Linux kernel mirror (for testing)
git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel
os
linux
apparmor: rename audit_data->label to audit_data->subj_label
rename audit_data's label field to subj_label to better reflect its
use. Also at the same time drop unneeded assignments to ->subj_label
as the later call to aa_check_perms will do the assignment if needed.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+17
-18
+3
-3
security/apparmor/audit.c
+3
-3
security/apparmor/audit.c
···
113
113
audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", ad->error);
114
114
}
115
115
116
-
if (ad->label) {
117
-
struct aa_label *label = ad->label;
116
+
if (ad->subj_label) {
117
+
struct aa_label *label = ad->subj_label;
118
118
119
119
if (label_isprofile(label)) {
120
120
struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
···
187
187
if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
188
188
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
189
189
190
-
ad->label = &profile->label;
190
+
ad->subj_label = &profile->label;
191
191
192
192
aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb);
193
193
+1
-1
security/apparmor/file.c
+1
-1
security/apparmor/file.c
···
67
67
68
68
if (ad->peer) {
69
69
audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
70
-
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->label), ad->peer,
70
+
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
71
71
FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, GFP_KERNEL);
72
72
} else if (ad->fs.target) {
73
73
audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
+1
-1
security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+1
-1
security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+1
-1
security/apparmor/ipc.c
+1
-1
security/apparmor/ipc.c
+2
-3
security/apparmor/lib.c
+2
-3
security/apparmor/lib.c
···
297
297
PERMS_NAMES_MASK);
298
298
}
299
299
audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
300
-
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->label), ad->peer,
300
+
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
301
301
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
302
302
}
303
303
···
357
357
typeof(*rules), list);
358
358
struct aa_perms perms;
359
359
360
-
ad->label = &profile->label;
361
360
ad->peer = &target->label;
362
361
ad->request = request;
363
362
···
418
419
}
419
420
420
421
if (ad) {
421
-
ad->label = &profile->label;
422
+
ad->subj_label = &profile->label;
422
423
ad->request = request;
423
424
ad->denied = denied;
424
425
ad->error = error;
+2
-2
security/apparmor/lsm.c
+2
-2
security/apparmor/lsm.c
···
722
722
return error;
723
723
724
724
fail:
725
-
ad.label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
725
+
ad.subj_label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
726
726
ad.info = name;
727
727
ad.error = error = -EINVAL;
728
728
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &ad, NULL);
729
-
end_current_label_crit_section(ad.label);
729
+
end_current_label_crit_section(ad.subj_label);
730
730
goto out;
731
731
}
732
732
+1
-1
security/apparmor/net.c
+1
-1
security/apparmor/net.c
+3
-3
security/apparmor/policy.c
+3
-3
security/apparmor/policy.c
···
733
733
734
734
/**
735
735
* audit_policy - Do auditing of policy changes
736
-
* @label: label to check if it can manage policy
736
+
* @subj_label: label to check if it can manage policy
737
737
* @op: policy operation being performed
738
738
* @ns_name: name of namespace being manipulated
739
739
* @name: name of profile being manipulated (NOT NULL)
···
742
742
*
743
743
* Returns: the error to be returned after audit is done
744
744
*/
745
-
static int audit_policy(struct aa_label *label, const char *op,
745
+
static int audit_policy(struct aa_label *subj_label, const char *op,
746
746
const char *ns_name, const char *name,
747
747
const char *info, int error)
748
748
{
···
752
752
ad.name = name;
753
753
ad.info = info;
754
754
ad.error = error;
755
-
ad.label = label;
755
+
ad.subj_label = subj_label;
756
756
757
757
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &ad, audit_cb);
758
758
+1
-1
security/apparmor/resource.c
+1
-1
security/apparmor/resource.c
+2
-2
security/apparmor/task.c
+2
-2
security/apparmor/task.c
···
217
217
}
218
218
}
219
219
audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
220
-
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->label), ad->peer,
220
+
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
221
221
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
222
222
}
223
223
···
263
263
if (&tracer->label == tracee)
264
264
return 0;
265
265
266
-
ad->label = &tracer->label;
266
+
ad->subj_label = &tracer->label;
267
267
ad->peer = tracee;
268
268
ad->request = 0;
269
269
ad->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,