Remove WASM exports that leak sensitive material into JS
Two wasm-bindgen exports were reaching across the security boundary
and had zero TS consumers:
- `WasmOpakeHandle::session()` serialized the entire `Session` (access
token, refresh token, DPoP private key) to JS, directly contradicting
the documented WASM security boundary — JS can't zeroize memory, so
tokens that cross end up retained on the runtime's GC schedule.
`tokenExpiresAt()` and `getDid()` cover every legitimate read.
- `WasmFileManagerHandle::fetchContentKey` returned a raw AES-256
content key as `Uint8Array`. Content keys are "WASM only" per the
sensitive-data policy; no call site on the JS side needed this.
Internal Rust callers (`XrpcClient::session`, `FileManager::fetch_content_key`)
remain — they're used by CLI and by WASM's own internal plumbing, which
is what the bindings are supposed to be abstracting.