Linux kernel mirror (for testing)
git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel
os
linux
Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-01-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor regression fixes from John Johansen:
"This fixes a couple bugs I have been working with Matthew Garrett on
this week. Specifically a regression in the handling of a conflicting
profile attachment and label match restrictions for ptrace when
profiles are stacked.
Summary:
- fix ptrace label match when matching stacked labels
- fix regression in profile conflict logic"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-01-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: Fix regression in profile conflict logic
apparmor: fix ptrace label match when matching stacked labels
+40
-25
+5
-4
security/apparmor/domain.c
+5
-4
security/apparmor/domain.c
···
330
330
continue;
331
331
332
332
if (profile->xmatch) {
333
-
if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
334
-
conflict = true;
335
-
continue;
336
-
} else if (profile->xmatch_len > len) {
333
+
if (profile->xmatch_len >= len) {
337
334
unsigned int state;
338
335
u32 perm;
339
336
···
339
342
perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
340
343
/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
341
344
if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
345
+
if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
346
+
conflict = true;
347
+
continue;
348
+
}
342
349
candidate = profile;
343
350
len = profile->xmatch_len;
344
351
conflict = false;
+3
security/apparmor/include/perms.h
+3
security/apparmor/include/perms.h
···
133
133
#define xcheck_labels_profiles(L1, L2, FN, args...) \
134
134
xcheck_ns_labels((L1), (L2), xcheck_ns_profile_label, (FN), args)
135
135
136
+
#define xcheck_labels(L1, L2, P, FN1, FN2) \
137
+
xcheck(fn_for_each((L1), (P), (FN1)), fn_for_each((L2), (P), (FN2)))
138
+
136
139
137
140
void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
138
141
void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
+32
-21
security/apparmor/ipc.c
+32
-21
security/apparmor/ipc.c
···
64
64
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
65
65
}
66
66
67
+
/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
67
68
/* TODO: conditionals */
68
69
static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
69
-
struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
70
-
struct common_audit_data *sa)
70
+
struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
71
+
struct common_audit_data *sa)
71
72
{
72
73
struct aa_perms perms = { };
73
74
74
-
/* need because of peer in cross check */
75
-
if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
76
-
!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
77
-
return 0;
78
-
79
-
aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
80
-
aa_profile_match_label(profile, &peer->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
75
+
aad(sa)->peer = peer;
76
+
aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
81
77
&perms);
82
78
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
83
79
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
84
80
}
85
81
86
-
static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
87
-
struct aa_profile *tracee, u32 request,
88
-
struct common_audit_data *sa)
82
+
static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
83
+
struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
84
+
struct common_audit_data *sa)
89
85
{
86
+
if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
87
+
!PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
88
+
return 0;
89
+
90
+
return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
91
+
}
92
+
93
+
static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
94
+
struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
95
+
struct common_audit_data *sa)
96
+
{
97
+
if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
98
+
return 0;
99
+
90
100
if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
91
-
return xcheck(profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa),
92
-
profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer,
93
-
request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT,
94
-
sa));
95
-
/* policy uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
96
-
if (profile_unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
101
+
return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
102
+
103
+
/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
104
+
if (&tracer->label == tracee)
97
105
return 0;
98
106
99
107
aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
100
-
aad(sa)->peer = &tracee->label;
108
+
aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
101
109
aad(sa)->request = 0;
102
110
aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
103
111
···
123
115
int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
124
116
u32 request)
125
117
{
118
+
struct aa_profile *profile;
119
+
u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
126
120
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
127
121
128
-
return xcheck_labels_profiles(tracer, tracee, cross_ptrace_perm,
129
-
request, &sa);
122
+
return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
123
+
profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
124
+
profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
130
125
}
131
126
132
127