Linux kernel mirror (for testing)
git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel
os
linux
libceph: Use HMAC-SHA256 library instead of crypto_shash
Use the HMAC-SHA256 library functions instead of crypto_shash. This is
simpler and faster.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
authored by
Eric Biggers
and committed by
Ilya Dryomov
27c0a7b0
e5f0a698
+26
-58
+3
-1
include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
+3
-1
include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
···
2
2
#ifndef __FS_CEPH_MESSENGER_H
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#define __FS_CEPH_MESSENGER_H
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#include <crypto/sha2.h>
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#include <linux/bvec.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/kref.h>
···
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struct ceph_msg_data_cursor in_cursor;
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struct ceph_msg_data_cursor out_cursor;
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-
struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; /* post-auth signature */
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struct hmac_sha256_key hmac_key; /* post-auth signature */
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bool hmac_key_set;
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struct crypto_aead *gcm_tfm; /* on-wire encryption */
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struct aead_request *gcm_req;
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struct crypto_wait gcm_wait;
+1
-2
net/ceph/Kconfig
+1
-2
net/ceph/Kconfig
+22
-55
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
+22
-55
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
···
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dout("%s con %p con_mode %d session_key_len %d con_secret_len %d\n",
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__func__, con, con->v2.con_mode, session_key_len, con_secret_len);
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WARN_ON(con->v2.hmac_tfm || con->v2.gcm_tfm || con->v2.gcm_req);
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WARN_ON(con->v2.hmac_key_set || con->v2.gcm_tfm || con->v2.gcm_req);
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if (con->v2.con_mode != CEPH_CON_MODE_CRC &&
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con->v2.con_mode != CEPH_CON_MODE_SECURE) {
···
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return 0; /* auth_none */
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}
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noio_flag = memalloc_noio_save();
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con->v2.hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(sha256)", 0, 0);
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memalloc_noio_restore(noio_flag);
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if (IS_ERR(con->v2.hmac_tfm)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(con->v2.hmac_tfm);
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con->v2.hmac_tfm = NULL;
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pr_err("failed to allocate hmac tfm context: %d\n", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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ret = crypto_shash_setkey(con->v2.hmac_tfm, session_key,
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session_key_len);
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if (ret) {
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pr_err("failed to set hmac key: %d\n", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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hmac_sha256_preparekey(&con->v2.hmac_key, session_key, session_key_len);
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con->v2.hmac_key_set = true;
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if (con->v2.con_mode == CEPH_CON_MODE_CRC) {
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WARN_ON(con_secret_len);
···
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return 0; /* auth_x, secure mode */
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}
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-
static int ceph_hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con,
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const struct kvec *kvecs, int kvec_cnt, u8 *hmac)
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static void ceph_hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con,
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const struct kvec *kvecs, int kvec_cnt,
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u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE])
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{
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SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, con->v2.hmac_tfm); /* tfm arg is ignored */
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int ret;
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struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx;
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int i;
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dout("%s con %p hmac_tfm %p kvec_cnt %d\n", __func__, con,
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con->v2.hmac_tfm, kvec_cnt);
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dout("%s con %p hmac_key_set %d kvec_cnt %d\n", __func__, con,
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con->v2.hmac_key_set, kvec_cnt);
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if (!con->v2.hmac_tfm) {
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if (!con->v2.hmac_key_set) {
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memset(hmac, 0, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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return 0; /* auth_none */
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return; /* auth_none */
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}
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desc->tfm = con->v2.hmac_tfm;
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ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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for (i = 0; i < kvec_cnt; i++) {
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, kvecs[i].iov_base,
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kvecs[i].iov_len);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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}
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ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, hmac);
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out:
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shash_desc_zero(desc);
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return ret; /* auth_x, both plain and secure modes */
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/* auth_x, both plain and secure modes */
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hmac_sha256_init(&ctx, &con->v2.hmac_key);
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for (i = 0; i < kvec_cnt; i++)
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hmac_sha256_update(&ctx, kvecs[i].iov_base, kvecs[i].iov_len);
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hmac_sha256_final(&ctx, hmac);
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}
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static void gcm_inc_nonce(struct ceph_gcm_nonce *nonce)
···
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static int prepare_auth_signature(struct ceph_connection *con)
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{
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void *buf;
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int ret;
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buf = alloc_conn_buf(con, head_onwire_len(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
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con_secure(con)));
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if (!buf)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ret = ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs,
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con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt, CTRL_BODY(buf));
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs, con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt,
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CTRL_BODY(buf));
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return prepare_control(con, FRAME_TAG_AUTH_SIGNATURE, buf,
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SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
···
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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-
ret = ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs,
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con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt, hmac);
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if (ret)
2437
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return ret;
2463
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ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs, con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt,
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hmac);
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ceph_decode_need(&p, end, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, bad);
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if (crypto_memneq(p, hmac, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
···
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memzero_explicit(&con->v2.in_gcm_nonce, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
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memzero_explicit(&con->v2.out_gcm_nonce, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
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3816
3786
-
if (con->v2.hmac_tfm) {
3787
-
crypto_free_shash(con->v2.hmac_tfm);
3788
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con->v2.hmac_tfm = NULL;
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-
}
3817
+
memzero_explicit(&con->v2.hmac_key, sizeof(con->v2.hmac_key));
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con->v2.hmac_key_set = false;
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if (con->v2.gcm_req) {
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aead_request_free(con->v2.gcm_req);
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con->v2.gcm_req = NULL;