Linux kernel mirror (for testing)
git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel
os
linux
Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-6.12-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm fixes from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"Two bug fixes for TPM bus encryption (the remaining reported issues in
the feature)"
* tag 'tpmdd-next-6.12-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
tpm: Disable TPM on tpm2_create_primary() failure
tpm: Opt-in in disable PCR integrity protection
+87
-33
+9
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+9
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
···
6727
6727
torture.verbose_sleep_duration= [KNL]
6728
6728
Duration of each verbose-printk() sleep in jiffies.
6729
6729
6730
+
tpm.disable_pcr_integrity= [HW,TPM]
6731
+
Do not protect PCR registers from unintended physical
6732
+
access, or interposers in the bus by the means of
6733
+
having an integrity protected session wrapped around
6734
+
TPM2_PCR_Extend command. Consider this in a situation
6735
+
where TPM is heavily utilized by IMA, thus protection
6736
+
causing a major performance hit, and the space where
6737
+
machines are deployed is by other means guarded.
6738
+
6730
6739
tpm_suspend_pcr=[HW,TPM]
6731
6740
Format: integer pcr id
6732
6741
Specify that at suspend time, the tpm driver
+20
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
+20
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
···
147
147
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32);
148
148
149
149
/**
150
+
* tpm_buf_append_handle() - Add a handle
151
+
* @chip: &tpm_chip instance
152
+
* @buf: &tpm_buf instance
153
+
* @handle: a TPM object handle
154
+
*
155
+
* Add a handle to the buffer, and increase the count tracking the number of
156
+
* handles in the command buffer. Works only for command buffers.
157
+
*/
158
+
void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
159
+
{
160
+
if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) {
161
+
dev_err(&chip->dev, "Invalid buffer type (TPM2B)\n");
162
+
return;
163
+
}
164
+
165
+
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
166
+
buf->handles++;
167
+
}
168
+
169
+
/**
150
170
* tpm_buf_read() - Read from a TPM buffer
151
171
* @buf: &tpm_buf instance
152
172
* @offset: offset within the buffer
+22
-8
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+22
-8
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
···
14
14
#include "tpm.h"
15
15
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
16
16
17
+
static bool disable_pcr_integrity;
18
+
module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444);
19
+
MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable_pcr_integrity, "Disable integrity protection of TPM2_PCR_Extend");
20
+
17
21
static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
18
22
{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
19
23
{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
···
236
232
int rc;
237
233
int i;
238
234
239
-
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
240
-
if (rc)
241
-
return rc;
235
+
if (!disable_pcr_integrity) {
236
+
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
237
+
if (rc)
238
+
return rc;
239
+
}
242
240
243
241
rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
244
242
if (rc) {
245
-
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
243
+
if (!disable_pcr_integrity)
244
+
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
246
245
return rc;
247
246
}
248
247
249
-
tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL);
250
-
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0);
248
+
if (!disable_pcr_integrity) {
249
+
tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL);
250
+
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0);
251
+
} else {
252
+
tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx);
253
+
tpm_buf_append_auth(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0);
254
+
}
251
255
252
256
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, chip->nr_allocated_banks);
253
257
···
265
253
chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size);
266
254
}
267
255
268
-
tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
256
+
if (!disable_pcr_integrity)
257
+
tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
269
258
rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value");
270
-
rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
259
+
if (!disable_pcr_integrity)
260
+
rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
271
261
272
262
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
273
263
+33
-25
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+33
-25
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
···
237
237
#endif
238
238
239
239
if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
240
-
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
241
-
/* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */
242
-
buf->handles++;
240
+
tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle);
243
241
return;
244
242
}
245
243
···
269
271
#endif
270
272
}
271
273
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
274
+
275
+
void tpm_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
276
+
u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphrase_len)
277
+
{
278
+
/* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */
279
+
int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
280
+
u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len;
281
+
282
+
if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) {
283
+
/* not the first session so update the existing length */
284
+
len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]);
285
+
put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]);
286
+
} else {
287
+
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len);
288
+
}
289
+
/* auth handle */
290
+
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
291
+
/* nonce */
292
+
tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
293
+
/* attributes */
294
+
tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0);
295
+
/* passphrase */
296
+
tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphrase_len);
297
+
tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphrase_len);
298
+
}
272
299
273
300
/**
274
301
* tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element
···
332
309
#endif
333
310
334
311
if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
335
-
/* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */
336
-
int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
337
-
u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len;
338
-
339
-
if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) {
340
-
/* not the first session so update the existing length */
341
-
len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]);
342
-
put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]);
343
-
} else {
344
-
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len);
345
-
}
346
-
/* auth handle */
347
-
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
348
-
/* nonce */
349
-
tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
350
-
/* attributes */
351
-
tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0);
352
-
/* passphrase */
353
-
tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphrase_len);
354
-
tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphrase_len);
312
+
tpm_buf_append_auth(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase,
313
+
passphrase_len);
355
314
return;
356
315
}
357
316
···
953
948
/* Deduce from the name change TPM interference: */
954
949
dev_err(&chip->dev, "null key integrity check failed\n");
955
950
tpm2_flush_context(chip, tmp_null_key);
956
-
chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE;
957
951
958
952
err:
959
-
return rc ? -ENODEV : 0;
953
+
if (rc) {
954
+
chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE;
955
+
rc = -ENODEV;
956
+
}
957
+
return rc;
960
958
}
961
959
962
960
/**
+3
include/linux/tpm.h
+3
include/linux/tpm.h
···
421
421
u8 tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
422
422
u16 tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
423
423
u32 tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
424
+
void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle);
424
425
425
426
/*
426
427
* Check if TPM device is in the firmware upgrade mode.
···
506
505
void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
507
506
u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
508
507
int passphraselen);
508
+
void tpm_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
509
+
u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen);
509
510
static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip,
510
511
struct tpm_buf *buf,
511
512
u8 attributes,