Linux kernel mirror (for testing)
git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel
os
linux
pkcs7, x509: Rename ->digest to ->m
Rename ->digest and ->digest_len to ->m and ->m_size to represent the input
to the signature verification algorithm, reflecting that ->digest may no
longer actually *be* a digest.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
+26
-29
+2
-2
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+2
-2
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
···
593
593
{
594
594
struct public_key_signature sig = {
595
595
.s_size = params->in2_len,
596
-
.digest_size = params->in_len,
596
+
.m_size = params->in_len,
597
597
.encoding = params->encoding,
598
598
.hash_algo = params->hash_algo,
599
-
.digest = (void *)in,
599
+
.m = (void *)in,
600
600
.s = (void *)in2,
601
601
};
602
602
+14
-14
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+14
-14
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
···
31
31
kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
32
32
33
33
/* The digest was calculated already. */
34
-
if (sig->digest)
34
+
if (sig->m)
35
35
return 0;
36
36
37
37
if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
···
45
45
return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
46
46
47
47
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
48
-
sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
48
+
sig->m_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
49
49
50
50
ret = -ENOMEM;
51
-
sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
52
-
if (!sig->digest)
51
+
sig->m = kmalloc(sig->m_size, GFP_KERNEL);
52
+
if (!sig->m)
53
53
goto error_no_desc;
54
54
55
55
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
···
59
59
desc->tfm = tfm;
60
60
61
61
/* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
62
-
ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len,
63
-
sig->digest);
62
+
ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, sig->m);
64
63
if (ret < 0)
65
64
goto error;
66
-
pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
65
+
pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->m);
67
66
68
67
/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
69
68
* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
···
77
78
goto error;
78
79
}
79
80
80
-
if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
81
+
if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->m_size) {
81
82
pr_warn("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
82
83
sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
83
84
ret = -EBADMSG;
84
85
goto error;
85
86
}
86
87
87
-
if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
88
+
if (memcmp(sig->m, sinfo->msgdigest,
88
89
sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
89
90
pr_warn("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
90
91
sinfo->index);
···
97
98
* convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
98
99
* hash it.
99
100
*/
100
-
memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
101
+
memset(sig->m, 0, sig->m_size);
102
+
101
103
102
104
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
103
105
if (ret < 0)
···
108
108
if (ret < 0)
109
109
goto error;
110
110
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
111
-
sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest);
111
+
sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->m);
112
112
if (ret < 0)
113
113
goto error;
114
-
pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
114
+
pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->m);
115
115
}
116
116
117
117
error:
···
138
138
if (ret)
139
139
return ret;
140
140
141
-
*buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
142
-
*len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
141
+
*buf = sinfo->sig->m;
142
+
*len = sinfo->sig->m_size;
143
143
144
144
i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST,
145
145
sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
+1
-2
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+1
-2
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+1
-1
crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
+1
-1
crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
+4
-6
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+4
-6
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
···
63
63
}
64
64
65
65
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
66
-
sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
66
+
sig->m_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
67
67
68
68
ret = -ENOMEM;
69
-
sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
70
-
if (!sig->digest)
69
+
sig->m = kmalloc(sig->m_size, GFP_KERNEL);
70
+
if (!sig->m)
71
71
goto error;
72
72
73
73
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
···
76
76
77
77
desc->tfm = tfm;
78
78
79
-
ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size,
80
-
sig->digest);
81
-
79
+
ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->m);
82
80
if (ret < 0)
83
81
goto error_2;
84
82
+2
-2
include/crypto/public_key.h
+2
-2
include/crypto/public_key.h
···
43
43
struct public_key_signature {
44
44
struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[3];
45
45
u8 *s; /* Signature */
46
-
u8 *digest;
46
+
u8 *m; /* Message data to pass to verifier */
47
47
u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
48
-
u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
48
+
u32 m_size; /* Number of bytes in ->m */
49
49
const char *pkey_algo;
50
50
const char *hash_algo;
51
51
const char *encoding;
+2
-2
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+2
-2
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c