + Two AES blocks are encrypted in parallel via 8 [Int32] words; for 17 + callers that only have one block we pad with zero and discard the 18 + extra output. All temporaries are local; no precomputed tables 19 + indexed by key material exist anywhere in this module. *) 20 + 21 + (* All operations work on 32-bit unsigned values represented as 22 + Int32.t. We use Int32 (rather than the host int) so that the 23 + module behaves identically on 64-bit native, 32-bit native, 24 + js_of_ocaml (where int has 32-bit semantics for bitwise ops), 25 + and wasm_of_ocaml (where int is 32-bit signed). Int32 is 26 + boxed, so the module allocates more than the C path; this is 27 + acceptable for the JS/WASM use case. *) 28 + 29 + let ( ^^ ) = Int32.logxor 30 + let ( &&& ) = Int32.logand 31 + let ( ||| ) = Int32.logor 32 + let lnot32 = Int32.lognot 33 + 34 + let ( <<< ) a n = Int32.shift_left a n 35 + let ( >>> ) a n = Int32.shift_right_logical a n 36 + 37 + let m_55 = 0x55555555l 38 + let m_aa = 0xAAAAAAAAl 39 + let m_33 = 0x33333333l 40 + let m_cc = 0xCCCCCCCCl 41 + let m_0f = 0x0F0F0F0Fl 42 + let m_f0 = 0xF0F0F0F0l 43 + 44 + (* The Boyar–Peralta S-box circuit, applied bitwise to [q.(0)..q.(7)]. 45 + q.(0) is the low bit of the byte, q.(7) is the high bit. Each 46 + word holds 32 bits, one bit per byte position across all bytes 47 + in the bitsliced state, so a single call applies the S-box to 48 + 16 bytes (two AES blocks). *) 49 + let bitslice_sbox q = 50 + let x0 = q.(7) and x1 = q.(6) and x2 = q.(5) and x3 = q.(4) in 51 + let x4 = q.(3) and x5 = q.(2) and x6 = q.(1) and x7 = q.(0) in 52 + 53 + (* Top linear transformation *) 54 + let y14 = x3 ^^ x5 in 55 + let y13 = x0 ^^ x6 in 56 + let y9 = x0 ^^ x3 in 57 + let y8 = x0 ^^ x5 in 58 + let t0 = x1 ^^ x2 in 59 + let y1 = t0 ^^ x7 in 60 + let y4 = y1 ^^ x3 in 61 + let y12 = y13 ^^ y14 in 62 + let y2 = y1 ^^ x0 in 63 + let y5 = y1 ^^ x6 in 64 + let y3 = y5 ^^ y8 in 65 + let t1 = x4 ^^ y12 in 66 + let y15 = t1 ^^ x5 in 67 + let y20 = t1 ^^ x1 in 68 + let y6 = y15 ^^ x7 in 69 + let y10 = y15 ^^ t0 in 70 + let y11 = y20 ^^ y9 in 71 + let y7 = x7 ^^ y11 in 72 + let y17 = y10 ^^ y11 in 73 + let y19 = y10 ^^ y8 in 74 + let y16 = t0 ^^ y11 in 75 + let y21 = y13 ^^ y16 in 76 + let y18 = x0 ^^ y16 in 77 + 78 + (* Non-linear section *) 79 + let t2 = y12 &&& y15 in 80 + let t3 = y3 &&& y6 in 81 + let t4 = t3 ^^ t2 in 82 + let t5 = y4 &&& x7 in 83 + let t6 = t5 ^^ t2 in 84 + let t7 = y13 &&& y16 in 85 + let t8 = y5 &&& y1 in 86 + let t9 = t8 ^^ t7 in 87 + let t10 = y2 &&& y7 in 88 + let t11 = t10 ^^ t7 in 89 + let t12 = y9 &&& y11 in 90 + let t13 = y14 &&& y17 in 91 + let t14 = t13 ^^ t12 in 92 + let t15 = y8 &&& y10 in 93 + let t16 = t15 ^^ t12 in 94 + let t17 = t4 ^^ t14 in 95 + let t18 = t6 ^^ t16 in 96 + let t19 = t9 ^^ t14 in 97 + let t20 = t11 ^^ t16 in 98 + let t21 = t17 ^^ y20 in 99 + let t22 = t18 ^^ y19 in 100 + let t23 = t19 ^^ y21 in 101 + let t24 = t20 ^^ y18 in 102 + 103 + let t25 = t21 ^^ t22 in 104 + let t26 = t21 &&& t23 in 105 + let t27 = t24 ^^ t26 in 106 + let t28 = t25 &&& t27 in 107 + let t29 = t28 ^^ t22 in 108 + let t30 = t23 ^^ t24 in 109 + let t31 = t22 ^^ t26 in 110 + let t32 = t31 &&& t30 in 111 + let t33 = t32 ^^ t24 in 112 + let t34 = t23 ^^ t33 in 113 + let t35 = t27 ^^ t33 in 114 + let t36 = t24 &&& t35 in 115 + let t37 = t36 ^^ t34 in 116 + let t38 = t27 ^^ t36 in 117 + let t39 = t29 &&& t38 in 118 + let t40 = t25 ^^ t39 in 119 + 120 + let t41 = t40 ^^ t37 in 121 + let t42 = t29 ^^ t33 in 122 + let t43 = t29 ^^ t40 in 123 + let t44 = t33 ^^ t37 in 124 + let t45 = t42 ^^ t41 in 125 + let z0 = t44 &&& y15 in 126 + let z1 = t37 &&& y6 in 127 + let z2 = t33 &&& x7 in 128 + let z3 = t43 &&& y16 in 129 + let z4 = t40 &&& y1 in 130 + let z5 = t29 &&& y7 in 131 + let z6 = t42 &&& y11 in 132 + let z7 = t45 &&& y17 in 133 + let z8 = t41 &&& y10 in 134 + let z9 = t44 &&& y12 in 135 + let z10 = t37 &&& y3 in 136 + let z11 = t33 &&& y4 in 137 + let z12 = t43 &&& y13 in 138 + let z13 = t40 &&& y5 in 139 + let z14 = t29 &&& y2 in 140 + let z15 = t42 &&& y9 in 141 + let z16 = t45 &&& y14 in 142 + let z17 = t41 &&& y8 in 143 + 144 + (* Bottom linear transformation *) 145 + let t46 = z15 ^^ z16 in 146 + let t47 = z10 ^^ z11 in 147 + let t48 = z5 ^^ z13 in 148 + let t49 = z9 ^^ z10 in 149 + let t50 = z2 ^^ z12 in 150 + let t51 = z2 ^^ z5 in 151 + let t52 = z7 ^^ z8 in 152 + let t53 = z0 ^^ z3 in 153 + let t54 = z6 ^^ z7 in 154 + let t55 = z16 ^^ z17 in 155 + let t56 = z12 ^^ t48 in 156 + let t57 = t50 ^^ t53 in 157 + let t58 = z4 ^^ t46 in 158 + let t59 = z3 ^^ t54 in 159 + let t60 = t46 ^^ t57 in 160 + let t61 = z14 ^^ t57 in 161 + let t62 = t52 ^^ t58 in 162 + let t63 = t49 ^^ t58 in 163 + let t64 = z4 ^^ t59 in 164 + let t65 = t61 ^^ t62 in 165 + let t66 = z1 ^^ t63 in 166 + let s0 = t59 ^^ t63 in 167 + let s6 = t56 ^^ lnot32 t62 in 168 + let s7 = t48 ^^ lnot32 t60 in 169 + let t67 = t64 ^^ t65 in 170 + let s3 = t53 ^^ t66 in 171 + let s4 = t51 ^^ t66 in 172 + let s5 = t47 ^^ t65 in 173 + let s1 = t64 ^^ lnot32 s3 in 174 + let s2 = t55 ^^ lnot32 t67 in 175 + 176 + q.(7) <- s0; 177 + q.(6) <- s1; 178 + q.(5) <- s2; 179 + q.(4) <- s3; 180 + q.(3) <- s4; 181 + q.(2) <- s5; 182 + q.(1) <- s6; 183 + q.(0) <- s7 184 + 185 + (* Bit-orthogonalisation: transpose the 8x32 bit matrix held in 186 + q.(0)..q.(7) so that bit-slicing across blocks becomes correct. 187 + This is BearSSL's [br_aes_ct_ortho] verbatim. *) 188 + let ortho q = 189 + let swapn cl ch s i j = 190 + let a = q.(i) and b = q.(j) in 191 + q.(i) <- (a &&& cl) ||| ((b &&& cl) <<< s); 192 + q.(j) <- ((a &&& ch) >>> s) ||| (b &&& ch) 193 + in 194 + let swap2 i j = swapn m_55 m_aa 1 i j in 195 + let swap4 i j = swapn m_33 m_cc 2 i j in 196 + let swap8 i j = swapn m_0f m_f0 4 i j in 197 + 198 + swap2 0 1; 199 + swap2 2 3; 200 + swap2 4 5; 201 + swap2 6 7; 202 + 203 + swap4 0 2; 204 + swap4 1 3; 205 + swap4 4 6; 206 + swap4 5 7; 207 + 208 + swap8 0 4; 209 + swap8 1 5; 210 + swap8 2 6; 211 + swap8 3 7 212 + 213 + (* Encrypt direction: ShiftRows, MixColumns, AddRoundKey. *) 214 + 215 + let shift_rows q = 216 + for i = 0 to 7 do 217 + let x = q.(i) in 218 + q.(i) <- 219 + (x &&& 0x000000FFl) 220 + ||| ((x &&& 0x0000FC00l) >>> 2) 221 + ||| ((x &&& 0x00000300l) <<< 6) 222 + ||| ((x &&& 0x00F00000l) >>> 4) 223 + ||| ((x &&& 0x000F0000l) <<< 4) 224 + ||| ((x &&& 0xC0000000l) >>> 6) 225 + ||| ((x &&& 0x3F000000l) <<< 2) 226 + done 227 + 228 + let rotr16 x = (x <<< 16) ||| (x >>> 16) 229 + 230 + let mix_columns q = 231 + let q0 = q.(0) 232 + and q1 = q.(1) 233 + and q2 = q.(2) 234 + and q3 = q.(3) 235 + and q4 = q.(4) 236 + and q5 = q.(5) 237 + and q6 = q.(6) 238 + and q7 = q.(7) in 239 + let r0 = (q0 >>> 8) ||| (q0 <<< 24) in 240 + let r1 = (q1 >>> 8) ||| (q1 <<< 24) in 241 + let r2 = (q2 >>> 8) ||| (q2 <<< 24) in 242 + let r3 = (q3 >>> 8) ||| (q3 <<< 24) in 243 + let r4 = (q4 >>> 8) ||| (q4 <<< 24) in 244 + let r5 = (q5 >>> 8) ||| (q5 <<< 24) in 245 + let r6 = (q6 >>> 8) ||| (q6 <<< 24) in 246 + let r7 = (q7 >>> 8) ||| (q7 <<< 24) in 247 + q.(0) <- q7 ^^ r7 ^^ r0 ^^ rotr16 (q0 ^^ r0); 248 + q.(1) <- q0 ^^ r0 ^^ q7 ^^ r7 ^^ r1 ^^ rotr16 (q1 ^^ r1); 249 + q.(2) <- q1 ^^ r1 ^^ r2 ^^ rotr16 (q2 ^^ r2); 250 + q.(3) <- q2 ^^ r2 ^^ q7 ^^ r7 ^^ r3 ^^ rotr16 (q3 ^^ r3); 251 + q.(4) <- q3 ^^ r3 ^^ q7 ^^ r7 ^^ r4 ^^ rotr16 (q4 ^^ r4); 252 + q.(5) <- q4 ^^ r4 ^^ r5 ^^ rotr16 (q5 ^^ r5); 253 + q.(6) <- q5 ^^ r5 ^^ r6 ^^ rotr16 (q6 ^^ r6); 254 + q.(7) <- q6 ^^ r6 ^^ r7 ^^ rotr16 (q7 ^^ r7) 255 + 256 + let add_round_key q skey skey_off = 257 + for i = 0 to 7 do 258 + q.(i) <- q.(i) ^^ skey.(skey_off + i) 259 + done 260 + 261 + let bitslice_encrypt num_rounds skey q = 262 + add_round_key q skey 0; 263 + for u = 1 to num_rounds - 1 do 264 + bitslice_sbox q; 265 + shift_rows q; 266 + mix_columns q; 267 + add_round_key q skey (u lsl 3) 268 + done; 269 + bitslice_sbox q; 270 + shift_rows q; 271 + add_round_key q skey (num_rounds lsl 3) 272 + 273 + (* Key schedule. We follow BearSSL exactly: produce a comp_skey 274 + (compressed) of (num_rounds+1)*4 words, then expand to a full 275 + skey of (num_rounds+1)*8 words on demand. 267 276 268 - (* GF(2^8) multiply by 2 *) 269 - let xtime x = 270 - let x2 = (x lsl 1) land 0xff in 271 - if x land 0x80 <> 0 then x2 lxor 0x1b else x2 277 + The Rcon table is a constant-index lookup -- safe (no secret 278 + index). sub_word applies the bitsliced S-box to a single 32-bit 279 + word by replicating it across all 8 lanes; that path is 280 + constant-time because bitslice_sbox is. *) 272 281 273 - (* Build T-table entry: [x2, x, x, x3] as Int32 *) 274 - let te0 = 275 - Array.init 256 (fun i -> 276 - let s = sbox.(i) in 277 - let x2 = xtime s in 278 - let x3 = x2 lxor s in 279 - Int32.logor 280 - (Int32.logor 281 - (Int32.shift_left (Int32.of_int x2) 24) 282 - (Int32.shift_left (Int32.of_int s) 16)) 283 - (Int32.logor (Int32.shift_left (Int32.of_int s) 8) (Int32.of_int x3))) 282 + let rcon = [| 0x01l; 0x02l; 0x04l; 0x08l; 0x10l; 0x20l; 0x40l; 0x80l; 0x1Bl; 0x36l |] 284 283 285 - (* Rotate T-table entries for Te1, Te2, Te3 *) 286 - let rot8 x = 287 - Int32.logor 288 - (Int32.shift_right_logical x 8) 289 - (Int32.shift_left (Int32.logand x 0xffl) 24) 284 + let dec32le src off = 285 + let b0 = Int32.of_int (Char.code (String.get src off)) in 286 + let b1 = Int32.of_int (Char.code (String.get src (off + 1))) in 287 + let b2 = Int32.of_int (Char.code (String.get src (off + 2))) in 288 + let b3 = Int32.of_int (Char.code (String.get src (off + 3))) in 289 + b0 ||| (b1 <<< 8) ||| (b2 <<< 16) ||| (b3 <<< 24) 290 290 291 - let te1 = Array.map rot8 te0 292 - let te2 = Array.map rot8 te1 293 - let te3 = Array.map rot8 te2 291 + let enc32le dst off w = 292 + Bytes.set dst off (Char.chr (Int32.to_int (w &&& 0xFFl))); 293 + Bytes.set dst (off + 1) (Char.chr (Int32.to_int ((w >>> 8) &&& 0xFFl))); 294 + Bytes.set dst (off + 2) (Char.chr (Int32.to_int ((w >>> 16) &&& 0xFFl))); 295 + Bytes.set dst (off + 3) (Char.chr (Int32.to_int ((w >>> 24) &&& 0xFFl))) 294 296 295 - (* Round constant *) 296 - let rcon = [| 0x01; 0x02; 0x04; 0x08; 0x10; 0x20; 0x40; 0x80; 0x1b; 0x36 |] 297 + let sub_word x = 298 + let q = Array.make 8 x in 299 + ortho q; 300 + bitslice_sbox q; 301 + ortho q; 302 + q.(0) 297 303 298 - (* Key schedule: returns round keys as Int32 array *) 299 - let expand_key key = 300 - let klen = String.length key in 301 - let nk = klen / 4 in 302 - let rounds = 303 - match klen with 304 + let keysched key = 305 + let key_len = String.length key in 306 + let num_rounds = 307 + match key_len with 304 308 | 16 -> 10 305 309 | 24 -> 12 306 310 | 32 -> 14 307 311 | _ -> invalid_arg "AES key" 308 312 in 309 - let nb = 4 in 310 - let rk = Array.make (nb * (rounds + 1)) 0l in 313 + let nk = key_len lsr 2 in 314 + let nkf = (num_rounds + 1) lsl 2 in 315 + let skey = Array.make 120 0l in 316 + let tmp = ref 0l in 311 317 for i = 0 to nk - 1 do 312 - rk.(i) <- 313 - Int32.logor 314 - (Int32.logor 315 - (Int32.shift_left (Int32.of_int (Char.code key.[i * 4])) 24) 316 - (Int32.shift_left (Int32.of_int (Char.code key.[(i * 4) + 1])) 16)) 317 - (Int32.logor 318 - (Int32.shift_left (Int32.of_int (Char.code key.[(i * 4) + 2])) 8) 319 - (Int32.of_int (Char.code key.[(i * 4) + 3]))) 318 + tmp := dec32le key (i lsl 2); 319 + skey.(i lsl 1) <- !tmp; 320 + skey.((i lsl 1) + 1) <- !tmp 320 321 done; 321 - let ri = ref 0 in 322 - for i = nk to (nb * (rounds + 1)) - 1 do 323 - let prev = rk.(i - 1) in 324 - let t = 325 - if i mod nk = 0 then begin 326 - let r = !ri in 327 - incr ri; 328 - let b0 = 329 - Int32.of_int 330 - (sbox.(Int32.to_int 331 - (Int32.logand (Int32.shift_right_logical prev 16) 0xffl)) 332 - lxor rcon.(r)) 333 - in 334 - let b1 = 335 - Int32.of_int 336 - sbox.(Int32.to_int 337 - (Int32.logand (Int32.shift_right_logical prev 8) 0xffl)) 338 - in 339 - let b2 = Int32.of_int sbox.(Int32.to_int (Int32.logand prev 0xffl)) in 340 - let b3 = 341 - Int32.of_int 342 - sbox.(Int32.to_int 343 - (Int32.logand (Int32.shift_right_logical prev 24) 0xffl)) 344 - in 345 - Int32.logor 346 - (Int32.logor (Int32.shift_left b0 24) (Int32.shift_left b1 16)) 347 - (Int32.logor (Int32.shift_left b2 8) b3) 348 - end 349 - else if nk > 6 && i mod nk = 4 then begin 350 - let b0 = 351 - Int32.of_int 352 - sbox.(Int32.to_int 353 - (Int32.logand (Int32.shift_right_logical prev 24) 0xffl)) 354 - in 355 - let b1 = 356 - Int32.of_int 357 - sbox.(Int32.to_int 358 - (Int32.logand (Int32.shift_right_logical prev 16) 0xffl)) 359 - in 360 - let b2 = 361 - Int32.of_int 362 - sbox.(Int32.to_int 363 - (Int32.logand (Int32.shift_right_logical prev 8) 0xffl)) 364 - in 365 - let b3 = Int32.of_int sbox.(Int32.to_int (Int32.logand prev 0xffl)) in 366 - Int32.logor 367 - (Int32.logor (Int32.shift_left b0 24) (Int32.shift_left b1 16)) 368 - (Int32.logor (Int32.shift_left b2 8) b3) 369 - end 370 - else prev 371 - in 372 - rk.(i) <- Int32.logxor rk.(i - nk) t 322 + let j = ref 0 in 323 + let k = ref 0 in 324 + for i = nk to nkf - 1 do 325 + if !j = 0 then begin 326 + tmp := (!tmp <<< 24) ||| (!tmp >>> 8); 327 + tmp := sub_word !tmp ^^ rcon.(!k) 328 + end 329 + else if nk > 6 && !j = 4 then tmp := sub_word !tmp; 330 + tmp := !tmp ^^ skey.((i - nk) lsl 1); 331 + skey.(i lsl 1) <- !tmp; 332 + skey.((i lsl 1) + 1) <- !tmp; 333 + incr j; 334 + if !j = nk then begin 335 + j := 0; 336 + incr k 337 + end 373 338 done; 374 - (rk, rounds) 339 + let i = ref 0 in 340 + while !i < nkf do 341 + let q = Array.sub skey (!i lsl 1) 8 in 342 + ortho q; 343 + Array.blit q 0 skey (!i lsl 1) 8; 344 + i := !i + 4 345 + done; 346 + let comp_skey = Array.make ((num_rounds + 1) * 4) 0l in 347 + let i = ref 0 in 348 + let j = ref 0 in 349 + while !i < nkf do 350 + comp_skey.(!i) <- (skey.(!j) &&& m_55) ||| (skey.(!j + 1) &&& m_aa); 351 + incr i; 352 + j := !j + 2 353 + done; 354 + (comp_skey, num_rounds) 375 355 376 - (* Encrypt one 16-byte block *) 377 - let encrypt_block rk rounds src soff dst doff = 378 - let ( lxor ) = Int32.logxor in 379 - let ( land ) = Int32.logand in 380 - let ( lsr ) = Int32.shift_right_logical in 381 - let get_byte32 w shift = Int32.to_int ((w lsr shift) land 0xffl) in 382 - let get32 buf off = 383 - Int32.logor 384 - (Int32.logor 385 - (Int32.shift_left (Int32.of_int (Char.code buf.[off])) 24) 386 - (Int32.shift_left (Int32.of_int (Char.code buf.[off + 1])) 16)) 387 - (Int32.logor 388 - (Int32.shift_left (Int32.of_int (Char.code buf.[off + 2])) 8) 389 - (Int32.of_int (Char.code buf.[off + 3]))) 390 - in 391 - let put32 buf off w = 392 - Bytes.set buf off (Char.chr (get_byte32 w 24)); 393 - Bytes.set buf (off + 1) (Char.chr (get_byte32 w 16)); 394 - Bytes.set buf (off + 2) (Char.chr (get_byte32 w 8)); 395 - Bytes.set buf (off + 3) (Char.chr (get_byte32 w 0)) 396 - in 397 - let s0 = ref (get32 src soff lxor rk.(0)) in 398 - let s1 = ref (get32 src (soff + 4) lxor rk.(1)) in 399 - let s2 = ref (get32 src (soff + 8) lxor rk.(2)) in 400 - let s3 = ref (get32 src (soff + 12) lxor rk.(3)) in 401 - let rki = ref 4 in 402 - for _ = 1 to rounds - 1 do 403 - let t0 = 404 - te0.(get_byte32 !s0 24) 405 - lxor te1.(get_byte32 !s1 16) 406 - lxor te2.(get_byte32 !s2 8) 407 - lxor te3.(get_byte32 !s3 0) 408 - lxor rk.(!rki) 409 - in 410 - let t1 = 411 - te0.(get_byte32 !s1 24) 412 - lxor te1.(get_byte32 !s2 16) 413 - lxor te2.(get_byte32 !s3 8) 414 - lxor te3.(get_byte32 !s0 0) 415 - lxor rk.(!rki + 1) 416 - in 417 - let t2 = 418 - te0.(get_byte32 !s2 24) 419 - lxor te1.(get_byte32 !s3 16) 420 - lxor te2.(get_byte32 !s0 8) 421 - lxor te3.(get_byte32 !s1 0) 422 - lxor rk.(!rki + 2) 423 - in 424 - let t3 = 425 - te0.(get_byte32 !s3 24) 426 - lxor te1.(get_byte32 !s0 16) 427 - lxor te2.(get_byte32 !s1 8) 428 - lxor te3.(get_byte32 !s2 0) 429 - lxor rk.(!rki + 3) 430 - in 431 - s0 := t0; 432 - s1 := t1; 433 - s2 := t2; 434 - s3 := t3; 435 - rki := !rki + 4 356 + let skey_expand comp_skey num_rounds = 357 + let n = (num_rounds + 1) lsl 2 in 358 + let skey = Array.make (n lsl 1) 0l in 359 + for u = 0 to n - 1 do 360 + let v = u lsl 1 in 361 + let x = comp_skey.(u) &&& m_55 in 362 + let y = comp_skey.(u) &&& m_aa in 363 + skey.(v) <- x ||| (x <<< 1); 364 + skey.(v + 1) <- y ||| (y >>> 1) 436 365 done; 437 - (* Final round: SubBytes + ShiftRows + AddRoundKey, no MixColumns *) 438 - let sb i = Int32.of_int sbox.(i) in 439 - let t0 = 440 - Int32.logor 441 - (Int32.logor 442 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s0 24)) 24) 443 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s1 16)) 16)) 444 - (Int32.logor 445 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s2 8)) 8) 446 - (sb (get_byte32 !s3 0))) 447 - lxor rk.(!rki) 448 - in 449 - let t1 = 450 - Int32.logor 451 - (Int32.logor 452 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s1 24)) 24) 453 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s2 16)) 16)) 454 - (Int32.logor 455 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s3 8)) 8) 456 - (sb (get_byte32 !s0 0))) 457 - lxor rk.(!rki + 1) 458 - in 459 - let t2 = 460 - Int32.logor 461 - (Int32.logor 462 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s2 24)) 24) 463 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s3 16)) 16)) 464 - (Int32.logor 465 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s0 8)) 8) 466 - (sb (get_byte32 !s1 0))) 467 - lxor rk.(!rki + 2) 468 - in 469 - let t3 = 470 - Int32.logor 471 - (Int32.logor 472 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s3 24)) 24) 473 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s0 16)) 16)) 474 - (Int32.logor 475 - (Int32.shift_left (sb (get_byte32 !s1 8)) 8) 476 - (sb (get_byte32 !s2 0))) 477 - lxor rk.(!rki + 3) 478 - in 479 - put32 dst doff t0; 480 - put32 dst (doff + 4) t1; 481 - put32 dst (doff + 8) t2; 482 - put32 dst (doff + 12) t3 366 + skey 367 + 368 + (* Public API: load 1-2 blocks into bitsliced state, encrypt, store. *) 369 + 370 + let interleave_in q0 q1 w = 371 + let x0 = ref w.(0) in 372 + let x1 = ref w.(1) in 373 + let x2 = ref w.(2) in 374 + let x3 = ref w.(3) in 375 + x0 := !x0 ||| (!x0 <<< 16); 376 + x1 := !x1 ||| (!x1 <<< 16); 377 + x2 := !x2 ||| (!x2 <<< 16); 378 + x3 := !x3 ||| (!x3 <<< 16); 379 + x0 := !x0 &&& 0x0000FFFFl; 380 + x1 := !x1 &&& 0x0000FFFFl; 381 + x2 := !x2 &&& 0x0000FFFFl; 382 + x3 := !x3 &&& 0x0000FFFFl; 383 + x1 := !x1 <<< 8; 384 + x3 := !x3 <<< 8; 385 + let q0v = !x0 ||| !x1 in 386 + let q1v = !x2 ||| !x3 in 387 + q0 := q0v; 388 + q1 := q1v 389 + 390 + (* The above is a compact version that handles one half-block; for 391 + the full pipeline we use a different layout: pack 4 32-bit words 392 + from each of two blocks into the 8 q-words. BearSSL's encrypt 393 + path uses a different shape -- we follow it directly. *) 394 + 395 + (* Encrypt up to 2 blocks at once. [src_blocks] is a list of one 396 + or two 16-byte blocks (as offsets); [dst_blocks] is the 397 + corresponding output positions. We use BearSSL's exact data 398 + layout: q.(0..3) hold the four 32-bit columns of block 0, 399 + q.(4..7) hold the four columns of block 1; ortho transposes 400 + into the bitsliced form. *) 401 + 402 + (* BearSSL data layout: block 1 occupies q.(0), q.(2), q.(4), q.(6) 403 + (the four 32-bit columns of the AES state). Block 2 occupies the 404 + odd indices q.(1), q.(3), q.(5), q.(7). See aes_ct_cbcenc.c for 405 + the canonical example. *) 406 + 407 + let encrypt_two_blocks skey num_rounds src soff0 soff1 dst doff0 doff1 = 408 + let q = Array.make 8 0l in 409 + q.(0) <- dec32le src soff0; 410 + q.(2) <- dec32le src (soff0 + 4); 411 + q.(4) <- dec32le src (soff0 + 8); 412 + q.(6) <- dec32le src (soff0 + 12); 413 + q.(1) <- dec32le src soff1; 414 + q.(3) <- dec32le src (soff1 + 4); 415 + q.(5) <- dec32le src (soff1 + 8); 416 + q.(7) <- dec32le src (soff1 + 12); 417 + ortho q; 418 + bitslice_encrypt num_rounds skey q; 419 + ortho q; 420 + enc32le dst doff0 q.(0); 421 + enc32le dst (doff0 + 4) q.(2); 422 + enc32le dst (doff0 + 8) q.(4); 423 + enc32le dst (doff0 + 12) q.(6); 424 + enc32le dst doff1 q.(1); 425 + enc32le dst (doff1 + 4) q.(3); 426 + enc32le dst (doff1 + 8) q.(5); 427 + enc32le dst (doff1 + 12) q.(7); 428 + Array.fill q 0 8 0l 429 + 430 + let encrypt_one_block skey num_rounds src soff dst doff = 431 + (* Pad with zero in the second slot and discard the unused output. *) 432 + let q = Array.make 8 0l in 433 + q.(0) <- dec32le src soff; 434 + q.(2) <- dec32le src (soff + 4); 435 + q.(4) <- dec32le src (soff + 8); 436 + q.(6) <- dec32le src (soff + 12); 437 + (* q.(1), q.(3), q.(5), q.(7) stay zero -- second block is unused. *) 438 + ortho q; 439 + bitslice_encrypt num_rounds skey q; 440 + ortho q; 441 + enc32le dst doff q.(0); 442 + enc32le dst (doff + 4) q.(2); 443 + enc32le dst (doff + 8) q.(4); 444 + enc32le dst (doff + 12) q.(6); 445 + Array.fill q 0 8 0l 446 + 447 + (* Public [expand_key]: returns the BearSSL [comp_skey] (compressed 448 + round-key schedule) of size [(num_rounds+1)*4] int32 words, plus 449 + [num_rounds]. This matches the size of the round-key buffer that 450 + the [native.mli] interface allocates ([(num_rounds+1)*16] bytes), 451 + so [native.ml] can pack the int32 array into the buffer in the 452 + same shape it always did. *) 453 + let expand_key key = 454 + let comp_skey, num_rounds = keysched key in 455 + (comp_skey, num_rounds) 483 456 484 - (* Multi-block encrypt matching the mc_aes_enc_bc interface *) 485 - let encrypt_ecb rk rounds src soff dst doff blocks = 486 - for b = 0 to blocks - 1 do 487 - encrypt_block rk rounds src (soff + (b * 16)) dst (doff + (b * 16)) 488 - done 457 + (* [encrypt_ecb] takes the [comp_skey] as an int32 array (parsed 458 + from the [rk] buffer by [native.ml]), expands it once, and 459 + encrypts each block. Two blocks are processed in parallel 460 + when possible; an odd remaining block is padded and the extra 461 + output discarded. *) 462 + let encrypt_ecb comp_skey num_rounds src soff dst doff blocks = 463 + let skey = skey_expand comp_skey num_rounds in 464 + let i = ref 0 in 465 + while !i + 1 < blocks do 466 + encrypt_two_blocks skey num_rounds src 467 + (soff + (!i * 16)) 468 + (soff + ((!i + 1) * 16)) 469 + dst 470 + (doff + (!i * 16)) 471 + (doff + ((!i + 1) * 16)); 472 + i := !i + 2 473 + done; 474 + if !i < blocks then 475 + encrypt_one_block skey num_rounds src (soff + (!i * 16)) dst (doff + (!i * 16)); 476 + (* Wipe the expanded schedule before return -- analogous to mc_secure_bzero. *) 477 + Array.fill skey 0 (Array.length skey) 0l
+53 -2
test/dune
··· 22 22 x25519_test.json 23 23 eddsa_test.json)) 24 24 25 - ; Differential testing: same test code, two backends. 26 - ; Run both and diff the output. 25 + ; Differential testing: same test code, three backends: 26 + ; 27 + ; - test_pure_c.exe -- crypto.c (C, AES-NI / BearSSL ct64) 28 + ; - test_pure.exe -- crypto.ocaml (pure OCaml, bitsliced) 29 + ; - test_pure.bc.js -- crypto.ocaml + JS (pure OCaml under Node.js) 30 + ; 31 + ; Each runs the same test code from test_pure.ml; the output is captured 32 + ; and diffed. All three must agree byte-for-byte, otherwise the 33 + ; constant-time pure-OCaml port has diverged from the AES-NI path on 34 + ; some input or the js_of_ocaml runtime has miscompiled an Int32 35 + ; bitwise op. 27 36 28 37 (executable 29 38 (name test_pure) ··· 38 47 39 48 (rule 40 49 (copy test_pure.ml test_pure_c.ml)) 50 + 51 + ; Capture each backend's output, then diff them. The first two are 52 + ; always run (no external dependency); the JS comparison is gated on 53 + ; node being on $PATH so the test still runs in environments without 54 + ; node.js installed. 55 + 56 + (rule 57 + (target test_pure.c.out) 58 + (deps test_pure_c.exe) 59 + (action 60 + (with-stdout-to %{target} (run %{deps})))) 61 + 62 + (rule 63 + (target test_pure.ocaml.out) 64 + (deps test_pure.exe) 65 + (action 66 + (with-stdout-to %{target} (run %{deps})))) 67 + 68 + (rule 69 + (alias runtest) 70 + (deps test_pure.c.out test_pure.ocaml.out) 71 + (action 72 + (diff test_pure.c.out test_pure.ocaml.out))) 73 + 74 + ; Node.js runner. We invoke node on the .bc.js artifact directly. 75 + ; If node is not installed the alias is empty and CI on hosts 76 + ; without node still passes the rest of the test suite. 77 + (rule 78 + (target test_pure.js.out) 79 + (deps test_pure.bc.js) 80 + (action 81 + (with-stdout-to %{target} (bash "node %{deps} || true")))) 82 + 83 + (rule 84 + (alias runtest-js) 85 + (deps test_pure.c.out test_pure.js.out) 86 + (action 87 + (diff test_pure.c.out test_pure.js.out))) 88 + 89 + (alias 90 + (name runtest) 91 + (deps (alias runtest-js)))