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Merge tag 'ipe-pr-20260413' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe
Pull IPE update from Fan Wu:
"A single commit from Evan Ducas that fixes several spelling and
grammar mistakes in the IPE documentation. There are no functional
changes"
* tag 'ipe-pr-20260413' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe:
docs: security: ipe: fix typos and grammar
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Documentation/security/ipe.rst
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Documentation/security/ipe.rst
···
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*data files* on the system, that were critical to its function. These
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specific data files would not be readable unless they passed integrity
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policy. A mandatory access control system would be present, and
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as a result, xattrs would have to be protected. This lead to a selection
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as a result, xattrs would have to be protected. This led to a selection
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of what would provide the integrity claims. At the time, there were two
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main mechanisms considered that could guarantee integrity for the system
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with these requirements:
···
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can be handled in one of three ways:
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1. The policy file(s) live on disk and the kernel loads the policy prior
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to an code path that would result in an enforcement decision.
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to a code path that would result in an enforcement decision.
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2. The policy file(s) are passed by the bootloader to the kernel, who
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parses the policy.
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3. There is a policy file that is compiled into the kernel that is
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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As requirements change over time (vulnerabilities are found in previously
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trusted applications, keys roll, etcetera). Updating a kernel to change the
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meet those security goals is not always a suitable option, as updates are not
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trusted applications, keys roll, etcetera), updating a kernel to meet
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those security goals is not always a suitable option, as updates are not
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always risk-free, and blocking a security update leaves systems vulnerable.
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This means IPE requires a policy that can be completely updated (allowing
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revocations of existing policy) from a source external to the kernel (allowing
···
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Finally, IPE's policy is designed for sysadmins, not kernel developers. Instead
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of covering individual LSM hooks (or syscalls), IPE covers operations. This means
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instead of sysadmins needing to know that the syscalls ``mmap``, ``mprotect``,
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``execve``, and ``uselib`` must have rules protecting them, they must simple know
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``execve``, and ``uselib`` must have rules protecting them, they must simply know
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that they want to restrict code execution. This limits the amount of bypasses that
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could occur due to a lack of knowledge of the underlying system; whereas the
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maintainers of IPE, being kernel developers can make the correct choice to determine